

Excursions in Epichoric History

Greek Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches

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Excursions in Epichoric History: Aiginetan Essays

by Thomas J. Figueira, Rutgers University

On the front cover: A calendar frieze representing the Athenian months, reused in the Byzantine Church of the Little Metropolis in Athens. The cross is superimposed, obliterating Taurus of the Zodiac. The choice of this frieze for books in *Greek Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches* reflects this series' emphasis on the blending of the diverse heritages—Near Eastern, Classical, and Christian—in the Greek tradition. Drawing by Laurie Kain Hart, based on a photograph.

Excursions in Epichoric History

Aiginetan Essays

Thomas J. Figueira

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TO
MARTIN OSTWALD

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Greek Studies: Interdisciplinary Approaches

Foreword

by Gregory Nagy, General Editor

BUILDING on the foundations of scholarship within the disciplines of philology, philosophy, history, and archaeology, this series spans the continuum of Greek traditions extending from the second millennium B.C. to the present, not just the Archaic and Classical periods. The aim is to enhance perspectives by applying various different disciplines to problems that have in the past been treated as the exclusive concern of a single given discipline. Besides the crossing-over of the older disciplines, as in the application of history to literature, this series encourages the application of such newer disciplines as linguistics, sociology, anthropology, and comparative literature. It also encourages encounters with current trends in methodology, especially in the realm of literary theory.

Excursions in Epichoric History: Aiginetan Essays, by Thomas J. Figueira, is a detailed and thorough cross-referenced historical investigation of the island state of Aigina. It is an essential companion volume to the author's earlier book on Aiginetan history, *Aegina: Economy and Society* (Arno Press, 1981/1982). A distinctive feature of Figueira's approach is his emphasis on the local or "epichoric" culture of a city-state that in many respects differed from the culture of the Athenians. One of the great merits of Figueira's work on Aigina is that it resists the practice of many historians who apply primarily Athenian historical models in trying to address complex questions of local cultural identity. His success in isolating and analyzing on their own terms the epichoric features of Aiginetan history leads to a remarkably unified and coherent picture of a city and its traditions, unblurred by the superimposition of "Athenocentric" inferences. Of particular interest is the author's sophisticated analysis of myths and rituals used by the Aiginetans to distinguish the identity of their city from that of others, especially of Athens.

Preface

MY RESEARCH on Aigina has been supported directly by a Fulbright Fellowship to Greece in 1976–1977, an NEH summer grant in 1981, and a fellowship at the Center for Hellenic Studies in Washington DC during 1982–1983. Rutgers University has contributed a series of Faculty Research Grants, which, especially in the early 1980s, helped carry my program of research ahead, and a Rutgers University FASP leave has assisted my final revision. A grant from the Research Council of Rutgers University has greatly aided in defraying the costs of final production. Much of the research contained herein has been conducted at the Alexander Library of Rutgers-New Brunswick, the Firestone Library of Princeton University, and the Humanities/Social Sciences Library of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. I should like to thank the staffs of all these institutions for their cooperation and professionalism.

Once again thanks are owed to my mother Marion Figueira for her assistance with child-rearing, permitting me to devote the time necessary to complete the revision and preparation of this work. Again my wife Sarah George was responsible for the final production, and we both convey our thanks to the Publications Office of the American School of Classical Studies (Princeton, NJ) for access to the typesetting facilities utilized for camera-ready copy. Diane Smith should be credited for producing the tables on pp. 144–45 and 409–18. Gregory Nagy is to be thanked for his encouragement of this project which appears in a series under his editorship; Jonathan Sisk and his staff at Rowman and Littlefield have been helpful at every stage of my collaboration with them.

Readers will find expressions of gratitude scattered throughout the volume in conjunction with the previously published pieces. The author would like to collect the names here of the many who have helped in various ways with the work on Aigina: A. Andrewes, E. Badian, J.B. Barron, L. Beer, G. Bugh, M.W. Chambers, C. Clairmont, W.R. Connor, J.K. Davies, L. Edmunds, H. Evans, A.J. Graham, C. Habicht, M.H. Jameson, C.M. Kraay, D. Lateiner, J. Lenaghan, P. Lockhart, G. Nagy, M. Ostwald, W.K. Pritchett, A.E. Raubitschek, M.B. Wallace, J. Walsh. The previously unpublished articles were aided by the criticisms, comments, and corrections of J.H. Kroll, T.R. Martin, and M.B. Wallace. I trust that the formulaic reminder that any remaining errors are my own will be taken for granted.

This work is dedicated to Martin Ostwald, with appreciation and admiration. I hope he will receive this volume as a small token of gratitude in return for his many years of generosity with his time, for encouragement of my work, and for his steadfast support of me and my family.

Abbreviations

- Aegina* = T.J. Figueira, *Aegina: Economy and Society* (New York 1981/1982)
- AL* = K.O. Müller, *Aegineticorum Liber* (Berlin 1817)
- APF* = J.K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* (Oxford 1971)
- ATL* = B.D. Meritt, H.T. Wade-Gery, & M.F. McGregor, *The Athenian Tribute Lists*, 4 vols. (Princeton 1939–1953)
- Beloch *GG*² = K.J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*² (Berlin 1912–1927)
- Busolt *GG*² = G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte bis zur Schlacht bei Chaironeia*² (Gotha 1893–1904)
- Busolt-Swoboda, *GS* = G. Busolt & H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*, 2 vols. (Munich 1920–1926)
- CAG* = *Commentaria in Aristotelem graeca* (Berlin 1882–1909)
- CAH* = *The Cambridge Ancient History* (¹ = Cambridge 1928–1939; ^{2/3} = Cambridge 1970–)
- Classen-Steup = J. Classen (rev. J. Steup), *Thukydides*⁵ (Berlin 1914–1922)
- Colonization* = T.J. Figueira, *Athens and Aigina in the Age of Imperial Colonization* (Baltimore 1991)
- CPG* = E.L. von Leutsch & F.G. Schneidewin, *Corpus Pseudoepigraphorum Graecorum*, 2 vols. (Göttingen 1839–1851)
- DAA* = A.E. Raubitschek, *Dedications from the Athenian Acropolis* (Cambridge, MA 1949)
- FGH* = F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* (Leiden 1923–1958)
- FHG* = K. Müller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum* (Paris 1841–1883)
- GGM* = C. Müller, *Geographi Graeci Minores* (Paris 1882)
- HCT* = A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, & K.J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, 5 vols. (Oxford 1945–1981)
- IG* = *Inscriptiones graecae* (Berlin 1873–)
- Jeffery, *Archaic Greece* = L.H. Jeffery, *Archaic Greece: The City-States c. 700–500 B.C.* (New York 1976)
- LSAG* = L.H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece* (Oxford 1961), rev. A.W. Johnston 1990
- Meiggs-Lewis = R. Meiggs & D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford 1969), rev. 1988
- PA* = J. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica* (Berlin 1901–1903)
- Poppo-Stahl = E.F. Poppo (rev. J.M. Stahl), *Thucydides: De bello Peloponnesiaco, Libri Octo*^{2/3} (Leipzig 1875–1888)
- PMG* = D. Page, *Poetae Melici Graeci* (Oxford 1962)

Abbreviations

RE = Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart 1894–1972)

SVA = *Die Staatsverträge des Altertums*. Vol. 2 = H. Bengtson, *Die Verträge der griechisch-romischen Welt von 700 bis 338 v. Chr.* (Munich & Berlin 1962); Vol. 3 = H.H. Schmitt, *Staatsverträge von 338 bis 200 v. Chr.* (Munich & Berlin 1969)

Theognis = T.J. Figueira & G. Nagy (eds.), *Theognis of Megara* (Baltimore 1985)

Tod, *GHI* = M.N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, 2 vols. (Oxford 1933–1948)

Welter, *Aigina* = G. Welter, *Aigina* (Berlin 1938)

Welter, *Aigina*² = *Aigina*² (Athens 1962)

N.b.: Corpora of inscriptions are cited after *SEG* (*Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum*). As a general rule, English-language journals are cited after the style of the *Transactions of the American Philological Association*; foreign journals after *L'année philologique*.

Introduction: Aigina and Epichoric History

I. EPICHORIC HISTORY

I have chosen the denomination epichoric history in order to qualify the political history of archaic Greek city-states other than Athens or Sparta. By this term, I hope to engender in the reader an appreciation analogous to that experienced about the evolution of epichoric scripts (before the emergence of culture-wide styles of writing) and a sensitivity parallel to that underlying the reception either of epichoric variants of myth or of poetic traditions that may be considered local when they are juxtaposed with comparative examples which are panhellenic in distribution and audience.¹ Such terminology frankly recognizes the degree to which we are perforce Athenocentric or Laconocentric in our appreciation of ancient Greek political history (after the beginning of the archaic period, c. 750). Yet, by my title, I intend to emphasize the autonomy of the political experience of the Aiginetans and of others who remained vital actors in interstate relations even after the dominance of the large international alliances during the fifth century. The Aiginetans are a particularly salient example among these states insofar as they tried to stand aloof for so long (in my view) from the opposing blocs that polarized Greece during the Pentekontaeteia. The record of their enmity toward the Athenians helps to illustrate not only the tenacity of *polis* (or "political") independence and local patriotism, but also the role that politicization and ideologization played in the conversion of Greek international politics into a struggle for panhellenic supremacy, which inevitably became a game with a much reduced cast of players.

It should become clear that the opportunities for the reconstruction of the history of individual city-states other than well-attested Athens and Sparta have in some instances reached a new threshold. The patient collection of evidence over the previous 150 years has led to sizeable increases in the raw material for scholarship. Much grueling work in compilation of the relevant dossiers of data has been done. Moreover, techniques for primary examination of this material in epigraphy, papyrology, textual studies, numismatics, topography, and site archaeology have matured. Finally, sociology, anthropology, and economics can enrich the insights of ancient historians, along with providing many valuable points of comparison. Here quantification has also opened new perspectives for interpretation, as it has promoted or rendered untenable (on evidentiary or comparative grounds) various hypotheses, which were expressed previously only in anecdotal or impressionistic terms.

¹ Regarding the latter, my thinking has been clarified by the work of G. Nagy, as typified by his book *Best of the Achaeans: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek Poetry* (Baltimore 1979).

Such research must strike a delicate balance between a respect for the independent value of its conclusions about these city-states, and a recognition that its progress establishes vantage points for a rethinking of archaic and classical Greek history in general terms. Indeed, the lines of sight from these points not only open vistas on the individual history of city-states like Aigina, but also transform our perspectives on old questions and challenge former hypotheses, now revealed as parochial through a concentration on Athens, on Sparta, and on the struggle for hegemony. Thus, there will (I trust) be more here than merely efforts—worthwhile as far as they go—at reconstructing a political history of Aigina, especially in their subversion from time to time of the received views on certain notorious *crucis* in the mainstream of Greek historical studies. Finally, we may be surprised to discern whispers of different ancient voices than those to which we are accustomed. They may be sensed when we discover Aiginetan informants of Herodotus attempting to shape his monumental work, or when we glimpse the aspirations of Pindar's Aiginetan patrons, or when we suspect an Aiginetan grounding for the strange story of the fate of the statesman Draco. There may be no small value in finding new pseudo-histories or false images to confound.

II. THE RESEARCH PROJECT IN AIGINETAN HISTORY

This research on Aiginetan history had its serendipitous origin in my participation in two seminars led by Michael Jameson at the University of Pennsylvania during 1974–1975 on “Dark Age and Archaic Greece” and on the “Athenian Empire”. For the latter, I should recall being assigned a paper on the question whether the Aiginetans had participated in the Peloponnesian League or the Delian League (an antecessor of chapter 4). There had been a tendency in dealing with that question—as with so many other issues during the deterministic intellectual climate of the 1950s and 1960s—to be influenced by what were felt to be the driving conditions of economic activity. Thoroughly sceptical of that sort of argument to start, I was immediately struck with the absence of attempts to describe in independent terms the economic life of city-states other than Athens. Athens was the norm, or, better, the most progressive or advanced *polis*, in comparison to which others might be judged more or less evolved. Thus, Aiginetan foreign policy led me to Aiginetan social institutions and to that central matter in the previous literature, namely the centrality of Aiginetan commerce in the social and political history of the island and the participation in trade of its elite.

Aiginetan social history was marked by a number of striking qualities that begged for exploration: early and numerous coins, prominent slave holding, a reputation for piracy, a large and powerful fleet, and evidence for trading from peddling right through to bulk trade in grain. As I made my own discovery of the earlier scholarship on the island in the works of Welter, Winterscheidt, Harland, and Müller, I realized that ancient historians tended to underestimate the amount of evidence that had already been collected and was

currently available. Thereupon, once again, chance intervened in the form of an illness, which militated against my original dissertation topic, "The Athenian Cleruchy", in favor of my continuing work on Aigina, on which I had already lavished more time than was justified for two papers, and about which I had already collected many of the testimonia and much scholarship.² In *Aegina and Athens in the Archaic and Classical Periods: A Socio-Political Investigation*, I had assayed a task that was in size and complexity beyond the scope of a single dissertation. In retrospect, I suppose that neither I nor those advising me could as yet quite shake off the influence of the meager record of recent scholarship on Aigina. It was hard to appreciate fully that the handful of articles in English over the last generation did not do justice to the wealth of available raw material. The result was a dissertation which was necessarily more far-ranging than I should have preferred and rather selective in the topics with which it dealt in depth.

The guiding principle of the dissertation and the book derived from it, *Aegina: Economy and Society*, was that any scrupulous reconstruction of the society of an archaic or classical *polis* other than Athens and Sparta had to try to establish an autonomous paradigm. For Aigina, that meant demonstrating how social institutions evolved differently from Athenian analogues by virtue of a disparate ecology, human resources, and cultural tools. Not only does that procedure hold the promise of enriching our understanding of life in Greece of the city-states by establishing alternative lines of institutional evolution to those evidenced by Athens and Sparta, but it also allows us to specify the ramifications of foregone paths of institutional developments in the two later panhellenic superpowers. Concomitantly, these divergences in the progress of economic differentiation and in societal integration turn out not to have been determined by underlying material conditions, but to have been constrained by the stock of resources (material and cultural) which were held by an emerging Dark Age community. The political rivalry between Aiginetans and Athenians added particular drama to the uncovering of patterns of social development inasmuch as the successful creation(s) of institutions and social processes had a direct impact on the ability of each people to withstand the hostility of their neighbors.

As I believe the discussions below will illustrate, the Aiginetans were the most consistently significant of Athens' regional adversaries. Their island was ideally situated to dominate those sailing in the Saronic Gulf. That threat was accentuated when the Athenians began to concentrate their maritime activities on the Peiraieus, for which Aigina was the eyesore (as the memorable phrase of Perikles would have it). Aigina was necessarily excluded (economically and socially) from those city-states ordered by aristocratic/agrarian (e.g. Argos), aristocratic/colonial (Corinth), hoplite/agrarian (e.g., later Argos, Sparta,

² It is an irony that Aiginetan studies led me back to the institution of the cleruchy, with the transformed viewpoints that were exploited in my *Colonization*.

and eventually Athens) evaluative and moral systems. Hence a more opportunistic, entrepreneurial, and pragmatic approach to seafaring came to predominate among the Aiginetans, in which Ionian trade patterns were adapted for a mainland Greek context. Aigina became wealthier and more oriented toward the sea than Athens, which, coupled with the Aiginetan experience in piratical activities, made the island a formidable opponent. The energy with which the Athenians upheld their interests against the Boiotians and Chalcidians provoked Aiginetan intervention, leading to nearly a half century (after c. 506) of intermittent clashes.

During this period, the majority of the Athenians keenly felt that they had suffered injustice at Aiginetan hands, and gaining the means for the redress of those grievances was an important factor in the development of Athenian military power. It is indeed not so very much of an overstatement to say that Athenian imperialism cut its teeth on Aigina.³ The Athenians first attempted an incorporation of Aigina through mythology and cult, similar to the efforts used by post-Peisistratid Athens to reconcile and assimilate the borderlands of Attica. Next, the Athenians added to these justifications for their designs on Aigina ideological claims to the island through their intervention on behalf of the Aiginetan *dāmos*. On the level of practical military organization, the inability of the Athenian fleet to overcome the Aiginetans prompted the naval law of Themistokles, with its far-reaching ramifications both on account of the ensuing existence of the ships necessary to repel Xerxes and for a shift toward the Athenian *dēmos* within the balance of political influence exercised by different social groups. When the eventual Athenian triumph over the Aiginetans was consummated, Athenian naval superiority in the Aegean was established on a footing so solid that only the grossest imprudences of the democracy of the period of the Peloponnesian War could subvert.

Small size, both in population and territory, typified *polis*-society and made it likely that political boundaries would transect populations which were becoming interrelated by the transfers of goods (as disparate as exotic luxuries, mundane products, human beings in the form of slaves, or poetry). For most *poleis*, autarky was impossible, despite the popularity from the fourth century of philosophical constructs that suggested otherwise. Thus there is evidence for continuing economic interaction between Aiginetans and Athenians even during their years of military confrontation. Although the reforms of Solon and

³ The relations of the Aiginetans with other powers such as Samos, Corinth, Argos, and Sparta will also frequently occupy our attention in the discussions to follow. Naturally, these states happen to be attested in our sources primarily in connection with the Aiginetan conflict with Athens. This is not merely, however, a trick of the survival of Athenocentric testimonia. As soon as Athens achieved even a regional importance—a threshold reached both in the war with Megara over Salamis (see *Theognis* 278–85) and in participation in the First Sacred War (Plut. *Solon* 11.1–2; see pp. 85–86 below)—it was bound to become a central preoccupation of Aiginetan policy. In contrast, a considerable portion of Corinthian interest and influence was projected in the opposite direction from Aigina, namely over the waters of the Corinthian Gulf to the west.

the outbreak of the "Heraldless War" were significantly disruptive of the pre-existing commercial conditions, the rapport between the two peoples appears afterwards to have achieved an equilibrium. Even Athenian imperialists seem to have sensed an impetus toward an intermeshing of the two states when they sought to dominate a "domesticated" Aigina. Moreover, those Athenian leaders who sought rapprochement between the two cities are themselves a testimony to the ties existing on the level of individuals. Although the attitudes about policy of Aiginetan leaders are far more difficult to assess, their intention seems to have been to encourage the political ascendancy in Attica of those who were convinced that the political and military costs of dominating Aigina would not offset the strategic advantages; in other words a leadership without aspirations toward a regional hegemony in central Greece.

Much of what I have just expounded was present in my dissertation in embryonic or even in implicit terms. Chronologically, where I next took the work on Aigina in 1977 was conditioned by the state of the profession in the late 1970s, a situation which is worth noting not only for an appreciation of the scholarship below, but also for what it can tell us about the present state of higher education and of the classical humanities in particular. At that time, the circumstances of employment were dominated by the stabilizing of college enrolments because of the peaking of the "baby boom" and the ending of the Vietnam War. Although institutions of higher learning had been avidly hiring all the qualified staff available just a few years before, too many able candidates were now seeking a constricting pool of positions. Graduate programs had been training Ph.D.'s as though a few years filled with job offers were to be the norm forever after. The temptations to cut corners in intellectual preparation and self-defeatingly to cast everyone and every inquiry in hyperbolic rhetoric were ever at hand. For those who found employment, colleagues who had never been subjected to the rigors of academic probation before tenure were waiting to render judgment in a peer review no longer worthy of that qualification.

The senior professoriate in the humanities faced a prospect which no other generation of scholars had ever encountered before: the intergenerational transfer of prestige, authority, and leadership, that heretofore inevitable concomitant and symbol of aging and even of mortality itself, need never take place. Educational turmoil during the late 1960s had damaged traditional modes of training and had subverted expectations of performance. Victims of arrested development who were hired in the boom years jostled harried junior colleagues, sometimes ill prepared, often ill used, chosen through inadvertence and hence interchangeable. Under the cloak of the laudatory intention to include more women in academe, the sword of intergenerational envy was unsheathed against potential male successors. Many succumbed to this temptation, many did not: even now we lack the distance in history required to compile the rolls of honor and of shame. And the real value of academic salaries

fell between 20% and 25%. Dismayingly, the ladders of academic upward mobility that were kicked down in our faces were the same ladders onto the first rungs of which the female, minority, newly American, and upwardly mobile students whose participation is indispensable for the viability of the whole discipline of ancient studies could have been helped.

My own experience at Rutgers University was not atypical—a heavy teaching load and programmatic *anomia* coupled with irrational demands to publish—Rutgers being God’s way of telling you that you need more publications. I needed to have a book out before I was evaluated for reappointment, after only two and a half years of service. In that context, the Arno series drawing from recent dissertations, the general editor of which was W.R. Connor, seemed to be a useful opportunity. Obviously, a university press would have been preferable, even if the New York Times, Arno’s parent company, had kept all its promises about press runs, advertising, promotion, and mailing review copies. A university press, however, meant waiting until *after* revision for acceptance, while the series with Arno offered acceptance with a subsequent chance to revise. When one is sitting in an academic department which is running on a three–five year cycle (negative external review—cut underhand deal with administrators for immunity—blame assistant professors for bad review—fire assistant professors—hire new assistant professors to redress problems—repeat process until safely into retirement), the conceivable delays and mistakes attendant on waiting for review by a university press made that alternative non-viable. Despite the failure of the New York Times to promote the book in accordance with prior arrangements, the first half of the dissertation was revised and expanded (doubling in size) and appeared to a favorable reception, if to few reviews. Therefore, I was able to beat the system.

It had been my initial intention to publish the second half of the dissertation in revised form at the same time. Several factors militated against implementing that plan. There had been that considerable expansion of the first part and, additionally, it was becoming clear that all was not well at Arno. Moreover, the second part in revised form read—the comments of Bob Connor who was kind enough to look over the revisions were helpful in understanding this point—as much too speculative a mediation of evidence. Aiginetan political history was lacking a previous chronological framework and a basis in historiographical consideration of the sources. I also found myself in disagreement with a surprisingly large number of the conclusions of recent scholarship. Material later than the temporal context covered in the dissertation, the classical period down to 431, offered supporting data too valuable to be ignored. Much reworking of Athenian history from an Aiginetan perspective appeared necessary to lay bare Aigina’s story. Hence, in order to avoid the shoals of idiosyncrasy, I embarked upon the series of studies which are included in this volume.

I have chosen this form for collecting my work on Aiginetan political history out of a belief that the research in detail which was needed to justify my broader conclusions deserves to be read together, so as to force an evaluation of

the thesis that epichoric history compels a reconsideration of mainstream, Athenocentric, or panhellenic Greek history. I have attempted to unify my treatments of separate issues and periods through various devices. A copious use of cross-references has been made. An ample subject index and an index locorum have been provided. A chronological table organizes the important events in Aiginetan history with references to the relevant discussion in this volume, in *Aegina*, and in *Colonization*. In a "Conclusion" to this work I have attempted to achieve two results which belonged in simpler terms to the superseded second part of my dissertation, which were conversely inappropriate to the articles and contributions as originally published. I have tried both to systemize the leitmotifs of Aiginetan political history and to say something about the interaction of economic life and politics in the history of the island.

Although this work will be read in the 1990s, almost all the research for this volume was done in the 1970s and 1980s, with intermissions to work on other projects. One segment of my research grew to transcend the compass of a single article (however generous), namely my reconstruction of the Athenian colony on Aigina after 431. That discussion, along with a treatment of its background in the vicissitudes of subject Aigina in the period after c. 456, comprises a large part of Part I of my *Colonization*. While it is investigated to a certain extent in the pages below, another distinct political *démarche*, the Athenian decision c. 506 to found a cult of the Aiginetan hero Aiakos, is treated in my monograph *Aiakos: Myth and Cult*, which will follow this publication by (it is hoped) no great lapse of time.

III. THE ORGANIZATION OF THE VOLUME

The essays composing this work are divided between those based on previously published articles and contributions and what is published here for the first time. Chapters 1–2, 4–7, 10–12 began as articles that appeared in journals between 1981 and 1990, and their basic structure has been preserved, with the order of arguments and enumeration of sub-sections in the same form as first published. The numbering of footnotes has been retained with a few new notes added, e.g., 28a following 28. The left-hand running heads of these chapters will remind the reader of their original place of publication and also contain a citation of the pages of the journal from which the chapter is derived. Moreover, the symbol "|" has been used to mark the original page-breaks. Thus, it should be readily possible to find the revised discussion in this volume of any material to which the citation in the initial version is known.

The format of these chapters for citation of ancient sources and modern scholarship has been harmonized as much as possible, and, for ease of reference, I have used abbreviations, a list of which appears with the front matter of the volume. The bibliography will be of utility on scholarly works which are prominent in single chapters as well as collecting much of the material on Aiginetan history. I have tried to correct minor mistakes in citation, orthography, and typology, and have also attempted to make stylistic improvements

where they occurred to me without burdening this work with needless (and self-indulgent) *apparatus neo-criticus*. My original editors were extraordinarily generous with the space which they granted me, but necessarily references to the scholarship of others and additional, usually illustrative, citations of ancient authorities were sometimes trimmed where constraints of space affected the initial publications. Such material has been added without notation when it lay to hand in my files. More recent scholarship and works that were missed have also been introduced into the argument. In order to avoid "back-to-the-future" confusion over the sequence of analysis or over derivation of insights, square brackets have been employed ([/]).

Naturally, there have been places where my original discussion seemed incorrect or deficient in light of further work of my own and of others or simply displeasing on my own rereading. The cases of more thoroughly revised sections are marked with <<|>> in order to obviate confusion for those who may have consulted the original versions. Where there have been additional arguments which adduce points or evidence new to the analyses in particular contexts, square brackets ([/]) have once again been used. Endnotes and Appendixes, wherever they appear, contain new material.

Chapters 9 and 13 have previously appeared in abbreviated form, respectively in a volume in honor of Martin Ostwald and in a memorial issue of the *Ancient World* which was dedicated to the memory of Fordyce Mitchel. While the general contours of my treatment in each case have been preserved, no effort has been made to maintain the general organization of these two pieces or the order of their footnotes. I had curtailed the scope of my discussion originally in order to accommodate the format of the volumes in question and have supplemented or have restored a full treatment here.

The remainder of this work, chapters 3, 8, and 14 appear here for the first time. In the interests of readability, I have endeavored to take full advantage of the material which is presented elsewhere in this work so as to avoid duplicating discussion.

Aiginetan Independence

IN THE COURSE of the explanation by Herodotus of the causes for the ἔχθρη παλαιή 'ancient hatred' between Athens and Aigina (5.82–88), we learn that the Aiginetans had once been under the hegemony of Epidaurus, and were compelled to conduct their legal affairs in that city (5.83.1). Aigina, acquiring naval power, won independence from Epidaurus, and in raiding her territory, stole statues of the goddesses Damia and Auxesia. The story is set in an unspecified, but very distant, past. Herodotus could not synchronize the incident with another event, nor separate it from a point of reference by a generational calculation, his usual chronological methods. Therefore, there is no reason to think that Herodotus had an explicit or implicit date for Aiginetan independence. Nonetheless, my discussion here shall be confined to the historical context for a single set of problems, those concerning Aiginetan independence from Epidaurus. Herodotus' account is filled with polemical and aetiological material, about some of which Herodotus himself expressed reservation or disbelief (5.82.2; 5.86.2, 3). Elsewhere I examine the constituent elements of the Damia and Auxesia incident, with the conclusion that the apparent agreement of Epidaurians, Aiginetans, and Athenians on the connection of the cult of Damia and Auxesia with Attica suggests that this link was historical.¹ Moreover, I find that the judicial character of Aiginetan subjection to Epidaurus is striking in light of the emphasis on *dikē* and *xenia* in Pindar's fifth-century *epinicia* dedicated to Aiginetans. Nothing, however, in that analysis undermines the historicity of Aiginetan subjection to Epidaurus, of Aigina's violent break with that city, and of subsequent Aiginetan hostility toward Epidaurus. After all, none of Herodotus' informants, who were of various civic affiliations, seem to have challenged this point. We shall see that the other available evidence supports Herodotus both on Aiginetan independence from Epidaurus (as far as his account goes) and on the two other important data concerning political history reported in his account, namely that independence was followed by friendship with Argos and enmity toward Athens. Our discussion must necessarily be far-ranging, since the significance of Aiginetan independence can only be evaluated against the background of the regional balance of power in the northeast Peloponnesus.

The beginning of Aiginetan coinage provides a *terminus ante quem* for Aiginetan independence. To have struck coins at so early a date (and one tradition tells us that Aigina was the first state to coin silver), at a time when Epidaurus did not mint, should be taken as a sign of political independence.

1. See pp. 50–53, 56 below; cf., e.g., T.J. Dunbabin, "Ἐχθρη παλαιή," *BSA* 37 (1936–1937) 83–91.

Unfortunately, the literary evidence on the beginnings of Aiginetan coinage, which stresses the role of Pheidon of Argos as the innovator of coinage, is worthless from a chronological standpoint (Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 176 with F 115; cf. Hdt. 6.127.3. See below ns. 11, 12, p. 89). With the literary evidence may be compared that of the earliest hoards, which date from the end of the sixth century. Thus, it is necessary to estimate the period of time by which the earliest coins preceded the coins contemporary with the first hoards. This process, advancing often through aesthetic arguments which establish the analogues or points of contrast between very early and later Aiginetan coins, or between Aiginetan silver and still earlier Ionian electrum, cannot gain certain results. The consensus, however, of recent scholarship suggests a date for the inauguration of Aiginetan coinage between 580 and 550.²

Herodotus links Aiginetan independence with a growth in the island's naval power. Since Aigina was so small, in comparison with mainland states and the larger Aegean islands, any increase in its economic and political power could only be fueled by commerce.³ It is reasonable to assume that as the Aiginetans became more active as maritime merchants, the number of their ships with a potential for combat increased. Long-distance carrying trade, in which the Aiginetans excelled (to be contrasted with the colonial commerce of, for example, Corinth), was pioneered by the Ionians c. 650. The Aiginetans appear to have imitated Ionian commercial patterns as much as a generation thereafter.⁴ A significant correlation is at hand, inasmuch as the growth of Aiginetan trade is inseparable from an involvement at Naukratis. Aigina, Samos, and Miletos were the only three states to possess their own sanctuaries at Naukratis, which argues for an especially intense involvement on the site.⁵ The Aiginetan sanctuary of Zeus has not been discovered. Yet, there was little significant construction there before the reign of Amasis (570–26). While the implication that Amasis founded Naukratis cannot be accepted, it is, nevertheless, probable that Amasis' reign did see a concentration of the Greek population and commerce in Egypt at this site.⁶ Naukratis' beginnings as a Greek settlement seem to lie in the period 610–595, while Greek finds in Egypt begin to appear in numbers 15–20 years earlier. Therefore, the beginnings of Egyptian trade may lie in 635, the foundation of Naukratis no earlier than 610, and the official concentration of the trade there c. 570, when Amasis came to

2. On Pheidon and Aiginetan coinage, see W.L. Brown, "Pheidon's Alleged Aeginetan Coinage," *NC* 10 (1950) 177–204; Figueira *Aegina* 65–80. On the inception of Aiginetan coinage, see *Aegina* 88–97 with R.R. Holloway, "An Archaic Hoard from Crete and The Early Aeginetan Coinage," *ANSMN* 17 (1971) 1–21; M. Price & N. Waggoner, *Archaic Greek Silver Coinage: The Asyut Hoard* (London 1975) 68–76; C.M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1976) 42–43.

3. See Figueira *Aegina* 23–43, for agricultural output and population.

4. Figueira *Aegina passim*, esp. 166–202, 230–51, 326–32.

5. Hdt. 2.178.1–3 with Figueira *Aegina* 261–64; cf. C. Roebuck, "The Organization of Naukratis," *CP* 46 (1951) 212–20.

6. In general, see J. Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas*³ (London 1980) 118–33.

power.⁷ In sum, the indications provided by Aiginetan commerce and coinage point toward a late seventh- or an early sixth-century date for the establishment of the economic vitality of the island. Aiginetan independence is to be associated with the growth of Aiginetan commerce and naval power in this same period.

EPIDAUROS AND ITS NEIGHBORS

In the politics of archaic Epidauros, the tyrant Prokles was the most important figure. During the late seventh century he took power, perhaps at the expense of a narrow oligarchy, whose council was called the *artunoi* 'directors'. Prokles is known chiefly because Periander of Corinth married his daughter Melissa.⁸ Periander was a mature man, already middle-aged in the chronographic tradition, when he succeeded his father (c. 628), and his sons by Melissa were not yet grown men in the first part of their father's reign. If Periander married at the customary age of c. 30, then he married late in his father's reign (c. 638), and his confrontation with Prokles took place not far into his own reign when his sons and Prokles' grandsons were adolescents (after c. 619).⁹ A union between the heir apparent to the tyranny at Corinth and the daughter of the tyrant of nearby Epidauros probably had a dynastic character. There is no evidence that Prokles had any other offspring.

Epidauros is strongly associated with Argos in our sources. Epidauros was a part of the Temenid inheritance, the Argive share of the Peloponnesus.

7. M.M. Austin, *Greece and Egypt in the Archaic Age*, PCPS Suppl. 2 (1970) 22–24; F.W. von Bissing, "Naukratis," *Bulletin de la Société Royale d'Archéologie d'Alexandrie* 39 (1951) 33–82.

8. Prokles and Melissa: Hdt. 3.50–52, 5.92η.1–4; Paus. 2.28.8; DL 1.94; Pythainetos *FGH* 299 F 3 (Athen. 13.589F); Plut. *Mor.* 403C–E. See H. Schaefer, "Prokles," *RE* 23.1, #3, cols. 176–77. The *artunoi*: Plut. *Mor.* 291D–E. The *artunoi* were the pre-Proklian government, as they are associated with the *konipodes*, a class of rural serfs (cf. Hesych. s.v. *κονίποδες*, κ 3517–18 Latte), unknown in classical Epidauros, and perhaps liberated by Prokles.

9. Kypselos ruled 30 years (Hdt. 5.92ζ.1; Nic. Dam. *FGH* 90 F 57.8; Aris. *Pol.* 1315b24–25); Periander for 40½ years (Aris. *Pol.* 1315b26–27, an emendation to give the sum in Aristotle for the Kypselid dynasty; cf. Sosikrates fr. 14, *FGH* 4.502); or for 40 years (DL 1.98). Periander's successor, Psammetikhos, ruled for 3 years, and the whole dynasty was in power for 73½ years (Aris. *Pol.* 1315b22–24, 26). Kypselos' accession date: 657/6 (DS 7 fr. 9.3); 658/7 (Euseb. *Chron. Arm.* p. 185 [Karst]; cf. F. Schachermeyr, "Periandros," *RE* 19.1, cols. 704–17, esp. 711–13). Periander's acme and accession: 628/7 (DL 1.98); 629/8 (Euseb. *Chron. Arm.* p. 185 [Karst]). End of the tyranny (or death of Periander): 589/8 (Hier. *Chron.* 100b [Helm]); 587/6 (Euseb. *Chron. Arm.* p. 187 [Karst]); 585/4 (Sosikrates *apud* DL 1.95). Another datum bearing on Kypselid chronology may also be introduced: the death of Melissa is made by Herodotus to follow an initial period of mild rule by Periander. The traditional chronology for the Kypselids has been rejected in favor of one lower by approximately 40 years (Beloch *GG*² 1.2.274–84; E. Will, *Korinthiaka* [Paris 1955] 363–440). Let it suffice to note that the archaeological arguments (e.g., on the date for the inception of Corinthian coinage) in its support have become counter-indicative with further work. The literary support for the lower dating (Hdt. 3.48.1, 5.94–95, 6.128.2) is open to an interpretation consistent with the higher dating. See J. Ducat, "Note sur la chronologie des Kypselides," *BCH* 85 (1961) 418–25; J. Servais, "Hérodote et la chronologie des Cypselides," *AC* 38 (1969) 28–81; A.M. Cirio, "Due iscrizioni del Sigeo e la cronologia dei poeti eolici," *Boll. Class.*³ 1 (1980) 108–12.

Its Dorian settlers were held to have been Argives. Possibly, Epidauros belonged to the cult league of Apollo Pythaeus, by which Argos expressed her hegemony over her immediate neighbors.¹⁰ As late as the Peloponnesian War, the Argives considered that the Epidaurians were bound to observe, by the tendering of a sacrifice, the sanctity of certain lands which the Argives held sacred to Apollo Pythaeus. The residual authority of the cult league can be seen in the Argive pretext for a war with Epidauros for failing to make this sacrifice.¹¹ A very different picture of the relations between Argos and Epidauros emerges from Herodotus 5.82–88. Here, the Argives are sympathetic to the Aiginetans, rebels from Epidauros, who are engaged in aggression against that city. If the situation portrayed in Herodotus is after the accession of Prokles, it (along with the marriage of Periander and Melissa) shows that the fall of the *artunoi*, probably linked by ties of family and cult to Argos, paralleled a reorientation of affiliation from Argos toward Corinth.

Mythology concerning the occupation of the Peloponnesus by the Dorians, under the guidance of the Heraklids, had as its chief beneficiaries the hereditary kings of Argos and Sparta, and the traditional aristocracies of other cities where Dorian Greek was spoken (e.g., the Bakkhiads), that alike claimed descent from Herakles. Whether we assign the early tyrants of the northern Peloponnesus ethnic, economic, nationalistic, or power-political motivations (all have been suggested), there is little doubt that they consolidated their power at the expense of hereditary aristocracies. Although Pheidon of Argos may have exhibited certain traits that were to be associated with the later tyrants, Argos (as its rival, Sparta), remained the odd man out among its neighbors (cf. *Aris. Pol.* 1310b25–28). In Argos, the monarchy (perhaps reorganized by Pheidon) hung on to power for a time, and relinquished it eventually to an oligarchy rather than to a (non-royal) tyrant.

To explain the career of Prokles, the foreign alignments of Sikyon and Corinth may be introduced for comparison. The prominence of the cult of Adrastos at Sikyon indicates that the aristocracy overthrown by Orthagoras (the first tyrant) placed emphasis on, at least, mythological connections with Argos.¹² The Sikyonian stance toward Messenia is consonant with this interpretation of Sikyon's relationship to Argos. Sikyon helped the Messenians in early fighting with Sparta, and received their fugitives after Sparta's victory (Paus. 4.11.1; 4.14.1). In seventh-century warfare of the Messenians against Sparta, the Sikyonians are again found on the Messenian side (Paus. 4.15.7).

10. Settlement of Epidauros and Temenid inheritance: Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 115; Strabo 8.6.10 C372 (cf. *Il.* 2.559–64); Paus. 2.26.1–2 (cf. 2.28.3–7, 2.38.1–2); Apollo Pythaeus: Paus. 2.36.5; cf. 2.35.2. See K.O. Muller, *Die Dorier* (Breslau 1844) 1.154–55. See also W.S. Barrett, "Bacchylides, Asine, and Apollo Pythaeus," *Hermes* 82 (1954) 421–44, esp. 438–42. Cf. Hdt. 6.92.1–2.

11. Thuc. 5.53, cf. DS 12.78.1, where *τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις* is a slip; see *HCT* 4.71–73.

12. Hdt. 5.67–68, cf. Paus. 2.6.6. Other Argive associations in Sikyonian myth: Hom. *Il.* 2.572, cf. 23.299; Paus. 2.6.7–7.1; Ibycus fr. 1a.40–45. See E. Will, *Doriens et Ioniens* (Paris 1956) 39–44. [On the Argive connections of Sikyon in myth, see A. Griffin, *Sikyon* (Oxford 1982) 36–39, 57–58 (the role of Ibycus).]

Accordingly, Phalanthos, the Spartan oecist of Taras, founded in 706, had originally intended to found a colony between Sikyon and Corinth (DS 8.21.3). As this establishment would have been to the disadvantage of the Sikyonians, Delphi, which is seen to have been solicitous to the Sikyonian aristocracy (Hdt. 5.67.2), diverted the project. In the fifth century, when Sikyon was an ally of Sparta, Argos still claimed authority over that city in a manner similar to claims concerning Epidauros. The Sikyonians were fined by Argos for complicity in the Spartan invasion which eventuated in the disastrous Argive defeat at Sepeia, and agreed to a compromise payment to Argos (Hdt. 6.92.1–2).

When Kleisthenes, strongest of the Sikyonian tyrants (mid-590s to mid-/late 560s?), degraded the cult of Adrastus and created a new tribal system (which would have acted against the prerogatives of the traditional aristocracy), he was at war with Argos (Hdt. 5.67.1). There is also an early usurpation of rights at Kleonai, and with it, at Nemea, to be considered (Plut. *Mor.* 553A–B), where the Orthagorids may thereby have been encroaching on the Argive sphere of influence (*n.b.*, the significant hostility of Delphi to the Sikyonian tyrant).¹³ Orneai was also under threat from Sikyon sometime in this period (Paus. 10.18.5; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 401D). The Nemean Games (founded c. 573), with their connection with Adrastus, advertized their Argive sympathies, and, given Kleisthenes' behavior toward that hero, represent Argive countermeasures toward Orthagorid aggression. The pattern which emerges is that the development of tyranny at Corinth, Sikyon, and Epidauros meant a lessening of the influence of the Argives, more conservative in their internal politics. Argive influence had made a heavy impression on the cities' ruling aristocracies. The tyrants, insofar as they sought personal power by strengthening the power of their cities, must perforce have been anti-Argive.

13. Eventual Argive control of Nemean Games (573): Euseb. *Chron. Arm.* p. 187 [Karst]; Hier. *Chron.* 101b [Helm]; cf. Pin. *Nem.* 4.17, 10.42; *ENem.* Hypoth. c–d. See M.F. McGregor, "Cleisthenes of Sicyon and the Panhellenic Festivals," *TAPA* 72 (1941) 266–87; also C.H. Skalet, *Ancient Sicyon* (Baltimore 1928) 57–60; [also Griffin *Sikyon* 43–47 (chronology), 51 (Nemea)]. Cf. J.B. Bury, *Nemean Odes of Pindar* (London 1890) 250–52. Note the appearance of an Aristis of Kleonai, son of Pheidon, in an inscription at Nemea from c. 560 (Meiggs-Lewis 9). Aristis may have been a descendant of Pheidon, in exile at Kleonai, after the fall of the Argive royal house, and a relative of the Leokedes, whom Herodotus calls (almost certainly incorrectly) a son of Pheidon and a suitor of Agariste (6.127.3). An Argive suitor of Kleisthenes' daughter is otherwise inexplicable, given his anti-Argive tendencies, and so is explained by positing two men named Leokedes with the earlier a son of Pheidon and predecessor of Meltas. Leokedes (II), the suitor, was, like Aristis, in exile, and so at odds with the Argive government (see n. 22 below). Unlike Corinth and Epidauros, Sikyon and Corinth did not draw closer in fear of Argos. Thrasyboulos' raid on Sikyon (see n. 45 below) may show Corinthian hostility. Later Isodemos the brother of Kleisthenes could be accused with plausibility of conspiring with the Kypselids by his brother (Nic. Dam. *FGH* 90 F 61.5; cf. Aris. *Pol.* 1316a29–30). However, by the time of Agariste's wedding, the prestige of the Kypselids was strong at Sikyon, but once again it is probably the prestige of the *exiled* (e.g., the tyrants of Ambrakia) Kypselids that is at issue (despite Hdt. 6.128.2).

Before Kypselos' acquisition of the tyranny at Corinth, Corinth had been governed by a narrow oligarchy composed of the heads of the *oikoi* of the Bakkhiad clan (Hdt. 5.92β.1; Nic. Dam. *FGH* 90 F 57; DS 7, fr. 9.6; Strabo 8.6.20 C378; Paus. 2.4.4). During their rule, Corinth seems to have been, if not an ally, at least generally friendly to Argos.¹⁴ Continuities in cult and mythology between Argos and Corinth may go back to this early relationship.¹⁵ Argive influence in Corinthian colonies (and also at Byzantion, the colony of the Megarians, former subjects of Corinth), particularly Syracuse, where Pollis, an Argive, is said to have been king, points in the same direction.¹⁶ The tradition of an attempt by Pheidon of Argos (probably dated to the early seventh century) to intervene at Corinth is another indication. One story placed Pheidon's death in Corinth during a time of civil strife, which has been thought to have been during the troubles attendant upon the downfall of the Bakkhiads.¹⁷ Corinth was by no means a dependency of Argos, although the Bakkhiads favored association with ascendant eighth-century Argos. Thus, it is not surprising that a common interpretation sees the creation of a tyranny at Corinth as signalling a far more assertive course in Corinth's foreign policy, and an end to deference toward Argos (as has already been suggested).¹⁸

It is unknown whether Kypselos actively helped bring Prokles to power at Epidauros in an attempt to remove this state from Argive influence. In any case, the marriage of Periander and Melissa must have been a guarantee of Corinthian support for Prokles and a bolster to his regime. Herodotus recounts most fully the grim details of his eventual falling out with his son-in-law Periander, and Ephorus and Heracleides Ponticus also touch on the

14. P.N. Ure, *The Origin of Tyranny* (Cambridge 1922) 179–80, points out that *Il.* 6.152 has Corinth as a part of Argos (cf. "Catalogue of Ships," *Il.* 2.570 with Corinth in Agamemnon's kingdom of Mycenae), and that the allocation of Corinth to Argos is implicit in the three-fold division of the Dorian Peloponnesus (e.g., Apollod. 2.8.4; Paus. 3.1.5; 4.3.4–5). Pausanias saw Corinth as a region of the Argolid (2.1.1, cf. 2.4.2). Cf. Will *Korinthiaka* 251–58, 296–98, 339–44, who, however, insists on the independence of Bakkhiad Corinth.

15. In general: T.J. Dunbabin, "The Early History of Corinth," *JHS* 68 (1948) 59–69, esp. 63–65; for the cult of Hera: N.G.L. Hammond, "The Heraeum at Perachora and Corinthian Encroachment," *BSA* 49 (1954) 93–102; cf. J. Salmon, "The Heraion at Perachora, and the Early History of Corinth and Megara," *BSA* 67 (1972) 159–204. [See now Figueira *Theognis* 265–66.]

16. Pollis, the Argive, King of Syracuse: Hippys of Rhegion *FGH* 554 F 4. See R. van Compernelle, "Syracuse, Colonie d'Argos?," *Kokalos* 12 (1966) 75–101 on the cult of Hera Argeia, on Orestes and Athena Phakelitis, and on Argive-style Geometric pots perhaps made by local potters. On Argos and Byzantion (?): Hesychios *FGH* 390 F 1.3; Joh. Lyd. *De Mag.* 3.70 on King Zeuxippos (cf. Kastor *FGH* 250 F 2a).

17. Pheidon's attempt on Corinth and the Actaeon story: Plut. *Mor.* 772D–773B; ΣApoll. Rhod. *Arg.* 4.1212–14a W. See A. Andrewes, "The Corinthian Actaeon and Pheidon of Argos," *CQ* 43 (1949) 70–78, esp. 77–78. Note that the Aktaion story, however, also provides an aetiology for the foundation of Syracuse (suggesting an improbably early date for Pheidon). For Pheidon's death in Corinth, see Nic. Dam. *FGH* 90 F 35; also Will *Korinthiaka* 353–57. No chronology can be derived from Nicolaos of Damascus. The Kypselos of F 31 cannot be Periander's father, but a figure of the Dorian conquest period, as can be seen from Nikolaos' source, Ephorus (*FGH* 70 F 116).

18. Ure *Tyranny* 179–80; H.T. Wade-Gery, *CAH* 3.542–43.

story.¹⁹ According to Herodotus, Periander caused the death of his wife Melissa. Subsequently, Periander's sons, on a visit to their grandfather Prokles, were informed by him of their father's guilt for Melissa's death. How much time passed between the death and Prokles' instigation (c. 620–15) is unknown. The Epidaurian may have waited until his grandsons (aged 18 and 17) were of an age to act on his accusations. So too, his actions may have had a cause other (perhaps political) than a parent's natural grief. [Pausanias saw Melissa's tomb at Epidauros (2.28.8). This was presumably a cenotaph erected by Prokles as Melissa seems to have been buried at Corinth (Hdt. 5.92η.2–4).] The younger and brighter of the two youths, Lykophron, became thereby estranged from Periander, and the latter's intimidation did not bring him to heel. In the end, when he saw that a reconciliation was not to be expected, Periander dispatched his son to govern Corcyra.

Prokles as a pro-Corinthian tyrant at Epidauros can also be given an intelligible place in Argive history. Argos seems to have grown in political and military power during the last part of the eighth and the early years of the seventh century.²⁰ Consequently, Pheidon (whom I would place in the first half of the seventh century) possessed a strong foundation for conducting an unusually successful foreign policy.²¹ Many facets of his career are restored

19. Ephorus and Heracleides Ponticus preserve independent traditions on Periander and Melissa, perhaps marked by different evaluations of Periander and his rule (cf. fr. 5, *FHG* 2.212–13; F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles* 7, *Herakleides Pontikos* (Basel 1953) fr. 144–45 and pp. 108–9). Nicolaos *FGH* 90 F 58 (on Periander's relationship with Melissa) is derived from Ephorus (cf. *FGH* 70 F 179). Perhaps Nicolaos F 59 (and Aris. *Pol.* 1284a26–33 on Periander's contacts with Thrasybulos; cf. Hdt. 5.92ζ–η.1) are also from Ephorus. Nicolaos had a Nikolaos, not Lykophron, as the son of Periander dispatched to Corcyra and killed by its inhabitants. He did, however, know of a son of Periander named Lykophron, who was killed ruling abroad among the *Perioeci* (see Jacoby, *FGH* 2, 248–50; Nic. Dam. *FGH* 90 F 59); cf. Schachermeyr *RE* 19.1, cols. 705–9. [Heracleides may be the author of a dialogue (*Περὶ ἀρχῆς*?) that is known from *POxy* 4.664, 50.3544 which contain a speech by an Ariphron (probably the grandfather of Perikles, see pp. 170–71 below). Ariphron describes the familial vicissitudes of Periander.]

20. The rise of Argos in the late eighth century: the building program at the Heraion, a vulnerable site central to the Argolic plain in the third quarter of the eighth century, see T. Kelly, *A History of Argos to 500 B.C.* (Minneapolis 1976) 60–64; the establishment of an Agamemnoneion at Mycenae, an indication of growing Argive influence (last quarter of the eighth century), as the abandonment of the cult in the early fifth century suggests the waning of that influence, see J.M. Cook, "Mycenae 1939–1952: Part III. The Agamemnoneion," *BSA* 48 (1953) 30–68, esp. 32–33, *id.*, "The Cult of Agamemnon at Mycenae," in ΓΕΡΑΣ ANTONIOY ΚΕΡΑΜΟΠΟΛ-ΛΟΥ (Athens 1953) 112–18; the destruction of Asine by Eratos of Argos, c. 710 (after a Spartan attack on the Argolid): Paus. 2.36.4–5, 3.7.4, 4.14.3, see J.N. Coldstream, *Geometric Greece* (London 1977) 145, 152–54; the invasion of the Thyreatis by Theopompos of Sparta, which implies that this region was already under Argive control (first third of the seventh century): Paus. 3.7.5. In general, see Kelly *Argos*, 51–72.

21. For an early seventh-century Pheidon, see Andrewes *CQ* (1949) 74–77 (accepted by Jeffery *Archaic Greece* 134–36, 143 n. 3, and by R.A. Tomlinson, *Argos and the Argolid* [Ithaca 1972] 80–83). The emphasis on the recovery of the lot of Temenos in Pheidon's career goes back to Ephorus (*FGH* 70 F 115 [= Strabo 8.3.33 C357–58]), who used Argive-Spartan hostilities as a principle of organization for the history of the archaic Peloponnesus (see A. Andrewes, "Ephorus Book I and the Kings of Argos," *CQ* 1 [1951] 39–45). See n. 17 above, ns. 23, 59 below.

through conjecture, but the story that Pheidon recovered the Temenid inheritance eloquently reveals his influence over surrounding states. Pheidon should perhaps be associated with an Argive victory over Sparta at Hysiai in 669/8 (Paus. 2.24.7). He upheld the right of the Pisatans to preside over the Olympic Games (Paus. 6.22.2 which should be emended; cf. Strabo 8.3.30 C355; Euseb. *Chron. Arm.* p. 92 [Karst]). Both incidents demonstrate the far-ranging power of Argos during his reign. It is likely that Argive influences which are to be observed in mythology and practical politics in Corinth, Sikyon, and Epidauros were strongest during his lifetime.

It is less important for us to reconstruct Pheidon's career than to point out that he represents a high water mark, and that the reigns of his successors show an Argos in difficulty. At length, mixed military fortunes abroad and growing dissent at home led to the deposition of Pheidon's second successor, Meltas. Meltas' father, Leokedes, had had his moral character called into question, which may indicate that dissatisfaction with the Temenids began in his reign.²² By the early part of the sixth century, the traditional Temenid kings of Argos had lost their preeminence in the polity, and at least one non-Temenid king must be accommodated before the magistracy of the *damiourgoi* became prominent.²³ If we synchronize the death of Pheidon with the fall of the Bakkhiads at Corinth, the troubled last years of the Temenids can be linked with setbacks suffered by Argos in the second half of the seventh century. A tradition transmitted by Diodorus has an Argive king expelled from office in a popular uprising, against the background of difficulties over Arkadian territory during a war with the Spartans. Some have identified this king with Meltas, the grandson of Pheidon.²⁴ The identification with Meltas, otherwise known to have been the last Temenid king, would give a reason for the deposition of the Temenids.

22. Leokedes = Lakedes = Lakydes: Plut. *Mor.* 89E, criticized for his effeminacy. On Meltas: Paus. 2.19.2, where we are told about his downfall. Meltas, son of Leokedes, is described as the tenth descendant from Medon, grandson of Temenos. As Pheidon was the 10th in succession from Temenos, Meltas is his grandson.

23. Post-Temenid kings: Damokratidas (cf. G.L. Huxley, *Early Sparta* [Cambridge, MA 1962] 60): Paus. 4.35.2; Aigon: Plut. *Mor.* 340C, 396C. Jeffery suggests (*Archaic Greece* 138) an elective kingship after the Temenids, a suggestion supported by the name Damokratidas (assumed by Aigon on his election?), and the tradition of early Argive democracy (Paus. 2.19.2). Although the basileus as a magistrate existed in fifth-century Argos (Meiggs-Lewis 42.B43, Hdt. 7.149.2), Damokratidas was a reigning king, as shown by the dating of the fall of Nauplia to his reign by Pausanias, who did not use local eponyms, except Athenian archons, a special case. After the elective monarchy (an interlude of one reign?), an oligarchy was established no later than the second quarter of the sixth century. Its chief magistrates were *damiourgoi*, numbering 9 (*SEG* 11.336) or 6 (*SEG* 11.314). Note also *IG* IV 506; *EM* s.v. *δημιουργός*, Gaisford 265.42–53. See N.G.L. Hammond, "An Early Inscription at Argos," *CQ* 54 (1960) 33–36; Jeffery *LSAG* 156–58, 168. The oligarchy may have ended in the troubled period after the Battle of the Champions c. 548, when Perilaos became tyrant (Paus. 2.23.7; cf. 2.20.7; Hdt. 1.82.8). In general, see M. Wörrle, *Untersuchungen zur Verfassungsgeschichte von Argos im 5. Jahrhundert vor Christus* (Diss. Erlangen-Nürnberg 1964), esp. 61–70.

24. *DS* 7.13.2 (from Ephorus [Andrewes *CQ* (1951) 39–40, 43–44]). Cf. W.G. Forrest, *A History of Sparta: 950–192 B.C.* (London 1968) 73; Jeffery *Archaic Greece* 138, 143 n. 4.

The Arkadians were necessarily involved in the warfare between Sparta and Messenia. Therefore, it is not surprising that a recent papyrus fragment of Tyrtaios, who participated in the Second Messenian War in the second half of the seventh century (c. 640; cf. *Suda s.v. Τυρταῖος*, τ 1205 Adler) describes warfare between the Spartans (v. 21) and the Argives (v. 15) and perhaps the Arkadians (*POxy.* #3316).²⁵ The word *taphros* can be restored in v. 19, which suggested to the editors the Battle of the Great Trench, an important event in Pausanias' treatment of this war (4.17.2–10). Moreover, hostility between Sparta and Argos also directly affected the Argolid. A Spartan force seems to have been established on the acropolis of Halieis in the Argolic Akte. A destruction layer (c. 590–80) on the acropolis contains Lakonian pottery in an amount and in types that suggest the presence of Spartans rather than trade. A garrison so far from home can be best explained by a threat from the outside, which at Halieis could only be from Argos.²⁶

Other centers of resistance to Argos in her immediate vicinity may also have existed at this time. Tiryns was probably an independent *polis*, composed of villages grouped around the Bronze Age citadel, in this period, as witnessed by the serpentine inscription on the rocks of the Mycenaean cistern. Nauplia took a course of sufficiently provocative independence toward Argos to have its inhabitants expelled from their homes by Argos in the time of the Argive king, Damokratidas, and then received by the Spartans, to be given territory in Messenia.²⁷ Significantly, it was Nauplian sympathy to Sparta, *Lakōnismos*, which prompted the Argive attack. In the mid- to late seventh century, Sparta was under pressure from Messenian resistance. Simultaneously, Argos faced dissension among the smaller states of the Akte. Both Argos and Sparta confronted complications in mastering their local adversaries which were created by the other: Argives appear with Arkadians against Sparta on the side of Messenia, and Spartans (at the least) installed themselves at Halieis. The marriage alliance between Prokles and the Kypselids shows that Epidauros, the strongest of the states of the Akte, stood aloof from Argos in the second half of the seventh century. Let us leave open for now the question whether Prokles' eventual falling-out with Periander also had a rationale in power politics.

AIGINA AND PROKLES OF EPIDAUROS

Aigina was a part of the Temenid inheritance, and may have belonged to the cult league of the temple of Apollo Pythaios, possibly organized after the

25. See R.A. Coles & M.W. Haslam, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* 47 (1980) 1–6.

26. See T.D. Boyd & M.H. Jameson, "Urban and Rural Land Division in Ancient Greece," *Hesperia* 50 (1981) 327–42, esp. 327–28. Cf. M.H. Jameson, "Excavations at Porto Cheli and Vicinity, Preliminary Report, I: Halieis, 1962–8," *Hesperia* 38 (1969) 311–42, esp. 318–22. The sanctuary of Apollo with its two temples may have continued in existence outside the city. This suggests a situation comparable to that prevailing at Asine after its sack by Argos, when the precinct of Apollo Pythaios was left intact.

27. N. Verdelis, M.H. Jameson, & I. Papachristodoulou, "Αρχαϊκὰ ἐπιγραφὰ ἐκ Τίρυνθος," *AE* (1975) 150–205, esp. 188–89, 204–205; Nauplia: Paus. 4.24.4, 4.27.8, 4.35.2.

conquest of Asine by Argos in the late eighth century.²⁸ That the Argives held Aigina to belong to their hegemonic sphere is shown by a fine levied on the islanders for collaboration with Kleomenes at Sepeia (Hdt. 6.92.1–2). The “Catalogue of Ships” assigned Aigina to the Argive kingdom of Diomedes (Hom. *Il.* 2.562; cf. pp. 409–18 below). Tradition has Pheidon minting silver on the island, for the first time in Greece. [This tradition of doubtful historicity symbolizes that the emergence of the Aiginetans as a community involved in seafaring and trade was linked with their status as a outlying, maritime perioecic community of Argos. The practical impact of Argive hegemony is suggested by a tradition out of Arkadian local historiography. Pausanias reports an early Arkadian king called Aiginetes, son of Pompos (8.5.8–10).^{28a} The frame for his naming was the penetration of Arkadia by Aiginetan merchants through Kyllene in Elis. There is no reason to doubt that itinerant Aiginetan merchants were the first to carry exotic goods into Arkadia by pack-train.^{28b} The consolidation of social roles on Aigina could evolve, independently from the agrarian communities of the Peloponnesus, towards economic specialization and a symbiosis with the northeast Peloponnesus because of the Aiginetans’ insular locale and the political protection afforded by Argos. The date is problematic: the first Messenian war broke out in the reign of Aikhmis, the great grandson of Pompos, dating the Aiginetan arrival in Arkadia to 800–750. That seems early in any case from the standpoint of economic development.

These Arkadian traditions are avowedly anti-Spartan. Not only do the Arkadians assist the Messenians against Sparta, but they had already battled with the Spartans under Polymnestor, who had captured the Spartan king Kharillos and his army as they intruded on Tegean territory (8.5.9). The detail that armed Tegean women had been instrumental in defeating the first Spartan invasion of their land indicates that the story is an aetiological explanation for a figure of Ares in woman’s dress (cf. Paus. 8.48.4–5). Moreover, this aetiology is not an isolated feature of the discussion in Pausanias of the early Arkadian kings. The names of the kings Pompos ‘procession’, Aiginetes ‘Aiginetan’, Aikhmis ‘spear-point’, and Iketas ‘suppliant’, indicate the symbolic character of this part of the king-list. One also suspects that the capture of the Spartan army in the reign of Polymnestor is a doublet (and mythological precedent) for the Tegean defeat and capture of a Spartan army in the early sixth century (Hdt. 1.65.1–66.4). In addition, Aristokrates, son of Aikhmis, was executed by the Arkadians in a stoning that parallels the stoning of the later Arkadian king (supposedly his grandson), Aristokrates of Orkhomenos or Trapezous (*n.b.*, not Tegea), the father-in-law of Prokles of Epidauros (8.5.11–13, 13.5). All these aspects of Arkadian historiography suggest that

28. In one account, Aigina was settled by Argives led by Deiphontes, the son-in-law of Temenos: Paus. 2.29.5. On the Temenid inheritance, see Figueira *Aegina* 175–80, 319–21 (for the Aiginetan magistracy of the *thearoi*). See ns. 2 and 21 above, n. 29 below.

28a. The Aiginetes, father of Pelios, who appears in the king-list of Patrai in Akhaia may owe his existence to a similar mythologization (Paus. 7.18.5).

28b. See *Aegina* 202–7.

the history of the region before 700 is a reconstruction based on later conditions. In actuality, the arrival of the Aiginetan merchants in Arkadia probably belonged to a period of Argive influence there after 700 (whether under Pheidon or Meltas is uncertain).]

Herodotus makes Aigina a dependency of Epidaurios, but shows the Aiginetans after independence appealing to Argos, apparently hostile to Epidaurios, for support against Athens. There is nothing *prima facie* improbable about an Epidaurian hegemony over Aigina: the prevailing (and quite reasonable) geographical description of the island saw it as an outlier of the Epidauria (Strabo 8.6.4 C369; Eustath. *Il.* 1.288 [443–44] *ad* 2.562; Pomp. Mela *Chorogr.* 2.7.109; cf. Strabo 2.5.21 C124, 8.6.1 C365). One must then note here that there existed variants of the Aiginetan foundation myth. One foundation story, pro-Argive in character, had the settlers coming straight from Argos to Aigina. Another tradition introduced the Epidaurians.²⁹ Whether the Epidaurian intermediate stage was interpolated or merely emphasized by the Epidaurians, it permitted them to lay claim to direct primacy over the island. These myths are not likely to be informative about tenth-century settlement patterns; rather they point to politics of the eighth and seventh centuries. The Argive and Epidaurian foundation stories suggest that these two states disputed control of Aigina. It is noteworthy that the Aiginetans, as far as can be judged from the Pindaric scholia (based on Aiginetan historians Pythainetos and Theogenes), favored the Argive claim, when they were not themselves claiming autochthony.^{29a} This is understandable when the support tendered by Argos to Aigina against Athens is remembered (Hdt. 5.86.4; 6.92.2–3).

The only extended anecdote about Prokles which has come to us (outside the accounts of his familial problems with Periander) describes how Prokles betrayed an Athenian guest-friend, Timarkhos. Timarkhos visited Prokles with a large sum on his person (Plut. *Mor.* 403C–E). He was slain by Kleandros of Aigina, a confidential agent of Prokles. A coincidence is possible, but it is certainly striking that an Aiginetan plays such a prominent role in one episode out of the poorly attested life of Prokles. Perhaps Kleandros served Prokles because Aigina was subject to Epidaurios.

Furthermore, in the third book of his work, Pythainetos, an Aiginetan local historian (possibly Hellenistic), reported the context in which Periander

29. Hdt. 8.46.1: Dorians from Epidaurios; Paus. 2.29.5: Argives from Epidaurios under Deiphontes; ΣPin. *Nem.* 3.1b; J. Tzetz. ΣLyc. *Alex.* 176: a colony of Argos; ΣOl. 8.39a–b: Triakon of Argos as oecist of Aigina, an Argive colony (cf. ΣPyth. 8.29a); Strabo 8.6.16 C375: Argives, Cretans, Epidaurians, and Dorians as settlers (perhaps successively). Argive and Epidaurian claims to precedence in the Akte, as expressed through myth, received emphasis in Ephorus where they were integrated into the myths surrounding the murder of Temenos (Andrewes *CQ* [1951] 39); cf. DS 7.13.1; Nic. Dam. *FGH* 90 F 30; Paus. 2.26.2, 2.28.3–7 on the conflict between Temenos, his sons, his daughter Hyrnetho and her husband Deiphontes.

29a. Note Harpocration s.v. ἀντόχθονες. See (e.g.) for the myth of the Myrmidons transformed from ants to men by Zeus at the prayer of Aiaikos, Hes. fr. 205 M/W; Eustath. *Il.* 1.121–22; Ovid *Met.* 7.522–660; cf. Theogenes *FGH* 300 F 1.

first met Melissa, Prokles' daughter (*FGH* 299 F 3 [= *Athen.* 13.589F]). Only a brief|bit has survived, scarcely more than a line. To explain how Pythainetos integrated this episode into a narrative which otherwise appears concerned with the local history of Aigina, Jacoby suggested that Pythainetos digressed here on the Peloponnesian tyrannies, a fact which indicated his lack of material specific to Aigina.³⁰ Rather, I would suggest that Periander's meeting with Melissa had its place in Pythainetos because Epidauros still ruled Aigina during Prokles' tyranny. The specific relevance of these domestic affairs would be their impact on a crucial event in Aiginetan history. The ruin of Prokles and his city, which had its roots in the marriage of Periander and Melissa, may have contributed to the opportunity for Aiginetan independence.³¹ Moreover, it is possible that the story in the *Moralia* about Prokles, Timarkhos, and Kleandros may also have come from Pythainetos, and have been connected with the same historical context, the downfall of Prokles and the liberation of Aigina.

The sequel to the betrayal of Timarkhos was that Prokles himself was to suffer death at the hands of Athenian friends of Timarkhos after he ἐξέπεσε 'fled from', 'was expelled from', or 'sallied out of' Epidauros, when his entire situation became desperate (τῶν πραγμάτων παντάπασι μοχθηρῶν γενομένων). At first glance, this seems at variance with the text of Herodotus, where Prokles is taken prisoner by Periander. Perhaps the contradiction is merely a seeming one. Periander can be seen to have been friendly to Athens from his arbitration of the ownership of Sigeion in the Troad, a point of contention between the Mytileneans and the Athenians (*Hdt.* 5.95.2; cf. Apollodoros *FGH* 244 F 27 = *DL* 1.74). Periander was also connected with a leading Athenian family, the Philaidai.³² The Athenians connected with the slain Timarkhos may have been among a group of their countrymen helping Periander besiege Epidauros. Their reward may have been the right to execute Prokles.³³

Another piece of evidence can be brought forward to demonstrate that Aigina was under the control of Epidauros in the reign of Prokles. An old cult

30. *FGH* 299, 3b, 1.5. Jacoby's view on the absence of data available to Pythainetos is untestable as too little of his work survives. The content of F 1 does not necessitate that the "Seeherrschaft" of the Aiginetans had been treated in Bk. 1. Moreover, if the account from Plutarch about the Timarkhos-Prokles episode stems from Pythainetos (a possibility that Jacoby admits), the Prokles narrative would be out of proportion to an excursus on Peloponnesian tyranny, treating at such length an episode or episodes out of the career of a minor figure. Nor is the tone of this passage, and of the brief mention of Periander's meeting with Melissa, appropriate to an excursus, but rather to melodramatic scene-portrayal of a main narrative. Note the sexual overtones of the description of Melissa as ἀναμύχρονος and μονοχίτων (cf. Euphor. fr. 53 Powell).

31. Cf. Müller *AL* 63–67. [Cf. also J.B. Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth* (Oxford 1984) 217–18.]

32. *Hdt.* 6.35.1, 6.128.2. [See Figueira *Colonization* 134–36, 260–61 for further references and discussion.] Also, a Kypselos served as archon in 597/6. See D.W. Bradeen, "The Fifth-Century Archon List," *Hesperia* 32 (1963) 187–208, esp. 187–88, 194–97, 206–208; [also Salmon *Corinth* 224.]

33. Müller *AL* 66, adds an unnecessary stage to Prokles' career: Prokles is freed by the death of Periander, and returns to Epidauros to be executed, as in the Timarkhos episode.

statue of Hera in the Samian Heraion was the work of an Aiginetan sculptor, Smilis, the son of Eukleides, and dated by reference to a Prokles.³⁴ This Prokles is called *arkhon* by Aethlios and *basileus* by the *Diegesis* to the text of Callimachus, both titles under which a tyrant like Prokles could appear in a context favorable to him. Pausanias treats Smilis as contemporary of Daidalos. Part of the confusion which made Smilis a prehistoric figure, perhaps to be associated with the Prokles who led the first settlers from Epidauros to Samos, is that Smilis seems to have reworked a very old cult object, a *sanis* 'plank' (which had been brought over from Argos in the traditional view), giving it human form.³⁵ Pausanias seems to have confused the *sanis* brought over from old Greece with the statue of Smilis. Of course, a genuine piece of work from the period of colonization that survived into the classical period, when its origins could be recorded, is improbable. To Pausanias, the term Daidalic would have connoted a work with affinities to the earliest statuary recognizably Greek. In the modern sense of Daidalic, Daidalic works continued to be produced down to the end of the seventh century (with some extension into the sixth century).³⁶ There is no reason to think that a work of the end of the seventh century might not appear as Daidalic in our evidence.

An early Samian electrum half-stater bears on its reverse a punch-mark that may well represent a miniature relief of Smilis' Hera statue. That the miniature portrays an archaic cult statue of Hera is demonstrated by the depictions of this same statue on Samian coins of the Imperial Period.³⁷ Moreover, Smilis' statue may have had an impact on or connection with the iconography of Samian coins, of which the chief obverse type is a lion's mask. A lion's skin was strewn at the statue's base (*Dieg.* 4.30; cf. Callimachus fr. 101 Pfeiffer). Although the specific mythological allusion is in doubt (a commemoration of a triumph by Hera over Herakles as the *Diegesis* to Callimachus [4.30] would have it, or a gesture of reconciliation to that hero, that granted him a place in the Heraion), it is reasonable to assume that the lion's skin of the coins either alludes directly to the treatment of Hera on Smilis' statue, or both the statue and coins bespeak a common mythological frame of reference. Such a frame of reference may argue for their approximate contemporaneity. It is hardly likely that the earliest coins predate c. 600.³⁸

34. Smilis' statue: Aethlios *FGH* 536 F 3 (Clem. *Protr.* 4.46.3), cf. Olympichos *FGH* 537 F 1 (Clem. *Protr.* 4.47.2); Callimachus *Aitia* fr. 100 Pfeiffer (= Plut. *Mor.* fr. 158 [Sandbach]), also *Dieg.* 4.22. Skelmis in Callimachus equals Smilis (Σ Paus 7.4.4); Athenagoras *Pro Christ.* 17 Spiro; Paus. 7.4.4–7. For the connection of Prokles of Epidauros with Smilis, see Jeffery *Archaic Greece* 151, 160 n. 5. See also B.S. Ridgway, *The Archaic Style in Greek Sculpture* (Princeton 1977) 25, 41. [Cf. A.A. Donohue, *Xoana and the Origins of Greek Sculpture* (Atlanta 1988) 202–5.]

35. See the references to Aethlios and Callimachus in n. 34 above.

36. A.W. Lawrence, *Greek and Roman Sculpture* (London 1972) 68–69; Ridgway *Archaic Style* 19–26, 37–38.

37. J.P. Barron, *The Silver Coinage of Samos* (London 1966) 1–3; see also P. Gardner, "Samos and the Samian Coins," *NC* 2 (1882) 201–90, esp. 218–20, 274–79, Pl. 12.1–4.

38. Barron *Silver Coinage* 2–3.

What little else we know about Smilis accords with a late seventh- or early sixth-century date. Athenagoras reports that Smilis created or reshaped a statue of Hera in the Heraion at Argos (Athenagoras *Pro Christ.* 17). Moreover, Pausanias attributed to Smilis the enthroned figures of the Seasons in the temple of Hera at Olympia (5.17.1). They can date no earlier than 600–590, the date of the temple's construction.³⁹ Pliny connects Smilis (Zmilus in his text) with Rhoecus and Theodoros, Lemnian architects of a labyrinth on Lemnos, described by him in a badly garbled notice (*NH* 36.90). No such structure is known. Its existence, as well as the existence of Lemnian homonyms of the two famous Samian architects Rhoikos and Theodoros, is not to be credited. Doubtless, what is referred to here is the Heraion at Samos, which is called a labyrinth and correctly attributed to Theodoros elsewhere in Pliny (*NH* 34.83).⁴⁰ The Heraion at Samos is firmly assigned to Rhoikos and Theodoros, but neither it nor any other building project of which we know has Smilis as its architect. Pliny's source probably connected Smilis' statue of Hera with the Heraion of Rhoikos and Theodoros.⁴¹ This gives us a very rough *terminus ante quem* for Smilis' work on Samos of c. 575–550, the date for the construction of this temple.⁴² Any closer conjunction would be ill-advised. Smilis' reworking of the older cult object may have been an early priority of the building program, for which it was not necessary to await the collection of the considerable sums necessary for the temple.

Arguing that a date for Smilis would fit an association with Prokles of Epidauros, we might suggest that this bit of evidence was distorted in the

39. Unfortunately, Athenagoras' text appears corrupt: ἡ δὲ ἐν Σάμῳ Ἡρα καὶ ἐν Ἀργεὶ Σμίλιδος χεῖρες, καὶ Φειδίου τὰ λοιπὰ εἰδῶλα. The Argive statue is introduced too elliptically; χεῖρες as 'works' is problematical (despite *AP* 16.262; Poll. 2.150; Clem. *Protrep.* 4.62.3); and the reference to other works of Pheidias is too abrupt and vague. I should suggest ἡ δὲ ἐν Σάμῳ Ἡρα καὶ τῆς Ἡρας ἐν Ἀργεὶ Σμίλιδος χεῖρες, καὶ Φειδίου τὰ λοιπὸν εἰδῶλον. Smilos may have supplemented an old statue with his additions later incorporated into a work of Pheidias. The statue of Athena at Plataia, attributed to Pheidias, which was wooden with chryselephantine features and marble extremities (Paus. 9.4.1), may provide a parallel (if the *ksoanon* was pre-Pheidias) to the composite statue of Hera at the Argive Heraion. For the date of the Hera temple at Olympia: A. Mallwitz, *Olympia und seine Bauten* (Munich 1972) 138.

40. See E. Sellers, *The Elder Pliny's Chapters on the History of Art* (London 1896) 68–69, 222–23. W.B. Dinsmoor, *The Architecture of Ancient Greece*³ (London 1950) 124 n. 1, explains Pliny's mistake as a misunderstanding of an epithet for the Heraion, ἐν λίμναις 'in the marshes', to mean a location on the island of Lemnos.

41. Athenagoras *Pro Christ.* 17 mentions Daidalos, Theodoros, and Smilis among others in the same passage.

42. Samian Heraion: H. Walter, *Das Heraion von Samos* (Munich 1976) 57–59; Dinsmoor *Architecture* 124–25. I follow D. Ohly ("Die Göttin und ihre Basis," *AM* 68 [1953] 25–50) both on Smilis' contribution *vis-à-vis* the *sanis*, and specifically in his doubts that the Smilis statue can be closely contemporary with the Rhoikos-Theodoros temple. A wooden statuette from Samos (c. 640), however, thought by Ohly to allude to the statue of Smilis ("Neue Holzfunde aus dem Heraion von Samos," *AM* 82 [1967] 89–99) appears rather to be Cretan (cf. P. Kranz, "Frühe Griechische Sitzfiguren," *AM* 87 [1972] 1–55, esp. 21–22). [Cf. E. Walter-Karydi, *Die Äginetische Bildhauerschule* (Mainz am Rhein 1987), *Alt-Ägina* 2.2.12–13.]

following fashion. Smilis, an Aiginetan, when Aigina was ruled by Epidauros, could have been mentioned in a Samian tradition as doing his own work while Prokles was *arkhōn* or even *basileus* (a term admissible as a tyrant's own representation of his position).⁴³ Smilis' other associations are with the cult of Hera, and he may have specialized in artistic work in honor of this most popular goddess of the Argolid. The pattern of work, later normal for a Greek sculptor who moved from commission to commission, is probably not the appropriate model for understanding a Smilis: Pausanias emphasizes that Smilis worked abroad at only Samos and Olympia (7.4.7). It was not unusual for popular memory to link literary or artistic figures with their tyrant patrons, but the inveterate tendency of the Greeks to foist greater antiquity on cult objects and temples led to eventual confusion. The Prokles associated with Smilis may have been replaced by another Epidaurian Prokles, son of Pityreus, who led colonists to Samos (Paus. 7.4.2). Hence, the equation in Pausanias (and perhaps in his unknown source) of the statue of Smilis with the statue brought over from the Argolid by the settlers of Samos was made. Callimachus may have specifically answered this interpretation in his poem. In the surviving portion, he is careful to point out that his allusion is not to the statue of Smilis, which was not yet in existence, when he speaks of the *sanis*.

AIGINA AND SAMOS

The involvement of Samos with the Aiginetans goes beyond the individual contribution of the Aiginetan artist Smilis to the Samian Heraion. King Amphikrates of Samos had once attacked Aigina (Hdt. 3.59.4). However, to understand the context for this attack, the foreign policy of Corinth, the dominant naval power in central Greece during the seventh and sixth centuries, should again be considered. Corinth was linked by a tie of friendship to Samos in the early archaic period. The Corinthians and Samians were both allies of Chalcis during the shadowy Lelantine War.⁴⁴ In the late eighth century, Ameinokles of Samos had built warships for the Corinthians (Thuc. 1.13.3). However, another tradition strongly connects Periander and Thrasyboulos of Miletos (Hdt. 1.20; 5.92ζ-η.1; cf. DL 1.95; Aris. *Pol.* 1311a20-22). The famous interchange on the methods for retaining a tyranny was said to have taken place between them. Periander also gave Miletos moral support against the Lydians. Friendship with Miletos should mean enmity with Samos, as these two cities were traditionally arch-rivals. Therefore, it is not surprising

43. The term *basileus* was not used on Samos for a later magistracy. Therefore, Prokles was not a Samian archon *basileus* recorded on an inscription. See Busolt-Swoboda GS 1.347-48; G. Busolt, *Die griechischen Staats- und Reichsaltertümer* (Munich 1892) 33 ns. 5, 6; 47 n. 3.

44. Hdt. 5.99.1. See A.R. Burn, "The So-Called 'Trade Leagues' in Early Greek History and the Lelantine War," *JHS* 49 (1929) 14-37, esp. 19, 23-25 (for the later rapprochement between Corinth and Miletos); D.W. Bradeen, "The Lelantine War and Pheidon of Argos," *TAPA* 78 (1947) 223-41, esp. 236-38. On Herodotus' sources on Samos, see B.M. Mitchell, "Herodotus and Samos," *JHS* 95 (1975) 75-91. [See Salmon *Corinth* 224-26 for unlikely simultaneous friendships between Corinth and both Miletos and Samos at the end of the sixth century.]

that the Samians were thought, in one version of the story, to have intercepted the Corcyraean boys sent by Periander late in his reign to Alyattes of Lydia for castration (Hdt. 3.48.2–4; cf. DL 1.95; [Plut.] *Mor.* 859E–860C). Thus, Corinth's alliance with Samos would appear to predate the alliance with Miletos.

Both Samos and Miletos are reported to have intervened in the Isthmian region. When the Aiginetans dislodged the Samians from Kydonia in 519 (Hdt. 3.59.1–4), Herodotus informs us that the bad feelings between the two states went back to the attack on Aigina by the Samians under Amphikrates. In this engagement, Herodotus says that both sides suffered grievously. Thrasyboulos of Miletos is said to have taken the port of Sikyon by the application of a clever ruse. As both Samos and Miletos are a long way from Aigina and Sikyon, it has been hypothesized that Corinth, hostile to both states, was the instigator of the two assaults.⁴⁵ The Corinthians later aided the Athenians against Aigina by a nominal sale of 20 ships c. 490 (Hdt. 6.89). Corinthian involvement in the Samian attack on Aigina need not even have been so particularly active. Surely the Samians would not have ventured into the Saronic Gulf against a powerful Aigina unless Corinth were known to be friendly. An underlying reason for the hostility between Aiginetans and Samians could have been the propensity of both states for piracy, and their competition in commerce, especially in trade between Greece and Egypt, where both states possessed their own sanctuaries at Naukratis (Hdt. 2.178.3). Significantly, the Aiginetans attacked the Samian exiles only when they established themselves at Kydonia, which lay on the trade route to Egypt around western Crete. And Crete itself was an important area for Aiginetan trade.⁴⁶

If Corinthian friendship with Samos was a precondition for a raid on Aigina, the attack probably took place before 605. The first token of Corinth's shift in alliance from Samos to Miletos is Periander's dispatch to Thrasyboulos of the Delphic response regarding the embassy of Alyattes to Delphi. The plague afflicting the Lydians, which prompted the embassy, sprang from an episode in the sixth year of Alyattes' campaigns against Miletos. If, instead of Herodotus' date of 617, we opt rather for a date of c. 612 for the accession of Alyattes, the end of the war could be no earlier than 605.⁴⁷ It is unclear how much earlier Periander became allied with Thrasyboulos. As Herodotus tells it, the advice of Thrasyboulos to Periander puts the Milesian in the role of mentor, suggesting a date early in Periander's reign. Herodotus connects the

45. Thrasyboulos and Sikyon: *Fron. Strat.* 3.9.7. See A.R. Burn, *The Lyric Age of Greece* (Oxford 1960) 193; Jeffery *Archaic Greece* 163, 213. [Salmon *Corinth* 227 connects an attack at Corinthian behest with the First Sacred War].

46. See pp. 90–91 below; on piracy see Figueira *Aegina* 202–8; on Crete: *Aegina* 133–36, 279–80, 295–96.

47. See J.G. Pedley, *Sardis in the Age of Croesus* (Norman, Okla. 1968) 53, where it is pointed out that the dedication of the pharaoh Necho at Miletos (Hdt. 2.159.3), associated with his victory over Nebuchadrezzar of Babylon, is appropriate to peacetime, and may so determine that the end of the war of Lydia with Miletos occurred before 605. See also H. Kaletsch, "Zur lydischen Chronologie," *Historia* 7 (1958) 1–47, esp. 34–39.

advice with the growing severity of Periander's government, and points to his robbery of the finery of the women of Corinth to gratify the ghost of the dead Melissa as symptomatic of Periander's violent behavior. The implications of this would put the alliance with Miletos at approximately the same time as the falling out with Prokles. However, the variant tradition, represented by Aristotle, reverses the roles of the two tyrants. Thus, the shape given to the story in Herodotus may be predicated on its narrative role as a catalyst in prompting Periander's movement away from his father's mildness. The synchronisms connecting Melissa's death, Periander's growing severity, his alliance with Thrasyloulos, and his disenchantment with Prokles need be no more than loose conjunctions.

Herodotus describes Amphikrates as reigning (*βασιλεύων*). Yet, Herodotus used *basileus* and related terms for tyrants, about whom, as here, little was known to him.⁴⁸ In contrast the rule of the tyrant Polykrates in the 530s and 520s was well attested for Herodotus. Discrepancies, however, in the evidence on Polykrates open the possibility that other tyrants, perhaps some members of his family, held supremacy before him.⁴⁹ Thus, Amphikrates is on balance more likely to have been a seventh-century figure than one of the sixth century.^{49a} Before 600, a tyrant or tyrants (the name Demoteles is known [Plut. *Mor.* 303E–F: *μοναρχίας*]) may have alternated with the island's landed elite, the Geomoroi, in a manner similar to the situation at Mytilene in the time of Pittakos and Alkaios. The Geomoroi were still ruling (for the last time?) c. 600. At this time the Samians founded Perinthos in the Propontis. A Megarian expeditionary force sailed to the Propontis perhaps because Perinthos was considered a threat to the Megarian colonies there. A Samian fleet countered and defeated the Megarians. The commanders of the Samians enlisted the Megarians to help overthrow the government of the Geomoroi on Samos.⁵⁰ The Samians, first fighting and later enlisting the Megarians

48. The traditional view that Herodotus used *basileus* and related terms for tyrants (J.E. Powell, *A Lexicon to Herodotus* [Cambridge 1938] s.v. *βασιλεύς*, 2c) has been challenged by A. Ferrill ("Herodotus on Tyranny," *Historia* 27 [1978] 385–98) who observes that Herodotus customarily differentiated between tyrants and kings. When Herodotus, however, was dependent on the terminology of his informants (for Telys of Sybaris, also noted as *τύραννος* [5.44.1–2], as granted by Ferrill, for Skythes of Zankle [6.23.1], for Aristophilides of Taras [3.136.2]), and where he lacked information on rulers who were probably tyrants, he used the language of monarchy, probably following the lead of his informants, that is, the same language which he also puts into the mouths of tyrants and those addressing them (e.g., 7.161.1). On Amphikrates, cf. R. Drews, *Basileus: The Evidence for Kingship in Geometric Greece* (New Haven 1983) 26–29.

49. J.P. Barron, "The Sixth-Century Tyranny at Samos," *CQ* 14 (1964) 210–29; cf. J. Labarbe, "Un décalage de 40 ans dans la chronologie de Polycrate," *AC* 31 (1962) 153–88.

49a. Cf. G. Shipley, *A History of Samos: 800–188 B.C.* (Oxford 1987) 37–39, who dates to c. 700 or not much later.

50. Perinthos: Hier. *Chron.* 98b (Helm); cf. Strabo 7, fr. 56; the overthrow of the Geomoroi: Plut. *Mor.* 303E–304C. Megarian foreign relations were a counter-image of Corinthian [Figueira *Theognis* 287–88; cf. 277–78, 292–94]. In the Lelantine War (eighth century?) Megara was friendly to Eretria and Miletos (see Burn *JHS* 49 [1929] 21–22). The Megarian colonists in Sicily quarreled with the colonists of Chalcis, enemy of Eretria (Thuc. 6.4.1). Megara shared the

(enemies of Corinth) as allies, sensibly adjusted their foreign policy in tune with the switch in Corinthian friendship from them to the Milesians.

If these considerations argue for a *terminus ante quem* for the Samian attack of 605, considerations of the scale of Aiginetan commercial and military activity seem to preclude an attack before 650. Herodotus reports that there were heavy losses on both sides in the engagement. Herodotus' fifth-century Aiginetan and Samian informants thought the attack sufficient to serve as a cause for the much later major confrontation at Kydonia. Then the Samians had a strong force, having possessed 40 triremes a few years before (Hdt. 3.44.2), and the Aiginetans thought so much of their victory that they dedicated the rams of the captured Samian triremes in the sanctuary of Athena (= Aphaia?: Hdt. 3.59.4). The scale of Amphikrates' raid seems to indicate a date later rather than earlier in the seventh century. Aiginetan maritime activity (as pirates or as merchants) must have taken some time to grow to such an extent as to provoke Samian enmity, and later an attack. This understanding directs our attention both to the second half of the seventh century and to the moment when Aiginetan military strength will have been great enough to allow a break with Epidauros.

Accordingly, if one opts for a date in the second half of the seventh century for Amphikrates' raid and accepts the precondition that Corinth must have been friendly to Samos and hostile to Aigina at the time of the raid, there appear to be two opportunities for the Samian attack. The Samians may have assailed Aigina in support of a coup d'état by Prokles, whom a tradition connects with the work of the Aiginetan Smilis on Samos and who can be thought of as pro-Kypselid by virtue of his daughter's marriage, against the pro-Argive aristocrats of Epidauros and Aigina. Alternatively, when Periander attacked Epidauros, the Samians may have attacked Aigina in a collateral move. While Aigina remained an enemy of Corinth after the fall of Prokles, the Samian attack cannot have been delayed for many years, since Periander's alliance with Thrasyboulos was not long after his falling out with Prokles. The Corinthian/Milesian alliance radically changed the prospects of a Samian foray into the Corinthian Gulf.

There is, however, a piece of evidence that argues strongly for both a late seventh-century date for Amphikrates and for a connection of the Samian raid on Aigina with Aiginetan independence. Duris of Samos told a rationalized version of the story in Herodotus about the early war between Athens and Aigina (Duris *FGH* 76 F 24 [ΣEur. *Hec.* 934 M Schwartz]). The surviving passage specifically concerns itself with the annihilation of the Athenian

settlement of the Propontis and Black Sea with Miletos [*Theognis* 270–71, 273–76]. At Perinthos the Megarians fought the Samians who had been friends of Corinth. Nonetheless, after Periander's rapprochement with Thrasyboulos, Megara fought Miletos (L. Robert, *BE* [1967] [*REG* 80] #528, pp. 536–38). [See *Theognis* 294–96.] Moreover, Corinth seems to have acted against Chalcis at Kerinthos in Euboea, whose destruction the Megarian poet Theognis lamented (vv. 891–94). [*Theognis* 288–91.]

expeditionary force, and the assassination of its sole survivor by means of the dress pins wielded by the female relatives of the lost men. The phrase *κατὰ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον* in the fragment shows the close connection of this story to the lost narrative that preceded it. As this is an excerpt from Duris' Samian history, the *Horai*, it must have had some relevance in terms of local history of that island.⁵¹ Too little is known about Aigina and Samos in the archaic period to reach certainty in this matter, but it does not appear unreasonable to suggest that Amphikrates' raid on Aigina may have provided the connection in the account of Duris. Duris had a context for Amphikrates' raid on Aigina, associating it with Aiginetan independence. This connection prompted him to recount the Damia and Auxesia episode linked by Herodotus with the aftermath of Aiginetan independence. A Samian attack which inflicted serious harm on Aigina could be contrasted (for patriotic purposes?) with an Athenian foray which failed disastrously. The standard emendation of the text of the scholion would read a reference to the second book of the *Horai*. The same book treated Pythagoras, which would point toward a sixth century date (*FGH* 76 F 22–23), but would not rule out mention of an Amphikrates active at the end of the seventh century.⁵² Our hypothetical seventh-century date for this event in Book 2 of the *Horai* would be even more probable if Eratosthenes derived his date of 588 for the boxing victory of Pythagoras (in fact won by a homonym) (*FGH* 241 F 11 = DL 8.47) from Duris (*FGH* 76 F 62; cf. Iamblich. *VP* 2 (11); Hesych. *s.v.* ἐν Σάμῳ κομήτας, ε 3288 Latte with Apollodorus *FGH* 244 F 29).

If Aigina took the opportunity of Periander's campaign against Epidaurus to revolt from that city, her augmented naval strength may have enabled her to remain free of an Epidaurus weakened by capture at the hands of Periander. | When Athens menaced the Aiginetans, who better than Argos, the city's old protector, for the Aiginetans to turn to for aid? To attribute such a

51. Jacoby *FGH* 2, 121–22, recognizes that the time reference indicates that this was not an excursus. Yet, to Jacoby, these *Horai*, *FGH* 76 F 22–26, belong to a work transcending local history, and with affinities to universal history. It is preferable to seek a Samian context for this anecdote. *Horai* is the traditional Samian term for a local history (Aethlios *FGH* 536 T 1, F 1–2; Alexis *FGH* 539 F 1–2; Anon. *FGH* 544 F 1–4). The fragments given by Jacoby to this hypothetical, more universal work (F 22–26) are the only ones to make explicit use of the term *Horai* (cf. F 60–71). There is no reason to hypothesize the *Horai* to have been a work striving for more than local significance merely on the basis of F 24. Müller recognized a (single) local history called the *Horai* (fr. 51, *FHG* 2.481). As context for the episode, see Ure *Tyranny* 177–78 for Amphikrates' raid, and compare Müller who suggests that the occasion was the Aiginetan expulsion of the Samians from Kydonia which cannot be credited (see also *AL* 73). The early war between Athens and Aigina can hardly be Peisistratid. See also R.B. Kebric (*In the Shadow of Macedon: Duris of Samos* [Wiesbaden 1977] 31, 37–39) on the strong influence of Herodotus on Duris (*FGH* 76 F 64).

52. Duris has the Athenians expelled from the island by the Spartans rather than by the Argives as in Herodotus. This appears to be a mistake which is understandable when Sparta's role as a defender of Aigina in the Peloponnesian and Corinthian Wars is remembered. The only new detail is the remark of Duris that "many say that the chiton-less Dorianize." This has the look about it of a footnote referring to the lost polemics on the moral qualities of different ethnic styles of dress (see p. 42 below; cf. Jacoby *FGH* 2, 122).

policy to the Aiginetan aristocracy would be consonant with our view that the aristocracies of the northeast Peloponnesus looked to Argos as their patron. The Aiginetans, with the external constraint of Epidaurian rule removed, would have followed their inclinations back to the Argive sphere of influence. This interpretation would explain the alignment of states in Hdt. 5.82–88. Aigina is truly independent, and making use of its warships against Epidau-ros. Epidauros, for the moment under Corinthian hegemony (or weakened by Corinthian attack), is friendly to Athens, but nonetheless powerless either to take counter-measures against Aigina, or to help Athens recover the statues of Damia and Auxesia. The Athenians, friends of Corinth, are not disinclined to embark on a hostile line against Aigina, rebellious to Corinth's satellite, Epidauros. The eagerness of the Argives to help the Aiginetans against Athens shows their hostility toward Epidauros. That the Argives may have been at war with Epidauros (or should we say with Corinth over Epidauros?) is perhaps indicated by the fact that the Argive force sent to Aigina set out from the Epidauria.

AIGINETAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE POLITICS OF THE ARCHAIC PELOPONNESUS

Some of the outlines of the historical background against which Aiginetan independence occurred are more understandable when the chronological material already discussed has been reduced to tabular form.

<<Aigina was a minor power in the balance of interstate forces in the northeast Peloponnesus during the seventh and early sixth centuries. The major players in the region were, however, affected by the status of the major claimant to hegemony in the southern Peloponnesus, Sparta. Spartan fortunes rested on the maintenance and expansion of their Messenian conquests,⁵³ but were also attuned to the vicissitudes of their neighbors, particularly Argos.⁵⁴ Spartan hostilities with the Messenians during the seventh century can be resolved into two stages. One was before 650, perhaps involving the defeat at Hysiai (669: the work of Pheidon?), as suggested by the dates of Apollodorus (660/59) and of Pausanias (685) for the beginning of the Second Messenian War (Apollod. *FGH* 244 F 334; Paus. 4.15.1). Even if we consider Pausanias' chronology (based on Messenian historiography?) too early, the Spartans probably had the better of fighting before 650, since he reports that they took Hira, the northern Messenian stronghold, in 668 (Paus. 4.23.4) and Phigaleia in southwestern Arkadia in 659 (Paus. 8.39.3–5). Since the definitive subjugation of Messenia did not occur until c. 600 (Plut. *Mor.* 194B; Ael. *VH* 13.42; cf. Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 71), and Tyrtaeus (whose acme lay after 650 [*Suda s.v.* Τυρταῖος, τ 1205 Adler]) is a witness to intense Spartan troubles, at

53. Outbreak of Second Messenian War in 660/59: note F. Jacoby *Apollodors Chronik: Eine Sammlung der Fragmente* (Berlin 1902) 130–34, 405 (cf. Justin 3.5.1–2). For Tyrtaeus' war in Sosibios, cf. Jacoby *FGH* 595, 3b, 1.641–42.

54. Compare, in general, Huxley *Early Sparta* 26–36, 53–60. F. Kiechle, *Messenische Studien* (Kallmünz 1959), esp. 82–105. [An argument for a lower dating of the Messenian Wars has been lately offered by V. Parker, "The Dates of the Messenian Wars," *Chiron* 21 (1991) 25–47.]

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

Pheidon of Argos	Argive domination of Aigina	669—Hysiai 668—Pheidon's anolympiad
		660/659 Messenian Revolt (<i>FGH</i> 244 F 334)
		658/7—Kypselos tyrant of Corinth
		c. 658–650 (?)—death of Pheidon
		644—Outbreak of Tyrtaean War
		c. 640 (?)—Prokles tyrant of Epidauros
		post-640—Aristokrates betrays Messenians
Leokedes and Meltas	Epidaurian control of Aigina	c. 638 (?)—marriage of Periander and Melissa
		c. 628—accession of Periander
		c. 620–615—visit of Lykophron to Prokles
Elective kingship Damokratidas king		c. 618–613—fall of Prokles, raid of Amphikrates on Aigina
		c. 610–594—foundation of Naukratis
	Independent oligarchy on Aigina	c. 610–595—alliance between Corinth and Miletos
		c. 600—subjugation of Messenia
Oligarchy		after c. 600—beginnings of Aiginetan coinage
		c. 595–590—war between Athens and Aigina
		586—death of Periander

least one other flare-up belongs in the second half of the century. Thus one may link an anolympiad in 644 with the Tyrtaeon war (a view supported by Sosibios' date of 637: Hier. *Chron.* 96b [Helm]; cf. Paus. 6.22.2). Spartan victories culminating c. 650 would be contemporary with the decline of Argos marked by the accession of the Kypselids, Orthagorids, and Prokles, and by the re-emergence of centers independent of Argos in the Akte. Halieis, which later had a Spartan garrison, saw its acropolis fortified c. 650.⁵⁵

Later in the seventh century, it is the unity and orientation of the Arkadians which provides an indication of the general Peloponnesian balance of power. The Arkadians are prominent as allies of the Messenians, an emphasis supported by Tyrtaeus (fr. 8 W; *POxy.* 3316). The treason of their king, Aristokrates of Orkhomenos, at the Battle of the Great Trench was the turning point for the rebels.⁵⁶ Although our information here is bound up in the career of the Messenian hero Aristomenes, a victim or target of opportunity for later legend-making, there is no reason to doubt that at first Aristokrates and the Arkadians supported the Messenians.⁵⁶ Aristokrates' daughter, Eristheneia, became the wife of Prokles of Epidaurus (DL 1.94; Heracleides Ponticus fr. 144 W; cf. Paus. 8.5.13). This conjunction is significant, as the marriage between Prokles of pro-Argive Epidaurus (i.e., before Prokles' seizure of the tyranny, as this must be) and the daughter of Aristokrates, an anti-Spartan dynast (before his change of sides) cannot have been without political significance. Eventually, Aristokrates was executed because he betrayed the Messenians to Sparta. His son-in-law Prokles led Epidaurus away from Argos toward closer ties with Corinth, apparently a friend of Sparta.⁵⁷

After 650, the Spartans were absorbed in Messenia (in the Tyrtaeon War), struggling against resistance and lured by further conquests. A first sign of Argive exploitation of this situation might have been the victory in Arkadia of the unnamed Argive king whom we have identified as Meltas. The repudiation and execution of Aristokrates might have opened an opportunity for Argive intervention. Instead of distributing captured lands to Argive settlers, the king restored it to fugitive Arkadians. For this, he was exiled and ended his days in Tegea as an honored guest. By this gesture, the Tegeans may have meant to encourage a non-confiscatory policy of resistance to Sparta at Argos.

55. Arkadians and Messenians: Paus. 4.17.2-10 (the Battle of the Trench); the anti-Spartan coalition: Apollodorus *FGH* 244 F 334 (Strabo 8.4.10 C362); Aristokrates' downfall: Paus. 4.22.1-7, cf. 8.5.13; Kallisthenes *FGH* 124 F 23 (Polybius 4.33.2-6).

56. On Aristomenes, see, for example, L. Pearson, "The Pseudo-History of Messenia and its Authors," *Historia* 11 (1962) 397-426; H.T. Wade-Gery, "The 'Rhianos-Hypothesis'," in E. Badian (ed.), *Ancient Society and Institutions: Studies Presented to Victor Ehrenberg* (Oxford 1966) 289-302.

57. Corinthian help to Sparta in the "Second Messenian War": Paus. 4.15.8. Pausanias (4.11.1) also has Corinth helping Sparta in earlier fighting (eighth century). Corinthian help to Sparta in the initial conquest of Messenia may be supported by the evidence that the exiled Bakkhiads later fled to Sparta (Plut. *Lys.* 1.2). There is no certainty, however, that this is not a backdating of their friendship. At some point, the Bakkhiad poet Eumelos wrote a hymn for a Messenian *theōris* to Delos (*PMG* 696, cf. Paus. 4.4.1). See Huxley *Early Sparta* 34-35, n. 199.

At the same time, the agitation for land allotments in Argos may suggest that the Spartan *klēroi* in Messenia had become the envy of the Argive hoplites. If the Argives repudiated a philo-Arkadian policy supported by the last Temenid in the late seventh century, it would explain how Aristodemos, son of Aristokrates, could be described as the ruler of nearly all Arkadia, after the fall of his father for his Laconism (DL 1.94).

While Meltas' achievements in Arkadia may have been in some sense stillborn, in the last quarter of the seventh century, Argos seems to have started decisively on the road to strategic recovery. A Spartan defeat at Orkhomeos, recorded by Theopompus (*FGH* 115 F 69; cf. DL 1.114) and supposedly predicted by the Cretan seer Epimenides, should belong in this period.⁵⁸ Perhaps, a Spartan force coming against the Argives or their Arkadian allies was defeated. A defeat predicted by Epimenides would fit chronologically, if Epimenides was active in the late seventh or early sixth century, as the story that he purified Athens after the Kylonian affair suggests (Plut. *Solon* 12.6–12; DL 1.110–11). Other Argive successes were registered against Laconizing neighbors who had exploited the weakness of the last Temenids.

Argos, under Damokratidas, a non-Temenid, achieved a major victory in taking Nauplia and expelling its inhabitants at a date toward the end of the seventh century, approximately at the end of the conflict in Messenia. The Nauplians were accused by the Argives of siding with Sparta (Paus. 4.35.2; Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 383). In light of the garrison at Halieis, this charge should not be dismissed as a pretext, and, moreover, the Nauplian espousal of Sparta quite possibly transcended moral support. The expulsion of the Nauplians may indicate a putting into effect of the land distribution policy that had been rejected by the exiled king. The Spartans settled the surviving Nauplians in Messenia (as they granted sanctuary to the Asineans after the First Messenian War). This parallels the exiled Argive king's restoration of land to the Arkadian fugitives. The phenomenon of harboring refugees from each other's region is significant, and shows the inbuilt split of the Peloponnesus into Argive and Spartan camps.⁵⁹

The destruction of the Spartan force at Halieis c. 590–80 shows the continuing improvement in Argive fortunes. As Halieis is separated from Lakonia by the Argolic Gulf, Spartan occupation had pointed up a state of Argive

58. Cf. D.M. Leahy, "The Spartan Defeat at Orchomenus," *Phoenix* 12 (1958) 141–65.

59. This interpretation of Argive-Spartan relations is strongly at variance with that of T. Kelly ("The Traditional Enmity between Sparta and Argos: the Birth and Development of a Myth," *AHR* 75 [1970] 971–1003; *id.*, *Argos* 49–50, 64–65, 73–77). Kelly has criticized the traditional view of a long-standing enmity between Argos and Sparta as a dominant factor in Peloponnesian history. To him, such hostility only came into being after the Spartan alliance with Tegea. However, he errs in believing that the Spartans only had access to the Argolid through Tegea (cf. G.L. Huxley, rev. *A History of Argos*, *Canadian Journal of History* 12 [1977–1978] 394–96). He also underestimates the role of Arkadia as an area of contest for Argive and Spartan imperialism. The evidence about the Spartan garrison at Halieis and the new papyrus of Tyrtaeus represent strong added support against his views.

impotence, much as the membership of Mycenae and Tiryns in the Spartan-led Hellenic League was to indicate the unfavorable military situation of Argos in the early fifth century. It is possible that Sparta had already been encroaching on Kynouria, with its port at Prasiai, an excellent jumping-off point for intervention in the Argolic Akte. Yet, in c. 550, Kynouria had been in Argive hands for a period of time (Hdt. 1.82.2). A similar conclusion is drawn from the eventual recovery of hegemony over Kleonai in the 570s (witnessed by the foundation of the Nemean Games), in the immediate vicinity of Argos. Even when the Spartans had suppressed the Messenians toward the end of the seventh century, ill-conceived designs for helotizing Tegea absorbed Spartan energies during the reigns of kings Leon and Hegesikles, c. 580-60 (Hdt. 1.65-68). The Spartan war with Tegea will have acted as a buffer, helping to insulate the Argolid from Spartan interference.>>

This period of Argive revival seems to offer a reasonable background for the narrative in Herodotus on Aiginetan independence and the early war with Athens. Argos had recovered the friendship and alliance of the Aiginetans, and is powerful enough to send an expedition across to the island (but see pp. 44-45 below for cautionary words on the historicity of the Argive intervention). Herodotus informs us that the Argives crossed over from Epidauros at a time when the Aiginetans were raiding that city. If we suppose that Epidauros had been assaulted and taken by Corinth not so many years before, the cause of Epidauros' impotence is understandable. The Argive army would be crossing through Epidaurian territory either because the Epidaurians were powerless to prevent the passage, or perhaps because, by now, the Argives had taken Epidauros or some part of its territory. In either case, the Aiginetan raids would have contributed to the Epidaurian plight. The following tentative series of events may be offered: destruction of Nauplia; intervention at Epidauros (?) and aid to Aigina; attack on Halieis; and recovery of Kleonai.

CONCLUSION

Aigina enjoyed a favorable sequence of external events which coincided with and may have contributed to the growth of the island's economy. Before 650, Aigina stood in a perioecic relationship to Argos, whence she received political leadership, and, presumably, military protection.⁶⁰ In return, Aigina, where piracy, peddling, and the slave trade were probably the most important sources of wealth, acted as a maritime adjunct to agrarian, inward-looking Argos. When Argos became weak after 650, Epidauros usurped hegemony over Aigina. If Aiginetan low-scale commerce within the Peloponnesus was becoming important, they could not be insensitive to the balance of power in the region which had swung so decisively away from Argos. Epidaurian dominance turned out to be a piece of good fortune for the Aiginetans, since Epidauros proved weaker in the long run than Argos might well have been. At a

60. See Figueira *Aegina* 184-90.

time when sources of grain outside the Greek world were not yet a major factor, Epidauros had only four times the arable land of Aigina. Thus, the potential of the Epidauria to support an agricultural population for providing hoplites was not so great that it could not be offset by a modest tapping of non-agricultural sources of income by the Aiginetans. So, Aiginetan seapower, even in its infancy, probably provided enough military force to break away from Epidauros. During the second half of the seventh century, certain characteristic features of Aiginetan society evolved (the assimilation of outsiders into the population, long-distance trade, and *xenia*-type relationships with customers and sources of goods). This process may have served to alienate the Aiginetans from Epidauros. The fifth-century political elite of Aigina, as can be seen from the *epinicia* of Pindar, emphasized its promotion of guest-friendship and of justice to foreigners. When the Aiginetans had to go to Epidauros to conduct their legal affairs, these evolving characteristics of the Aiginetan communal *persona* may well have been frustrated.

The fall of Prokles at the hands of Periander provided an opportunity for the Aiginetans to break free of outside domination. It was again their good fortune to find that their former *hēgemōn*, Argos, had recovered sufficiently so as to help Aigina against its enemies. Aiginetan naval power (with the commercial activity that provided its underpinning) had grown to the extent that Argos could no longer dominate Aigina, but only become its ally. It is for this reason the Aiginetan membership in that shadowy cult organization, the Kalaorian Amphictyony, yields an interesting indication. Aigina appears along with Epidauros, Nauplia, and Prasiai, all presumably as charter members of an amphictyony which began c. 700 or a little later.^{60a} These four states probably fell under the hegemony of Argos at the time of their initial association. Later Argos acted for Nauplia and Sparta for Prasiai, but the relationship of Aigina with Argos never again became hegemonic. After independence, Aigina was able to resist the hostility of its Saronic Gulf neighbors, Corinth and Athens, as the island had earlier held off its maritime rival Samos. The characteristic political aloofness of Aigina is a product of these years. So is its only exception, friendship with Argos, whose infantry provided a complementary military force to Aiginetan seapower.

60a. Our unique testimonium is Strabo 8.6.14 C374. Yet, it is likely that Strabo depends on Ephorus here, because he cites him for Poseidon's lordship over Kalaureia (*FGH* 70 F 150) and also notes a myth (which probably had an aetiological significance for the cult) to the effect that Poseidon had traded Delos for Kalaureia. Other members of the Amphictyony were Hermione, Athens, and Boiotian Orkhomenos. For a reconstruction, see Figueira *Aegina* 185–88, 219–20.

Herodotus on the Early Hostilities Between Aigina and Athens

THE DESCRIPTION by Herodotus of the early confrontation between Aigina and Athens (5.82–88) stimulates both historical and historiographical inquiry. Calculations of probability, shaped by modern historical sensibility, can be applied to determine which elements of the account accurately report archaic events. As there are no accounts of these events which are fundamentally independent of Herodotus (cf. Duris *FGH* 76 F 24; Paus. 2.30.4), a historical reconstruction of the early hostilities between Athens and Aigina, as opposed to a validation of all or part of Herodotus' narrative, is impossible.¹ An appraisal of the historicity of the data presented is affected by analysis of the methods and purposes of the historian. This section of the narrative offers a promising field for an investigation into Herodotus' methodology, because different types of data are united here, and because varying accounts by Athenians, Aiginetans, and Argives are explicitly juxtaposed. In turn, a determination of the nature of Herodotus' assimilation of his evidence allows us to hypothesize about this source material in its original form. Thus, while only some statements in Herodotus accurately describe archaic Aigina and Athens, we are amply compensated for the loss of material about the archaic period with a better understanding of the attitudes and preoccupations of Herodotus' contemporaries.

Herodotus' careful, relatively detailed treatment of the episode bespeaks his interest in the interrelations of Athens and Aigina. The importance given to the three bouts of hostility between Aigina and Athens (5.82–88; 5.79–81, 89–90.1; 6.49–50.3, 61–73, 85–93) mirrors the attitudes of his informants. When Athenians and Aiginetans thought of each other, they thought primarily of past violent encounters. The historian as passive observer was prey to their emphasis because he could not decide what was historically significant in isolation from his informants/audience. To this extent, the establishment of deeds *μεγάλα τε καὶ θωμαστά* 'great and marvelous' was a social process, where the original topics about which the historian questioned his informants were amplified by an exposure to the preoccupations which they expressed. Nonetheless, Herodotus utilized the Athenian-Aiginetan conflict to serve the themes of his history. Important factors in forming the policy of Athens and Aigina during Xerxes' campaign, the treatment of which was the centerpiece of the

1. My treatment may be compared with T.J. Dunbabin, "Ἐχθρη παλαίη," *BSA* 37 (1936–1937) 83–91. See notes 5, 8, 10, 17, 20, 38 below. A determination of the date of Aiginetan independence is quite another matter, inasmuch as a body of independent data can be adduced. See pp. 28–33 above.

work, were that Athenian ships, built for use against Aigina, were available for service against Persia (7.144.1–2) and that the war between Aigina and Athens had been mediated by the Hellenic League (7.145.1). These hostilities, to which the Athenian naval program was a response, began c. 490 in reaction to Aiginetan submission to Persia (6.49.1–2). The Medizing was the final result of the πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος, 'Heraldless War' opened by the Aiginetan attack on the Attic coast in c. 506 (5.79–81). Significantly Herodotus appended the Damia/Auxesia episode and the early hostilities to his treatment of this Aiginetan decision to attack Attica in the late sixth century. The Aiginetans were prompted by the ἔχθρη παλαιή 'ancient hatred' toward Athens begun by the early hostilities.

A summary is in order here. The people of Epidauros, suffering from a crop failure, were advised by Delphi to dedicate images in Attic olive wood of the goddesses Damia and Auxesia (Hdt. 5.82.1–2). For the wood, the Epidaurians were to perform annual sacrifice to Athena Polias and Erekhtheus (82.3). The Aiginetans, rebels from Epidauros, appropriated the statues (83.1–3). The Athenians tried to vindicate their rights diplomatically, but eventually sent a force against Aigina (84–85.1). Ensuing events were reported differently by Aiginetans and Athenians. The Athenians spoke of sending a trireme, while the Aiginetans asserted that the Athenians could not have come without many ships (85.1, 86.1–2). The Athenians claimed that thunder and an earthquake occurred simultaneously with a fit of madness that overcame their men, who killed each other (85.2). The Aiginetans added that the statues sank to their knees to thwart Athenian theft, and that an Argive force attacked the Athenians (86.3–4; cf. Themist. *Or.* 4.56c Downey [= 65 Dindorf]). All agree that there was a single Athenian survivor. The Aiginetans and Argives claimed that the Athenians were slain by the Argives, while the Athenians blamed the aforementioned supernatural occurrences (87.1–2). The survivor was slain on his return by the wives of his dead comrades, by means of dress pins (87.2). Thereupon, Athenian women were made to discard Dorian dress for the Ionian style, which lacked pins (87.3). The Argives and Aiginetans commemorated these events by using pins (until Herodotus' time) half again as long as those used previously, and by dedicating pins in the shrine of Damia and Auxesia. Also, the introduction of Attic products, especially pottery, into the sanctuary was forbidden (88.2–3).|

AETIOLOGIES

Much of the material in the narrative appears to have had an original rationale in providing aetiological explanations for fifth-century customs, either specifically concerning cult or involving social mores in general. The kneeling statues of Damia and Auxesia are traced to their resistance to theft. The impious behavior of the Athenians explains the prohibition against the introduction of Attic products into the sanctuary. The practice of dedicating *περόναι* 'dress pins' in the sanctuary was created to commemorate the brutality of the Athenian women toward the expedition's survivor. All this is

aetiological in the strictest sense: it explains cult practice. An inscription of the Attic colony, established on Aigina in 431, recording that many iron pins (346) were stored in the sanctuary, supports Herodotus' observation that pins were dedicated there.²

Herodotus was otherwise well informed about the cult. He knew the name (Oie), the location (*ἐς τὴν μεσόγαιαν*), and distance from the city (c. 20 stades) of the cult place (5.83.2). According to Herodotus, sacrifices and female choruses celebrated the goddesses' rites (83.3). Ten men were chosen as *χορηγοί* to each of the deities. The choruses ridiculed the women of Aigina (83.3). These rites were the same as those performed at Epidauros, but there were also mystery rites in that city. The willingness of Herodotus to vouch for the continued wearing of longer dress pins (mistaken though this may be) by the women of Argos and Aigina until his own time (*ἔτι καὶ ἐς ἐμὲ*) goes back to personal experience, a visit to the island, and probably also to the sanctuary itself (5.88.3; cf. 1.92.1; 2.122.2; 2.130.1).³ There Herodotus collected material from Aiginetans claiming to be knowledgeable both about the cult of Damia and Auxesia and about local history. From the perspective of the Aiginetans, a foundation story for the cult of Damia and Auxesia lies behind the account in Herodotus.

Since the posture of the statues, the prohibition of Attic pottery, and the practice of dedicating pins are motivated by details within the story of the Athenian attack, Herodotus' informants must have believed that they were unusual, needing special explanation. Nevertheless, the association of Damia and Auxesia with fertility is clear and kneeling statues of deities connected with childbirth can be paralleled.⁴ But the comparative rarity of similar statues might have prompted the Aiginetans to seek a special cause. The dedication of pins in itself does not demand a specific cause, as excavation has attested similar deposits elsewhere.⁵ Herodotus' statement that Aiginetan and Argive women adopted and still wore longer pins in commemoration of this affair is refuted by archaeological data (see n. 16 below). A shift to longer pins does not appear in the material remains, and at no time during the archaic period did the pins

2. *IG* IV 1588.10–14, 27, 35–37, 40–44, where Damia = Mnia. See P. Jacobsthal, *Greek Pins and their Connexions with Europe and Asia* (Oxford 1956) 90–91, 97–100.

3. See F. Jacoby, "Herodotos," *RE* Supplbd. 2 (Stuttgart 1913) cols. 205–520, esp. 268–69.

4. R. Carpenter, *Observations on Familiar Statuary in Rome*, *Amer. Acad. Rome* 18 (1941) 54–59; F. Dümmler, "Auxesia," *RE* 2.2, cols. 2616–18. Parallel are the statues of Eileithyia at Tegea (Paus. 8.48.7), and of an unidentified goddess from Sparta. See B. Palma, "ΑΡΤΕΜΙΣ ὈΠΘΙΑ?", *ASAA* 52–53 (1974–1975) 301–7. Cf. *AD* 24 B'1 (1969) 131. I should like to thank Professor B.S. Ridgway of Bryn Mawr College for information on kneeling posture in archaic and classical art. See the Endnote (pp. 57–58 below) for comparative material on Damia and Auxesia.

5. Note the similar women's dedications to Artemis Brauronia (cf. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Aristoteles und Athen* [Berlin 1893] 2.282). See particularly the excavation reports of P. Papadimitriou: *Praktika* (1945–1950, 1955–1959); *Ergon* (1956–1962); *BCH* 73–75 (1949–1951); *BCH* 82–87 (1958–1963). See also Dunbabin *BSA* (1936–1937) 86; and Jacobsthal *Greek Pins* 100–5 for deposits elsewhere.

worn by Argive and Aiginetan women differ significantly from those of their neighbors. This error of Herodotus, in turn, makes it difficult to reconstruct what the Aiginetans originally reported about the use of *peronai* and what facets of the cult they intended to explain by this motif.

The prohibition against the use in the sanctuary of Attic pots seems to have been unusual enough to demand some special cause. The prohibition, generalized to the entire island, has been used to date the episode by seeking a time when Attic imports are in default on Aigina.⁶ Thus, most recently, Coldstream dates the early war in the mid-eighth century, since pots of Attic LG Ib have not been discovered on Aigina.⁷ However, a generalization of the ban seems to go beyond the text of Herodotus: *προσφέρειν πρὸς τὸ ἱρόν*, 'to introduce into the sanctuary'. The *αὐτόθι*, 'on the spot' which locates where it was a *νόμος* 'law' to drink from local vessels, refers to the *τὸ ἱρόν* of the previous phrase. Corroboration is provided by the way in which Athenaeus cites this passage (11.502C): *Ἡρόδοτος δ' ἐν τῇ πέμπτῃ τῶν ἱστοριῶν νόμον φησὶ θέσθαι Ἀργείους καὶ Αἰγινήτας Ἀττικὸν μηδὲν προσφέρειν πρὸς τὰς θυσίας μηδὲ κέραμον, ἀλλ' ἐκ χυτρίδων ἐπιχωρίων τὸ λοιπὸν αὐτόθι εἶναι πίνειν*. Clearly he understood the prohibition to apply only in religious contexts, although possibly generalized beyond the cult of Damia and Auxesia alone.

Moreover, a general ban is not aetiological in the same sense as an explanation for the kneeling statues, as it goes beyond explaining facets of the cult of Damia and Auxesia. It is also noteworthy that the prohibition is against anything Attic, not only pottery. If generalized to the entire island, such a total embargo would certainly have forbidden the importation of other Athenian craft goods, and might also have prohibited Athenian grain, olive oil, silver, and slaves. Seen in this perspective, the ban (like other embargoes) seems at least as damaging to its imposers, the Aiginetans, as to its victims, the Athenians. If a ban against anything Attic ever existed, it is unlikely that it could have lasted long. Also, Herodotus' Aiginetan informants seemed to have told him about fifth-century conditions. A ban in the past would be the single exception.

The dating of a general ban against pottery alone is equally problematical. To date it, one would need to isolate a period during which no Attic pots were found on Aigina. Such a hypothesis as that of Coldstream, based on the absence of Attic LG Ib, could be confounded by a few finds on an island where relatively few sites have been excavated. Although previous scholars did not have Coldstream's exact classification of Geometric pottery, nevertheless, one may note that scholars like Welter and Kraiker had no eighth-century hiatus in Attic importations.⁸ The supposition that Attic pots were never totally absent but fell

6. See, e.g., beginning of the seventh century: P.N. Ure, *The Origin of Tyranny* (Cambridge 1922) 167-68, 314-20; mid-sixth century (ban valid for Argos too): J.C. Hoppin, "The Vases and Vase Fragments," in C. Waldstein (ed.), *Argive Heraeum* (Boston & New York 1902-1905) 2.57-184, esp. 174-76; *id.*, "The Argive Exclusion of Attic Pottery," *CR* 12 (1898) 86-87.

7. J.N. Coldstream, *Greek Geometric Pottery* (London 1968) 361 n. 10; *id.*, *Geometric Greece* (New York 1977) 135.

8. See Welter *Aigina*, table on p. 129; also W. Kraiker, *Aigina: Die Vasen des 10. bis 7.*

in numbers is difficult to reconcile with the notion of a ban. To prove the general prohibition, one must assume that it did not work completely and there is not much to be said for the logic of such an argument. And if the ban did not work, why could the Aiginetans not anticipate that it would not be successful and devise some surer response to the Athenians. In addition, when the prominence of Aiginetan merchants (like Sostratos) in the sixth-century trade in Attic pots is recalled, the prohibition becomes an embarrassment to Herodotus' Aiginetan contemporaries rather than a reminder of Athenian impiety.⁹ Therefore, it remains preferable to cleave to a literal and narrow construal of Herodotus, i.e., the prohibition was limited to the sanctuary.¹⁰ The prohibition seemed especially odd to fifth-century Aiginetans and their visitors, since Athenian fifth-century pottery was otherwise common in sacred and profane contexts on the island. Hence, Herodotus singled out pottery among Athenian goods with the phrase *μήτε κεράμουν* (cf. 4.76.1). A linking of the ban with an early war with Athens made for a dramatic rationale for the practice.

There is, however, no certainty that the prohibition had to be old. In the 480s, after the failure of the Athenian-backed popular uprising, the Athenians established Aiginetan fugitives at Sounion (6.90). From there, they raided their homeland. Architectural changes made in the temple of Aphaia may have been to protect against raids by the exiles.¹¹ Similarly, the exiles possibly tried to carry off the statues of Damia and Auxesia. If so, a historical raid has been lost amid aetiological speculation. Moreover, the ban fits the tone of Aiginetan-Athenian relations in the first half of the fifth century. Yet, a specific "cause" for the ban may not indeed be necessary. In c. 506, there had begun the *πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος* between the two states, whose name "Heraldless War" denotes a conflict outside the conventions of international relations.¹² Thus, even without a specific act of impiety, a spirit of anti-foreign exclusiveness (like the exclusion of Dorians from the Acropolis [Hdt. 5.72.3], which was used against Kleomenes) caused Athenian goods to be considered polluted, at least for use in a fertility cult, closely associated with the collective existence of the community.¹³ A belief, however, that Dorian Aigina was different from

Jahrhunderts v. Chr. (Berlin 1951) 23–25, 26–29, 84–92. See also Dunbabin *BSA* (1936–1937) 84, 89. [W. Felten, "Attische schwarzfigurige und rotfigurige Keramik," in *Alt-Agina* 2.1.23–55, esp. 23.]

9. Note Hdt. 4.152.3. See A.W. Johnston, "The Rehabilitation of Sostratos," *PdclP* 27 (1972) 416–23; F.D. Harvey, "Sostratos of Aegina," *PdclP* 31 (1976) 206–14; cf. M. Torelli, "Il santuario di Hera a Gravisca," *PdclP* 26 (1971) 44–67. On Aiginetan trade with Athens and in Athenian goods, see Figueira *Aegina* 145–46, 237–51, 269–71.

10. Dunbabin *BSA* (1936–1937) 84–85.

11. G. Welter, "Aeginetica I–XII," *AA* (1938) cols. 1–33, esp. I, col. 3. Cf. H. Thiersch, "Aeginetische Studien, II," *NGG* (1928) 167–94, esp. 168–71 who blames Nikodromos' raiders for the destruction of one set of East Pedimental sculptures.

12. Hdt. 5.81.2. See A. Andrewes, "Athens and Aegina, 510–480 B.C.," *BSA* 37 (1936–1937) 1–7, esp. 1–2.

13. F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques* (Paris 1969) #110 is a Parian inscription seeming to contain a prohibition against participation in a cult by a Dorian *xenos*. The document

Ionian Athens might have been a factor in excluding Athenian pottery from the sanctuary at any time after Solon, who emphasized that Athens was an Ionian community (fr. 4a.2 W; cf. Strabo 14.1.3 C632–33; Paus. 7.2.1–4; *Suda* s.v. Πανύσεις, π 248, some of which reflects Pherecydes *FGH* 3 F 155). In conclusion, the ban on Athenian pottery in the sanctuary of Damia and Auxesia would have seemed appropriate to fifth-century Aiginetans. This recognition does not decisively controvert, however, an early inception for the prohibition. [For more on the ban on Attic pottery, see Appendix I, below.]

Herodotus reserves or suspends judgment at several points in recounting this aetiological material. That Attica alone produced olive trees at the time of the Epidaurian request for olive wood is introduced by λέγεται (5.82.2).¹⁴ Herodotus suggests that a belief in the especially sacred quality of Attic olive wood was the reason. Where motivations were at issue such as here, it was possible for him to rationalize, but he could not when statements of fact unacceptable to him were made. Herodotus observes that it is unbelievable to him that the statues went to their knees to resist capture (ἐμοὶ μὲν οὐ πιστὰ λέγοντες), but that it is believable to some other (person) (ἄλλω δέ τῳ) (5.86.3). Here Herodotus is not envisaging that a member of his audience will be more gullible than he, especially given his strong disavowal. Rather, the ἄλλος τις is his informant(s) who received an incredible story from his source and credulously transmitted it to Herodotus (cf. 4.42.4 for similar phrasing).

Herodotus' source(s) of information was close to Aigina's ruling oligarchy, as he possessed a detailed understanding of the conduct of the cult of Damia and Auxesia. Regarding the fifth-century conflict between the two states, Herodotus was particularly well informed about the defiance by the Aiginetan Krios of the Spartan king Kleomenes on the eve of Marathon, even knowing about Kleomenes' wordplay on Krios' name (6.50.3). He was also aware that Kleomenes later sent Krios to Athens as a hostage (6.73.2). Moreover, Herodotus knew of Krios' son Polykritos, a winner of the individual *aristeia* at Salamis (8.93.1). Polykritos had confronted Themistokles at that battle in an interchange in which the advantage was to the Aiginetan (8.92.2). Presumably the anecdote had an Aiginetan source. The prominence of Polykritos at Salamis may have induced Herodotus to interview Polykritos or a relative, if he was unavailable.¹⁵

is very damaged, but possible readings for l. 2 are Δ[αμ]ῶν, the name of a festival in honor of Demeter, and Κόρη Ασπί, whose mention certainly would suggest the notion of a fertility specifically civic. Observe also that the prohibition of Megarian entry into the Agora (cf. Thuc. 1.139.1–2; Plut. *Per.* 29.4, 30.3; DS 12.39.4–5), a focus of religious as well as economic life, by the Megarian Decree(s) is parallel to the prohibition on Attic products.

14. R.W. Macan, *Herodotus: The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Books* (London 1895) 1.228, citing 4.184.3, 5.42.1.

15. See Jacoby *RE* Supplbd. 2 (1913) 269, cf. 459–60. A second possibility would be Pytheas, son of Iskhenos (7.181.1; 8.92.1) or a relative (cf. Lampon, son of Pytheas [9.78.1–79.2]; Pytheas, son of Lampon [Pin. *Nem.* 5.4, 43; *Isth.* 5.19–21, 6.58; cf. fr. 4 S/M; Bacchyl. 13.191 S/M]).

Good local information may be contrasted with the statement, incorrect on the basis of material remains, that dress pins were made longer and continued so in celebration of this incident.¹⁶ His Aiginetan informants, knowing about contemporary dress, could not have been his source. Their account was meant only to explain cult practices, not social mores. If Herodotus based his conclusion on long pins, which he saw in the sanctuary, he extrapolated incorrectly. In doing so, he provided a symmetrical counterpart to the Athenian abandonment of pins.

Consider now the pins themselves of the inscribed inventory of the sanctuary (*IG* IV 1588). They are iron, which was no longer in general use as a material for pins after the Protogeometric period.¹⁷ There are three alternatives to explain the deposit: 1) the deposit was dedicated after a Protogeometric war; 2) old pins were dedicated in the archaic period; and 3) Protogeometric-style pins continued to be dedicated. The improbability that a Protogeometric war was remembered tells against the first. The fragility of iron pins argues against both the first and second. While some of the pins are specifically said to be fragments, whole *peronai* appear to predominate. This leaves the last, the dedication of iron pins being traditionally preserved. An Aiginetan aetiology attempted to explain the dedication of these pins of a much earlier type in material and perhaps in size, not the use of long pins by fifth-century women as Herodotus may have thought.¹⁸

Let us now consider the Athenian sequel to the attempted theft of the statues, a change from Dorian to Ionian dress (from pinned peplos to unpinned chiton). The artificial character of this explanation is apparent. A widespread, gradual change in custom is said to have had a single cause, to have been legislated, and to have taken place instantaneously. Yet, the change from Dorian to Ionian style dress has been used to date the early hostilities between Athens and Aigina, placed thereby c. 560 or 550.¹⁹ The actual change took place in the first half of the sixth century, with a range of 575–50 or 550–30.²⁰ An upper limit for the transition is the initial appearance of the chiton in Ionia, dated to 580–70.²¹

16. Jacobsthal *Greek Pins* 90–91. See also Dunbabin *BSA* (1936–1937) 87–88, who, however, implausibly introduces the supposed money in spits of Pheidon of Argos and an even more improbable money in pins.

17. Jacobsthal *Greek Pins* 87–89, 98–99. See also A.M. Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece* (Edinburgh 1971) 225–28, 269.

18. Jacobsthal *Greek Pins* 99. G. Welter, "Aeginetica XIII–XXIV," *AA* (1938) cols. 480–540, esp. 496–97, 512–17, reports a chamber tomb (the characteristic elite burial form on Aigina), dated in the late seventh or early sixth century, containing two iron pins.

19. See the references in Ure *Tyranny* 168–70. Note the scepticism of Dunbabin *BSA* (1936–1937) 85–86.

20. G.M.A. Richter, *Korai: Archaic Greek Maidens* (London 1968) 9–10; L. Bonfante, *Etruscan Dress* (Baltimore 1975) 38, 119–20, n. 32–33.

21. Bonfante *Etruscan Dress* 38, who rightly emphasizes that two changes (not merely the one in Herodotus) are at issue: first, sewn chiton to pinned peplos, and then peplos to chiton. See also J. Boardman, "Two Archaic Korai in Chios," *Antike Plastik* 1 (1962) 43–45.

Who told Herodotus about the change of dress at Athens? Superficially, an Athenian source ought to balance an Aiginetan source on the practice of dedicating pins at the Damia/Auxesia sanctuary. However, as will become clear, the Aiginetans, Argives, and Athenians framed their versions of the dispute with an eye toward partisan interests. The account of the change in dress brings no luster to the Athenians. The brutal murder of the survivor puts both the Athenian women and their menfolk who could not control their behavior in a bad light. Also, an implied invidious comparison is made with Dorians like the Aiginetans who could still safely allow their women the use of *peronai*. On a symbolic level, the cult of Damia and Auxesia integrated the two genders, as expressed through the ritualized mockery of Aiginetan women. The Athenian intervention into the goddesses' affairs, however, merely exposed an Attic disequilibrium between men and women through the murder of the survivor.

This is one place where the derivative narrative of Duris can clearly be helpful (*FGH* 76 F 24), as it indicates that a polemic between Ionians and Dorians over the moral valence of their respective dress styles is involved here. As Duris notes, many Greeks, even in his own day (εἰς ἡμᾶς), described τὰς ἀχίτωνας 'those not wearing chitons' as playing the Dorian (δωριάζειν). The scholion to Euripides, supplying us with the fragment of Duris (*SEur. Hec.* 934 M [Schwartz]), also described Spartan girls spending their days ungirdled and chiton-less, while wearing a small *himation* pinned at one shoulder, and, for support, cites Callimachus (fr. 620a Pf.; cf. *EM s.v. δωριάζειν*, 293.40–47 Gaisford). To critical or lubricious Ionians, lightly-dressed young Dorians were φαινομηρίδας 'thigh-revealers' (Ibycus fr. 58, *PMG* 339), and the Dorian style was equivalent to nakedness (Anacreon fr. 54, *PMG* 399 in *SEur. Hec.* 934 M: ἐκδύσα κιθῶνα δωριάζειν).

It is against this mode of ethnically-grounded social comment that the story of the behavior of the Athenian women in our narrative must be assessed. The brutality of the Athenians with their *peronai* therefore can be viewed as a Dorian/Aiginetan counter-criticism in face of Ionian aspersions on Dorian clothing styles. For confirmation, a fragment of the Aiginetan historian Pythainetos may be noted (*FGH* 299 F 3). Here Melissa, daughter of Prokles of Epidauros, charms her future husband Periander. She is described as dressed in the Dorian style in what is perhaps a romantic prelude to her later tragedy.

Another aspect of the change in style of dress of the Athenians is its deflation of Attic cultural pretensions. That the Athenians initially used a style of dress based on that of their Dorian neighbors undercuts Athenian claims to cultural independence and preeminence. A similar effect is achieved by the observation that the Athenians next turned to copying the Ionians out of shame: as the founders of Ionia, they ought to have been leading. An obvious similarity between Athens and Ionia, the same style of dress, was thereby shown to have been assumed by the Athenians to suppress an embarrassing incident.

Moreover, the structure of the narrative by its division into Athenian and Aiginetan sub-sections after the introductory section (recounting the creation of

the statues and their appropriation by the Aiginetans) also suggests an Aiginetan provenience for the account of the change in dress. After the introductory section (5.82–84), *oratio obliqua* predominates. First the events are told from the Athenian standpoint: Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν νυν λέγουσι (85.1). This section concludes with a similar phrase: Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν νυν οὕτω λέγουσι γενέσθαι (86.1). The Aiginetan version begins with: Αἰγινῆται δέ (86.1). The Aiginetan account of Athenian actions (86.1–3) is followed by their version of their own counter-actions, introduced by σφέας δὲ Αἰγινῆται λέγουσι (86.4). What is said in this brief section is corroborated and closed: λέγεται μὲν νυν ὑπ’ Ἀργείων τε καὶ Αἰγινητέων τάδε (87.1). The Aiginetan version is then interrupted by a parenthesis explaining that the Athenians agreed on the existence of one survivor (87.1: ὁμολογέεται δὲ καὶ ὑπ’ Ἀθηναίων). To this Herodotus adds that the Argives claimed to have killed the other Athenians (Ἀργεῖοι μὲν λέγουσι), and that the Athenians attributed the result to divine intervention (87.2: Ἀθηναῖοι δέ). The rest of the narrative section, including the actions concerning the change in dress, proceeds, introduced by μέντοι in its progressive sense (87.2), in infinitive constructions without attribution. Herodotus states in the indicative the nature of the change in dress, noting the Karian origins of Ionian dress (87.3–88.1). The closing section of the narrative explains the actions of the Aiginetans and Argives to commemorate the impiety and defeat of the Athenians. An Aiginetan account clearly lies behind these data. The brutal killing of the survivor and the change in dress at Athens, told in indirect speech, should be interpreted as subordinated to an understood verb whose subject is Αἰγινῆται. Thus, Herodotus depends on Aiginetan material for the change in dress at Athens. The Athenian account of the fate of the survivor of the expedition is not reported, and there is no certainty that one ever existed.

An interest in styles of dress and their variety is one of Herodotus’ ethnographic preoccupations.²² However, the association of the change in dress with early hostilities between Aigina and Athens is not Herodotean speculation. Herodotus marks his own contributions by a shift from indirect speech to a finite construction (5.87.3–88.1): Athenian women had previously dressed like the Corinthians; the change in dress was the adoption of the chiton; Dorian dress was the original Hellenic style; and the Ionians and Athenians abandoned Hellenic dress for Karian. Although the last statement is not trivial inasmuch as he believed that the Ionians were Hellenized Pelasgians (1.56.2–3), by these footnotes Herodotus dulls the partisan edge to the contrast between Dorian and Ionian customs, implicit in the report of his Aiginetan informants.

Although modern scholars have used the change in dress to date these hostilities, there is no reason to think that the Aiginetans dated anything by it,

22. Herodotus on comparative dress: e.g., 1.135.1, 1.171.4–5, 1.195.1, 1.202.3, 1.215.1, 2.36.3–37.2, 3.98.4, 3.106.3, 4.23.2, 4.43.5, 4.106, 4.168.1, 4.189.1–2, 5.9.1, 7.61–87 (the army list of Xerxes). Less variable Greek dress called for fewer references, except where foreign dress is compared to it (1.195.1) or Greek dress was derived from non-Greeks (1.171.4–5; 4.189.1).

i.e., by intuitively comparing dedications in the sanctuary with Athenian statuary in Dorian dress. As can be seen from a sixth-century inscription recording a reconstruction at the Aphaia sanctuary in a particular priesthood, there could have been chronological data on the foundation of the cult of Damia and Auxesia.²³ Pindar's fifth-century Aiginetan patrons could tell him about ancestors' victories in the seventh and sixth centuries;²⁴ and the Aiginetans probably had a date (if only relative) for their independence from Epidaurus. The traditions of oligarchic families, some of whom continued to be important down to the mid-fifth century, ensured the survival of such information. Yet, the fantastic events which the Aiginetans incorporated into their account places the story in mythic, not historical time. To make their polemical point against the Athenians, the Aiginetans needed but one piece of information, that Athenians once wore Dorian dress.

Herodotus did not gather *logoi*, which existed in a pristine or raw state; rather, the process of collection shaped the material offered by his informants. Herodotus' intention to immortalize the heroic deeds of the Persian wars, in which (in this case) Aiginetan accomplishments had a prominent part, allowed him an initial means of approach to the Aiginetans. Much as an epic poet through knowledge of the glorious actions of heroes and his mastery of genealogy (along with his technical skill) established his authority with a Dark Age aristocratic audience, Herodotus needed to demonstrate to the Aiginetans of the mid-fifth century his historical skills promising contemporary immortality. This demonstration was accomplished through the oral presentation of previous *historiē*. The counterpart to this process of validation was a partial assimilation of Herodotean perspectives by the audience. Thus Herodotus' preoccupation with conspicuous, general social characteristics like dress and its evolution, and with (what we would call) acculturation was perhaps assimilated by the Aiginetans in order to create a treatment of the early hostilities with Athens more likely to be incorporated into the Herodotean repertoire.

POLEMICS AND PROPAGANDA

The various accounts of the Damia/Auxesia episode also shed light on the political situations and attitudes of fifth-century Aiginetans, Athenians, and Argives. But did Herodotus date the data of his Aiginetan sources early because of their marvelous features and because he accepted the axiom that the hostility between the two states must be very old? Then did he also date most of his Athenian information on the same affair to 490 because of the participation of Sophanes of Dekeleia, a fifth-century figure? Wilamowitz believed so and he cites similarities between the fighting described in the Damia and Auxesia incident and that in the conflict c. 490 as indicating that the same episode was the basis for both versions.²⁵ Yet similarities (e.g., the landing of

23. IG IV 1580. See M. Guarducci, *Epigrafia Greca* (Rome 1967-1978) 1.197-98; Jeffery *LSAG* 110-12.

24. E.g. Hegesimakhos and Praxidamos of the Bassid family (Pin. *Nem.* 6).

25. Wilamowitz *Aristoteles* 2.282-87; cf. Andrewes *BSA* (1936-1937) 1-2.

an Athenian expeditionary force and the intervention of the Argives) are explicable on the grounds that warfare between Athens and Aigina was not infinitely variable. The Athenians made expeditions against Aigina, and the Aiginetans called upon Argive infantrymen to complement their fleet twice, and perhaps on other occasions of which we know nothing. The character of the fighting was built into the geographical situation.

It is, however, unlikely that the Athenians could have penetrated to the Damia/Auxesia sanctuary at Oie in the Mesogaia c. 490. It would have been imprudent for them to detach a large force (strong enough to annihilate a picked corps of 1000 Argive hoplites) while an Aiginetan fleet of 70 triremes might reappear. The interior of the island, in any case, is rough terrain for the most part, scarcely the place to fight a hoplite engagement. The disparity between the results of the Argive intervention in the early war (annihilation of the Athenians) and in the fighting in the early 480s (their own annihilation) argues that the two accounts cannot derive from the same incident told variously by the citizens of the different cities. A drawn battle could conceivably have been represented in the traditions of both sides as a victory, but it strains belief that both Argives and Athenians claimed to have virtually annihilated the enemy's force. It is possible, however, that an Argive victory over the Athenians in the early war either was exaggerated to become an annihilation or, more probably, an Athenian disaster was invented by the Argives to balance the fifth-century destruction of their one thousand volunteers. Thus, it is a mirror-image of the fighting in the early 480s, not a garbled doublet of it.

The friendship between Argos and Aigina was old by the fifth century, as the Argive fining of the Aiginetans for collaboration with Kleomenes during the Sepeia campaign demonstrates (Hdt. 6.92.1–2). The appearance of the Argives in the early war, whether genuine or anachronistic, is not implausible. The testimony of the Argives, supporting the Aiginetans on the size and fate of the Athenian expedition, has been in the background of our discussion thus far. That both Argive and Aiginetan aristocrats shared a self-laudatory account of the early war points to continued ties between the two cities, at least sentimental, even after Athenian subjection of Aigina, when Herodotus was making his inquiries.

Yet, it is important to note that the Athenian treatment of the military phase of the episode is minimizing, and seeks to deflate the Argive and Aiginetan claims. Elements, however, in the narrative appear to be Aiginetan rebuttals to Athenian claims. For instance, the Aiginetans used an argument of probability to demonstrate that the Athenians did not come in a single ship. They could have repelled one ship even without ships themselves. Such an argument suggests that Herodotus had called an Athenian version to their attention. Therefore, although we cannot rule out that Herodotus questioned informants more than once about the incident—Attica and Aigina are indeed close to each other—it is probable that Herodotus had heard from the Athenians about the Damia/Auxesia affair before his trip to Aigina and the sanctuary.

Herodotus does not attribute his account down to the Athenian expedition to Aigina to any one of the participants. In a narrative where he is careful to distinguish what is controversial from what is not, it is hard to believe that impromptu story-telling can have been retold uncritically. As we shall see below, the tone of the introductory section is hardly pro-Aiginetan. As elsewhere in Herodotus, an anti-Aiginetan tone suggests non-Aiginetan informants (cf. e.g., 6.49.1–2; 6.91.1–2; 9.78–79; 9.80.3).²⁶ The data in the opening section of this narrative are possibly derived from Athenian informants. However, it should not be ruled out that Herodotus questioned the Epidaurians, since at the outset these events so closely concerned them. Epidaurian corroboration should convince us of the existence of independent traditions on the subject.

According to Herodotus, Aiginetan independence is to be associated with the islanders' building of ships and becoming *θαλασσοκράτορες*. This favorable military situation allowed the Aiginetans to commit acts of piracy against Epidauros. There is no reason to doubt that Aigina had once been under the control of Epidauros. The foundation stories which claim Epidaurian settlement of Aigina reflect historical claims (of eighth- or seventh-century vintage) to ownership of Aigina. The data which associate Prokles of Epidauros with Aigina point in the same direction.²⁷ Epidauros has as at least four times the arable land as Aigina. As long as both states drew mainly on their agricultural potential, Epidauros may have been strong enough to retain its hold over Aigina. Yet, when Aigina began to draw on resources outside the island through commerce (contributing to the growth of the Aiginetan navy), the islanders broke the grip of the Epidaurians. The sequence in Herodotus: subjection to Epidauros—growth of navy—independence from Epidauros—reprisal campaign against Epidauros, has at the very least a superficial plausibility (see pp. 17–23, 30–33 above).

The importance given here to seapower is redolent of views on military power that became firmly established during the Pentekontaeteia, when the dominant feature of international affairs was the hegemony of Athens over its allies through the application of seapower. Herodotus himself shows his appreciation of naval power when, for instance, he describes the tactical discussions among the Greek commanders before Salamis (8.49.1–2, 60β–62), or when he describes the military position of Polykrates of Samos (3.122.2). The decisive role of emergent Athenian naval power during Xerxes' campaign also receives emphasis (7.139.1–5).|

Perhaps the *locus classicus* for Greek ideas on the role of seapower is the "Archaeology" of Thucydides, where, in the general treatment of the growth of

26. At other times, Herodotus transmitted anti-Aiginetan material with a stronger element of personal judgment. For instance, he condemns their raid on Phaleron (5.81.2–3; 6.87) and by implication Aiginetan Medism (6.61.1; cf. 6.49.1–2).

27. Compare Hdt. 8.46.1 with Paus. 2.29.5; Strabo 8.6.16 C375; ΣPin. Nem. 3.1b for the Epidaurian colonization of Aigina, and *Ol.* 8.39a–b (cf. ΣPyth. 8.29a); Strabo C375 for Aigina as a colony of Argos. Prokles and Aigina: Plut. *Mor.* 403C–E; Pythainetos *FGH* 299 F 3. See pp. 17–19 above.

military power to the eve of the Peloponnesian War, the historian puts a special emphasis on the evolution of combat at sea.²⁸ He recognized, as did the "Old Oligarch", that seapower was a mode of military activity especially suited to imperialism.²⁹ Athenian seapower was linked with Athenian *πολυπραγμοσύνη*, which, although controversial, could still be defended.³⁰ The little information, however, that we have on Aiginetan seapower portrays it mainly in the negative. Here, as elsewhere in Herodotus, the Aiginetan climb to naval eminence goes hand in hand with a growth in arrogance among the islanders. In 5.81.2 the Aiginetans attack the Athenian coast because they are incited by their great prosperity, certainly a reference to Aiginetan commerce. In our episode, it is the Aiginetan acquisition of numbers of ships that permitted raids against Epidauros (83.2). The fact of the theft of sacred statues (along with the refusal either to return the statues or to tender the requisite ritual duties to the Athenian cults) may in itself be considered an implicit accusation against the Aiginetans. Nor is this interpretation limited to Herodotus. The account of Diodorus, based on Ephorus, on the hostilities between Athens and Aigina in the fifth century attributes responsibility for them to Aiginetan arrogance, which sprang from their naval and commercial power.³¹

Possibly, the Aiginetans told a different, perhaps laudatory, story about the circumstances under which they acquired the statues, and this account has not been transmitted. The Aiginetans made much of their upholding of the

28. Thuc. 1.4.1–5.1; 1.8.2–4; 1.9.3; 1.13.1–15.3. See *HCT* 1.120–26.

29. See also Thuc. 2.62.2–3, with [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.1–8, 11–16 (the term *θαλασσοκράτορες* appears in 2.2, 14). Cf. Plut. *Them.* 4.4–5 with Stesimbrotos *FGH* 107 F 2; Plato *Laws* 4.706B–E. In general, see A. Momigliano, "Seapower in Greek Thought," *Secondo Contributo alla Storia degli Studi Classici* (Rome 1960) 57–67.

30. The Corinthian speech at Sparta (Thuc. 1.69–71) is a distillation of criticism of Athenian activism. Yet, in the *Epitaphios*, *πολυπραγμοσύνη* is portrayed positively, even as an aspect of Athenian imperialism (2.40.1–5). Seapower was a dimension of *πολυπραγμοσύνη*. Urging the naval expedition against Syracuse, Alkibiades sees in *ἀπραγμοσύνη* the greatest threat (6.18.6–7), while the expedition may be undertaken safely because the Athenians will be *ναυκράτορες* of all the Sicilians (6.18.5). See V. Ehrenberg, "Polypragmosyne: A Study in Greek Politics," *JHS* 67 (1947) 45–67.

31. Herodotus emphasizes that *ἀγνωμοσύνη* went along with the growth of the Aiginetan fleet (5.83.1). The same term describes Ionian senselessness in the face of invitations of surrender at Lade (Hdt. 6.10). Compare Diodorus on the so-called "revolt" of Aigina (DS 11.70.2 [464/3]) where the Aiginetans are described as filled with *φρόνημα* 'pride' and on the war between Athens and Aigina (11.78.3–4) where they are said to have been arrogant (*πεφρονηματισμένους*). Ephorus, Diodorus' source, whose understanding of naval warfare was praised even by Polybius (*FGH* 70 T 20), seems to have seen seapower as a central factor in Aiginetan history (*FGH* 70 F 176). We may contrast the favorable appraisal of Aiginetan seapower which is prominent in Pindaric epinicia. There praise for Aiginetan justice and hospitality toward *ξένοι* is juxtaposed with epithets for the island like "long-oared", "famous for ships", and "ship-ruling daimon" (*Ol.* 8.19–23; *Nem.* 5.8–13; *Isth.* fr. 1.1–4; *Paian* 6.123–31). *Pythian* 8, in honor of Aristomenes of Aigina, opens with an invocation of the goddess Hesukhia, who makes cities great (8.1–20). Athenian activist imperialism is the implicit contrast. Yet, the very grandeur of the occasions graced by epinician celebration may have lent credibility to charges of Aiginetan arrogance. [On *Pythian* 8, see now Figueira *Colonization* 90–93 and pp. 215–16 below].

rights of *ξένοι* and of their justice in dealings involving themselves and foreigners (Pin. *Ol.* 8.19–30; *Nem.* 4.11–13; *Paian* 6.131–32). The success of the Aiginetans in commerce may have depended on legislation favorable to outsiders and a fair adjudication of “contractual” differences. That the Aiginetans had to conduct their legal affairs at Epidauros would have been irksome in such matters.³² One may hypothesize an Aiginetan treatment of their use of seapower against Epidauros that justified the raids as requital for injustices toward themselves and their *ξένοι*. Such a version might have been passed over by Herodotus because his non-Aiginetan sources agreed in such a negative judgment of the appropriation of the statues, an evaluation which coincided with other mid-fifth-century evaluations of Aiginetan seapower. Once more, however, the polemical character of the information given Herodotus counsels caution. If one accepts the premise that Aiginetan seapower is customarily misused, then the raids against Epidauros and the theft of the statues look as though they belong together. Yet, it is indeed even possible that in earlier stages of transmission the traditions on the theft of the statues (with the events following it) and on Aiginetan independence from Epidauros were indeed separate.

It is necessary next to consider once again the concept of thalassocracy itself before leaving the topic of Aiginetan seapower. Let us start with the “Thalassocracy List” preserved in Eusebius and derived from Diodorus Siculus.³³ The list records a series of *ἄρχαι* at sea by single states, concluding with Xerxes’ campaign of 480 (or its aftermath) when the Athenian thalassocracy presumably begins. The Aiginetan|thalassocracy runs from 490–480 on the list.³⁴ Clearly, to date the Damia/Auxesia episode in this period would be to tax Herodotus and his informants with gross errors. While the principles of organization of the list are only dimly glimpsed, it is clear that a rather simplistic appraisal of the naval situation in favor of the Athenians at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War has been crudely transported into the past. To Herodotus and Thucydides, as is apparent not only from their use of related terminology but from their description of naval warfare, thalassocracy was the ability to conduct amphibious expeditions against enemies without hindrance, and to deter or defeat such expeditions against oneself. In our text the term *θαλασσοκράτορες* should admit a meaning of tactical and strategic superiority in

32. On the economic relations between Epidauros and Aigina, see Figueira *Aegina* 170–92. On the judicial hegemony of Epidauros, cf. P. Gauthier, *Symbola: les étrangers et la justice dans les cités grecques* (Nancy 1972) 349–51, who is, however, incorrect to limit the cases at issue to those between Epidaurians and Aiginetans. There is no reason why the clause, *δίκας διαβαίνοντες ἐς Ἐπίδαυρον ἐδίδοσαν τε καὶ ἐλάμβανον παρ’ ἀλλήλων οἱ Αἰγινῆται*, ought not to mean that all litigation by Aiginetans was conducted in Epidaurian courts. Moreover, at this date, any foreign litigant would probably have needed a local, private or state-sponsored patron to go to court.

33. DS 7, fr. 11; Eusebius *Chron. Arm.* pp. 106–7 (Karst); Hier. *Chron.* 107 (Helm). Cf. J.L. Myres, “On the ‘List of Thalassocracies’ in Eusebius,” *JHS* 26 (1906) 84–130, for the view that the list derives from fifth-century thought (esp. 85–89), and for the Aiginetan thalassocracy (esp. 95).

34. On the List’s organization, see, e.g., W.G. Forrest, “Two Chronographic Notes,” *CQ* 19 (1969) 95–110, esp. 95–106.

a specific military or geographical context.³⁵ This definition does not preclude simultaneous thalassocracy by more than one state inasmuch as thalassocracy is not understood to entail sea-lane control, a modern feature of naval preeminence impossible for the ancients because of technological limits (see pp. 332–35 below). Nonetheless, the concept of naval warfare of the list is far removed from the practical conduct of naval hostilities in the archaic period. A serial list of thalassocrats is a structural feature which seems to have been borrowed from dynastic chronography, and applied without much thought to military practice. Therefore, by the time of Herodotus' writing, views are unlikely to have been so crystallized on this subject as to forbid the Aiginetans being described as *θαλασσοκράτορες* at a time other than their canonical place on the list or to preclude a sense for the term well short of absolute superiority.

Herodotus himself was particularly disturbed by the Aiginetan statement that the Athenians could not have come in one or a few ships, and he shows his disquiet in his careful report of the Aiginetan argument.³⁶ The Aiginetans said that one or a few ships could have been repelled by them, even if they had no navy. This is not impressive reasoning. Herodotus points up its inadequacy by observing that they were unable to report whether they had withdrawn in the face of superior Athenian numbers, or had meant to lure the intruders to defeat at the hands of the Argives.

Any consideration of the development of thalassocracy on Aigina (with its limited resources) prompts sobering conclusions. The historical significance of the early confrontation varies in proportion with the trust that is put in the Aiginetan/Argive version of the hostilities, inasmuch as only they reported large-scale fighting.³⁷ The Athenian version of the affair is throughout at pains to minimize the scale of the incident. The Athenians talked of a single

35. In the only other passage in which he uses a related term, Herodotus calls Polykrates the first of the Greeks after Minos to *θαλασσοκρατέειν* (3.122.2; see J.E. Powell, *A Lexicon to Herodotus* [Cambridge 1938] 165). This passage ensures that a limited sense of thalassocracy is at work in 5.83.2, unless the Damia and Auxesia episode is after Polykrates, a date irreconcilable with Herodotus' treatment of it. Possibly, collective and individual (e.g., that of Polykrates) thalassocracy were different matters to Herodotus, but the conjunction with raiding for both the Aiginetans and Polykrates (3.39.3–4) may be significant. Thucydides uses *θαλασσοκρατέειν* (7.48.2, 8.30.2, 8.41.1) and *θαλασσοκράτωρ* (8.63.1) to express tactical or regional superiority under specific circumstances. The term *ναυκρατέειν* is used in the same way (7.60.2). Less conditional predominance at sea is expressed by *ναυκράτωρ* (5.97, 5.109, 6.18.5), used only in speeches by Athenians to refer to their naval primacy. See T. Gardiner, "Terms for Thalassocracy in Thucydides," *RhM* 112 (1969) 16–22.

36. Macan *Herodotus* 1.230.

37. Modern commentators have been quick to follow the Aiginetan lead by turning an Athenian defeat in this "war" into the reason for a supposed Athenian decadence in the second half of the eighth century. See Dunbabin *BSA* (1936–1937) 88–90 and the citations of the works of Coldstream in n. 7 above. There is a good probability that the Aiginetans had marked the Athenians out as victims of their raids in the period after their independence. And a fragment of Hesiod is evidence that the Salaminians, symbolized by the hero Ajax, may have specialized in preying on their Peloponnesian neighbors in piratical raids (fr. 204 M/W). These raids and counter-raids of the Dark Age and early archaic period did not amount to wars or sustained confrontations.

trireme and a supernatural disaster rather than a military confrontation. In their own view, the expedition need not even have been seen as aggression, but as an attempt (albeit extremely unfortunate) to reclaim their own property. The Aiginetans may even have insisted that many Athenian ships had come to their island in order to set the stage for an Aiginetan victory at sea to close the story. Thus the early hostilities would more closely parallel the sequence of events c. 490. An early discomfiture of the Athenians could have served as a partial palliative for the shame of fifth-century defeat and subjection by Athens. If that was so, a further Athenian defeat was filtered out by Herodotus. Such a reconstruction is perhaps too sceptical of the historical value of the Aiginetan version, but, in any case, there is little justification for preferring the Aiginetans' large battle to the Athenian account of the misadventure of a single ship.

Another aspect of the account of the Damia/Auxesia episode may show the influence of fifth-century political partisanship. The Epidaurian cult of Damia and Auxesia had a strong connection with Attica and the Epidaurians performed ritual duties to Athena Polias and Erekhtheus. Since Herodotus reported no variants on this matter, one may assume unanimity or, at most, minor disagreement among his sources. It is possible to envisage what valence might have been given to the sacrifices by the parties involved. The Epidaurians were directed by Delphi to acquire Attic wood for the statues because it was especially holy or because the olive grew nowhere else then. It is unlikely that Epidaurians and Aiginetans would have made up a story with such a setting. This motif is of the same spirit as Athenian claims that grain cultivation was a gift of Demeter to the Eleusinians, and disseminated from Attica to the rest of mankind in return for which the Greeks were to offer first-fruits to the Eleusinian goddesses.³⁸ Herodotus' informants may have had their eye on requirements (promulgated after the transfer of the treasury in 454) that each Athenian ally contribute a cow and a panoply for the Great Panathenaia, or on the *temenē* of Athena Polias which may have been established in allied cities during the Pentekontaeteia.³⁹ The obligatory sacrifices here might have served as both a positive precedent for the duties of allies in the minds of fifth-century Athenians, and as a admonitory example of the antiquity of Athenian imperialism for the Aiginetans and Epidaurians. Moreover, any relationship between

38. See *Suda s.v. πρῶταίαι*, π 2420 Adler; Isoc. *Paneg.* (4) 31; Xen. *HG* 6.3.6; cf. *SIG*³ 704E.16-17; first fruits: *IG* I³ 78.14-36, cf. *IG* II² 140. On Demeter's gift of grain to the Athenians, see the references (esp. to pictorial representations) in N.J. Richardson, *The Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (Oxford 1974) 194-96.

39. Panathenaia: Arist. *Nubes* 386-87 with scholia (386a Holwerda); Meiggs-Lewis 40.2-4 [= *IG* I³ 14], 46.41-43 [= 34], 49.11-13 [= 46], 69.55-58 [= 71]. *Temenē* of Athena Polias on Aigina: *IG* IV 29-32; cf. Aelian *VH* 6.1; for the Koan and Samian instances, see J.P. Barron, "Religious Propaganda of the Delian League," *JHS* 84 (1964) 35-48, esp. 44-45. [Note now Barron, "The Fifth-Century *Horoi* of Aigina," *JHS* 103 (1983) 1-12; Figueira *Colonization* 115-20.] See also C.J. Herington, *Athena Parthenos and Athena Polias* (Manchester 1955) esp. 12-15.

Athens and Epidauros exhibiting a subordination of Epidauros to Athens was valuable as a precedent for Athenian political influence in the Argolic Akte. During the First Peloponnesian War Athens had put pressure on Epidauros to bring it into the Athenian sphere of influence in order to improve access to Argos (Thuc. 1.105.1; cf. 2.56.4–5; 4.45.2; 5.53). To say, however, that these obligations for Epidauros inspired contrasting associations among Herodotus' informants does not necessarily mean that the duties are apocryphal.

The credence which Herodotus seems to have given to the opening section of this narrative, 5.82–84, by relating it without variants may suggest his use of Epidaurian sources. Herodotus informs us that the Aiginetan and Epidaurian cults of Damia and Auxesia were much alike. While this observation could have had an Aiginetan source, an Epidaurian one is also very possible. As has been noted previously, the treatment of Aiginetan independence is more critical of the Aiginetans than of the Epidaurians. Presumably, the argument that the Epidaurians were absolved of their obligations to Athena and Erekhtheus because they no longer had the statues, which Herodotus puts in the mouth of the Epidaurians, was also derived from them (5.84.1).¹ The Epidaurians, although staunch allies of Sparta and threatened by fifth-century Athens, did not simply deny that they had ever owed such duties. Obligations to Athens, even if placed in the distant past, would not have been the sort of thing that would have been concocted by the Epidaurians in the mid-fifth century. If someone wished to fabricate a story connecting an Epidaurian and Aiginetan cult with Attica, he would hardly have chosen two goddesses who have no apparent Athenian cult (see the Endnote). This is another argument against wholecloth fabrication. There emerges then a common thread of agreement which binds the introductory section of Herodotus' narrative together, namely that Athens had a real connection with Damia and Auxesia.

AIGINETAN INDEPENDENCE AND HOSTILITY TOWARD ATHENS

The associations between Epidauros and Aigina in political tradition as well as in myth support the Herodotean assertion that Aigina was once under the control of Epidauros (see pp. 17–23 above). At some point Aigina, minting her own coins no later than 550–40, must have gained its full independence. There is, however, no certainty that this independence needed to have been achieved suddenly, in one step, or violently. The role of Epidaurian juridical rights as a provocation to the Aiginetans and of Aiginetan seapower in the liberation struggle is plausible. But that same plausibility becomes suspect as it coincides with what we know about views on fifth-century Aigina. Although the aetiological material explaining facets of the cult of Damia and Auxesia is suspect, the fact that a foundation story for the Aiginetan cult of Damia and Auxesia centers around appropriation of the statues and hostility toward Athens indicates that conflict with Athens and Epidauros was associated by the Aiginetans with the beginning of their independent history. This belief,

apparently strongly held, must provide the basis for any further discussion (see pp. 79-84 below).

A conjunction between the cult of Damia and Auxesia and Aiginetan independence may offer a modality for the transmission of political events. On independence from Epidauros, a religious reorganization to emphasize local associations and to affirm the religious authority of the Aiginetan aristocracy may have taken place. If, in the case of Damia and Auxesia, this process created difficulties with Athens (a refusal to fulfill cult obligations), then it is possible that this confrontation was remembered by the cult personnel and their descendants.

On oligarchic Aigina, cult officials will have been members of the hereditary aristocracy. Such aristocrats may well have remembered their ancestors' role regarding the cult of Damia and Auxesia, just as the aristocratic Bassid clan could remind Pindar of their ancestors' athletic record going back into the sixth century (*Nem.* 6). There may have been something in the sanctuary of Damia and Auxesia which could pass for material proof among fifth-century Aiginetans. The sacred inventory from the sanctuary lists several military dedications (4 shields: *IG IV* 1588.19-20, 21-22, 39; 2 breastplates: 20-21, 38-39). The incongruity of weapons dedicated to goddesses of childbirth and fertility may have led to the hypothesis of a war involving the cult. Thence it is a short step to positing the Athenians, recently bitter enemies of Aigina, as opponents in such a war. From this perspective, the hostilities themselves can be envisaged as a part of an aetiological explanation of the cult of Damia and Auxesia.

It is another matter, however, to go from an acceptance of a climate of hostility between Athens and Aigina (as I have suggested above) to an acceptance of the hostilities as reported by Herodotus or of an early war. Only in the Aiginetan version (albeit supported by the Argives) did a military conflict take place. To the Athenians, their ship had come to grief mysteriously. Aiginetans and Athenians both agreed on a single survivor, but the motif of the single survivor might have played a different role in each of their reports to Herodotus. The survivor's brutal murder is necessary so that the Aiginetan story can motivate the changes in dress practices. For the Athenians, the existence of the survivor provides a witness to guarantee that the Athenians did not suffer a military defeat. Neither Athenians nor Aiginetans bother to tell us how the survivor got back to Attica. The Aiginetan version ends with Athenian humiliation, while we have no Athenian report at all of an aftermath to the expedition.

That an Athenian account may have ended rather abruptly is understandable when the character of Athenian polemics against Aigina is noted. Herodotus cuts short the Athenian preparations for revenge for the Aiginetan coastal raids of c. 506 with the march of Kleomenes of Sparta against Attica (5.90.1). Later, in c. 489-88, when the Aiginetans ambush an Athenian *θεωρία* at Sounion,⁴⁰ Herodotus speaks of them committing a further outrage

40. See pp. 118-21 below.

before the Athenians had an opportunity to requite them for their earlier misdeed, the raids of c. 506 (6.87; 5.81.2, 3, 89.2). Here the historian has accepted the perspective of his Athenian informants, who saw themselves as repeated victims of Aiginetan abuse. Athens' savage subjugation of Aigina in the 450s and the latter's reduction to tributary status in the Delian League may have cast the Athenians in a bad light, in part because Aiginetan autonomy may have been guaranteed by the island's membership in the Hellenic League (see pp. 281–84 below). The Athenians countered sympathy for Aigina by portraying Athens as the victim of an early Aiginetan misdeed, the sacrilegious theft of the statues of Damia and Auxesia and equally sacrilegious refusal to continue the requisite cult services. The Aiginetans could be tarred with the same brush as the Megarians, who in the Athenians' minds continually encroached on the Hiera Orgas, a place sacred to Demeter on the border between Eleusis and the Megarid (e.g., Thuc. 1.67.4; 1.139.1–2). Thus, Athenian conquest of Aigina was the long-postponed requital of a sequence of Aiginetan outrages.

HISTORICAL CAUSATION

It remains to consider the narrative on the creation of the *ἔχθρη παλαιή* in its role as a historical determinative. The importance of the Aiginetan decision to attack Athens in c. 506 for the Herodotean treatment of the repulse of the Persians has been mentioned. A late sixth-century political decision is explained largely in terms of a much earlier confrontation rather than in terms of topical influences. Intermediate between the early confrontation and the Aiginetan decision of c. 506 is the *ἔχθρη παλαιή*, an emotional state out of which the Aiginetan decision emerges.

A similar retrojection of causation can be seen in the Herodotean narrative on an attempt by Samian aristocrats, supported by Sparta and Corinth, to overthrow the Samian tyrant Polykrates. Herodotus cites Spartan and Corinthian anger over Samian aggressions of (at least) a generation before as reasons for their actions (Hdt. 3.47–49; cf. [Plut.] *Mor.* 859E–860C). The Samians themselves attributed Spartan help to a reciprocation of earlier services by them to Sparta. However, a topical cause could be offered in Polykrates' rapprochement with Persia (3.44.1–2). Some time later, the exiled Samians established themselves in Kydonia in Crete and were expelled from there by the Aiginetans. To Herodotus, the Aiginetans acted out of a hostility toward Samos caused by the expedition of King Amphikrates of Samos against Aigina some time before (Hdt. 3.59.3–4), much as the *ἔχθρη παλαιή* led to a move against Athens in c. 506. As an alternative reason for the Aiginetan action at Kydonia, contemporary commercial rivalries might be suggested. These suggestions are by no means self-evident (other plausible causes could be offered). They differ from those rationales in Herodotus because they are grounded in the chronological context and can be derived from a calculation of results by the party taking action. |

Thus, considerations of momentary expediency or events of the immediate past do not receive exclusive emphasis in policy-making as presented by Herodotus. One may compare the intervention in decision-making of oracles, which, by their nature, are non-topical. The Aiginetans are confronted with a choice whether or not to open hostilities against Athens because the Thebans received advice from Delphi to seek the help of those nearest to them (5.79-80.1). This, properly understood (!), meant an appeal to the Aiginetans, because the nymphs Thebe and Aigina were sisters. Just as it was hard for Herodotus to give an accurate treatment of decision-making, decision-makers themselves did not publicize their reasoning. In the Dark Age and early archaic period the decision to invade a neighbor for land, slaves, and booty, or to repel such an invasion, was closely involved with momentary feelings. However, when it became necessary to act to the city's advantage by intervening in situations in which the community was less emotionally involved, the common man's sensitivity toward policy probably lagged behind that of the political elite. Mechanisms were needed to mobilize the community's energy, drawing strength from its system of prejudices and beliefs, for warfare involving personalized violence. These were found in the procurement and adaptation of oracles, in manipulation of traditional memory, and in an encouragement of notions of racial (more properly ethnic) affiliation. What remained in popular memory were not the initial phases of decision-making among small (often familial or partisan) groups, but only the most public aspect of policy-making, mass validation of the leadership's decisions.

Had Herodotus questioned his contemporary, a mid-fifth-century Aiginetan or Athenian, on why Aigina was hostile to Athens in c. 506, one suspects that the almost universal response would have been that the two states had always been enemies (cf. Olympiod. *In Alcib.* 72). Athenian-Aiginetan animosity was a part of their engrained prejudices and their background. This is not surprising, given that the animosity by the mid-fifth century had been among the preoccupations of both states' foreign policies for more than fifty years. There is a tendency to assume that the intensity of deeply-held social and political attitudes is proportionate to their antiquity. Thus, the origin of the hardened hostility between the Athenians and the Aiginetans—which in point of fact could have been generated by relatively recent political occurrences, albeit reinforced by the mistrust attendant upon differences in dialect or custom, by the countless instances of friction between neighbors, or by envy—must be very old. Yet, as far as we know (and, paradoxically, much of our information is drawn from Herodotus himself), Athens and Aigina were not continually at war throughout the seventh and sixth centuries. The *ἔχθρη παλαιή* is an insufficient explanation of the reasons why Aigina or Athens sought war at any precise moment.

Nonetheless, that the *ἔχθρη παλαιή* was the cause of the Aiginetan attack in c. 506 more nearly approximates the Aiginetan view than the Athenian. The Aiginetans gave Herodotus a detailed account ending in a major military confrontation. All of this is of a quality and on a scale to justify an inveterate hatred.

Thus, the hatred was *προοφειλομένη* 'owed already' to the Athenians (5.82.1; cf. 6.59 [?]), a term used especially of hostile acts deserved as requital (Eur. *IT* 523; Arist. *Vesp.* 3; cf. Thuc. 1.32.1). The Athenians spoke of the failure of a single ship's mission, not even necessarily a military one. This was scarcely enough to motivate an ancient hatred, commemorated by cult practice and civil enactment. To Athens, the Aiginetan attack in c. 506 was an outrage. Thus, if the positing of the *ἔχθρη παλαιή* as a cause gets in the way of understanding the reasons for the Aiginetan decision in c. 506, the responsibility for this diversion is borne to a large extent by the Aiginetan informants of Herodotus.

Moreover, Herodotus' informants seem to have been members of the Aiginetan ruling class (see pp. 40–41, 44 above). This suggests that deliberate misrepresentation played a part. It may be that the Aiginetan decision to attack in c. 506 could not be justified in terms of the system of values of the Aiginetan aristocracy and in light of the conventions of contemporary interstate behavior. The aggression was, on Herodotus' evidence, without a *casus belli*. The name of the war which it began was the *πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος*, itself outside diplomatic conventions. In retrospect, the decision of c. 506 must have seemed disastrous to the Aiginetans. It inaugurated 20 years of intermittent warfare which, at length, prompted two countermeasures: the fortification of the Peiraieus and the Themistoclean ship-building program, which forever relegated Aigina to second-class status as a naval power. Although the Hellenic League mediated this war, its legacy of bitterness lay in the background of the climactic struggle with Athens in the 450s. [See Figueira *Colonization* 104–13.] At its end, Aigina was a subject of Athens, having suffered irreparable material, economic, and demographic losses. One can see why anti-Athenian Aiginetan aristocrats (like the family of Krios and Polykritos) chose to see the attack on the Attic coasts as just another stage in a long feud and a natural outgrowth of reciprocal hatred. Herodotus was prepared to follow the Aiginetan lead in interpretation because he had no technique, so long after the events, to distinguish between the causes of policy and their public justification, and because the intense mutual antipathy exhibited by his Athenian and Aiginetan informants made the determinative force of an *ἔχθρη παλαιή* seem plausible.

CONCLUSION

First, we may consider what our investigation has brought forth about historical data. Much of what Herodotus reports concerns the cult of Damia and Auxesia. As far as this involves contemporary cult practices (the annual choruses, ten *χορηγοί*, the nature of the rites themselves, and the comparability of Epidaurian rituals) based on evidence collected from elite Aiginetans during a visit to the island (see pp. 36–44 above), there is no reason for doubt. Other statements (the dedication of pins, the posture of statues of Damia and Auxesia, the ban on Athenian products) were probably also matters of current cult procedure. However, for these practices, aetiological explanations were created, tracing them to a conflict with Athens. Herodotus partially distorted his aetiological source (trying to explain the dedication of obsolete-style pins)

in stating that Aiginetan and Argive women continued to wear longer pins until the present. To the aetiologies of Aiginetan cult practice, there is added a pseudo-aetiology of Aiginetan provenance about the adoption of Ionian dress at Athens. The aetiologies are otiose, farfetched, and polemical. The most credible of them is that the ban on Athenian products in the sanctuary was caused by a conflict with Athens involving Damia and Auxesia. But the credence to be placed in the explanation of the ban depends on one's belief in the historicity of the war.

Concerning the political background to the episode more of the material is likely to be historical, as might be expected. The Aiginetans would not have ruined what they meant to be plausible aetiologies with obviously false background details. That Aigina was in some sense subordinated to Epidauros is supported by external evidence. The part played by legal jurisdiction in this subjection may be historical, but is suspect, if, as is likely, it was used in an Aiginetan defense of their break with and hostility toward Epidauros. The help given by the Argives can be paralleled, and the friendship between the two states was an old one. Without outside corroboration, however, the Argive intervention could just as well be a plausible conjecture. That the rise of Aiginetan naval power led to a more independent stance by Aigina is probable, if only because Aigina had so few other resources on which to draw. That "thalassocracy" led to a struggle for independence which included raids against Epidauros may also be true. While Aiginetan seapower may have had a sinister reputation, making such a reconstruction plausible, the reputation itself probably had some historical basis. Whether these raids included the theft of the statues depends on the strength of the connection between the cult and Aiginetan independence. It is possible to hypothesize about how memory of such a connection was preserved in elite circles on Aigina. Finally, we come to perhaps the most important piece of information in the narrative about late seventh- or early sixth-century international affairs, namely the connection of the Aiginetan cult of Damia and Auxesia with Athens. Although we have suggested reasons in fifth-century policies why Herodotus' informants wanted to talk about this connection in the way in which they did, the fact that none chose to deny its existence is most important. The very singularity of the Epidaurians and Aiginetans deriving a cult from Athens argues for its historicity. Moreover, there was agreement that the cult was caught up in the animosity between Athens and Aigina. Yet, the force of this agreement is vitiated by the polemical use to which the hostilities were put by the Aiginetans, attempting to justify the fatal *ἑχθρη παλαιή*, and to a lesser extent by the Athenians portraying themselves as victims of Aigina. The account of the fighting itself may easily be doubted. There is no easy way to reconcile the Athenian story of a strange disaster befalling one ship, and the Argive/Aiginetan story of a military debacle. The aetiological role of the latter version and the fact that it seems a compensation for fifth-century defeats undercuts it. Nevertheless, the Athenian story, with its earthquake and madness, taken in isolation from the

Aiginetan version, illuminates nothing concerning the archaic political history of the Saronic Gulf.

When considered as a document on Herodotean methodology, further conclusions may be drawn from our treatment of these chapters. Herodotus brought together the evidence of Aiginetan, Argive, Athenian, and probably Epidaurian informants. He carefully distinguishes the explicit disagreement among these informants. Where there was complete agreement or where the informants of one city were opposed by the agreement of the other informants, the narrative does without citation of source. Herodotus explicitly criticized the statues going down on their knees, and implicitly doubted that there was a time at which only Attica had the olive tree. He marked where he found the Aiginetan account wanting in detail about the Athenian landing on Aigina. It seems that Herodotus may have curtailed an even more detailed and anti-Athenian Aiginetan version. Significantly, he gives his own interpretation on the change in dress at Athens, which falls short of what the Aiginetans would probably have made of it. Yet, it must be noted that Herodotus limited his rationalizing to doubts and omissions. He did not rewrite his informants' accounts tendentiously nor in a historicizing spirit.⁴¹ For the most part, he was content to report them with attribution. Yet, his account is almost entirely without chronological information. The beginning of the episode, set in a time when only Attica had the olive and after an undated, rather indeterminate famine and oracle, suggests that we are not in historical, but mythological time. Some of the events mentioned were potentially dateable (like Aiginetan independence).⁴² That Herodotus did not choose to date them suggests that he recognized that his source material was flawed. Yet, the account of the episode, with its marvelous occurrences and sense of passionate advocacy, is consonant with the depth of antipathy felt by fifth-century Aiginetans and Athenians. If on one level it does not give a satisfactory rationale for the late sixth- and fifth-century conflicts between Aigina and Athens, perhaps we are meant by Herodotus to understand that the inability to give such a rationale was one of the salient characteristics of the feud between Aigina and Athens.

ENDNOTE

The Aiginetan titles for Damia and Auxesia were Mnia and Auzesia (*IG* IV 1588); the kindred cult at Epidauros, attested by Herodotus, used the names Mneia/Mnia and Auxesia: *IG* IV.1² 386, 398, 410, 434 (*theoi Azosioi*; month Azosios: 103, 106[?], 108). About the Troizenian cult, the names Damia and Auxesia were used by Pausanias (2.32.2), but the names Amaia and Azēsia were also current there (Zenob. 4.20 = *CPG* 1.89). Pausanias recognized that the local *aition* was different from the Epidaurian and Aiginetan accounts, telling a story about a derivation of the cult from Crete with *stasis* and *lithobolia* 'stoning' ritually reenacted thereafter by the Troizenians. That feature

41. Compare A. Momigliano, "The Place of Herodotus in the History of Historiography," *Secondo Contributo* 29–44, esp. 30–32, 37–40.

42. For the historical context and date for Aiginetan independence, see pp. 9–33 above.

surely has its affinities with the ritual abuse at Aigina and Epidauros and is apotropaic. As in the Argolic Akte and Aigina, the involvement of the goddesses' cults with fertility is also indicated by parallels with the worship of Demeter, where Auxesia as Azēsia can be an *epiklēsis* of Demeter as in Sophocles (fr. 981 Radt; cf. Hesych. s.v. Ἀζησία, 1468b Latte; Phot. s.v. Ἀζησία; *Anec. Bekk.* 1.348.26). Hesychius reports a folk etymology deriving the name from ἀζαίνειν 'dry up'. Damia and Auxesia can also be equated with Demeter and Korē in the pair Amaia and Azēsia, a coupling widespread enough to give rise to a proverb about protracted searches (Zenob. 4.20 = *CPG* 1.89; [Plut.] 1.41 = *CPG* 1.327; *Suda* s.v. Ἀμαία, α 1541 Adler). The similarity of ritual practices in the cult of Damia and Auxesia with the worship of Demeter is demonstrated by a remark of Pausanias that he had sacrificed to Damia and Auxesia on Aigina in accordance with Eleusinian practice (2.30.4).

That the kneeling posture of the goddesses is suggestive of childbirth and its deity Eileithyia is shown by the kneeling statue of that goddess (Paus. 8.48.7–8). See also n. 4 above. That connection is underlined by the appearance on a Thera inscription of λοκ<h>αία Δαμία (*IG* XII.3 361), where the adjective λόχιος 'belonging to childbirth' gives a clue to interpretation.

The analogous cult in Attica is dedicated to the *Charites*, Auxo and Hēgemonē (Paus. 9.35.2; appearing in other references with other Graces: Clem. *Protrep.* 2.22 P; Hyg. *Fab.* 183). See F. Dümmler, "Auxesia," *RE* 2.2, cols. 2615–18; O. Kern, "Damia," *RE* 4.2, col. 2051. Although Auxo and Hēgemonē are not prominent in classical Athenian cult, a hint of a former significance may be glimpsed in their appearance in the ephebic oath among the ἵστορες θεοὶ Ἀγλαυρος, Ἑστία, Ἐννώ, Ἐννάλιος, Ἄρης καὶ Ἀθηνᾶ Ἀρεία, Ζεύς, Θαλλώ, Αὐξώ, Ἡγεμόνη, Ἡρακλῆς . . . (Tod, *GHI* #204.16–19; cf. Poll. 8.106). Their appearance among martial deities and the name Hēgemonē itself seems to suggest an interesting transposition of their *dunamis* into the political realm. See pp. 79–80 below.

APPENDIX I

S.P. Morris in her book *The Black and White Style: Athens and Aigina in the Orientalizing Period* (New Haven 1984) has developed an ambitious reconstruction of the artistic context for a ban on Attic pottery on Aigina. E.T.H. Brann (*Late Geometric and Protoattic Pottery, The Athenian Agora* 8 [Princeton 1962] 20, 24) had first suggested a workshop on Aigina of middle proto-Attic in the so-called "black and white" style. Morris argues that all the "black and white" pottery was actually created in a group of workshops operating on Aigina. She adduces several arguments in support of her thesis: 1) a preponderance of Aiginetan findspots for these pots; 2) the existence of a Doric dialect inscription, perhaps in the Aiginetan script, which gives its name to the "Menelas" stand of the Polyphemos Painter (*LSAG* #2, pp. 110, 112); 3) the appearance of two pots which are seemingly not of Attic clay, most notably the name piece of the Ram Jug Painter; 4) differences in shapes, in deployment of mythological material, and in flora, fauna, and figural style from other contemporary Attic workshops. The "black and white" style developed in order to supply a need on Aigina for funerary pottery caused by the ban on Attic pottery enacted in response to the events narrated in Herodotus.

Even if this hypothesis could be accepted in its entirety on archaeological and art historical grounds, there are still potent historical and historiographical reasons against finding an aetiology for the "black and white" style in early hostilities between Athens

and Aigina. First of all, these artists were active in the years 670–40, which, for the many reasons presented in chap. 1 above, seems too early for Aiginetan independence. Secondly, while Morris concedes that Herodotus limits the ban to the sanctuary of Damia and Auxesia, there is also ample justification for denying that he or his informants missed a general prohibition. As I have argued, the ban on Attic pottery, like other aetiological motifs appearing in the narrative, should belong to current practice in the sanctuary which could, in turn, be explained by the early hostilities. Finally, the administrative background for a seventh-century prohibition ought to be remembered. It is most unlikely at such a date that the provenience of any particular pot could be traced. In an archaic setting, Attic pottery meant pots which were recognizably Athenian in material and in general terms of decoration, and the “black and white” pots were probably still too Attic in appearance to qualify as non-Athenian. In a matter of religious feeling and communal sentiment, a technical demonstration of local origin—for pots using Attic clay!—seems infeasible.

Doubt can also be cast on the arguments for associating the style exclusively with Aigina. One commentator suggests that the inscription on the “Menelas” stand is unlikely from placement and the subject matter of its context to have been a caption. Rather the name *Menelās* belongs to a choral passage in Doric which is being sung by the figures marching in procession in the scene. See G. Ferrari, “Menelās,” *JHS* 107 (1987) 180–82. Reviewers have drawn attention to other counter-indications. An attribution of a majority of pots in the style to Aiginetan findspots depends to some extent on a diminution of the pots attributed to the relevant painters—a point particularly true with regard to the Ram Jug Painter. Moreover, it is uncertain that a few pots in atypical clay from the standpoint of the conventions of the Attic pottery industry justifies a leap in reasoning to conclude that they are in Aiginetan clay on the basis of discovery on Aigina. Note these reviews: J. Boardman, *TLS* (1984) 948; J.B. Carter, *AJA* 89 (1985) 695–97; B. Cohen, *CW* 79 (1986) 337; J.N. Coldstream, *Hermathena* (1986) 79–80; J.M. Cook, *JHS* 105 (1985) 236; D.C. Kurtz, *Phoenix* 39 (1985) 122–24; E. Walter-Karydi, *Gnomon* 59 (1987) 378–80.

If my reconstruction in *Aegina* 237–51, 264–80 is correct, Aiginetan merchants played a significant role in the overseas dissemination of Attic pots from 650. Insofar as information about the preferences of foreign buyers affected the nature of pots produced in Attica that process of “market feedback” was probably mediated (to a great extent) through Aiginetan middlemen. It is the considerable merit of Morris’ work for economic history (putting aside the value of her scholarship in art historical terms) that it has drawn attention to and documented the first stages of this interaction. Hence we note that “black and white” style pots popular on Aigina differ systematically in characteristics such as shape from the products of workshops whose output was more parochially centered in Attica itself. Unsurprisingly, the same pots were more influenced by Corinthian motifs, accommodating themselves to the pottery most prevalent in international circulation.

In other periods, the influence of Aiginetan (and other foreign) merchants on the production of Attic pottery was felt by an industry which nonetheless does not seem to have transcended the boundaries of Attica. If the suggestions of Brann and Morris are right, it is only with the “black and white” style (at the very beginning of the cooperation between potter and merchant) that Aiginetan influence on Attic craftsmen had the effect of drawing a portion of that production to itself. This blurring of political boundaries, in effect creating a larger economic unity, cannot be separated from the conditions of crisis surrounding debt and dependent agriculture prevailing in pre-Solonian Attica.

APPENDIX II

I had missed the discussion of these chapters in Herodotus in D. Fehling, *Die Quellenangaben bei Herodot* (Berlin 1971) until the publication of the English translation, trans. J.G. Howie, *Herodotus and His 'Sources': Citation, Invention and Narrative Art* (Leeds 1989). The following points of Fehling may be noted: 1) One should be suspicious about the dovetailing versions which differ only in party bias (pp. 106–7), especially when accounts are attributed to their most obvious source (92). 2) A fantastic and a rationalized version are juxtaposed (111–12). The incident of the goddesses of Damia and Auxesia falling to their knees is an invention of Herodotus (122).

I have found a basis for this narrative not in Herodotean fabrication but in Aiginetan aetiology, however suspect. Both the inscribed inventory of the precinct of the goddesses and the congruence of the polemics deployed here with Aiginetan and Athenians views portrayed elsewhere support this conclusion. The fantastic details do not merely set the stage for impressive rationalization, but betray traces of a mythological comprehension of the past. Its investigation permits us to reconstruct a psychological and ideological profile of Herodotus' Aiginetan and Athenian informants which appears to have real explanatory power. Versions here differ mainly in bias, not because of Herodotean characterization but by virtue of Greek inhibitions toward outright denial, as opposed to reformulation, in techniques of controversy. Rather than a neat novelist of pseudo-tradition, this Herodotus has been seen to have filtered out even more partisan details of his source material and to have made at least one mistake (unnecessary for a fictionalist) in pursuit of narrational symmetry. There are also signs that Herodotus could have told us a good deal more, if he had chosen to, for a further use of Epidaurian informants was probably an option. The citation of obvious sources is not an inventor's economy, but instead the result of a *historiē* which checks traditions disparately collected with obvious exponents of local tradition. Out of the vast number of *logoi* which could have been presented from fifth-century sources—witness local historiography—can it be surprising that Herodotus has selected those most appropriate to his criteria of interest?

I have not thought it worthwhile to cite in detail the comments of R.J. Buck, "Epidaurians, Aeginetans, and Athenians," in G.S. Shrimpton & D.J. McCarger (eds.), *Classical Contributions: Studies in Honor of Malcolm Francis McGregor* (Locust Valley NY 1981) 5–13, which I find hurried and tendentious. For anyone who might see similarities in the collection of the evidence or in phrasing between that piece and chapters 1 and 2 of this work (or the original articles), I should note that the basic shape and content of my essays had been achieved before Buck's publication was called to my attention and are in no way derivative. Having been written in the period before March 1981, my two pieces were then parts of a single article, which was divided into two offerings after it proved too unwieldy for single publication—having been rejected by *Phoenix*. Naturally, I have dated drafts and correspondence.

Athenians, Aiginetans, and the Solonian Crisis

ANY INVESTIGATION of the early interaction of the Aiginetans and Athenians is pervaded with a tension that typifies epichoric history, namely the need to keep two perspectives in balance. On the one hand, one seeks to discover what can be reconstructed about political and institutional history in an often destructive process. Material ostensibly about the past turns out to reveal the aspirations, anxieties, and self-justifications of the classical Greeks who informed historical accounts. So our second perspective focuses on an exploration of the creation of that archaic past and not on its recovery. We are brought, however, full turn once again, when we realize that the classical appreciation of the past has its own history in the archaic period. Thus, paradoxically, we risk criticizing received accounts of archaic history in favor of a speculation framed in terms of our own intellectual predilections. With these cautions in mind, an investigation can be made into the relationship of Aigina and Athens c. 600.

PART I: SOLON'S REFORM OF ATTIC MEASURES, WEIGHTS, AND COINAGE

Solon is reported to have created the Attic standard in *metra* 'measures', *stathma* 'weights', and *nomisma* 'coinage'. My investigation will end in doubts that he did any such thing. The legislator(s) who codified Attic metrological standards—there is no certainty that he was Solon—probably solidified some subset of traditional Attic practices. In contrast, the tenor of our evidence is that the first legislator, Solon, replaced Aiginetan or Peloponnesian standards with Attic ones, a succession characteristic of the classical Athenian appreciation of an appropriate role for Solon *vis-à-vis* the Aiginetans. Part II of this paper will explore the background to that appreciation.

Solon's metrological reform had a place in Atthidography, Athenian local history, and is reported in two passages. Let us first consider the Aristotelian *Athenaion Politeia* (10.1–2):

ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς νόμοις ταῦτα δοκεῖ θεῖναι δημοτικά, πρὸ δὲ τῆς νομοθεσίας ποιήσας τὴν τῶν χ[ρ]εῶν [ἀπο]κοπήν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν τε τῶν μέτρων καὶ σταθμῶν καὶ τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος αὐξήσιν. ἔπ' ἐκείνου γὰρ ἐγένετο καὶ τὰ μέτρα μείζων τῶν Φειδωνείων, καὶ ἡ μνᾶ, πρότερον ἔχ[ο]υσα [σ]ταθμὸν ἑβδομήκοντα δραχμάς, ἀνεπληρώθη ταῖς ἑκατόν. ἦν δ' ὁ ἀρχαῖος χαρακτήρ διδραχμον. ἐποίησε δὲ καὶ σταθμὰ πρὸς τ[ὸ] νόμισμα, τ[ρ]εῖς καὶ ἑξήκοντα μνᾶς τὸ τάλαντον ἀγούσας, καὶ ἐπιδιενεμήθησαν [αἱ τ]ρεῖς μναὶ τῷ στατήρι καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις σταθμοῖς.

The Atthidographer Androtion offered another version of the same program. Whether he differed over the substance of the reform of the standards is disputed, but he did express an idiosyncratic view when he brought these modifications into conjunction with the Seisakhtheia, the Solonian cancellation of

debts.¹ A crucial emendation has been marked with brackets ([/]). It has achieved wide acceptance.²

τοῦτο γὰρ ἐποίησατο πρῶτον πολίτευμα, γράψας τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχοντα τῶν χρεῶν ἀνεῖσθαι, πρὸς δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς σώμασι μηδένα δανείζειν. καίτοι τινὲς ἔγραψαν, ὧν ἐστὶν Ἀνδροτίων, οὐκ ἀποκοπῇ χρεῶν, ἀλλὰ τόκων μετριότητι κουφισθέντας ἀγαπῆσαι τοὺς πένητας, καὶ σεισάχθειαν ὀνομάσαι τὸ φιλανθρώπουμα τοῦτο καὶ τὴν ἅμα τούτῳ γενομένην τῶν τε μέτρων ἐπαύξηνσιν καὶ τοῦ νομίματος τιμῇ. ἑκατὸν γὰρ ἐποίησε δραχμῶν τὴν μνᾶν, πρότερον ἐβδομήκοντα ἄγουσαν [mss.: καὶ τριῶν οὖσαν], ὥστ' ἀριθμῶ μὲν ἴσον, δυνάμει δ' ἔλαττον ἀποδιδόντων, ὠφελείσθαι μὲν τοὺς ἐκτίνοντας μεγάλα, μηδὲν δὲ βλάπτεσθαι τοὺς κομιζομένους.

Plut. *Solon* 15.2–4 = Androtion *FGH* 324 F 34

Plutarch continued by observing that the majority of commentators saw a true cancellation of debts in the Seisakhtheia. In this, they were almost certainly correct, but the line of reasoning by which Androtion arrived at his mistaken conclusion is revealing about the assumptions underpinning classical Athenian views on economic and especially on monetary history.

So much ingenuity has been spent on reconciling these two passages with each other, with theories on the development of coinage, and with numismatic data, that a major issue has gone nearly without comment. Solon appears implicitly to have differentiated Athenian economic life from that of the Aiginetans. The existence of such a tradition has significance for understanding the political interrelations of the two *poleis*. Unfortunately, the antiquarian preoccupations of fourth-century historiography has attenuated the partisan “bite” of these traditions in their earlier formulation. Thus, it is necessary to clear the path to our subject by a survey of the other issues and their scholarship.

Solon and Attic Coinage

That a linkage was made between Solon and these matters is hardly surprising in itself, regardless of our judgments on the confidence which later Athenians placed in the traditional stories. As founding lawgiver in Attic political culture, Solon would be considered the natural source of so manifest a feature of civic life as Attic measures, weights, and coins. The affixing of Solon’s name here is analogous to that elastic concept “the laws of Solon”, which could be stretched to cover any traditional part of the law code (even when modernization had probably taken place; pp. 235–41 below). The decree of

1. He has been almost universally rejected, for good reason as I shall show below. The moderate conservative Androtion misunderstood the Seisakhtheia as a radical measure; cf. Figueira *Theognis* 146–47. See also Jacoby *FGH* 3b (Suppl.) 1.145.

2. T. Reinach, “Zu Androtion fr. 40 Müller,” *Hermes* 63 (1928) 238–40; also Jacoby *FGH* 3b (Suppl.) 1.465–66; P. J. Rhodes, “Solon and the Numismatists,” *NC* 15 (1975) 1–11, esp. 2; cf. E. Lévy, “La réforme solonienne de mesures, poids et monnaies à propos d’une controverse récente,” *SM* 89 (1973) 1–6; D. Flach, “Solons Volkswirtschaftliche Reformen,” *RSA* 3 (1973) 13–27, esp. 24–25.

Teisamenos of 403/2 indicates the traditional character of Solon's role in creating Attic weights and measures.³

Archaeology has now decisively undermined a Solonian role in initiating Attic coinage, if we may assume for now that his legislation in this area will have been enacted in his archonship, 594/3. Aiginetan coining began between 580 and 560 (or by 540 at the latest).⁴ When design and style of representation are considered, the earliest Aiginetan coins appear to have preceded Attic counterparts. Accordingly, the inception of Athenian minting is now placed after 550.⁵ Systems of dates for both coinages accord with a chronology in the later seventh century for the first Ionian issues in electrum and are also reconcilable with the tradition that the Lydian silver coinage was the viable rival to the Aiginetans for a claim of priority (cf. Hdt. 1.94.1; Xenoph. fr. 4 W).⁶ A recent attempt to date the beginnings of electrum coinage in the first half of the seventh century, which has not won over many scholars, is not much help here.⁷ Even if the first electrum is placed before 650, the result is merely an elongated

3. And. 1.83: ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ, Τεισαμενὸς εἶπε, πολιτεύεσθαι Ἀθηναίους κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, νόμοις δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς Σόλωνος, καὶ μέτροις καὶ σταθμοῖς, χρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς Δράκοντος θεσμοῖς, οἷσπερ ἐχρώμεθα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ. The same habit of mind is illustrated by a Demosthenic citation of a Solonian reference to a law on counterfeiting (24.212–14).

4. Add to the citations on pp. 10 above and 89 below C.M. Kraay, "The Asyut Hoard: Some Comments on Chronology," *NC* 17 (1977) 189–98, esp. 197–98; J. Kroll & N. Waggoner, "Dating the Earliest Coins of Athens, Corinth and Aegina," *AJA* 88 (1984) 325–40, esp. 335–40.

5. Wappenmünzen (= WM) 545–25, first owls 525–480: C.M. Kraay, "The Archaic Owls of Athens: Classification and Chronology," *NC* 16 (1956) 43–68; *id.*, "The Early Coinage of Athens: A Reply," *NC* 2 (1962) 417–23; *id.*, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1976) 61. WM 545–10, owls 510–490: W.P. Wallace, "The Early Coinages of Athens and Euboea," *NC* 2 (1962) 23–42. WM from c. 550: Kroll & Waggoner *AJA* (1984); from 546–35: J. Kroll, "From Wappenmünzen to Gorgoneia to Owls," *ANSMN* 26 (1981) 1–32, esp. 30. WM 545–10, owls 510–480: M. Price & N. Waggoner, *Archaic Greek Silver Coinage: The Asyut Hoard* (London 1975) 61–68; cf. Kraay *NC* (1977) 195–96; H.A. Cahn, "Asiut: Kritische Bemerkungen zu einer Schatzfundpublikation," *SNR* 56 (1977) 279–87. Cahn has been the leading exponent of a higher dating: "Zur frühattischen Münzprägung," and "Dating the Early Coinages of Athens," *Kleine Schriften zur Münzkunde und Archäologie* (Basel 1975) 70–80, 81–89. The most extreme (and improbable) downdating is offered by M. Vickers, "Early Greek Coinage, A Reassessment," *NC* 145 (1985) 31–44; *id.*, "Persépolis, Athènes et Sybaris: Questions de monnayage et de chronologie," *REG* 99 (1986) 239–70. The response of M.C. Root, "Evidence from Persepolis for the Dating of Persian and Archaic Greek Coinage," *NC* 148 (1988) 1–12, is devastating.

6. For the dominant opinion (first electrum dated in the late seventh century), see P. Jacobsthal, "The Date of the Ephesian Foundation Deposit," *JHS* 71 (1951) 85–95; E.S.G. Robinson, "The Coins from the Ephesian Artemision Reconsidered," *JHS* 71 (1951) 156–67; *id.*, "The Dates of the Earliest Coins," *NC* 16 (1956) 1–8. A date before 660: L. Weidauer, *Probleme der frühen Elektronprägung* (Fribourg 1975); *id.*, "Die Elektronprägung in der orientalisierenden Epoche frühgriechischer Kunst," *SNR* 60 (1981) 7–19. Cf. T. Hackens, "Chronique numismatique: 1. Les monnaies grecques les plus anciennes (VII^e s. av. J.-C.)," *AC* 46 (1977) 205–18, esp. 208–13; M.J. Price, "Thoughts on the Beginnings of Coinage," in C.N.L. Brooke, B.H.I.H. Stewart, J.G. Pollard & T.R. Volk (eds.), *Studies in Numismatic Method* (Cambridge 1983) 1–10.

7. D. Kagan, "The Dates of the Earliest Coins," *AJA* 86 (1982) 343–60. Cf. R.R. Holloway, "The Date of the First Greek Coins: Some Arguments from Style and Hoards," *RBN* 130 (1984) 5–18 (also discussing Weidauer's work); Kroll & Waggoner *AJA* (1984).

electrum (and, concomitantly, pre-silver phase) in the history of money.⁸ Too many coins of the earliest silver issues, some in fairly good condition, appear in hoards which may confidently be dated to the end of the sixth century.⁹

Moreover, Solon, as portrayed in our source passages, is not inaugurating Attic coinage, fixed after 550 by archaeology, but is altering an existing coinage. The remark, *ἦν δ' ὁ ἀρχαῖος χαρακτήρ διδραχμον*, appears to be a reference to the Wappenmünzen (or 'Heraldic Coins').¹⁰ Attic tradition could have seen Solon as replacing the Wappenmünzen with the "owls", but another story out of the same tradition makes it more likely that he was held to have created the Wappenmünzen in place of a still earlier coinage. Hippias reportedly demonetized a previous coinage, issuing new coins of a different type (Aris. *Oec.* 1347a8–11). This story probably reflects either the beginning of the owls,¹¹ or the Wappenmünzen tetradrachms with the *gorgoneion* obverse (leaving the inception of the owls for Kleisthenes?).¹² The coinage superseded by Solon could derive from Theseus, who is assigned ox-type didrachms by Philochorus.¹³ Since fines expressed in numbers of oxen in Dracontian legislation were explained by invoking these coins, they were believed to have been extant in the late seventh century. Mature Attidography thus appears to have presented this evolution for Attic coinage: Theseus inaugurated ox-didrachms, which continued into or were revived during the time of Draco; Solon created the Wappenmünzen didrachms; Hippias initiated the owls (or Wappenmünzen

8. See *Aegina* 91–97.

9. See C.M. Kraay, "Hoards, Small Change and the Origin of Currency," *JHS* 84 (1964) 76–91; Kroll & Waggoner *AJA* (1984) 327–31, 337–38.

10. See K. Kraft, "Zur Übersetzung und Interpretationen von Aristoteles, *Athenaion Politeia*, Kap. 10 (Solonische Münzreform)," *JNG* 10 (1959–1960) 21–46, esp. 29. The historical context of the WM was probably as obscure to the ancients as to us. See R.J. Hopper, "Observations on the Wappenmünzen," in C.M. Kraay & G.K. Jenkins (eds.), *Essays in Greek Coinage* (Oxford 1968) 16–39; Kroll *ANSMN* (1981); H. Nicolet-Pierre, "Monnaies archaïques d'Athènes sous Pisistrate et les Pisistratides (c. 545–c. 510)," *RN* 25 (1983) 15–33, *RN* 27 (1985) 23–44.

11. See R.T. Williams, "The 'Owls' and Hippias," *NC* 6 (1966) 9–13; O. Picard, "Hippias et les premières chouettes Athéniennes," *RN* 16 (1974) 151–54; cf. B.A. van Groningen, *Aristote: le second livre de l'économie* (Leiden 1933) 70–72. See also Kraay *Coinage* 59–61.

12. Kroll, *ANSMN* (1981) 10–20, argues for a more complex transition—tetradrachms with the *gorgoneion* obverse followed by owl tetradrachms, with WM didrachms continuing to be minted. Cf. Nicolet-Pierre *RN* (1983) 31. There is some risk of modernizing sixth-century economic/administrative conditions in such reconstructions, as the hypothesis of the tetradrachm as a coin of export weight for silver from Laurion and the targeting of tetradrachms and didrachms toward different economic constituencies are particularly intractable in corroboration. A complex transition, which is conceivably Hippias, could be only vaguely related to the story as we have it about Hippias' demonetization.

13. Philochorus *FGH* 328 F 200 = Σ Arist. *Aves* 1106; Plut. *Thes.* 25.3; Hesych. *s.v.* *βοῦς ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ*, β 68 Latte; Poll. 9.60. The type is unknown among the historical WM. Theseus was adopted as a champion by Eupatrids and oligarchs during the sixth century. See Figueira, "The Ten Archontes of 579/8 at Athens," *Hesperia* 53 (1984) 447–73, esp. 462–65 (including discussion of Plut. *Thes.* 25.1–3). These didrachms were enough like the types of the Wappenmünzen to serve as a justification for minting activity by anti-Peisistratid partisans, whose legal standing may well have been weak. The traditions on the origination of mining or minting by other early Attic kings belong to similar matrices of partisanship (Pliny *NH* 7.56.197; Poll. 9.83).

tetradrachms). Consequently, one could then posit the existence of a pre-Solonian coinage congruent with the superseded systems of measures and weights noted in the *Athenaion Politeia*. This pattern for the Atthidographic history of coinage, however, then transports us into a realm of real fantasy, since no Athenian coinage before the Wappenmünzen existed.¹⁴ The ancients, however, were not bound by numismatic methodology, nor barred from “discovering” series of coins to illustrate antiquarian suppositions or partisan contentions.

As the date for the earliest issues of Athenian and Aiginetan coinage has dropped through the sixth century, any rationale for tinkering with the traditional date for Solon’s reforms has also eroded. Even if we adopt a date in the 570s for some Solonian legislation, it is now uncertain whether any Attic coins could still be placed early enough to leave him a plausible role.¹⁵ The surviving traditions on Solon’s activities after his archonship are conventional, focusing on his travels abroad and stance toward the rise of Peisistratos. Foreign travels form a motif out of a paradigm for the life of an archaic sage/*nomothetēs* and are deployed in order to explain how and why Solon was not forced to amend his legislation.¹⁶ The suspicions experienced toward Peisistratos and the gradual estrangement of the two men, who had been *erastēs* and *erōmenos*, fit another paradigm about elite political competition that is extensively developed in elegiac poetry through the alienation of Theognis from Kyrnos.¹⁷ None of this material offers a substantial bridge to a second round of legislation or to the *coup d’état* of Peisistratos. Thoroughly suspect are the travels, later interaction with Peisistratos, and thereby the received date for Solon’s death (cf. *Suda s.v. Σόλων*, σ 776 Adler; Plut. *Solon* 32.3 with Heracleides Ponticus fr. 148 Wehrli; Phainias fr. 21 W, cf. DL 1.62; ΣPlato *Rep.* 599E). Without needing to save some supposed date for Attic coinage in the 570s by redating, there is no reason to alter the chronology of any of the reforms. The *stasis* at Athens in the 580s

14. C.T. Seltman, *Athens: Its History and Coinage Before the Persian Invasion* (Cambridge 1924) 6–15, made a search for such a coinage—entirely reasonable on the basis of the *Ath. Pol.*—finding it in an Aiginetan weight issue shared with Karthaia of Keos, but has received little support (Cahn *Kleine Schriften* 74–76); cf. E.S.G. Robinson, rev. Seltman, *Athens*, NC⁵ 4 (1924) 329–41, esp. 332–34; J.H. Jongkees, “Notes on the Coinage of Athens,” *Mnemosyne* 12 (1945) 81–117, esp. 81–87; also Kroll & Waggoner *AJA* (1984) 327.

15. For lower dating, see C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution* (Oxford 1952) 316–21; Davies *APF* 323–24. Cf. Rhodes *NC* (1975) 6–7. R.W. Wallace’s recent overview supports the higher chronology (“The Date of Solon’s Reforms,” *AJAH* 8 [1983] 81–95).

16. Visit to Egypt: Hdt. 2.177.2; Plut. *Solon* 26.1–2 (also Cyprus); note the variable chronology: Hdt. 2.177.2 with 1.29.2–30.1; Plato *Tim.* 21C–22B with Plut. *Solon* 31.6. See also A. Martina, *Solon* (Rome 1968) #62–69, pp. 22–31. Trip to Lydia: Hdt. 1.29–33, cf. 1.86.3–5; DS 9.26–27; Plut. *Solon* 27–28; note also ΣPlato *Rep.* 599E. Other attestations: Martina *Solon* #70–99, pp. 32–50. The journeys to Philokypros, Amasis, and Kroisos created notorious chronological problems (recognized even in antiquity). The other standard placement for the travels of a *nomothetēs* was in his youth (Plut. *Solon* 2; cf. Hermippos fr. 9, *FHG* 3.38 = fr. 7 Wehrli). In comparison, the self-immolation of Lykourgos at Delphi performs a parallel function in the Spartan legislative tradition (Plut. *Lyc.* 29.3–4).

17. *Ath. Pol.* 14.2–3; Plut. *Solon* 1.3–6, 29.1–5, 30.1–8, cf. 8.3; see also Martina *Solon* #571–87, pp. 271–76. The *Ath. Pol.* doubted the erotic connection on chronological grounds (17.2).

and 570s can be shown to have had a different aetiology from the agrarian crisis faced by Solon.¹⁸

A difficulty in reconstructing the legislative history of Attic coinage is that the economic role of the first coins themselves was not that great. There were not yet enough to dominate even intra-*polis* exchange and the fractional coins required for smaller retail purchases were insufficient until the last quarter of the sixth century. Contrary to later expectation, coinage may not have occupied anyone's attention, and, if it did belong to a legislative program, there is no assurance that anyone bothered to preserve memories of what had been done.

Solon and Attic Metrology

It will surprise no one that the direction of scholarship has changed significantly on the context of the reforms mentioned in *Ath. Pol.* 10 and Plutarch *Solon* 15. Not only has numismatic research on early coins dissociated Solon and coinage,¹⁹ but the shock of confronting a non-monetary early sixth-century Attic economy has also undermined earlier interpretations, which now appear to have modernized economic phenomena beyond all probability.²⁰ Archaeology does not preclude Solon having legislated on weights and measures; it could be envisioned that a historical reform of these standards was confounded with simultaneous and ahistorical legislation about coinage.²¹ Yet, with Solon having had nothing to do with coinage at all, any counter testimony tends to taint other theoretically possible details.²² Thus we are brought to an investigation of

18. See Figueira *Hesperia* (1984) 467–71.

19. The recent works are numerous; earlier work being less helpful through its outdated archaeological context: Kraft *JNG* (1959–1960) 21–46; C.M. Kraay, "An Interpretation of *Ath. Pol.* Ch. 10," *Essays in Greek Coinage* (Oxford 1968) 1–9; K. Kraft, "Zur solonischen Gewichts- und Münzreform," *JNG* 19 (1969) 7–24; M.H. Crawford, "Solon's Alleged Reform of Weights and Measures," *Eirene* 10 (1972) 5–8; M. Chambers, "Aristotle on Solon's Reform of Coinage and Weights," *CSCA* 6 (1973) 1–16; Lévy *SM* (1973); T. Fischer, "Zu Solons Mass-, Gewichts- und Münzreform: ein Diskussionsbeitrag," *Chiron* 3 (1973) 1–14; Flach *RSA* (1973); Rhodes *NC* (1975) 1–11; *id.*, "Solon and the Numismatists: Postscript," *NC* 7 17 (1977) 152; S. Karweise, "Aristoteles' *Ath. Pol.* c. 10: des Rätsels Lösung?," in *Litterae Numismaticae Vindobonenses* (Vienna 1979) 23–41. Earlier work may be noted in Kraft *JNG* (1959–1960) n. 1, p. 21; Martina *Solon* 448–49; Fischer *Chiron* (1973) n. 5, p. 2.

20. The revolution in historical sensibility may be assessed through J. Johnston, "Solon's Reform of Weights and Measures," *JHS* 54 (1934) 180–84, where we find "But in all commercial communities, ancient and modern, in times of economic stress there are business men, industrialists and farmers, who are struggling along under the burden of debt, and who bravely continue the struggle. These are the persons whose activities constitute the mainspring of economic life in any profit-making economy." He concludes that Solon lessened Attic measures from Aiginetan—the Pheidonian *metra* actually mentioned representing a considerable embarrassment—to disguise a price increase. Cf. F. Creatini, "Riflessi sociali della riforma ponderale di Solone," *SCO* 34 (1985) 127–32, where Solon intends to lower census thresholds. One might believe that πεντεκοσιομέδμνος was a traditional epithet for the rich landowners, but that leaves unexplained why the other census levels had to be enumerated as they were. Hence the idea of changing *metra* to lower census thresholds seems a cumbrous way of broadening access to political power.

21. See Kraay *Essays* 7–8.

22. Crawford *Eirene* (1972) 5, 8.

the structure and content of the two source passages, and here we must establish a few ground rules before proceeding. First, it is unlikely that we are dealing with a cryptogram which requires an extraordinary amount of recondite information or abstruse calculations for comprehension. We must look instead for an interpretation based on a limited set of data that fourth-century readers can be expected to have known and used to make sense of two accounts from works intended for a general educated audience. A persistent mistake has been to interpret our sources in light of the considerable data about coinage and metrology now available from archaeology. The Attidographers knew about earlier coins through several means, such as a knowledge of heirlooms, familiarity with dedications, or chance discovery of lost hoards, but none of these led to archaeological understanding or exact chronology.

Moreover, it is only with great reluctance that one may deny that both the *Athenaion Politeia* and Androtion derived from the same tradition of Solon's reform.²³ If Androtion was using special pleading to argue that the received and majority view on the Seisakhtheia was erroneous, he probably modified as little as possible in that view. He would rather have prodded a detail implicit in received tradition (like the nature of the new drachma) toward a new conclusion, and not needlessly subverted his purpose by innovation in a genre which was manifestly conservative. And there is a good chance that Androtion was himself a major source for the *Athenaion Politeia*, so the chance that its author drew parts of his treatment of Solon from Androtion urges that they proposed a common understanding of the nature of the metrological reform (but not, of course, of the Seisakhtheia).²⁴

Accordingly, one need not conclude that the particular passage of Androtion utilized by Plutarch contained a complete account of the metrological changes like the *Athenaion Politeia*. If Androtion was otherwise faithful to the sequence Seisakhtheia > *nomothesia* > program of metrological reforms (see below), he may have treated the creation of the redesigned *mna* (in isolation) early in his portrait of Solon, appending it to a narrative on the Seisakhtheia. That conjunction was his new contribution. He then returned to a contextualized account of the other changes after the *nomothesia*. The *Athenaion Politeia* exploited only his full account for its version of the metrological reforms. Our two sources can then be used to supplement each other until we discover that they are clearly in disagreement.

There is something fundamentally anachronistic about Solon's metrological reforms. In the main, early economic legislation involved regularizing traditional procedures, which could vary from place to place even in the same community. A Pheidon or a Solon presumably codified the weights and measures extant in their *polis* or in some prestigious, populous, or powerful segment

23. Crawford *Eirene* (1972) 7–8. Cf. Kraft *JNG* (1959–1960) 22–23; Kraay *Essays* 8–9, Rhodes *NC* (1975) 2–4.

24. Jacoby *FGH* 3b (Suppl.) 1.462–64.

of it.²⁵ What could have motivated an early lawgiver toward uprooting one system (indigenous or foreign) in favor of another and how could he have communicated his rationale to the community? Later, there were economic factors which urged an accommodation of weights, measures, and coin standards to those of an important trading partner(s). In the early sixth century, there was hardly enough external trade involving Attica to drive a systematic reform.

We must also emphasize that economic forces acted to encourage the *accommodation* of an autonomous system; they did not force a differentiation such as that described here. In the system of fifth-century Attic weights there was at least one point of congruence with the Aiginetan system. That this conversion point was economically significant and commercially exploited is shown both by the Athenian use of the turtle or tortoise, contemporary symbols of Aiginetan coinage, to signify precisely this common weight, and by a shift from turtle to tortoise to mirror this modification in Aiginetan coin-type.²⁶ Barring economic forces, altering standards can only have been a symbolic act, a gesture of political or ideological independence or distancing. Differentiation of metrological standards as a form of political communication seems improbable in a pre-ideological age of primitive solidarity between members of the same community and at a time when there was only slight intrusive pressure from abroad.

Both passages speak of augmentation: *Ath. Pol.*, αὔξησις; Plut., ἐπαύξησις. Since the *Athenaion Politeia* lists *metra*, *stathma*, and *nomisma*, scholars have sensibly sought changes in these three areas in the following clauses. As this treatment is more complete than Androtion's account, which focuses on monetary reform, it ought to provide a framework for reconstruction. A corollary assumption, however, compels less credence: the three areas where standards changed are treated in the same order as their first mention.²⁷ Collocations of the words μέτρα and σταθμά (and related terms) are common, so that the succession μέτρα, σταθμά, and a third term is not surprising. In the conjunctions of terms based on μετρ- and σταθμ-, the word based on μετρ- is twice as likely to come first. The genitives τῶν μέτρων καὶ σταθμῶν are linked here by sharing a single τήν (construed with αὔξησις), while τοῦ νομίσματος has the second τήν to itself.²⁸ So stylistic considerations and not the order of topics to follow may have determined the order of first citation. In comparison, note

25. See Rhodes *NC* (1975) 10–11, who, however, has fourth-century Athenians posit a change on the basis of the specifications in the remains of Solon's code. See n. 55 below.

26. M. Lang & M. Crosby, *Weights, Measures and Tokens, The Athenian Agora* 10 (Princeton 1964) 5, 8–11. Both turtles and tortoises can be one-sixth (of the weight stater; with one-twelfth for the half turtles and tortoises), while some tortoises carry the designation one-fourth (*Agora* LW #34, #37), and one-eighth for the half tortoise (*Agora* LW #45, #47). Variation in weight suggests that different turtles and tortoises were components of different Attic weight systems or that they denoted different weights within the same system. As standards changed at Athens and probably also abroad, the points of intersection between the Aiginetan and Athenian systems changed. E. Pernice, *Griechische Gewichte* (Berlin 1894), catalogues many such Athenian weights (#112–231), which may be contrasted with two weights found on Aigina (#727, #728).

27. Cf. Kraft *JNG* (1959–1960) 24–27; Kraay *Essays* 2–3; Rhodes *NC* (1975) 2–3.

28. Note Kraay *Essays* 2.

the parallel passage in Strabo on Pheidon: καὶ μέτρα ἐξεῦρε τὰ Φειδώνια καλούμενα καὶ σταθμούς καὶ νόμισμα κεχαραγμένον τό τε ἄλλο καὶ τὸ ἀργυροῦν . . . (8.3.33 C358 = Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 115). Coin standards and weight standards are so intimately connected that changes in one are enmeshed with modifications in the other. Thus, the sequence of lists differs from an expository order with coins followed by weights, which in this case is governed by the supposed derivation of the weight standard from the coin standard.

The change in *metra* seems straightforward: it is grounded in current economic practice, thus being easily comprehensible to a fourth-century audience. Fourth-century Pheidonian *metra* appear to have been lighter than Attic *metra*. In Theophrastus, using Pheidonian *metra* implies stinginess (*Char.* 30.11). An Apolloniate gift of barley at Delphi had 3000 Pheidonian *medimnoi*, which equaled 1875 Delphic *med.* (Tod *GHI* #140.80–88).²⁹ It is likelier that Delphic measures were on the Aiginetan standard rather than the Attic (the other possibility), but in either case Pheidonian *med.* were lighter than their Attic or Aiginetan counterparts. Thus, Solon's change from Pheidonian to Attic measures was an augmentation. Fourth-century historiography (e.g. Ephorus) had Pheidon establishing the Peloponnesian system of weights and measures and initiating coining (and thereby the Aiginetan standard) on Aigina (cf. *FGH* 70 F 176). If Solon, as the primary Athenian *nomothetēs*, must originate the Attic system, is it not inevitable that Solon must emend Pheidon? Every ancient tradition makes of Pheidon the earlier figure.³⁰

Accepting the reality of this change is a different matter, as doubt exists that fourth-century Pheidonian *metra* were indeed used throughout the archaic Peloponnesus and on Aigina, although the story that Pheidon coined on Aigina means that Aiginetan *metra* were in popular opinion also "Pheidonian". The monthly dues Spartiates were expected to tender to their messes represent a traditional duty of early origin. Dicaearchus expressed the amount of grain as 1.5 Attic *medimnoi* of barley meal and the wine as 11–12 *khoes*, again presumably Attic (fr. 23, *FGH* 2.242 = fr. 72 W). Plutarch, however, mentions the payment of 1 *med.* and 8 *khoes* (*Lyc.* 12.3). The discrepancy is owed to his measures being Spartan: Attic *metra* were c. two-thirds the size of the Spartan.³¹ A 1.44/1.5 ratio of Lakonian to Attic measures is reminiscent of the ratios of 10/7 and 10/6 prevailing for the Aiginetan and Attic coin and weight standards. The Aiginetan and Lakonian systems of metrology need not have been precisely the same, but some metrological regimes of the archaic Peloponnesus

29. Note Fischer *Chiron* (1973) n. 16, p. 5.

30. See pp. 14 above, 89 below. Just as Ephorus used Pheidon's coining to portray the cultural differences between Sparta and Argos (or between a primordial and a modified Dorian cultural order; see *Aegina* 71–79), Attic historiography stressed Solon's transformation of Peloponnesian metrological customs.

31. See F. Hultsch, *Griechische und römische Metrologie* (Berlin 1882) 533–35; O. Viedebant, *Forschungen zur Metrologie des Altertums* (Leipzig 1917) 69–70. For analysis, T. J. Figueira, "Mess Contributions and Subsistence at Sparta," *TAPA* 114 (1984) 87–109, esp. 87–89.

were systematically heavier and larger *per* standard unit than their Attic counterparts.³² This raises the possibility that archaic Aiginetan *metra* (necessarily “Pheidonian” historiographically) were in fact larger than their Attic analogues, unlike the Pheidonian *metra* used in the fourth century, which may be a (derivative) system linked to Corinth.³³

If the Delphians used Aiginetan *medimnoi* (just as they coined on the Aiginetan standard), the Apolloniote Pheidonian measures related to Delphian/Aiginetan *metra* by the proportion 1.6/1, as compared to an Attic/Aiginetan ratio of 1.44–1.5/1 (cf. Lakonian *metra*). Thereby, Solon’s reform is comprehensible as an increase because he replaced Pheidonian *metra* with Attic *metra* c. 7–11% larger, which is just the level of difference implied by Theophrastus’ reference to the *Aiskhrokerdēs*’ usage of Pheidonian measures.

The *Athenaion Politeia* then proceeds to comments about the constitution of the *mna* (= mn.): (A) καὶ ἡ μνᾶ, πρότερον ἔχ[ο]υσα [σ]ταθμὸν ἐβδομήκοντα δραχμάς, ἀνεπληρώθη ταῖς ἑκατόν; (B) ἦν δ’ ὁ ἀρχαῖος χαρακτήρ διδραχμον. If we insist on maintaining the order *metra*, *stathma*, and *nomisma*, statement (A) belongs to a modification of the weights, while clause (B) introduces the coinage reform. The problem with this interpretation is that Plutarch’s version of Androtion seems to contain a statement parallel to (A) and clearly applied to coinage: ἑκατὸν γὰρ ἐποίησε δραχμῶν τὴν μνᾶν, πρότερον ἐβδομήκοντα [καὶ τριῶν] οὖσαν . . . Moreover, if (B) introduces coinage, then Solon is envisaged as replacing the didrachm with the tetradrachm,³⁴ when Attidography is better reconstructed to show a change from Aiginetan didrachms to Attic didrachms. If we were intended to think that the famous owl tetradrachms were being started, would the author have introduced so momentous an innovation so offhandedly? The adjective ἀρχαῖος need not have comparative force here. Yet, if (A) refers to a coinage reform, any objection to (B) as parenthetical is removed:³⁵ it amplifies the point of (A) by implying that Aiginetan-weight didrachms are yielding to Attic-weight didrachms; no tetradrachms were as yet minted. As Kraft observes, the three aorists ἐγένετο, ἀνεπληρώθη, and ἐποίησε mark three stages of the argument, while the imperfect ἦν indicates a parenthesis.³⁶

Fourth-century practice again provides a basis for interpretation. The ratio of 70 to 100 connoted an obvious fact of everyday business, being the

32. In Plut. *Mor.* 226D a piece of Lakonian iron money weighs an Aiginetan *mna*, suggesting Aiginetan weights were used at Sparta.

33. The Pheidonian measures noted at Delphi were from Apollonia, a Corinthian colony, and the Pindaric *scholia* speak of Pheidonian measures at Corinth (*ΣOl.* 13.27d). This raises the possibility that both the system of *metra* prevailing at Corinth and its colonies and that of Aiginetan measures tapped the authority of Pheidon. Nor would a role for the shadowy lawgiver Pheidon of Corinth be impossible as an explanation for the existence of two “Pheidonian” systems (if they indeed existed). Note Aris. *Pol.* 1265b12–16.

34. Kraay *Essays* 5–6; Chambers *CSCA* (1973) 2–3, 6–7.

35. Kraft *JNG* (1959–1960) 25–26; cf. Kraay *Essays* 3.

36. In general, see Kraft *JNG* (1969) 10–16 on the reasons why this sentence cannot convey the reform of coins.

exchange rate between fresh Aiginetan and Attic coins.³⁷ More obscure allusions may be hypothesized, but not as associations which an *Atthis* could anticipate in the minds of its audience.³⁸ Evidence, most significantly from Delphi, shows that Aiginetan coins were aggregated in mn. of 70 dr. so that 60 mn. of 70 dr. comprised a talent of 4200 dr. (not the 6000 dr. Attic talent). This accounting practice made the Aiginetan and Attic coin talents worth the same. Hence the *Athenaion Politeia* reasonably gives a weight of 70 dr. to the pre-Solonian (Aiginetan) mn. and says that it was filled out (ἀνεπληρώθη) “with” 100 dr. The nature of the the *mna* had changed: weighing the same, it was now divided into 100 lighter Attic dr. and not, as formerly, 70 heavier Aiginetan dr.³⁹ To say, therefore, that Solon changed the *mna* from 70 to 100 dr. is to imply that Athens abandoned the Aiginetan drachm for the Attic. Nor should such a contention be surprising. Nothing indicates that the Athenians questioned the priority of the archaic Aiginetan turtles. To affirm that Athens had once coined Aiginetan-weight didrachms merely put Attica in the company of many of its neighbors adopting the same standard. Aprioristically, nothing is wrong about this assertion; it is just that modern numismatics has proven it groundless.

This interpretation of Solon’s transformation of the *mna* is strengthened by Androtion’s use of it to explain the cancellation of debts, as he makes sense only if such a change is understood. Androtion imagined that debt at this time was monetary debt, quantifiable and expressed in explicit contractual terms. Interest was the cost for using money, just as it would be in the classical period. To him, the Seisakththeia was a populist lightening of burdens through a moderation of interest (τόκων μετριότητι κουφισθέντας ἀγαπήσαι τοὺς πένητας). Agrarian debt in the seventh century, however, was the material expression of the style of reciprocity prevailing between the most and the least powerful members of the community. Possibly the status of debtor was sometimes

37. Actual transactions differed with the quality of the coins and with market conditions like the availability of each coinage. See, e.g., J. Bousquet, “Inscriptions de Delphes,” *BCH* 109 (1985) 221–53, esp. 235–37; cf. P. Marchetti, “Les cours de l’attique et de l’éginétique et les rapports or-argent dans les comptes de Delphes,” in D. Knoepfler (ed.), *Comptes et inventaires dans la cité grecque* (Geneva 1988) 103–10.

38. Contrast the curious observation of Kraay (*Essays* 4) on the confusing influence of “the unfortunate numerical coincidence that 70 Aeginetan drachmae are about the same in weight as 100 Attic drachmae.” As for abstruse explanations, consider Kraft *JNG* (1959–1960) 34–46 (also *JNG* [1969] 20–22), who has Solon’s reforms moving the Athenians from the Chalcidic standard (attested only in western Euboian colonies) through the Achaean standard of southern Italy, to the Attic standard of the WM. This sequence embodies the relationship 70:100:105 presented in the *Ath. Pol.* Disregarding the improbability that the Achaean *weight* standard could play its assigned role, one would still strain to believe both that western Chalcidic and Achaean standards derived from unattested prototypes in their central Greek *metropoleis* and that such esoteric data from metrological history were recoverable by a Peripatetic author investigating standard weights still extant in the mint. We are left last with the mystery of what external economic forces prompted sixth-century legislators to make this sort of adjustment.

39. Crawford *Eirene* (1972) 6–8; Fischer *Chiron* (1973) 6–7. For reasons outlined below, the historicity of the *mna* with 70 dr. is questionable, a judgment *a fortiori* against a pre-Solonian *mna* with 70 Attic dr. (cf. Kraay *Essays* 4–5, 8). All economic reasons proposed for changing the *mna* from 70 to 100 dr. are thoroughly modernizing.

acquired through actual, discrete borrowings of food, seed-grain, draft animals, or labor, but indebtedness probably also subsumed legal patronage, physical or military protection, religious sponsorship, and traditional deference.

In this context, the “debtor”/“creditor” relationship became open-ended, intrinsic, and hereditary.⁴⁰ The debtor’s receipt of goods and services need not have been individual or voluntary rather than a consequence of his and his forefathers’ status as the most marginal inhabitants of an area containing large, stable landholdings (such as the plain around the city itself). A degree of coercion, pure and simple, may also have been involved since some members of the community were not yet recognized as Athenians, protected by customary law (Solon fr. 36.9, 14 W; *Ath. Pol.* 5.3). Loans did not elicit payments (of interest and principle) calculated to retire a debt: rather indebtedness required an open-ended clientage which included permanent payments. There was no interest charged for using money, but a return expected commensurate with the *aretē* of the giver in a manner comparable to the unequal gift-exchanges portrayed in epic or the donations expected by Hesiod’s “bribe-devouring” kings.

Money represented a more refined way to quantify and to reason about obligations and their fulfillment, even before appearing in the quantities or as the fractional coins suited to facilitating local business (see n. 77 below). In contrast, the pre-monetary indebted were locked in an endless cycle of dependence because they could not manipulate terms of agreement (or of termination) by which they entered into or continued in disadvantageous relationships. Hence early Attic indebtedness implies a dependent class either *pelatai* ‘clients’ by virtue of their general subordination (*Ath. Pol.* 2.2) or *hektēmoroi* ‘sixth-parters’ (Poll. 4.165, Phot. s.v. *πελάται* both equate the two classes), forever compelled to render a portion of their production to their powerful neighbors (*Ath. Pol.* 2.2; Plut. *Solon* 13.4).⁴¹ The *horoi*, the uprooting of which Solon so eloquently evokes (fr. 32.5–7 W), delimited land which had entered the penumbra of influence exerted by the powerful. From an appreciation attuned to later financial conditions, interminable repayment (almost regardless of original “debt”) seems grossly disproportionate. Within a relationship of dependency, however, although it may seem counter-intuitive, these “loans” may

40. Solon and Attic tradition spoke of the poor both as enslaved (fr. 36.13–15: *τοὺς δ' ἐνθάδ' αὐτοῦ δουλίην ἀεικέα | ἔχοντας, ἥθη δεσποτέων τρομεομένους, | ἐλευθέρους ἔθηκα*; *Ath. Pol.* 2.1: *ἐδούλευον*, cf. 12.3) and in service to the wealthy (note Photius, *Suda* s.v. *σεισάχθεια* [σ 289 Adler], Apostol. 15.39 [= CPG 2.640]: *ἐργάζεσθαι τοῖς χρήσταις*, all of which may stem from Philochorus, cf. *FGH* 328 F 114; cf. DL 1.45: *ἐθήτευον*). Although the reform could be summarized as the “curtailment of debt” (e.g., *Ath. Pol.* 11.2: *τὰς τῶν χρεῶν ἀποκοπὰς*, cf. 6.1; 13.3), *σεισάχθεια* ‘shaking off of burdens’, apparently a contemporary denomination, demonstrates that a general amelioration of status was involved (e.g., *Ath. Pol.* 6.1; Philochorus *FGH* 328 F 114). Plutarch represents the term *Seisakhtheia* as a euphemism (*Solon* 15.2–3), a change in appreciation created by later differentiation of civic from economic status. See also Heracleides fr. 1.5, *FGH* 2.208; Plut. *Mor.* 343C, 807D; DS 1.79.4 = Hecataeus *FGH* 264 F 25; DL 1.45; also the passages cited in Martina *Solon* #274–96, pp. 141–46.

41. The global nature of dependency turned the scarcely extortionate “rent” of one-sixth into true exploitation. The *πελάται* are also linked with the *θήτες* (Poll. 3.82; ΣPlato *Euthyphr.* 4C; Phot. s.v. *πελάται*).

have been followed not only by repayments by the debtor, but also by further donations from the creditor as patron to client (providing a degree of mitigation).

For his part, Androtion gives us rather a scenario involving monetary debasement, one much beloved by creditors in the modern period. It was easier to retire debts which stay the same in nominal terms (ἀριθμῶ μὲν ἴσον . . . ἀποδιδόντων) with money of lower silver content like Androtion's lighter didrachms (δυνάμει δ' ἔλαττον ἀποδιδόντων). Like other advocates of debt relief, he believes that debtors received great benefit from this process (ὠφελεῖσθαι μὲν τοὺς ἐκτίνοντας μεγάλα), and that creditors were not harmed (μηδὲν δὲ βλάπτεσθαι τοὺς κομιζομένους). His assurance rests presumably on his belief that creditors will still have the same buying power with their new didrachms, since prices would stay the same. Such conventional pricing is attested in the Solonian (improbable) tradition that a *medimnos* and a sheep had the value of a drachma (Plut. *Solon* 23.3). Yet, lowering the silver content of the didrachm increased the money supply, likely to be reflected in higher prices. The creditors thus had less buying power than previously.

There is no difficulty then in seeing our clause (A) of the *Athenaion Politeia* as constituting τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος αὐξήσιν in the sense that the *mna* was nominally increased in terms of drachms.⁴² The parallel statement in Plutarch's account of Androtion creates problems. The manuscripts read καὶ σειςάχθειαν ὀνομάσαι τὸ φιλανθρώπουμα τοῦτο καὶ τὴν ἅμα τούτῳ γενομένην τῶν τε μέτρων ἐπαύξισιν καὶ τοῦ νομίσματος τιμὴν. If this reading is retained, τιμὴ must be understood as 'valuation' or 'valorization', which may not be inappropriate.⁴³ Retention of τιμὴν is supported by a gloss for Σειςάχθεια in the *Etymologicum Magnum*, τιμὴν τοῦ νομίσματος (710.35–36 Gaisford). A lexicographer read the same text that has been transmitted to us. Others, however, have objected that τιμὴν does not parallel ἐπαύξισιν and that its article is lacking. The readiest emendation has been τιμῆς.⁴⁴ Barring a slip in the transmission of an original more like the text of the *Athenaion Politeia*, it is hard to recognize an ἐπαύξισιν . . . τοῦ νομίσματος τιμῆς 'augmentation of the value of the money' in the reconstruction proposed above.

A common answer has been to posit a shift from the didrachm to the tetradrachm as a concomitant aspect of the change in the *mna*.⁴⁵ We must thus

42. Note Crawford *Eirene* (1972) 6. Admittedly, this means different types of increase in *metra* and in *nomisma*, but the alternatives are less palatable, for instance, an Attic *mna* of 70 dr. preceding Solon, as Kraay *Essays* 4–5, Rhodes *NC* (1975) 4 suggest.

43. B. Keil, *Die solonische Verfassung in Aristoteles' Verfassungsgeschichte Athens* (Berlin 1892) 165. The manuscript reading is also kept by R. Flacelière, E. Chambry, & M. Jumeaux, *Plutarque: Vies* 2 (Paris 1968) 27; Fischer *Chiron* (1973) 2.

44. A.W. Gomme, "Two Notes on the Constitution of Athens," *JHS* 46 (1926) 171–78, esp. 171; Jacoby 3b (Suppl.) 2.132, n. 3, who does, however, object that τῆς τιμῆς is necessary. The emendation was first offered by Sintenis, and is accepted by K. Ziegler, *Plutarchi vitae parallelae* 1.1 (Leipzig 1957) 99 and by M. Manfredini & L. Piccirilli, *La vita di Solone* (Verona 1977) 47.

45. E.g., Crawford *Eirene* (1972) 6.

return to the idea that Solon inaugurated the owl tetradrachms.⁴⁶ Unfortunately, there is no reference at all to coin denominations in Androtion and only an implied change decipherable in the *Athenaion Politeia*'s remark that the ἀρχαῖος χαρὰκτῆρ was the didrachm. If we must emend (an alternative to which I am resistant), it is preferable to see Androtion as again extrapolating from his theory on the economics of the Seisakhtheia. By allowing Athenians to exchange didrachms on the Aiginetan standard for the same weight, but a greater number of lighter Attic didrachms, Solon increased the value of Athenian money, because Androtion assumes that those lighter Attic didrachms had the same buying power. Nonetheless, since a decisive case cannot be made for any emendation, great reluctance must be felt over converting this clause into the fundamental key to an interpretation of the entire tradition.

It is probable that anachronism has affected this portrait of the relationship of archaic Attic and Aiginetan coinage. While fourth-century evidence suggests an Aiginetan talent composed of 60 mn., each including 70 dr.,⁴⁷ that is a secondary development, intended to facilitate treasurizing and tallying Aiginetan talents when the Attic standard had come to predominate. At least one other financial context at Delphi shows an Aiginetan *mna* of 100 dr. to be in simultaneous use with *mnai* of 70 dr.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the archaic Aiginetan *mna* and talent held 100 dr. and 6000 dr., just like their Attic counterparts.⁴⁹ There is no warrant for believing that a division into 70 had any original basis, unlike the divisions into 60 and 100.

The data are clear regarding the related Aiginetan weight standard. Pollux unequivocally refers to a *mna* of 100 and a talent of 6000 dr. (9.86).⁵⁰ Two

46. In a more elaborate scenario, the main tradition could have seen Solon creating WM didrachms while Androtion might have opted for the "gorgoneion" tetradrachms.

47. The Delphian evidence: *SGDI* #2264.5–6, cf. 2287.3; *SIG²* 438.133–35; *FdD* 3.1.294, 3.5.19, 48.i.43–45, 50.ii.9–14, 58.13–15. See T. Reinach, "Observations sur le système monétaire Delphique," *BCH* 20 (1896) 251–56, 385–86 ("La mine Delphique"). The evidence outside Delphi is less persuasive; note an inscription from Arkadian Orkhomenos: T. Reinach, "Inscription d'Orchomène d'Arcadie," *BCH* 28 (1904) 1–19, esp. 17–18 on line 16 (= *Rec. Inscr. Jur.* #43); from Gortyn: *SGDI* #5009; from Messene: *IG* V.1.1433. For instance, the *lebetes* 'cauldrons' and *darkhmai* 'handfuls' of spits listed in groups of 35, attested in an inscription of Khorisiai in Boiotia, are hardly evidence for coin mn. of 70; see N. Platon & M. Feyel, "Inventaire sacré de Thespies: trouvé à Chortita (Béotie)," *BCH* 62 (1938) 149–60. Cf. Crawford *Eirene* (1972) n. 7, p. 7; Kraay *Essays* 5; Rhodes *NC* (1975) 4–5.

48. In the archonship of Kadys, probably at the beginning of the fourth century, a law restricting the amount of legal interest seems to have used a local (Aiginetan) *mna* of 100 dr. (*FdD* 3.1.294). See T. Homolle, "La loi de Cadys sur le prêt à intérêt," *BCH* 50 (1926) 3–106, esp. 26–27; cf. T. Reinach, "A propos de la loi Delphique de Cadys," *BCH* 51 (1927) 170–77.

49. Note Kraft *JNG* (1959–1960) 28, which is sensible despite its dogmatic tone; see also Kraft *JNG* (1969) 17–20.

50. Poll. 9.86 also states that an Aig. talent (= T) was equal to 10,000 Attic dr., a possibility only if the Aig. T had 6000 dr. This ratio differs from the 10:7 ratio between the Aig. and Attic coin Ts, and might denote the ratio between the Aig. and Attic weight Ts. See Lang *Weights* 11; cf. Hultsch *Metrologie* 194–97. The Aig. weight T was somewhat heavier in proportion to the Attic weight T than the Aig. coin T to the Attic coin T.

passages in Hero's *Geometrika* imply that the Aiginetan *mna* was relatively heavier than the Attic *mna* through separate comparisons with the Ptolemaic *mna* (23.55, 59). Aiginetan talents (coin and weight) were heavier, just as Aiginetan and Spartan *metra* exceeded Attic *metra*. Thus, when the *Athenaion Politeia* speaks of the 'filling' of the *mna* (ἀνεπληρώθη) or Androtion of making the *mna* consist of 100 dr., a reflection of current accounting was being anachronistically projected into the past.

The *Athenaion Politeia* next proceeds to discuss how Solon made *stathma* 'weights' in relation to the coinage (πρὸς τὸ νόμισμα).⁵¹ The connective δὲ καὶ indicates a movement to the next topic. The verb ἐπιδιενεμήθησαν also shows that coinage is providing a basis for establishing the weights through addition, since it must mean 'to distribute as additive' (cf. Joseph. *BJ* 2.100). So 63 coin *mnai* comprised the weight talent with the (additional) 3 *mnai* being added to the stater and the other *stathmoi*.⁵² This stater is not the standard didrachm coin, but rather the weight equivalent to two mn. or 1/30th of a talent. An Athenian decree of the second century indicates that the terminology and syntax of this passage belongs to the technical language of official metrology.⁵³ Following the tendency established by the tradition, one might anticipate that Aiginetan weights had been in use in pre-Solonian Attica so that there is no way in which Attic weights as an end-product of the reform could stand for an augmentation. This objection, however, is merely an outgrowth of modern views and not what the *Athenaion Politeia* actually says, since it fails to take into account the original size of the *mna* with its 70 dr. Thus, it is not hard to see why the *Athenaion Politeia* visualized Solon's actions as an increase. Another implication of the text may be that coins and *stathma* had weighed the same (however improbable that may seem to us administratively) until Solon increased the weights. Therefore, the *mna* grew in the number of drachms that it held and then increased in weight.

We should look again toward the metrological conditions of the classical period for help in interpretation. The 5% difference between the coin and weight talents, created by the distribution of three coin *mnai* over the new weight talent, parallels the fifth-century status of the Attic system of weights where the weight standard was 5% heavier than the coin standard.⁵⁴ This

51. For the meaning of πρὸς, see Chambers *CSCA* (1973) 7, who cites J.E. Sandys, *Aristotle's Constitution of Athens*² (London 1912) s.v. πρὸς, pp. 314–15. Kraft *JNG* (1959–1960) 26–27 opts for σταθμά as predicative: "he made as weight(-standards) for coinage the talent having . . ." Cf. also Kraay *Essays* 6–7.

52. Note Chambers *CSCA* (1973) 8.

53. *IG* II² 1013.29–31: ἀγέτω δὲ καὶ ἡ μνᾶ ἡ ἐμπορικὴ Στεφανηφόρου δραχμὰς ἑκατὸν τριάκοντα καὶ ὀκτὼ πρὸς τὰ στάθμα τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀργυροκοπίῳ καὶ ῥοπῇ Στεφανηφόρου δραχμὰς δεκάδυο . . .

54. Lang *Weights* 15–17. Kraft found Solon's augmentation of coinage in this provision (*JNG* [1959–1960] 42–43; *JNG* [1969] 22–23) with the unfortunate result that the Athenians must have minted coins which were over weight *vis-à-vis* the weight standard. There is no commercial or actuarial motivation for such a procedure. Cf. Kraay *Essays* 7; Lévy *SM* (1973) 5–6; Rhodes *NC* (1975) 5–6.

differential was traditional by the late fifth century, but there is some doubt that the standard for *stathma* had stayed unchanged since Solon.⁵⁵

Moreover, even if one disregards the possible anachronism here over the sixth-century weight standard and the ratio of 105 weight dr./100 coin dr., an improbability resides in the very notion of configuring a system of weights on the basis of coin weights. Coined silver with the affixing of an official type was more valuable for the same weight than uncoined silver—i.e., it had a degree of token value. In weights of the same name, the coin weight was usually the lighter of the two. That coin weights were lighter than homonymous weights facilitated mints taking in raw silver and returning coins. A part of the discount exacted in conversion (to cover minting costs, tax, and wastage) was disguised. For example, even if one could get back the same number of coin drachmas as the number of weight dr. handed over, he had already given up (e.g.) 5% of his silver. The coin standard was an understrength weight standard, and weight standard not an overstrength coin standard, as the *Athenaion Politeta* suggests. The reversal of derivation hints at a tradition in which Solon set out to differentiate Athenian coins from Aiginetan coins and that intention determined the creation of a new Attic weight standard (necessarily somewhat heavier) as a corollary.

The Athenians found symbolic significance in the affinities of metrological units, as Pollux suggests (9.76). He says that they called the Aiginetan drachma the *παχέαν δραχμήν* 'fat drachma', refusing to name it the Aiginetan out of hatred for the islanders. The epithet may not only have been justified by the Aiginetan drachma's heavier weight, but also because it conveyed a hint of *hubris*. Herodotus, almost certainly working from Athenian sources, called the Aiginetan oligarchs *οἱ παχέες* 'the bloated ones' (6.91.1; the term is used only in the context of *stasis*: 5.30.1, 77.2; 7.156.2).

When we theorize that classical Athenians believed that Solon altered Attic measures, weights, and coinage from Aiginetan, Pheidonian, or other Peloponnesian prototypes, we add another item to a dossier of beliefs on the early history of Athenian/Aiginetan alienation. Both peoples spoke of the existence of an *ἔχθρη παλαιή* 'ancient hatred'; they derived the Aiginetan cult images of Damia and Auxesia from Attic olive wood and connected an appropriation of the statues with Aiginetan independence; they traced early hostilities to a dereliction of cult dues, associated with the statues (see pp. 36–44, 55–57 above). The Aiginetans spoke of this episode as an early war and claimed

55. Working from three extant weights of c. 500 (*Agora* 10, BW1–3) that imply a stater weighing less than c. 800 gm., Chambers *CSCA* (1973) 11–15 suggests a weight standard c. 10% lighter than the classical norm—c. 900–920 gm. for the stater (note also Rhodes *NC* [1977] 152). He also notes a (fifth-century?) weight reconcilable with a stater of 860 gm., approximating the weight of 200 coin dr. (*JG* I² 917). Lang *Weights* 4, 18–19 would see these lighter standards as interludes within the dominance of the Solonian norm (weight *mna* = 105 coin dr.). Yet, one cannot cite in support the fact that Athens reverted to the Solonian standard in 403/2 by the decree of Teisamenos (And. 1.83), for the reference there to the *metra* and *stathma* of Solon need not contrast with current conditions. And references to changing economic circumstances and especially to the varying supply of silver provide no rationale for modifying weight standards. See Rhodes *NC* (1975) 8–9.

Draco, the Athenian statesman, as a founding lawgiver of their own (see pp. 250–52 below). The Athenians saw an early origin for a continuous string of Aiginetan outrages toward themselves and trespasses against the rules of interstate behavior (pp. 51–53, 133–34). All these real or fabricated occurrences are connected with Aiginetan independence just before 600. Just as Draco, the record of whose activities is pervaded by oligarchic or non-populist resonances, was a fit legislator for pre-Solonian Athens and Aigina, Solon, who places Athens on the road to democracy, must distinguish Athens from Aigina.

Doubt may be expressed over every aspect of the received account of Solon's metrological reforms: Solon did not order the coining of silver at Athens and would not have modified measures, weights, and coins except insofar as he crystallized traditional Attic practices. The details attributed to his reforms in this area are retrojections of later conditions, stemming from a single pervasive belief (held by its framers) in the hostility of early Athenians and Aiginetans. Solon, if he is truly the Attic legislator *par excellence*, must enhance that estrangement, not mitigate it.

Moreover, *Ath. Pol.* 10.1 notes that, along with the populist features of Solon's legislation in 9.1–2, both debt cancellation before the *nomothesia* and the reform of standards afterward were also "demotic":⁵⁶ ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς νόμοις ταῦτα δοκεῖ θείναι δημοτικά, πρὸ δὲ τῆς νομοθεσίας ποιήσας τὴν τῶν χρεῶν ἀποκοπήν, καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα τὴν τε τῶν μέτρων καὶ σταθμῶν καὶ τὴν τοῦ νομίσματος αὐξήσιν. In Androtion's theory, monetary reform and Seisakhtheia have been conflated so that their populist character is manifest. In the *Athenaion Politeia* no such elucidation is made explicit. Considering how Solon's economic differentiation of Athens from Aigina fits into the record of estrangement between Athenians and Aiginetans c. 600–590, we must ask why Solon's actions in *Ath. Pol.* 10 are necessarily populist and why they must follow the *nomothesia* and not, along with the Seisakhtheia, precede it.⁵⁷ This is particularly difficult to grasp, since increasing *metra* would have raised the income needed for census requirements (a rather reactionary turn).

The true history of the early monetary and metrological evolution of archaic *poleis* was shrouded from the eyes of classical Greeks. As facets of an everyday reality of seeking subsistence, an understanding of their true nature had been lost as social conditions changed. Our speculative reconstructions can attempt interpretations only by hypothesizing the lost contexts for the few pieces of evidence that were preserved, and there archaeology provides the only rigor that such a process can possess. As in this case, we find that the ancient account in its extension offers a narrative which was psychologically satisfying to ancient audiences for reasons of verisimilitude, to be sure, but a verisimilitude according to their own partisan political lights.

56. Chambers *CSCA* (1973) 2; cf. Kraft *JNG* (1959–1960) 22–23.

57. Chambers *CSCA* (1973) 2 relates μετὰ ταῦτα to the cancellation of debts, followed by the *nomothesia*; see also Keil *Verfassung* 163; Sandys *Constitution* 38. Compare P.J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford 1981) 164; Flach *RSA* (1973) 19–20.

PART II: THE SOLONIAN CRISIS AND AIGINA

The historicity of the stories about early conflict between Athens and Aigina are thoroughly questioned in this volume. From the discussion of the beginning of the "ancient hatred" between Aigina and Athens, two aspects of Herodotus' account deserve credence, because of the number and various civic affiliation of those prepared to attest to their truth: the cults of Damia and Auxesia at Aigina and Epidauros were linked to Athens; and Aiginetan independence from Epidauros, cultic self-assertion, and hostility to the Athenians were connected in historical fact.⁵⁸ Now our fundamentally sceptical conclusions about the Solonian metrological reforms transform their analysis. While earlier scholarship tried to discover an economic and political rationale for his initiatives in their historical context, we must search for a factual causation, not of the reforms, but of an early sixth-century hostility between Athens and Aigina and of the belief in Solon as a differentiator of Athens from Aigina, both of which the Atthidographic account of the reforms encapsulated and dramatized. A coherent recreation can be built and is worth attempting, granted that the reader remembers its fragile foundations and that the result cannot be bound within tight chronological conjunctions.⁵⁹ Discrete events within the framework are irrecoverable; one can only sketch general trends, which justify attitudes current in the fifth century.⁶⁰

The socio-economic landscape of Attica was probably quite varied in the late seventh century.⁶¹ There still existed many independent agriculturalists, some on less rich land, and, in some districts (almost certainly including future

58. A climate of hostility is also supported by evidence external to Herodotus, namely the Athenian collaboration in the attack on Prokles of Epidauros (see pp. 19–20 above) and the *stemma* of the Philaidai. They traced their line to the Aiakid Philaios, son of Aias (Marcell. *Vit. Thuc.* 3 which derives through Didymus from Pherecydes *FGH* 3 F 2; Hellanicus *FGH* 4 F 22). In the first half of the sixth century, the Philaidai produced a number of leading Athenian politicians, including the archon Kypselos (597/6); the archon Hippokleides (566/5?, see also Hdt. 6.127.4, 128.2); Miltiades, the oecist of the Chersonese (Hdt. 6.35.1, 36.1) and perhaps the polemarch Epilykos (seventh century?: *Ath. Pol.* 3.5). Their genealogy not only embodied a claim to Salamis, which their ancestor had given to Athens (Paus. 1.35.2; Plut. *Solon* 10.3), but also could advance a claim to Aigina (in initial formulation: cf. pp. 211–12 below), because the Philaidai were the true heirs of Aiakos to Aiginetan leadership and not the island's aristocracy (despite its veneration of Aiakos). See also Davies *APF* #8429, pp. 294–99.

59. An Aiginetan assertion of cultic and political independence in the 610s could be balanced by an Athenian exacerbation of tension after Solon's reforms.

60. Because of the vast scholarship on the Solonian reforms, varying substantially in approach, it is impossible to situate my interpretation *vis-à-vis* earlier work; that would demand an entire monograph of its own. For two recent interpretations, cf. T.W. Gallant, "Agricultural Systems, Land Tenure, and the Reforms of Solon," *BSA* 77 (1982) 111–24; T.E. Rihll, "EKTHMOPOI: Partners in Crime," *JHS* 101 (1991) 101–27.

61. Mercantilist interpretations were once popular in reconstructing the economic ramifications of archaic policies. Note (e.g.) J.G. Milne, "The Economic Policy of Solon," *Hesperia* 14 (1945) 230–45. In such hypotheses, statesmen achieved economic benefits by manipulating the terms of trade or exchange. Unfortunately, they work within an outmoded statist model for economic life, dependent on the sort of information which leaders like Solon neither intended nor were able to collect.

Peisistratid strongholds), a continuous spectrum of landholdings and connected social groups remained intact. The system of the *naukrariai* implies this situation (see pp. 163–67 below), as do the traditions on the suppression of the Kylonians and the war over Salamis, with their indications of the continued existence of many independent farmers of moderate means.⁶² Moreover, coastal Attica and perhaps the Laurion region had populations drawing in part on non-agricultural bases. Nevertheless, it is also apparent that the plain around the *asty* had seen the emergence of networks of clientage and of a dependent rural population, the *hektēmoroi*, to the benefit of nobles whom I would identify as the self-professed Eupatrids (and later the factionalists of the *Pedion* party). Although specifics are lacking, nothing contradicts the interaction of two sorts of unrest in this setting: agitation from a *dēmos* threatened with serfdom and rivalry from other members of the elite who were less able or less prepared to draw on the resources of their poorer neighbors in an exploitative manner, and thereby feared the consolidation of a stronger power base by the Eupatrids.

The existence of the honors paid to Athena Polias and to Erekhtheus for the statues of the goddesses Damia and Auxesia, made of Attic olive wood (Hdt. 5.82.3), seems to indicate that the movement of foodstuffs in the Saronic Gulf was ritualized, allowing non-material goods such as deference and a recognition of religious prerogatives to be elements of exchange. The Athenian analogue for Auxesia was the *Kharis* 'Grace', Auxo, but in Attica she is not paired with Damia/Mnia as elsewhere in the Saronic Gulf, but uniquely with Hegemone 'Leader' (see pp. 57–58 above).⁶³ The political connotations of that name are unlikely to have been accidental. The cultivated olive was the tree of human society *par excellence*, and its symbolic associations are with fertility, acculturated military activities, and communal cooperation.⁶⁴ Although classical Attica was quintessentially a food- (and, particularly, grain-) importing economy, the fertility and access to the sea of its two main agricultural plains, its lack of political consolidation, and agrarian dependency may have combined to promote seventh-century Attica as a food exporter. The vast complex of Athenian claims to the origination of agriculture through divine dispensation is an ideological survival of this period, as the Homeric Hymn to Demeter aids us in recognizing.⁶⁵ These myths moved toward fixation in the late seventh century. The expectation that necessary transactions involving conveyance of foodstuffs from Attica to Aigina would occur was not only shaped by economic factors but also conditioned by the existence of the cult honors. The capacity of the Epidaurian statues to ward off famine was owed to their connection with Attica, and that would have been an absurdity if Athens was not a consistent exporter in the local trade in grain, however modest and intermittent that is imagined to have

62. On the Kylonians, see pp. 166–67 below; for the Solonian capture of Salamis, see *Theognis* 280–85 and esp. Plut. *Solon* 9.2.

63. Herodotus' informants do not seem to have made the connection; the resonances of archaic ritual ideology were very muted.

64. M. Detienne, "L'olivier, un mythe politico-religieux," *RHR* 178 (1970) 5–23.

65. See pp. 50–51 above and *Colonization* 230–32.

been at this early stage. Yet, even modest additional supplies may have been critically important not only for subsistence, but also in sustaining a differentiation of craft specialties.

Thus, the mundane analogue to the supernatural power of Attic olive wood may have been the ability of the fertile plain around the *asty* and of the Eleusinian plain to produce grain which could be concentrated in the hands of the Athenian elite through the "rents" of the *hektēmoroi*. That "surplus" could then be circulated through aristocratic gift-exchange and barter, and the sacrifices owed to the goddess and hero of the *asty*'s acropolis underpinned the dependence of Athens' neighbors in the Saronic Gulf on Attic grain to tide them over dearths.

The exchanges of goods among the communities of the Saronic Gulf were still relatively unconstrained by political influences, when compared to the mode of reciprocity prevailing within communities (for example, between *pelatai* and Eupatrids in Attica). Participants in a transaction anticipated a neutral outcome, an exchange mutually beneficial to both sides, but it is uncertain whether they achieved the degree of depersonalization familiar to us or even to their fifth-century descendants. In Homeric exchange, the socio-economic status and political or military power of participants conditioned patterns of exchange, just as the transactions themselves had effects on status and power. In the particular situation at issue, religious and possibly political deference and dependence followed from receiving Attic grain; food was not simply a commodity. Such a commercial regime is characteristically pre-monetary, prevailing because markets were fragmented, exchanges were cumbrous, hence conventional or stereotypical, and alternative trading partners were limited.

The Aiginetans originally related to the Athenians as piratical raiders of the long, vulnerable Attic coast and as sources of petty import goods, *Aiginaia*, and of slaves to Athenian buyers.⁶⁶ Yet, as the Aiginetans ventured further afield and began to traffic in exotic goods, in craft goods, and especially in metalwork, their interaction with their Athenian neighbors will have evolved. In some places in Attica, where customers were poor and unwary, the Aiginetan ship captain may still have been the peddler and robber by turns. To Attic craftsmen, such as a few proto-Attic potters/painters, Aigina may have appeared an attractive market or even a prospective new home, where merchants were eager to acquire local substitutes for foreign goods for resale abroad or for their own, now more affluent, mode of consumption. Some may have left an Attica where they felt socially vulnerable (see pp. 58–59 above).

To masters of the *hektēmoroi* the Aiginetans will now have been sellers whose repertoire of goods included a range of merchandise that supported conspicuous consumption and social display: imports from Asia, perfumes, jewelry, and, perhaps, above all, gold and silver.⁶⁷ This aristocratic "kit", more readily available on the mainland c. 600 than before, distinguished its

66. I heavily depend on my reconstruction in *Aegina* (esp. 230–36).

67. See *Aegina* 237–64, 264–80 on commercial development.

possessors from other members of the community and thereby solidified a claim to elite privileges and powers. Excluding other elite groups on the way to political preeminence required monopolizing status-raising luxuries. Furthermore, non-Greek slaves, who could be procured from colonial Greece, were more easily and thoroughly exploitable than Athenian *pelatai*, *hektēmoroi*, and *thetes*, who were encumbered by their families and protected to some extent by custom (one sixth rent and no more!) and perhaps by religious sanction (through the *phratry*).

If the Eupatrids of c. 625–600 were a Bakkhiad clan (to cite the Corinthian parallel) or a closed oligarchy in waiting, the imports acquirable through trade with long-distance merchants will have been tempting. In return, they possessed a much more restricted inventory of exports. Athenian craft industries were in their infancy. Craftsmen may, in any case, have fallen outside the circle of dependency centered on the elite. Merchants could easily deal with producers themselves, without elite intermediation. Athenian aristocrats will thus have looked first to the agricultural goods of their own estates. We ought, however, to avoid the modernizing image of industrial farms producing grain for the hungry towns of Aigina and Megara.⁶⁸ Different elements of the elite, however, related to neighboring communities differently, depending on the degree to which they were tied to them through *xenia* involving aristocratic exchange in grain.⁶⁹ Because of the ease of transport by sea, grain produced on farms of the plain of the *asty* may not only have been an attractive foodstuff in the town of Aigina—the island supported a much larger population than its own fields could support by c. 500—but also a product easily reshipped. Athenian grain could then go into an embryonic international market, the inception of which will have been encouraged by the Lydian incursions into rural Ionia and consolidated by the beginning of procurement of Egyptian wheat.

To appreciate the impact of these changes in Attica, consider again the pre-Solonian crisis. The relationship of the *hektēmoroi* to the land has been complicated by the attention lavished on the issue of inalienability of property. In terms of economic causation, this question is a false one. While seventh-century Attic property was probably as alienable as the holdings portrayed in the Hesiodic tradition, *hektēmoros* and farm had a necessarily conjoined fate.⁷⁰ In a pre-monetary economy, where agriculture was the sanctioned form of

68. See R.J. Hopper, "Plain, Hill, and Shore in Early Athens", *BSA* 56 (1961) 189–219, esp. 213–14. Cf. Busolt *GG*² 2, n. 1, pp. 244–45. The Megarians, however, neither belong in the same institutional category as the Aiginetans nor did they experience parallel fortunes in foreign affairs. See *Theognis* 143–58, 273–88.

69. We should recall the Athenian *xenos* Timarkhos who was treacherously killed when he visited Prokles of Epidauros by the Aiginetan Kleandros (Plut. *Mor.* 403C–E).

70. Solon was a liberator both of the indebted (fr. 26 W; *Ath. Pol.* 6.1; Plut. *Solon* 15.5–7; other evidence in Martina *Solon* #274–96, pp. 141–46), and of the land (fr. 36.1–7 W with Plut. *Solon* 15.6). Moreover, *ἐπίμορος* was used both of land subjected to tenancy with *μορτή* the "rent" paid (Poll. 7.151; Hesych. *s.v.* *ἐπίμορος*, 85 Latte; Eustath. 2.189.9–10 [19.28]) and of the *hektēmoros* tilling the land (Hesych. *s.v.* *ἐπίμορος*, 85 Latte).

subsistence, a full-fledged market in land did not exist. Since no recognized alternative existed for the dispossessed client, he must either become an outlaw and as such a menace to public order or become incorporated into the following of a rival aristocrat.⁷¹ The land from which he was expelled had no alternative cultivator save another dependent and his family. Exploitative landowners faced a zero-sum game in which they could exchange clients with their rivals, but only at the cost of distancing themselves from the paradigm for elite behavior established by panhellenic poetry. They could jettison their role as exponents of Zeus-ordained *dikē* and abandon a reciprocity attuned to traditional leadership in return for a minor tightening of control.

Solon, however, faced a crisis where Athenians were sold abroad as slaves or driven overseas by rural unrest.⁷² He faced the temptation of tyranny, and that prospect surely indicates a critical rather than a chronic problem (fr. 32–34 W with Plut. *Solon* 14.8–15.1, cf. *Ath. Pol.* 12.3). These circumstances were not of long standing, for he implies they were, in large measure, reversible, and many of the victimized group may have remained in the vicinity of Attica. Some *new* factor had intervened, and one may freely suspect that it was also responsible for the sudden acute turn that a long-standing pattern of agrarian dependency seems to have taken.

Athenians were now sold abroad because there were customers to buy them on Aigina (and thence elsewhere), who could pay for them in the status-establishing goods and the slaves sought by the Eupatrids. The slaves could then replace the *hektēmoroi* on the land, allowing for the creation of more extended estates such as those suggested for archaic Chios (cf. Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 122; Thuc. 8.40.2). The sale of Athenians as slaves to Aiginetans increased the number of mouths to be fed on Aigina through exported Attic grain. Other Athenians, by fleeing to Aigina, had on their own escaped an exploitative elite (perhaps like some proto-attic potters of the “black and white” style). Thus, we glimpse how Aigina grew between 650 and 480 beyond natural increase by recruiting new community members through importation and manumission of slaves (another modality of Aigina’s renowned *xenia*). When Solon speaks of the Athenians forgetting their Attic tongue, he refers to these unfortunate “immigrants” to nearby Dorian communities (fr. 36.11–12 W: . . . γλῶσσαν οὐκέτ’ Ἀττικὴν|ιέντας . . .). They had picked up a Doric inflection to their speech, which was grating on the acute Attic ears of a Solon. The beginnings of economic integration in central Greece had precipitated an Athenian social crisis.

How can we be sure, however, that Attic nobles of the *pedion* were interacting in this way with Aiginetan merchants? Direct evidence is and must be in default, because middlemen at this stage in the history of commerce leave

71. Athens had no consistent contemporary success at colonization, for which see *Colonization* 132–42. There were few non-Athenian expeditions (then leaving mainland Greece) to which the dispossessed could attach themselves.

72. Fr. 36.8–11: πολλοὺς δ’ Ἀθήνας πατρίδ’ ἐς θεόκτιτον|ἀνήγαγον πραθέντας, ἄλλον ἐκδίκως,|ἄλλον δ’ ἀναγκαίης ὑπὸ|χρειοῦς φυγόντας . . .

virtually no trace on their goods of trade. Yet, the Aiginetans can be synchronically demonstrated to have traded the set of goods which would have been most attractive to an aspiring narrow oligarchy in Attica. And then there is Solon's reaction, which, arguably, reflects an exchange of products, as hypothesized above: 1) he impeded elite attempts at social differentiation by sumptuary legislation (cf. [Dem.] 43.62–63; Athen. 15.687A); 2) he strengthened the hand of upper-class competitors of the Eupatrids by trying to guarantee their access to office through the census system;⁷³ 3) he allowed only the export of olive oil among agricultural products, presumably because oil complemented the goods of merchants without threatening the social autonomy of poorer agriculturalists (Plut. *Solon* 24.1–2); 4) thus he forbade the export of grain, weakening the rationale for exploitation of Attica's rural population;⁷⁴ 5) finally, he repatriated Athenians who had been sold or had fled abroad.⁷⁵ His project of repatriation could only have been feasible if (uniquely in this period) slaves and freedmen of Attic extraction had remained on nearby Aigina and within the region of central Greece in general.

Nascent economic integration among the Athenians, Aiginetans, and the inhabitants of the northeast Peloponnesus had concomitant ramifications outside Attica. The adaptation to a new style of seafaring and commerce meant a richer and more militarily powerful Aigina. Herodotus' informants said Aiginetans used their "thalassocracy" to appropriate the statues of Damia and Auxesia and to refuse to uphold ritual responsibilities to Athena and Erekhtheus. If fidelity to sacral tradition connotes continuing participation in early archaic trade patterns in the Saronic Gulf, abnegation is illustrative of the emergence of a new regional exchange of products. No single source of grain need be privileged, as more suppliers became available (including Egypt). Grain became a good to be procured in a secularized mode, with Athenian exports funneling into a disparate and unclassified stock. To the Aiginetans, now acting in complete independence from their former Peloponnesian masters, upper-class Athenians will have been merely one constituency of suppliers, still perhaps *xenoi*, but in a style of *xenia* less personalized and thereby attenuated.

This desacralization of the procurement of grain bespeaks a shift in advantage toward the Aiginetans and away from their suppliers; a shift prompting an Aiginetan resacralization of the *distribution* of grain.⁷⁶ The founding hero of the Aiginetans was Aiakos: his mother was the nymph Aigina herself

73. *Ath. Pol.* 7.2–4; *Aris. Pol.* 1274a18–21; Plut. *Solon* 18.1–2; Poll. 8.129; also Martina *Solon* #344–49, pp. 171–73.

74. Cultivation of trees was more intensive, demanding greater investment and a longer wait for returns, hence substantial foregone consumption in the short term. The grain exporter calculated over much shorter terms, being tempted toward infringing on others' land to permit more extensive cultivation and a manipulation of labor inputs on a seasonal basis through dependent labor. In the archaic economy, he was tempted to replace investment with the politically-based power to exploit.

75. Land on which viable claimants remained could be freed; estates lying entirely in the hands of the wealthy were untouched. That sparked populist demands for a thorough confiscation and redistribution (*Ath. Pol.* 11.2, 12.3 with *Solon* fr. 34 W; Plut. *Solon* 16.1, 4 with fr. 34 W).

76. A full discussion of this material will appear in my *Aiakos: Myth and Cult*.

and his prayer to his father Zeus had caused the island to be peopled with humans transformed from ants, the Myrmidons (e.g., Hesiod fr. 205 M/W; Apollod. 3.156–58). Aiakos was especially prominent in his role as intercessor for Greece with Zeus, as he prayed to him in order to save mankind from a drought, and in return the Aiginetan cult of Zeus Hellenios was widely venerated (e.g. Paus. 2.29.7–9; ΣPin. *Nem.* 5.17). Significantly, in one variant the drought is created by Athenian misdeeds (DS 4.61.1–2). Aiakos' intercession on the mythological plane is reflected on a mundane level by the activity of Aiginetan merchants as grain traders. Under the guidance of ethical norms guaranteed by the same Zeus Hellenios, they reenacted on behalf of needy Greeks (with their *xenoi*) Aiakos' saving intercession. The Athenian comic poet Cratinus could joke about a golden age when man consumed Aiginetan grain without troubles (fr. 165 K). Just as the dues in honor of Damia and Auxesia symbolized Attica as a prop to the subsistence of central Greece, honoring Zeus Hellenios and Aiakos meant accepting Aiginetan patterns of *xenia* as a hedge against shortages of food.⁷⁷

CONCLUSION

If the Solonian reforms disrupted an unacceptable symbiosis between Aiginetan merchants and some Athenian aristocrats, it is little wonder that an atmosphere of hostility was handed down as a legacy of this period. Attic tradition imagined Solon as abandoning Aiginetan and Peloponnesian weights, measures, and coinage and establishing Attic metrological standards. Such legislation fits nicely into the dichotomy: Draco/oligarchy/pro-Aigina juxtaposed with Solon/"democracy"/anti-Aigina. I have doubted that he actually did so, because of the anachronisms that the received account of the reforms entails.

Nevertheless, in Attic tradition, the metrological reforms naturally follow the Seisaktheia and the *nomothesia*, because they were meant to assure their success by supposedly severing economic links between Athens and Aigina. Although establishing *metra* seems logically prior to the creation of a census system based on those same measures, Attic tradition did not visualize the *metra* in their function as prerequisites for the census classes. Rather it focused only on the *modification* of the *metra* for its supposed significance as a symbol of the Solonian differentiation or alienation of Athens from Aigina.

One must emphasize here, however, that the ban on export of grain, the sumptuary legislation, and the system of census classes (in that order) would have been the decisive instruments in sundering an undesirable collaboration between Athenians and foreign traders. Changing official standards will have had no additional practical effect and was unenforceable as a curb on an illegal trade. One might well argue that archaic trading was being conventionalized, so that it is reasonable to speak of a pre-monetary economy where objects like

77. A new inscription from the Agora of 374/3, reported by R.S. Stroud (*AIA Abstracts* 16 [1992] 23–24), mentions storing grain from Attic cleruchies in the Attic Aiakeion (a traditional site?) and its distribution.

tripods or spits and set weights of bullion played a role in certain standard or stereotypical transactions.⁷⁸ We would still, however, be without a reason for Solon's metrological reforms as presented by the Atthidographers, since the need for changing Aiginetan/Peloponnesian standards for new Attic standards would be unexplained. Even if it could be enforced, no *political* goal was served by mandating a change in weight for lumps of bullion, when "foreign exchange" (a shift between systems of *stathma*) could be managed with a balance scale and a chisel.

If the travels of Solon as a merchant and sightseer after his reforms could be believed, he would encapsulate in his person a transformation of the Athenian economy toward commerce and grain *importation*. Paradoxically, the motif of the travels of the *nomothetēs* was initially deployed to justify his absence from home. Thus, when the story was first elaborated, for an Athenian to be a long-distance merchant was equivalent to his not returning consistently to Attica for the period of his travels.

Fifth-century Aiginetans spoke of a major Athenian expedition to Aigina thwarted by divine agency, by Argive help, and by their own forces. It had occurred after their independence and the capture of the statues of Damia and Auxesia. This campaign helped to inaugurate the *ἔχθρη παλαιή* between the two states. As has been argued above, the war was *ben trovato* for the purposes of Aiginetan apologetics during the Pentekontaeteia (pp. 54–55 above). In contrast, the Athenians spoke only of a mysterious disaster befalling one of their ships on an embassy to Aigina.

If we are to follow the Aiginetans in envisaging warfare, the hostilities are best placed after the Solonian reforms and not in the late seventh century in closer conjunction with Aiginetan independence. The status of ties between the elites of *poleis* in the same region conditioned the presence or absence of conflict. In a period when the background level of intercommunal violence was still high, any disequilibrium was conducive to opportunistic aggression (cf. the raids of Aias). The Aiginetans may have reacted to the sundering of Athenian trading ties by believing themselves free to undertake piratical raids against Attica. Herodotus speaks of the role of Aiginetan seapower in the context of the quarrel. A vivid indication of seventh-century *ληστεία* in the Saronic Gulf may well be exhibited in all its brutal ramifications in the remains of a group execution of 17–18 men discovered among the seventh-century burials in a cemetery at Phaleron.⁷⁹ With Salamis in Athenian hands in the period after 594/3 and

78. Cf. Kroll & Waggoner *AJA* (1984) 332. If the fines and payments listed in Plut. *Solon* 23.1–4 are meant to be monetary, and not bullion, as appears to be the case, an anachronistic citation of archaic law and not the code of Solon is at issue. See p. 233 below and *Aegina* 65–80.

79. The corpses lack grave goods themselves and so are specifically undateable. The victims were killed by *apotumpanismos*, a procedure in which they were pinned to planks and left to die. The most likely hypothesis is that they were captured *λησταί*. See S. Pelekidis, "Ἀνασκαφή Φαλήρου," *AD* 2 (1916) 16–64, esp. 49–64; cf. K. Kourouniotes, "Ἐξ Ἀττικῆς," *AE* (1911) 246–56. For interpretation, see A.D. Keramopoulos, *Ὁ Ἀποτυμπανισμὸς* (Athens 1923) esp. 42–46; L. Gernet, "Sur l'exécution capitale: A propos d'un ouvrage récent," *Anthropologie de la grèce antique* (Paris 1968) 302–29, esp. 303–5, 313–14, 317.

Megara less a threat, Athenian capacity to retaliate would have been substantial. Participation in the First Sacred War c. 590 indicated a willingness to act outside the borders of Attica (cf. Plut *Solon* 11.1).⁸⁰ The interests of our sources do not allow anything more than to indulge our tendencies toward speculation. As the foregoing discussion has demonstrated, their proclivities lay with programmatic elaborations.

ENDNOTE

If Athens and Aigina were put out of phase economically by the Solonian reforms, it is noteworthy that the two *poleis* soon re-achieved an intermeshing of their economies. Attic pottery became a standby as a good traded by Aiginetan merchants, and other Athenian products, which cannot be traced with similar ease, may have followed the same route (as almost certainly consignments of Attic oil also did). Peisistratid Attica was already experiencing the movement away from cereal cultivation which was to result in the notorious dependence of the fifth-century *polis* on imported wheat. The Aiginetans will have been deeply involved in this trade too. Mercantilism could not exist in any structured manner in archaic Greece, as contiguous *poleis* were too small to have chauvinistic economic policies. Even modest growth in output tended to make them more interdependent in ways beyond the capacity of primitive administrative systems to monitor, let alone supervise or police.

If we conclude that the interrelations of Aiginetans and Athenians settled into a new pattern of cooperation for the rest of the sixth century, it is important to realize that a "good neighbor" policy toward Aigina was much in the interest of Peisistratos and his sons. They were strikingly reluctant to undertake hostilities against the neighbors of Attica, with the possible exception of Thebes. Presumably, the last thing they wanted were wars fought in hoplite battles which would strengthen the cohesion and assertiveness of Attic small-holders. As for contesting Aiginetan naval power, once again that was scarcely advantageous to the tyrannical dynasty. As their victory over the Samian exiles at Kydonia showed, the Aiginetans would have been formidable adversaries, beyond the capacity of Peisistratid Athens to subdue.

Furthermore, the Peiraieus had not yet become the point of concentration of almost all the naval and maritime assets of the Athenians. Once the Peiraieus had been developed, the maritime vision of Athens was riveted in one direction, toward the Saronic Gulf, ever toward Aigina, the "eyesore of the Peiraieus". In the sixth century, however, there were only the undeveloped beach facilities at Phaleron, merely one of approximately equal local ports extending along the coast away from Athens toward Sou-nion, and then along the coast in the east and northeast. The separate status of the Paralia shows the estrangement of coastal Attica from the attitudes of the *asty*. These ports, each with its own maritime population, looked out on the sea in different directions, toward Euboea, toward the northeast Aegean, and toward the northern tier of the Cyclades, as well as toward the Saronic Gulf. To those dependent on these harbors, Aigina did not perforce loom as large in their calculations and fears. Among these other inhabitants of coastal Attica, there were doubtless many who stood with the followers of Peisistratos of the party of the Diakrioi.

80. For relations between the two cities later in the century, see endnote immediately below.

Aiginetan Membership in the Peloponnesian League

MODERN STUDIES of Greece in the fifth century have been largely absorbed in an investigation of the foreign policies of Athens and Sparta, and in the relations of other states with these two great powers. Thus, it comes as no surprise that interest in Aigina's foreign policy has emphasized the question of whether this island belonged to the Peloponnesian or Delian Leagues in the fifth century. The nearly unanimous opinion, usually taken for granted rather than specifically argued, is that Aigina had become a member of the Peloponnesian League by, at the latest, the first decade of the fifth century.¹ The reasons for this determination are often unstated and so can only be subject to speculation. In part, this interpretation may spring from an approach to Greek foreign affairs that focuses on the racial or ethnic character of the states involved. As Sparta, the greatest of the Dorian states, offered an ideological counterpart to Ionian Athens, the Aiginetan Dorians, or as has been suggested, Dorian *Vorkämpfer* of the Athenians, must have thrown in their lot with Sparta.² For example, G.E.M. de Ste. Croix emphasizes that Aigina was Dorian, and an aristocratic oligarchy, and thus had every reason to align itself with Dorian and oligarchic Sparta against Athens.³ Naturally arguments of affinity could be invoked to gain the public acceptance for decisions (often with complex causations or convoluted rationales for the elite), but that is a very different thing from envisaging a necessary convergence. And, despite speaking the Dorian dialect, the Aiginetans put greater emphasis on the Achaean Aiakids as their forebears, if Pindar's Aiginetan odes are any indication.⁴ Given the probable gross social dissimilarities between the two states, to say Aigina and Sparta were both oligarchies is to say nothing more than that

1. E.g., F.E. Adcock *CAH* 4.73; H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte*⁴ (Munich 1969) 135–36; G. Glotz & R. Cohen, *Histoire grecque* (Paris 1926) 1.374; R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 183; *ATL* 3.197; E.M. Walker *CAH* 4.166; Welter *Aigina*² 11. Such citations might be multiplied almost at will. An exception is K. Wickert, *Der peloponnesische Bund von seiner Entstehung bis zum Ende des archidamischen Krieges* (Diss. Erlangen-Nürnberg 1961) 23–26. There have been two specific studies on the subject: D.M. Leahy, "Aegina and the Peloponnesian League," *CP* 49 (1954) 232–43; D.M. MacDowell, "Aigina and the Delian League," *JHS* 80 (1960) 118–21; but few have adopted a position on the strength of their arguments.

2. The notion that the racial background was crucial for the political history of the Peloponnesus goes back to K.O. Müller, *Die Dorier*² (Breslau 1844) esp. 1.161–215, with 1.156–57; *id.*, *AL* 144–45. For the ethnic argument, especially on the opposition to Athens, see E. Kirsten, "Aigina," *Gnomon* 18 (1942) 289–311, esp. 301–4. Cf. E. Will, *Doriens et Ioniens* (Paris 1956) esp. 11–16. [The issue of the existence of ethnic prejudices or stereotypes is quite a different one. See J. Alty, "Dorians and Ionians," *JHS* 102 (1982) 1–14.]

3. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London 1972) 334.

4. E.g., Pin. *Ol.* 8.28–52; *Pyth.* 8.98–100; *Nem.* 3.26–66, 4.45–72. On Aiginetan autochthony, see pp. 17–19 above.

they were not Athenian-style democracies. We are left with the question of why hostility to Athens should draw Aigina closer to Sparta in a period when Sparta was hardly Athens' consistent opponent. |

In addition, a belief in Aiginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League takes substance from the prevailing interpretation of the intervention of the Spartan king Kleomenes in Aiginetan affairs recorded in Herodotus Book Six (see also pp. 113-49 below).⁵ The legal grounds for the taking of hostages to insure Aiginetan quiescence pending the arrival of the Persian expeditionary force under Datis have been said to have been Sparta's responsibilities as Aigina's *hēgemōn*.⁶ As we shall see, however, Herodotus' account of this episode is far from being so transparent. In any case, such an unusual episode (involving a submission by an uncoerced *polis* to Persian suzerainty) should not be made to bear the decisive burden of proof on either side of this issue.

The paucity of the evidence both precludes a definitive conclusion and necessitates much of the argument's being *e silentio*. Nevertheless, silences in our sources, where Aigina as an ally of Sparta could be expected to appear, are obviously not without significance. Indeed, in none of our sources is there anything remotely resembling a direct statement that Aigina was a member of the Peloponnesian League. All such conclusions are strictly inferential.

I. AIGINETAN FOREIGN RELATIONS BEFORE 550

Although there has been no clear suggestion that Aigina became an ally of Sparta before 550, the direction of Aiginetan overseas connections deserves emphasis. Aigina is linked with and influenced by Argos and the Argolid in this period rather than by Sparta. Therefore, it falls to those who would maintain that Aigina joined the Peloponnesian League sometime after the mid-sixth century to indicate when, how, and why the Aiginetan change in policy took place.

The evidence of mythology points toward a strong association between Aigina and Argos. The Dorian settlers of Aigina were either directly from Argos, or from Argos with Epidauros as intermediary.⁷ The Epidaurian role as direct colonizer suggests that the historical rivalry between Epidauros and Argos over Aigina, a sometime dependency of Epidauros, has left its mark on the tradition.⁸ Aigina belonged to the Temenid inheritance—those states originally allotted to Argos at the Heraclid return.⁹ It strains belief that the resettlement of the Peloponnesus by Dorian bands in the Dark Ages took this highly developed form, or so legalistic a framework, or that such events were

5. Hdt. 6.50-51. See, e.g., U. Kahrstedt *Griechisches Staatsrecht* (Göttingen 1922) 1.28; De Ste. Croix *Origins* 334.

6. Leahy *CP* (1954) 236-37.

7. Hdt. 8.46.1; ΣPin. *Ol.* 8.39a-b with Σ*Nem.* 3.1b, Σ*Pyth.* 8.29a; Paus. 2.29.5; J. Tzetz. Σ*Lyc. Alex.* 176; cf. Strabo 8.6.16 C375.

8. Hdt. 5.83.1. On Epidauros and Sparta, see Wickert *Bund* 60-61. See also pp. 11-17 above.

9. Note Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 115 = Strabo 8.3.33 C357-58. See pp. 17-19 above on the settlement of Epidauros and thence Aigina.

remembered accurately. Rather, Argos' growing strength from the eighth century, making possible territorial aggrandizement, gives a practical upper limit for a formulation of the inheritance. The sources in themselves do not necessarily equip us to evaluate how far these Argive claims to predominance over Aigina were translated into reality.¹⁰ Nevertheless, the Temenid inheritance's emphasis on the innate sovereignty of Argos' hereditary kings could only have been formulated before the end of the monarchy, at the latest in the early sixth century. (See pp. 16–17 above.)

Pheidon (who is to be dated in the first half of the seventh century) had the greatest impact of the Argive kings on collective memory, and is credited with the recovery of the lot of Temenos. He is connected with Aigina by a tradition that he minted silver on the island.¹¹ It is debatable whether Pheidon can be downdated on the basis of Herodotus in order to save this tradition in the face of lowered dates for the beginning of Aiginetan coinage.¹² Even if one adopts the extreme position that this tradition was pure fiction, he must recognize that its authors, by virtue of their belief in it, expected to place Aigina in the Argive sphere of influence in the early archaic period. Correspondingly, there is nothing in the parallel dossier created about Dark Age Sparta to substantiate an association with Aigina.

Other scattered bits of evidence, though not in themselves of great consequence, fail to point toward Sparta. First of all, Aigina was a member of the Kalaurian Amphictyony, centered on the temple of Poseidon at Kalaureia near Troizen.¹³ Argos took up direct membership by taking Nauplia's place by c. 600, but the influence of Sparta seems later, not until the 540s, when Sparta exercised the vote of Prasiai by virtue of conquest.¹⁴ Also, the sources for early Peloponnesian history, and particularly for the Messenian Wars, for which Pausanias is our chief intermediate source, do not connect Aigina with Sparta, although allies of both the Spartans and the Messenians make their appearance from as far away as the Isthmian states, and even from Samos.¹⁵ Moreover, the allies attributed to each side also reflect the alignments of the

10. On Argos in this period, see R.A. Tomlinson, *Argos and the Argolid* (Ithaca 1972) 67–87; T. Kelly, *A History of Argos down to 500 B.C.* (Minneapolis 1976) 51–72.

11. On Pheidon, see A. Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (London 1956) 31–42. On the minting, see Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 176 with F 115; *Mar. Par. FGH* 239 A 30; *EM s.v. ὀβελίσκος*, 612.56–613.23 Gaisford; and the Chronological Table (pp. 409–18 below) for full citations.

12. A. Andrewes, "The Corinthian Actaeon and Pheidon of Argos," *CQ* 43 (1949) 70–78, persuasively argues for a seventh-century date for Pheidon. The trend on the beginnings of Aiginetan coinage has been to downdate. See W.L. Brown, "Pheidon's Alleged Aeginetan Coinage," *NC* 10 (1950) 177–204 (after 610); R.R. Holloway, "An Archaic Hoard from Crete and The Early Aeginetan Coinage," *ANSMN* 17 (1971) 1–21 (580–70); C.M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1976) 42–43 (after 600); M. Price & N. Waggoner, *Archaic Greek Silver Coinage: The Asyut Hoard* (London 1975) 68–76 (550–40). In general, see Figueira *Aegina* 65–80, 88–97.

13. Strabo 8.6.14 C374. For details, see Figueira *Aegina* 185–88, 219–20 and p. 33 above; cf. T. Kelly, "The Calaurian Amphictyony," *AJA* 70 (1966) 113–21.

14. On Argos, see Jeffery *Archaic Greece* 138–39, 150–52. On Sparta: Hdt. 1.82.1–3.

15. Paus. 4.11.1; 4.15.7–8. On Samos, see Hdt. 3.47.1.

late fifth and early fourth centuries, in the light of which Aiginetan absence from the account is striking, given its close relationship with Sparta in this later period. Aigina makes its only appearance in early Peloponnesian history, as reported by Pausanias, in an anecdote in which Aiginetan merchants are described as penetrating Arkadia through Kyllene, the port of Elis.¹⁶ While Elis drew closer to Sparta after the intervention of Pheidon of Argos at Olympia, the Arkadians were usually hostile to Sparta in the early archaic period. [See, however, pp. 18-19 above.]

The early conflict between Athens and Aigina, which created the *ἔχθρη παλαιή* between the two states, is perhaps pertinent.¹⁷ Aigina is described as a dependency of Epidauros, and its independence from that state, which is implicitly said to have preceded the war by a short period, seems to lie between c. 615-595.¹⁸ It is Argos that is the recipient of the Aiginetan appeal for help. Again, while we can minimize the historical value of this story, an extreme and perhaps unjustifiable measure, it is noteworthy that it is the ties between Argos and Aigina that receive emphasis. In conclusion, nothing suggests any connection at all between Aigina and Sparta before 550.

II. AIGINA FROM 550 TO 480 B.C.

First of all, it is appropriate to analyze the data which we have on Aigina in order to see if any alliance with Sparta can be drawn from it. Then, we might examine the evolution of the Peloponnesian League to discover if there is a point at which the accession of Aigina to the League seems most natural.

Sparta and the Samians

In 525, the Spartans, with the support of at least Corinth among their allies, directed an expedition against Polykrates, the tyrant of Samos, in order to restore to power a group of aristocratic exiles.¹⁹ The Spartans' real motivation may have been something other than either pique over two Samian thefts or gratitude for earlier Samian help against Messenia, the two motives cited in Herodotus.²⁰ The Samian refugees represented a threat because of their

16. Paus. 8.5.8. This episode is put two generations before a Spartan invasion of Tegea by King Kharilaos. This story, ending as it does with a Spartan defeat and the imprisonment of Spartan captives, may be a doublet retrojecting the hostility between Sparta and Tegea of the early sixth century. In Pausanias, the war with Tegea is put two generations before the Messenian War. Welter, *Aigina*² 51, places the episode in c. 750. The account of the Aiginetan trading voyages appears built around an etymology of the name of an Arkadian king, Aiginetes, which seriously undercuts its credibility in context.

17. Hdt. 5.82-88.

18. See pp. 28-33 above; also T.J. Figueira, *Aegina and Athens in the Archaic and Classical Periods—a Socio-Political Investigation* (Diss. University of Pennsylvania 1977) 216-26.

19. Hdt. 3.47.1.

20. If the Spartans had more serious motives for their move against Polykrates, the incongruity indicated in the text is heightened. Herodotus (3.47.1-49.2) recorded discrepant Spartan and Samian traditions about the reasons for the intervention, and was uneasy about the preserved tradition concerning Corinth's involvement. [Plutarch] (*Mor.* 859C-60C) points out several

ability to combine commerce and piracy. After the failure of the expedition, the Samian aristocrats, having indulged in a piratical foray against Siphnos, bought the island of Hydra from the Hermionians, and left it in the care of the Troizenians. They then established themselves at Kydonia. The prospect of an eventual foundation by the Samians of a trading station or a piratical base at Hydra, so near their home, should not have been welcomed by the Aiginetans. Moreover, because Kydonia dominated the sea route to Egypt around the western end of Crete, the settlement there was regarded as threatening by the Aiginetans, who ejected the Samians from the island in the sixth year after their arrival.²¹ In doing so, the Aiginetans not only protected their trade with Egypt and activities in Crete, but they forestalled the possibility that the Samians, have strengthened themselves in Crete, would return to Hydra confident in their ability to hold their own against any interference. Thus, we have the Samian aristocrats, Spartan protégés, acting provocatively toward the Aiginetans, presumably Sparta's allies, and the latter reacting with violence. Though not impossible given the lapse in time between the expedition against Polykrates and the ejection of the Samians from Kydonia, this scenario is certainly disturbing. It raises questions about Sparta's policy and its relations with its allies in this period that the alternative (that Aigina did not belong to the Peloponnesian League) does not.

Athens and Aigina, 511–506

When the Peisistratids were overthrown in Athens, several of Athens' neighbors reacted belligerently.²² The hostilities embarked upon by Thebes, its Boiotian allies, and Chalcis were eventually to embroil Aigina.²³ Simultaneously, there were changes in attitude toward Athens on the part of Kleomenes and the Spartan government, perhaps consequent either to the constitutional changes proposed by Kleisthenes, or to the embassy dispatched to Persia (Hdt. 5.73.1–3). It is noteworthy that Athenian warfare with neighboring states does not seem to have been integrally involved with Spartan efforts to put Isagoras and then Hippias in control at Athens. In the first place, we have no way of knowing whether warfare with Thebes preceded Spartan disenchantment. Theban hostility toward Athens lay in the Athenian alliance with Plataia. If the Plataian appeal to Athens at Kleomenes' urging is redated from 519 to 509,²⁴ the war between Thebes and Athens would have just preceded

weaknesses in Herodotus' account, and the nearly contemporary expulsion of Lygdamis of Naxos may point to a more complex causation for the expedition.

21. Hdt. 3.44.1, 59.1–4.

22. Hdt. 5.74.2.

23. Hdt. 5.79.1–81.3.

24. Hdt. 6.108.1–6; Thuc. 3.68.5. The emendation, moving the date from 519 (the present reading in Thucydides' text) to 509, goes back to G. Grote, *A History of Greece*² (London 1888) 3.383–84; cf. W.W. How & J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* (Oxford 1912) 2.109–10. M. Amit, "L'alliance entre Athènes et Platées," *AC* 39 (1970) 414–26, opts for the year 509. [See now Figueira *Theognis* 298–300.]

the Spartan change of heart toward Athens (i.e., anxiety over Kleisthenes). The emendation explains several details of the Plataian alliance story: Kleomenes received the Plataian appeal north of the Isthmus because he had just expelled Hippias; the Corinthians were at hand (in the Peloponnesian army) to arbitrate between Athens and Thebes; the Plataians need no longer be thought of as appealing from the *dunasteia* of Thebes to tyrannical Athens. Kleomenes allied Plataia to Athens, so strengthening both, during the brief time when he trusted Athens, that is, between his expulsion of Hippias and his disenchantment with Kleisthenes. The desire to embroil Thebes with Athens, attributed to Kleomenes by Herodotus,²⁵ is anachronistic, as it takes as its starting point Spartan-Athenian relations of the period after Kleomenes' abortive interventions.

The Thebes-Chalcis-Aigina alliance is grounded in the realities of local politics, while the Spartan moves against Athens are Hellenic in scope, either seeking to seal off the Peloponnesus from influences disruptive to Spartan hegemony, and/or removing a potential Persian bridgehead in Europe. Thus, it is not surprising that the only sign of cooperation between the Spartans and Athens' local enemies is the Theban-Chalcidian attack on Attica ἀπὸ συνθήματος.²⁶ The σύνθημα was probably an *ad hoc* agreement for this campaign by the Spartans with two non-allies, as Herodotus' usage of the word suggests.²⁷

After Kleomenes' attempt to put Isagoras in power, there is no mention of the Thebans or Aiginetans. The Aiginetan devastation of the Attic coasts, apparently their chief contribution to the effort against Athens, was a military technique essentially unsuited to Spartan needs.²⁸ Kleomenes' eventual espousal of Hippias' restoration may suggest that the king had come to realize that, without greater internal support (an addition of the remaining partisans of the Peisistratids to the faction of Isagoras), no narrowly-based government could hope to survive at Athens. In the face of Kleisthenes' championing of the *dēmos*, Isagoras had shown himself too weak to maintain himself on the strength of his own following. Kleomenes wanted to expel the Alkmeonids and other anti-oligarchic families by a show of force. Aiginetan military activity, rather than awing the Athenians into compliance, could only have the counter-productive effect that it did, namely, to exacerbate the Athenians to the point of insisting on an attack against Aigina.²⁹ Surely, Sparta would have urged a military policy on Aigina more in tune with its own goals, if Sparta had been in a position to do so as Aigina's *hēgemōn*.

25. Hdt. 6.108.3.

26. Hdt. 5.74.2.

27. Wickert *Bund* 25. A similar phrase, ἐκ συνθήματος (Hdt. 6.121.1), is used for the compact of the Alkmeonids with the Persians to give the shield signal after Marathon. In Herodotus, *synthēma* carries meanings from "watchword" (e.g. 9.98.3) to these passages, where it must mean something like "prior agreement".

28. Cf. Hdt. 5.81.3, 89.1-2.

29. Hdt. 5.89.3.

The above interpretation is borne out by the indifference of the Spartans to the precarious situation of the anti-Athenian coalition created by their withdrawal. Both Thebes and Chalcis were defeated, with the result in the case of Chalcis that Athenian settlers were established on the lands of the town's evicted aristocrats, and in the case of Thebes, that the independence of Plataia and Athenian control of a strip of Boiotia bordering Attica was vindicated. There is no reason to doubt that similar punishment would have been meted out to the Aiginetans had it been in the power of the Athenians to do so. The Delphic response given to the Athenians inquiring what steps to take against the Aiginetans was to establish a precinct for Aiakos. This must mean that Athens hoped to achieve rightful ownership of the island by appropriating its leading hero.³⁰

The war which the Aiginetans had started at the urging of Thebes is described by Herodotus as a *πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος*, which ought to mean that it lay outside the conventions of Greek warfare.³¹ This seems to be out of character with the Spartan interventions against Athens, which are marked by no deviations from normal military practice, as far as we are informed.

The conflict continued after Sparta desisted from meddling in Athens' internal affairs. There is something perverse in a point of view which would see Aigina as belonging to the Peloponnesian League throughout the period when the island was at war with Athens. What is an alliance (*summakhia*) but a commitment to help another state against an enemy?³² Yet Athens was prepared to embark upon active hostility against Aigina seemingly without fear of reprisal from the Peloponnesian League. Herodotus breaks off his narrative of Athenian-Aiginetan relations, so that we cannot know what turns this confrontation may have taken in the 490s. But the Aiginetan decision to Medize in 491 indicates that no firm reconciliation had taken place.

30. Hdt. 5.89.1–2. On the analogy of the Salaminioi, note F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques: Supplément* (Paris 1962) #19, 49–54; *IG II²* 1232.

31. Literally, 'heraldless', this term more often takes on the meaning of 'implacable' or 'relentless' (Xen. *Anab.* 3.3.5, *HG* 6.4.21; Aesch. 2.37; Dem. 18.262; Plut. *Mor.* 253F; cf. Dio Cass. 1.8; Hesych. s.v. *ἀκήρυκτος*, 2388 Latte) than the sense 'undeclared' (Plato *Laws* 626A). That connotation was reinforced by the common appearance of phrasing like *ἄσπονδος καὶ ἀκήρυκτος πόλεμος* (App. *Sam.* 4.3, 13, 16; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 57.3; Lucian *Alex.* 25). See A. Andrewes, "Athens and Aegina, 510–480 B.C.," *BSA* 37 (1936–1937) 1–7, esp. 1–2.

32. The concept is embodied in such phrases as ... *ὥστε τὸν αὐτὸν ἐχθρὸν εἶναι καὶ φίλον* ... (*Ath. Pol.* 23.5 on the Delian League); ... *ὥστε τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἐχθροὺς καὶ φίλους νομίζειν* ... (*Thuc.* 1.44.1). See also *SEG* 26.461.7–10. See J.A.O. Larsen, "The Constitution of the Peloponnesian League," *CP* 28 (1933) 257–76, esp. 273–76; *id.*, "The Constitution of the Peloponnesian League II," *CP* 29 (1934) 1–19, esp. 1–6. The charges against Sparta of the Corinthian speaker in *Thuc.* 1.68.2 do not provide a true parallel, inasmuch as their basis can only be in the confrontation between Athens and Corinth over Corcyra. In fact, the Spartans did not simply leave the Corinthians in the lurch, but attempted to help them and Corcyra to a mutually satisfactory resolution of the dispute (*Thuc.* 1.28.1). When the Corinthians remained adamant in their agitation, they were instrumental in motivating the eventual Spartan decision to go to war with Athens (*De Ste. Croix Origins* 66–71).

The Sepeia Campaign

The next occasion which was to involve the Aiginetans and the Spartans was Kleomenes' campaign against Argos that ended with the Spartan victory at Sepeia, usually dated to 494.³³ Kleomenes, thwarted in his initial invasion of the Argolid, made an approach by sea. Later, when Aigina approached Argos for aid against Athens, the Argives refused, because the Aiginetans had participated with their ships in the Sepeia campaign. Argos fined both Aigina and Sikyon, whose ships had been used, five hundred talents each.³⁴ The fine suggests that some residual Argive claim to hegemony over Aigina and Sikyon existed. The traditional view that this hegemony goes back to a period of Argive dominance in the northeast Peloponnesus (perhaps during the late eighth or early seventh century) does not appear unreasonable.³⁵

The Sikyonians paid their fine, which suggests that, although by this time a member of the Peloponnesian League, they felt it politic to assuage Argive resentment.³⁶ The Aiginetans refused to pay, and stated that the ships had been taken by coercion. This must suggest something other than normal provision of ships by a member of the Peloponnesian League to Sparta, as *ἀνάγκη*, the term employed by Herodotus here, would be an extraordinary way to refer to such duties.³⁷ Moreover, the Sikyonians, who undoubtedly furnished ships in response to legitimate Spartan orders, did not try to excuse themselves in the same fashion, as far as we know. Herodotus puts the statement that the Aiginetan ships were taken under compulsion in the mouth of the Argives, which may imply that the factuality of this excuse was accepted at Argos. Therefore, the core of the charge against the Aiginetans would be the second part of the Argive statement, namely that the crewmen of their ships had disembarked with Kleomenes (disregarding the strained syntax:

33. Hdt. 6.77-82. The later date, which I accept, depends on an interpretation of the joint oracle given to Argos and Miletos (Hdt. 6.77.2), which suggests a date in the mid 490s. See Beloch *GG*² 1.2.14; Busolt *GG*² 2.561-65; Grote *History of Greece*² 4.14.

34. Hdt. 6.92.1-2.

35. Müller *Die Dörfer* 1.154-55. See also W.S. Barrett, "Bacchylides, Asine, and Apollo Pythaeus," *Hermes* 82 (1954) 421-44, esp. 438-42.

36. On Sikyonian membership in the Peloponnesian League, see Kahrstedt *Staatsrecht* 1.28; Wickert *Bund* 18-19. That the Sikyonians were ready to hand over to Argos a sum of money of this magnitude, 100T in the final settlement, suggests a real fear of Argive retaliation. In the normal balance of military power in the Peloponnesus, and especially after Sepeia, it is hard to visualize why this fear should have been so intense. Perhaps it was Persia (and Argive overtures to Persia) that provided the impetus for this anxiety on the part of the Sikyonians and the fine was paid in the late 480s as insurance against a Persian victory.

37. J.E. Powell, *Lexicon to Herodotus* (Cambridge 1938), s.v. *ἀνάγκη*, p. 21, translates *ἀνάγκη* as "by force or compulsion" in this passage. Parallel is 6.25.2, where, after the fall of Miletos, the Persians regain control of a group of Karian cities by the application or threat of force. "Coercion" is to be preferred in 7.172.3, where the Thessalians warn the Hellenic League of the uselessness of coercing them if the League refuses to help; also, 7.136.1, where the bodyguards of Xerxes attempt to coerce the Spartan ambassadors to offer *proskynesis*. Cf. MacDowell *JHS* (1960) 118. De Ste. Croix *Origins* 334, however, justifiably rebuffs MacDowell's suggestion that *ἀνάγκη* must mean that the Aiginetan ships were seized in wartime. Had Herodotus meant to stress that physical force was brought to bear, he would perhaps have used *βίη* (cf. 6.5.2, 9.76.2).

Αἰγινᾶται νέες . . . καὶ συναπέβησαν Λακεδαιμονίοισι). On this, Herodotus gives us no hint of any Aiginetan excuse.

We cannot know certainly how Kleomenes compelled the cooperation of the Aiginetan ships, although Herodotus' silence and the very speed with which the Spartan king moved against Argos would appear to rule out acquiring the ships even through a minor military engagement.³⁸ One good possibility is that Kleomenes intercepted some Aiginetan merchant ships which had assembled in the Gulf of Nauplia to do business with the Spartan army (or with both opposing armies). The chief charge against the Aiginetans in the eyes of the Argives, their disembarkation with Kleomenes, would be shorthand for some active participation, in the strict sense, during the campaign's fighting.³⁹ The episode has no bearing on Aiginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League, once we realize that the Aiginetan ships were not there on official business in the first place. Perhaps it is also sensible to minimize Argive dissatisfaction with the Aiginetan excuse. The Argives may have been reluctant to help Aigina (when the latter later asked for help against the invading Athenians) out of fear of reawakening Spartan suspicions on the subject of their military strength. In answer to the Aiginetan request, however, a force of one thousand volunteers went out to aid the Aiginetans. It is hard to believe that Aigina could call on the services of so many genuine volunteers so soon after Sepeia. This may be an expedition sanctioned in some way by the Argive leadership, despite their official disavowal.⁴⁰

Kleomenes and Aigina, 491/490–489

It is on Kleomenes' intervention on Aigina that the demonstration of Aiginetan involvement with the Peloponnesian League has often turned. This whole episode raises difficulties on many counts: its chronology in Herodotus, Spartan foreign policy, and the relationship between Kleomenes and Demaratos, to name a few.⁴¹ These cannot be investigated here, but it should be strongly suggested that this episode's importance for Spartan foreign policy has been somewhat underestimated, and that at least some of this chain of events must fall after Marathon.

Athens appealed to Sparta because the Aiginetans were said to have given tokens of submission to the envoys of the Great King.⁴² Undoubtedly, the Athenians feared that Aigina would add its weight to the Persian assault, and

38. Cf. Tomlinson *Argos* 96.

39. Cf. Leahy *CP* (1954) 234. It is unnecessary to look for reasons for the cooperation of the crews of the Aiginetan ships with Kleomenes. Déclassé elements of Aiginetan society must have had a significant role in manning the ships, military or merchant, of the large Aiginetan fleet. They would have had little commitment to upholding the official stance of neutrality of the Aiginetan state toward its friends in Argos.

40. Tomlinson *Argos* 100, 181. Cf. Thuc. 1.107.5, 5.67.2, 5.81.1–2; DS 12.75.7. There is no reason to believe that the government of the so-called *douloi* would not have continued a traditional pro-Aiginetan policy.

41. See pp. 113–49 below; also Figueira *Aegina and Athens* 274–307.

42. Hdt. 6.49.1; cf. 7.133.1.

perhaps offer them a base. The submission to the Persians itself argues against Aiginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League. Contemporaneously, Sparta will put the envoys of Dareios to death.⁴³ Herodotus gives us the impression that each state confronted with the question of whether or not to Medize reacted individually. Yet it strains belief, for instance, that Eretria and Chalcis, for instance, close to Athens, were not in communication with Athens over what policy to take.⁴⁴ So it seems reasonable that Sparta and its allies were aware of each other's views on Persian aggression. Thus, the Aiginetans could not decide to Medize without putting themselves out of step with Sparta and the League. Conversely, a key factor may have been the attitude of Argos toward Persia. By 491, with the debacle of Sepeia still fresh, Argos may have begun to contemplate the advantages accruing from a pro-Persian policy. There were after all those who later saw in Argive behavior during the invasion of Xerxes a deeper involvement than the neutrality that was the city's official policy.⁴⁵

Moreover, the appeal to Sparta has been taken unnecessarily to mean that Athens was appealing to Sparta as Aigina's *hēgemōn*. Athens was unable to coerce the Aiginetans by its own strength, as the ensuing hostilities indicate.⁴⁶ Only the threat of military intervention by an outside power could bring the Aiginetans to comply. Such a threat is inherent in Kleomenes' behavior on his first trip to Aigina.⁴⁷ It may not be inappropriate to observe that the Aiginetans learned from Demaratos, the other Spartan king, how most effectively to question the legality of Kleomenes' demands. We can admit that the warner or advisor, sometimes in secret communication with his state's adversary, plays a dramatic role on many occasions in Herodotus. It does not alter the fact that Aiginetan resistance was predicated on Demaratos' involvement. From Kleomenes' viewpoint, Demaratos had to be removed for his opposition

43. Beloch *GG*² 2.1.40–41, n. 6, questioned the chronology and the very reality of the Persian request for submission from the Spartans and Athenians, and with it the historicity of their violence to the envoys. See, however, R. Sealey, "The Pit and the Well: The Persian Heralds of 491 B.C.," *CJ* 72 (1976) 13–20, who has convincingly supported the view that this episode is correctly represented by Herodotus.

44. See M.B. Wallace, "Herodotos and Euboia," *Phoenix* 28 (1974) 22–44, esp. 35–37.

45. Hdt. 7.149.3–152.3.

46. Hdt. 6.88–93. An alternative route out of this dilemma is to assume that Athens belonged to the Peloponnesian League. It should, however, be rejected (see Leahy *CP* [1954] 235–36; Wickert *Bund* 20–23). A better approach would be that Sparta had a defensive alliance with Athens (a general *epimakhia* or a special agreement to repel the expected Persian expeditionary force). Aiginetan Medism, however, which could only signify a willingness to collaborate actively with the Persians on request, would justify an Athenian appeal to Sparta (*pace* Leahy *CP* [1954] 236). Still a third possibility, attractive given Sparta's behavior during the Marathon campaign, is that the grounds for Kleomenes' action were informal understandings between Kleomenes and his supporters and the Athenians. See, however, n. 58 below.

47. As Kleomenes' personal threat against Krios demonstrates (Hdt. 6.50.3). The impressive fortifications of the harbor and town were built during the 480s, and their absence in 491 may have militated in favor of eventual Aiginetan cooperation.

to his own decision to take hostages. To make Demaratos himself the intermediary for the conveyance of the knowledge of this opposition to Aigina is not necessary for the sake of the economy of the narrative. What precisely in this involvement motivated the Aiginetans to resist Kleomenes (the information which Demaratos gave them, or merely the fact of his support) is not specified by Herodotus, and so can only be a subject of speculation.⁴⁸

Nevertheless, trying to see the Peloponnesian League in this episode seems wrong-headed. There is no suggestion that anyone except the Spartans was privy to or involved in the decision to move against Aigina (and some doubt whether it is not Kleomenes and his political allies rather than the Spartan government in the strict sense). While it is true that in an emergency Kleomenes may have been empowered to act on his own toward a recalcitrant ally, even with a League matter involved, his natural reaction to the Aiginetan refusal to turn over hostages should have been to return with a decree or pronouncement of the collective organ of the League, and perhaps, along with it, representatives of allied states to attest to its authenticity and validity.⁴⁹ In the event, if we accept Herodotus' estimation that Demaratos' opposition led to Kleomenes' engineering his deposition, there must have been no device ready to Kleomenes' hand but the removal of Demaratos.⁵⁰

The extraction of hostages may have been involved with the privileges of the two Spartan royal houses, with each king possessing a veto power over the other in this matter. As such it would have been a natural consequence of the occasional presence of two kings on campaign. Without the veto, one king would also have been able without check to commit the Spartan state to a particular line of policy by means of demanding hostages from a particular foreign city. Significantly, after the initial rebuff of Kleomenes, Herodotus turns to a discussion of the traditional rights of the two kings.⁵¹

48. Cf. Leahy *CP* (1954) 236.

49. Leahy *CP* (1954) 235, 238, insists that we must see in this episode a "revolt" from the League, with the League executive acting by virtue of its emergency powers. He fails to address the question of why it should be necessary to impeach a Spartan king to carry into effect a League directive. Is it necessary to imagine that Sparta's allies had recognized certain privileges of the Spartan kings independent of the public enactments of the Spartan state? Such powers would have to be imagined to be beyond the League's decision-making powers, and such authority is undocumented. The readiness of the Aiginetans to capitulate after the political impotence of Demaratos had been demonstrated may help to show that the important point for the critical group of Aiginetans (the "swing votes," i.e., those prepared to go back on their submission to Persia out of fear or a consideration of Sparta) was whether Kleomenes had the unconditional backing of the Spartan authorities. Once it appeared that they might have to face the combined forces of Sparta, Corinth, and Athens, Medism may have looked much less attractive an alternative. The veto of one king over another in this matter was interpreted to mean that there was no such consensus.

50. It is possible that the deposition of Demaratos had been planned for this moment for some time (see H.W. Parke, "The Deposing of Spartan Kings," *CQ* 39 [1945] 106-12). See pp. 123-24 below.

51. Herodotus' discussion of Spartan kingship has its initial connection to the preceding narrative in the dispute between Kleomenes and Demaratos, which Herodotus links with the difference in prestige between the royal houses (6.51-52), but soon turns to the privileges of the kings (6.56-59).

Yet, this prerogative may have been limited in use to non-allied states, or the members of the alliance and the Spartan government would have been in a position to bring the matter to some conclusion short of the removal from office of one of the kings. There is no indication that this sort of hostage-taking was in customary use by Sparta among its allies. In this case, assuming for the moment that Aigina was a member of the Peloponnesian League, the Spartans take hostages from their ally, and deposit them in the hands of that ally's worst enemy. It is not hard to view this as a hostile act, which would terminate any alliance, if one were preexisting. Later, during the Peloponnesian War, the Spartans extract hostages from the Arkadians, but clearly with the connivance of the pro-Spartan party in their home cities. They deposit them in Orkhome-nos, itself an Arkadian city.⁵² |

The language used by Herodotus to express the decision of the Aiginetans to hand over their hostages to Kleomenes and Leotikhidas, who had replaced Demaratos, has been taken to suggest their recognition of a legal requirement to cooperate. The verb *δικαίω* is taken to convey this sense of legal responsibility. However, Herodotean usage scarcely indicates so exclusive a sense. At several junctures, the historian uses *δικαίω* in the sense of "deeming something fit or appropriate." Therefore, the meaning here could be that of the prudence or common sense of an action in the context of previously expressed attitudes, rather than its moral rightness.⁵³

After the fall of Kleomenes, the Spartans were confronted by the Aiginetans, who claimed that Leotikhidas was implicated in Kleomenes' acts of violence which led to the custody of the Aiginetan hostages by the Athenians.⁵⁴ Herodotus tells us that the Spartans condemned Leotikhidas and were willing to hand him over to the Aiginetans. The specific grounds for the conviction

52. Thuc. 5.61.4, a parallel adduced by De Ste. Croix (*Origins* 334). Other parallels: 8.3.1, Agis extracts hostages from the Thessalians; 8.24.6, 31.1, Astyokhos takes hostages from the Chians. These are too few cases to make a judgment on continuing royal prerogatives.

53. Leahy *CP* (1954) 236–37 (and also De Ste. Croix *Origins* 334) asserts that *δικαίω* with the infinitive means: a recognition of some general principle of justice (e.g., Hdt. 1.89.1, 2.151.3, 3.148.2), occasionally religious duties (e.g., 2.47.2, 4.186.2), or legal obligation (e.g., 6.82.1, 6.86.1). He grants a non-moral usage (like the English "see fit to") (e.g., 2.181.1, where Amasis decides to marry a Kyrenaeen, or 4.154.2, where a Cretan king decides his second wife should be a step-mother to his daughter). These latter are merely clear cases of a wider phenomenon, wherein the usage of *δικαίω* belongs to the prudential class of motivation rather than to the legal or judicial. In 8.126.2, Artabazos decides to reduce rebellious Poteidaia; similarly, Mardonios decides to fight at Plataia because of adherence to a Persian *nomos* (9.42.1). But, in this case, the *nomos* appears to be nothing more than the tradition of fighting against inferior or equal enemy numbers. See also 2.172.5, where the Egyptians are induced to recognize Amasis as master, and 3.19.3, where Kambyses declines to use force to make his Phoenician subjects serve against Carthage. If we insist that *δικαίω* must always have a legal meaning, it is possible to reconstruct steps to resolve such decisions into obligatory terms. Yet, such a procedure smacks of semantic apriorism. Granted that a legalistic reading is impossible in several cases, there is no reason why *δικαίω* cannot have weakened from its strong original sense of obligation. Once we admit that political attitudes and norms can justify the use of *δικαίω*, further speculation becomes fruitless, inasmuch as we have no direct evidence on the reasoning that led the Aiginetans to "deem it prudent" to give in.

54. Hdt. 6.85.1.

were that Leotykidas had outraged the Aiginetans. It is hard to see how a legitimate decision of the Peloponnesian League could ever have been open to such an indictment as this.⁵⁵ One cannot extricate oneself from this predicament simply by stating that the ephors were hostile to Kleomenes and Leotykidas throughout the episode. If a League decision was the ultimate basis for the kings' action, the ephors could not accuse them of outrage without implicating the Spartan government itself and its allies. There were in any case three boards of ephors in office during the episode (i.e., if the trial of Leotykidas took place after Marathon). The thought that all were uniformly hostile to Leotykidas and Kleomenes demands an unlikely continuity in their views, unless one believes that the ephorate was invariably at odds with the royal houses. Nor is it reasonable to assume that the *dikastērion* mentioned by Herodotus was likely to have been merely the ephors, without at least the *gerousia* as a participant.

No similar difficulties exist if we assume that Kleomenes and Leotykidas were acting by means of the customary prerogatives of the Spartan kings, which did not need further official sanction. Traditional rights are two-edged swords. A strong-willed monarch like Kleomenes might expand their application and insist upon their exercise. A weaker figure like Leotykidas, in face of a strong official reaction, may not have been able to make such a stand. One approach would be to assume that the specific grounds for Leotykidas' indictment may in fact have been that he was bribed by the Athenians to give them the hostages. Bribery was the accusation originally thrown in the teeth of Kleomenes by the Aiginetans on his first visit to the island.⁵⁶

It is difficult to understand precisely what we are to think of the Spartan willingness to deliver Leotykidas into the hands of the Aiginetans after his conviction. Certainly, the Spartans were prepared to, and did, condemn their kings, who usually fled into exile. But it is difficult to cite a parallel for the handing over of a king to a foreign state, allied or not.⁵⁷ Leotykidas may have been threatened with *atimia*, which would make of him an outlaw, whom the Aiginetans (or anyone else, for that matter) might drag off for punishment. This view would minimize the significance of the Aiginetan participation in the affair; in other words, they were witnesses rather than a principal party. But this conclusion does not help us much in understanding why Leotykidas could not take more care to escape the consequences of the trial. It may be also be that the Aiginetans were only being authorized to keep Leotykidas a hostage while their leaders were held in Athens (6.85.1: *καί μιν κατέκριναν ἔκδοτον ἄγεσθαι ἐς Αἴγινα ἀντὶ τῶν ἐν Ἀθήνῃσι ἐχομένων ἀνδρῶν*, cf.

55. Leahy *CP* (1954) 237–38.

56. Hdt. 6.50.2.

57. Spartan kings in exile: Leotykidas, at Tegea (Hdt. 6.72.2); Kleomenes, in flight to Thessaly or Sellasia (Hdt. 6.74.1; D. Hereward, "Herodotus vi.74," *CR* 1 [1951] 146); Pleistoanax, at Lepreon (Thuc. 5.16.3); Pausanias, at Tegea (Xen. *HG* 3.5.22). These examples raise the question of why Leotykidas was so foolish as to fail to forestall punishment in the matter of the Aiginetan hostages by flight.

6.85.2: τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Σπαρτιητέων ἔκδοτον γενόμενον; see 3.1.1 for the meaning of ‘hostage’ for ἔκδοτος). Herodotus, who probably used Aiginetan informants here, also emphasized the Aiginetans to facilitate the introduction into his narrative of the hostilities between Athens and Aigina that follow. The prominence given to the calming influence on the Aiginetans of Theasides, son of Leoprepes, described as an ἀνὴρ δόκιμος, may mark him as the Aiginetan *proxenos* at Sparta, who was remembered with respect by the Aiginetans.

Caution is advisable in this matter as, besides the bare facts of Leotykhidās’ escape from punishment by going to Athens to request the return of the hostages, Herodotus tells us little about the termination of the incident that is pertinent. Leotykhidās’ diplomacy in Herodotus’ narrative amounts to a homily.⁵⁸ He makes no effort to force the Athenians to recognize that their refusal to cooperate with him might have adverse effects for them at Sparta. The Athenians react by echoing the Aiginetans’ refusal to render up the hostages when only one king of the two has requested them.⁵⁹ The Spartans are content to leave the matter at that, with the Aiginetans left to take their own steps to get back the hostages.⁶⁰

It may be justifiable to believe that belated Spartan solicitude for an ally prompted their willingness to punish Leotykhidās. On the other hand, it is difficult to see why a serious attempt at restitution for a wronged ally might not have been somewhat more forceful. It remains a possibility that the disgrace with which Leotykhidās’ career ended may have moved Herodotus or his informants to put the king’s efforts to recover the hostages in the worst possible light. Did Leotykhidās merely go to Athens to remind the Athenians that they were behaving ungratefully in retaining their prisoners after the Persian danger, the reason for their deposit, had passed? In any event, this remains a very complex and disturbing stretch of Herodotean narrative.

After Leotykhidās’ failure, hostilities began between Athens and Aigina. The actual fighting included an attempt by the Athenians to overthrow the island’s reigning oligarchy. When this failed, the fugitive Aiginetan democrats were established in Attica to carry on piracy against their homeland.⁶¹ During the preliminaries to the Athenian intervention in support of these Aiginetans,

58. Hdt. 6.86a–d. Leotykhidās’ remarks are exhausted by the story of the bad faith of Glaukos of Sparta, who stole funds left in his keeping by a guest-friend, and are meant to provide the Athenians with a chilling example of the requital given to the faithless. Significantly, Glaukos misappropriates what is given to him by a *xenos*, and this suggests that Sparta or Kleomenes’ clique and the Athenians may have conceptualized their cooperation against the Persians in 491/90 in terms of a merely *xenia*-type relationship, rather than a *summakhia*. See H.W. Stubbs, “The Speech of Leotykhidās in Herodotus VI 86,” *PCA* 56 (1959) 27–28.

59. Herodotus’ term for the Athenian refusal is a *prophasis*, the same word used for the justification of Athens’ appeal to Sparta. It does not denote the truth or falsity of the reason stated, but merely that it is self-interested. See H.R. Rawlings, *A Semantic Study of Prophasis to 400 B.C.*, *Hermes Einzelschriften* 33 (Wiesbaden 1975) 14–21, 25–33. Cf. L. Pearson, “*Prophasis* and *Aitia*,” *TAPA* 83 (1952) 205–23.

60. Hdt. 6.87.

61. Hdt. 6.88–90.

the Athenians discovered that they did not have enough "battle-worthy" ships and were compelled to acquire twenty ships from Corinth by nominal sale.⁶² While it is barely possible that two members of the Peloponnesian League might be at war with each other, with the Spartans remaining aloof because they judged that the claims of the two allies negated each other, this is not the case here. Corinth was at most a minor party in the military action taken by Athens against Aigina, an ally of Sparta, we are to believe.⁶³ In this case, we must also believe that Sparta was prepared to countenance aid by its ally, Corinth, to Athens so that this outsider to the League might attempt to subjugate another League member.

Moreover, are we also to believe that Sparta was disinterested in the Athenian effort to put the *dāmos* in power on Aigina? Sparta has always been supposed to have supported oligarchies among its allies, if only to insure the loyalty to Sparta of the local aristocracies.⁶⁴ Yet it is not to Sparta that Aigina applied for help at this point, but to Argos. Although the Argives refused official help, one thousand volunteers went out to the island. The Aiginetan plea is especially surprising, if Aigina was an ally of Sparta.

A means out of this predicament is to follow A. Andrewes in his hypothesis that Herodotus confused two wars in this passage.⁶⁵ The Nikodromos coup, and with it the Corinthian sale of ships to Athens and Argive aid to Aigina, belonged to a conflict to be dated to 493. Based on this interpretation, D.M. Leahy advances the possibility that Aigina was not a member of the League in 493, but had become one by 491, joining the League when Argos proved an undependable protector, and Sparta had shown its might so dramatically at Sepeia.⁶⁶ Fear of an involvement of the Peloponnesian League in the war with Aigina induced the Athenians to allow hostilities to peter out.

The case for a redating of the Nikodromos coup to 493 is hardly overwhelming, and serious arguments can be brought against it.⁶⁷ In any case, if Aigina were a recent enlistee in the Spartan alliance, its Medism would seem all the more curious. Also, Athens was at war, or on the brink of war, with Aigina from Marathon down to the foundation of the Hellenic League, without a hint in Herodotus of an anticipated Spartan intervention. Leahy's view that Athens was readier to take this risk after 490 because such an action would have been a very different matter from the prospect of an unexpected and unprovided for intervention is without point. With the reasonable expectation of another attempt against Greece by the Persians, and with Spartan

62. Hdt. 6.89.

63. Note Leahy *CP* (1954) 238. On Corinth and Aigina, see pp. 23–28 above and *Aegina* 207–8. [The war between Corinth and Megara c. 465 is no true parallel (Thuc. 1.103.4), inasmuch as it was undertaken by Corinth at a moment of extreme Spartan distraction. Note the Spartan provision for the restoration of Megarian territory in the Thirty Years Peace (Thuc. 1.115.1). See *Theognis* 155–57; *Colonization* 109–13.]

64. De Ste. Croix *Origins* 99–100; Leahy *CP* (1954) 240–41. Cf. Thuc. 1.76.1.

65. Andrewes *BSA* (1936–1937) 2–7.

66. Leahy *CP* (1954) 239–41 with n. 60, p. 243.

67. Figueira *Aegina and Athens* 284–96; see pp. 131–34 below.

cooperation so vital in this event, Athens could not afford to behave provocatively toward the Peloponnesian League.

Athens and Aigina in the 480s

That a state of tension, if not outright military confrontation, between Athens and Aigina existed in the 480s is implicit in Herodotus' account of Themistokles' legislation on the navy. The latter argued for his naval program on the grounds of the usefulness of the ships against Aigina.⁶⁸ This situation, perhaps marked by intermittent warfare, can hardly be reconciled with Aiginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League. It is equally difficult to understand against the background of the record of Sparta's cooperation with Athens. Even if clauses of the treaties of the members of the Peloponnesian League with Sparta established the necessity for mutual consultation before aggressive measures, Sparta could hardly have put Aigina off repeatedly without Aiginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League lapsing.

III. THE GROWTH OF THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE

The allies with whom it is reasonable to assume that Sparta had ties by the early fifth century fall into two categories: (1) neighboring states such as Tegea, Sparta's earliest ally (cf. Hdt. 1.65-68, 9.26), and the other Arkadian cities, whose role was that of buffer states to Lakonia and Messenia; (2) states such as Corinth and Sikyon, which had previously been ruled by tyrants. Sparta had perhaps adopted an antityrannical stance to gain adherence of this second group, which in the case of Corinth and Sikyon had reason to fear Sparta's old adversary, Argos. Aigina was not close to Sparta; nor does tyranny, and the instability attendant on it, seem to have troubled Aigina in the sixth century.

The extent to which the Spartans were willing to take on permanent allies far afield is indicated by two events. In 519 (or, if we emend Thucydides' text, in 509), Kleomenes refused Plataia's offer of alliance because this city was too far away for a Spartan alliance to be of any value to it.⁶⁹ Also, at least once, the Spartans sent an expeditionary force to the Cyclades, but seem to have made no allies there. They expelled Lygdamis, tyrant of Naxos, but, as far as we know, Naxos never joined the Peloponnesian League.⁷⁰

The most probable time for the admission to the Spartan alliance of the small states of the Argolid and Argolic Akte is after the Battle of Sepeia, when, for the first time, Argive power there was definitively subverted by Sparta.⁷¹ These states, to whom Argos always represented the first concern, should have

68. Hdt. 7.144.1.

69. See n. 24 above.

70. Plut. *Mor.* 859D. On the date of 525, see H.W. Parke, "Polycrates and Delos," *CQ* 40 (1946) 105-8; for 516-14, during Sparta's brief thalassocracy, see W.G. Forrest, "Two Chronographic Notes," *CQ* 19 (1969) 95-110, esp. 105.

71. Wickert *Bund* 56-61; G. Busolt, *Die Lakedaimonier und ihre Bundesgenossen* (Leipzig 1878) 75-82.

begun to look to Sparta for aid about this time. There is a temptation to put Aigina among these states, except for several considerations. Once Aigina had grown to be a naval power, the island no longer needed to fear an alliance with Argos as having a potential for gradual subjugation. Argos was never a naval power in this period. Rather, Argos, whose hoplite military strength complemented Aigina's naval capability, may have appeared the ideal ally against larger neighbors such as Corinth and Athens. There was little that Sparta could do to aid Aigina that could not also be provided by Argos, namely, modest reinforcements on land. But more important, in this period, when Spartan influence was spreading along the southern and western shores of the Saronic Gulf, in the 490s and 480s, Athens, Aigina's enemy, became much more desirable to Sparta as a friend, because of the growing Persian menace.

The role of Corinth in the Peloponnesian League deserves some attention regarding Aigina. Herodotus reports to us a single incident—the debate over restoring Hippias at Athens—that gives us a picture of the internal workings of the Peloponnesian League.⁷² Here, Corinth seems to have had a dominant voice among Sparta's allies. Because of its wealth and naval strength, Corinth was always in a position to play a most independent role in the alliance.⁷³ The question remains whether Corinth could have played this role early in the fifth century had Aigina, another wealthy naval power, been a member of the League. Furthermore, Corinth can be seen as hostile to Aigina from the sale of Corinthian ships to Athens for use against the island.⁷⁴ It is doubtful that Corinth would have encouraged Aiginetan participation in the alliance, or that Sparta could have brought these two unfriendly neighbors under the same political tent. The attractions of membership to the Aiginetans were similarly constrained: distant Sparta could not offer much more than Argos against Athens on land, and, without the friendship of Corinth, for the moment well disposed to Athens, the prospect of a naval alliance against the Athenians was unrealistic.

A further consideration on the subject of Aiginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League concerns the origin of the Hellenic League against Persia. It could be argued that the Hellenic League had its genesis in two related needs: (1) to bring under Spartan leadership those states who would not accept permanent Spartan hegemony; (2) to bring together those states who could only unite temporarily in cooperation, and whose long-term interests were incompatible. Athens was certainly among the states to whom the first requirement was pertinent. Similarly, Argos, against whom the Peloponnesian League was in large part aimed, was the target of an appeal to join the Hellenic League. Perhaps Aigina was another state to whom permanent

72. Hdt. 5.92–93.

73. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, e.g., Thuc. 1.67.5–71; machinations after the Peace of Nikias: Thuc. 5.38.

74. Hdt. 6.89.

acceptance of Spartan hegemony was irksome, while alliance only for the purpose of repelling the Persians was an attractive alternative.⁷⁵

The reconciliation of Athens and Aigina, which Herodotus stressed as an early significant accomplishment of the League, bespeaks the second of these needs.⁷⁶ If Aigina was a member of the Peloponnesian League, accepting the authority of Sparta and its allies in foreign policy, would this reconciliation have loomed so large either on the agenda of the Hellenic League or in the mind of its historian? Would not the decision of Sparta and its allies to enter into cooperation with Athens have of itself implemented a reconciliation of all the outstanding quarrels between individual League members and Athens?

In summation, there seems to be no firm reason to believe that Aigina belonged to the Peloponnesian League before 480. The hypothesis of a membership provides a framework for understanding Aiginetan history in this period that is not easily accommodated with events, unless the very concept of participation in the League is so stripped of meaning as to be of historical disinterest.

IV. AIGINA AND THE PELOPONNESIAN LEAGUE AFTER 480

Spartan and Aiginetan Attitudes

In the period after 480, the perspective from which the problem of Aiginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League should be viewed has changed. The Aiginetans should have recognized the greatly augmented strength of Athens. At first glance, it might be thought that this threat had become so clear that the Aiginetans would seek Spartan protection. Such a view, however, depends on an interpretation which sees the Spartans as willing to take on a defensive responsibility which demanded a naval capability that, from the 470s onward, they no longer possessed. True, Sparta retained its partnership with Corinth, and thereby the support of Corinth's substantial naval power. There may have been doubts (subsequently validated by Kekryphaleia), however, whether Corinth could use its fleet to any effect in the Saronic Gulf, so close to the Peiraieus. In addition, our judgment on Spartan readiness to accept Aigina depends on an appraisal of Spartan suspicion of Athens that has an early anticipation of an inevitable struggle with the Athenians, wherein Aiginetan aid might be valuable. Spartan anxiety stemming from the growing strength of Athens grew more slowly than this.⁷⁷ Without

75. The editors of the *ATL* (3.95-100) wish to see on the Serpent Column (Meiggs-Lewis 27), set up to commemorate the Greek victories over Persia, three sub-groups headed by Athens, Sparta, and Corinth. Accordingly, Aigina was listed under Sparta. The organization of material is scarcely systematic enough to warrant such conclusions. See P.A. Brunt, "The Hellenic League against Persia," *Historia* 2 (1953-1954) 135-63, esp. 144-48; Meiggs-Lewis p. 59; MacDowell *JHS* (1960) 119.

76. Hdt. 7.145.1.

77. We may disregard DS 11.50.3-8, where the Spartans, eager for war with Athens in 475/4, are stopped by Hetoimaridas, a *gerōn*. Diodorus relates some details on Peloponnesian history that may go back to Charon of Lampsakos (see D.M. Lewis, "Ithome Again," *Historia* 2

the influence of this fear, Spartan encouragement of an Aiginetan application to the Peloponnesian League may have been thought to be unduly provocative to Athens, a declaration of Spartan distrust. That Sparta was unwilling to do this is witnessed by the failure to press the issue of prohibiting the rebuilding of Athens' walls, and by the reluctance to give Pausanias any overt support.

Even assuming, however, that the Spartans were willing to welcome the Aiginetans into their alliance, reasons can also be brought forward to explain Aiginetan neutrality. First of all, there is the question of what Sparta can be imagined to have done to encourage so trusting an attitude in the Aiginetans as to prompt their risking an affiliation with the Peloponnesian League, which could only be a proclamation that Aigina anticipated trouble with Athens. It should have been obvious to the Aiginetans that the great fleet of Athens, built from the revenues of Laurion, would have represented a deadly threat to Aigina if it had been used against the island as planned. The Persian invasion and Aigina's adherence to the Hellenic League ward off this immediate threat. It may have then have seemed that safety in the years following Salamis may have been best sought not by appeals to Sparta, which could do little to aid Aigina, but by a dependence on the mutual guarantees established by the Hellenic League.⁷⁸

The Aiginetans would have been reassured by the absorption of Athenian energies in the war against Persia, and with a concomitant neglect of the old local disputes with Thebes, Megara, and Aigina. The Aiginetans may also have expected that the Athenians would not remain on the whole so successful against Persia, as they did before overreaching themselves in Cyprus and in the Egyptian campaign. In the absence of explicit source material, any discussion of Aiginetan policy and Spartan attitudes toward Aigina is hypothetical. Such speculation, however, does show that chains of reasoning can be set up to explain Aiginetan neutrality should our investigation of specific episodes show no sign of Aiginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League (on attempts at rapprochement by the Aiginetans with Athenian politicians, see pp. 205–12 below).

The Foundation of the Delian League

Although one might think that mention would be made of the Aiginetans when Athens replaced Sparta as the leader in the struggle against Persia, our sources serve us badly in this regard. The first signs of a breakdown of the

[1953–1954] 412–18). The Spartan decision to contest the naval hegemony with Athens was a sudden flareup, as suddenly quieted by Hetoimaridas' intervention. Thucydides' silence and his emphasis on the slow growth of Spartan fear of Athens shows that the momentary enthusiasm for war (or, more correctly, their determination to risk war by protesting the formation of the Delian League) left no permanent impression on the Spartan majority. Nor did the episode affect Aigina's plans, as it was too fleeting, and was probably not common knowledge until much later. Cf. H.D. Meyer, "Vorgeschichte und Gründung des delisch-attischen Seebundes," *Historia* 12 (1963) 405–46, esp. 433–35.

78. See pp. 109–11, 281–84, and 286–87 below on the issue of Aiginetan autonomy.

Hellenic League as an active force can be seen in the retirement of the Spartans in 479, leaving the Athenians to besiege Sestos. Herodotus says only that the Spartans, with the Peloponnesians, chose to withdraw, and that the Athenians remained to besiege Sestos.⁷⁹ That we should not interpret Herodotus to mean that the Peloponnesian League as such withdrew, leaving the Athenians (not being members of the League) at Sestos, can perhaps be reasoned from the accounts of Thucydides and Diodorus.⁸⁰ Both report Ionians and islanders remaining to aid the Athenians. This venture appears to be the first sign of collaboration among the members of the future Delian League. No members of the Hellenic League from the mainland states, whether members of the Peloponnesian League or not, need to be thought to have participated. In trying to determine the Aiginetan attitude toward the allied defection from Pausanias' leadership, we are hampered by the uncertainty over the very presence of an Aiginetan contingent in the fleet. Pausanias had twenty ships from the Peloponnesus, and thirty from Athens, as well as a great number of allies of indeterminate origin.⁸¹ The fleet is smaller than we might expect, unless the other allies provided a considerable force. The contingent from the Peloponnesus is also quite small, if Sparta, Corinth, and Aigina are all thought to be contributing. It may be possible that the Aiginetans were among the other allies, if they contributed at all. Thucydides tells us that all eventually deserted the Spartans except the soldiers from the Peloponnesus. Since he usually employs the term "Peloponnesus" as strictly geographical, while the term "Peloponnesians" is often used for members of the Spartan alliance, no inference about Aigina should be drawn from his language here.⁸² Diodorus adds the detail that some Peloponnesians deserted Pausanias, returning home and sending embassies to Sparta.⁸³ None of these accounts is specific enough to give us any solid evidence about Aiginetan affiliation in this period.

The Embassy of Polyarkhos and the Helot Revolt

An Aiginetan, Polyarkhos, came to Sparta bearing the information that the Athenians were rebuilding their walls.⁸⁴ This could be thought to suggest that Aigina had joined the Spartan alliance.⁸⁵ The weakness of this point becomes clear when one considers the lack of feasible alternatives for the recipient of the Aiginetan imputation. Sparta was the *hēgemōn* of the Hellenic League. While at Thucydides' urging we may suspect Sparta's good faith in

79. Hdt. 9.114-15.

80. Thuc. 1.89.2; DS 11.37.4.

81. Thuc. 1.94.1.

82. Thuc. 1.95.4. See De Ste. Croix *Origins* 106-7, 188; Gomme *HCT* 4.249; cf. Meiggs *Athenian Empire* 51-52.

83. DS 11.44.6.

84. Plut. *Them.* 19.2. MacDowell *JHS* (1960) 119, does not see Polyarkhos as an official Aiginetan envoy. De Ste. Croix (*Origins* 334) has pointed out that ἀποστέλλω is regularly used in Plutarch for sending out an envoy.

85. De Ste. Croix *Origins* 334-35.

attempting to prevent the refortification, the fact remains that, nominally (and, one might add, publicly), Spartan behavior on this subject was predicated on panhellenic interest, the danger of Persian utilization of extra-Isthmian fortification.⁸⁶ It does not appear possible to draw any conclusion from this episode about Aiginetan membership in the Peloponnesian League.

Regarding Aiginetan aid to Sparta during the Helot Revolt as an indication of League membership, a similar difficulty is at issue.⁸⁷ Sparta called on Athens for help, presumably under the terms of the Hellenic League, which was still held to be in existence.⁸⁸ There is no reason why Aiginetan aid to Sparta should not fall under this same category of responsibilities of members of the Hellenic League toward Sparta. It is possible that the treaty or treaties establishing the Hellenic League specifically legislated for Sparta's calling on its allies in the event of a Helot revolt.⁸⁹ Thucydides informs us that, in part, the Spartans were later ready to establish the Aiginetans, who had been driven from their island at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War by the Athenians, in the Thyreatis, because of their help to Sparta during the Revolt. This, along with Thucydides' use of the terms *ἐνεργέτης/ἐνεργεσία* to describe the Aiginetan service to Sparta, suggests a special gratitude on the part of the Spartans, one not simply based on a service owed to them by a member of the Peloponnesian League.⁹⁰ That Aiginetan service rather than Spartan guilt over the supposed abandonment of the island by Sparta in the Thirty Years Peace is the Spartans' explicit motivation suggests that Aigina was never truly a Spartan ally in the Peloponnesian League.

The First Peloponnesian War

Aigina is not mentioned in the early fighting of the so-called "First Peloponnesian War". On one interpretation of the admittedly abbreviated narrative of Thucydides' *Pentekontaeteia*, the Athenian war with Aigina only broke out after the Battle of Kekryphaleia. As is well known, the chronology of this

86. Thuc. 1.90.1–2. Note that the allies mentioned here could, just as well, be members of the Hellenic League as Peloponnesian League members.

87. Thuc. 2.27.2. See MacDowell *JHS* (1960) 119.

88. Cf. Thuc. 1.102.1–2; Plut. *Cimon* 16.8.

89. De Ste. Croix, *Origins* 113, believes Sparta had the right to call out its Peloponnesian allies immediately if the Helots revolted. On the analogy of alliance between Athens and Sparta in 421/0 (Thuc. 5.23.3), it is possible that a similar stipulation was inserted into the agreements of the Hellenic League, since Sparta's ability to operate outside the Peloponnese depended upon the Helots remaining quiet. Thus, Athens, Plataia, and Aigina come to Sparta's aid. But see note 90, in which case, treaty obligations would be in the background.

90. The Aiginetans are *ἐνεργέται* in Thuc. 2.27.2, and their *ἐνεργεσία* is also mentioned in 4.56.2. A parallel is 1.32.1, where the Corcyraean speaker concedes that there had been "neither alliance nor benefaction" preexisting between Athens and Corcyra. The Corinthian in 1.41.2 recalls Corinthian services to Athens, when Corinth dissuaded the Peloponnesians from aiding Samos. There can be no alliance here. Generally, Thucydidean usage suggests a special, almost gratuitous service, to be reciprocated with gratitude. Seldom are these terms used of allies, as in the speeches of Diodotos (3.47.3) and Brasidas (4.11.4), and in these the tone is rhetorical. The speakers are at pains to magnify the friendly services of the parties described as the benefactors.

period in Thucydides is filled with difficulties in interpretation. In this case, the problem lies in an understanding of his word order: πολέμον δὲ καταστάτος πρὸς Αἰγινήτας Ἀθηναίοις μετὰ ταῦτα ναυμαχία γίγνεται ἐπ' Αἰγίνῃ μεγάλη Ἀθηναίων καὶ Αἰγινήτων The very fact that Thucydides thought it necessary to inform us that war had broken out between Athens and Aigina may in itself suggest that the Aiginetans were not members of the Peloponnesian League. Otherwise, they might have been assumed to have been at war with Athens from the outbreak of hostilities with the Peloponnesians. At any rate, the narrative could suggest that only after Kekryphaleia did war break out between Athens and Aigina if we take μετὰ ταῦτα as going with the initial genitive absolute or with the whole sentence.⁹¹

This interpretation may be borne out by Diodorus, who may be following Thucydides in one passage (11.78.3–4). If so, he interpreted him to mean that the Athenians decided to go to war with the Aiginetans after Kekryphaleia. The difficulty lies in that this passage is a doublet.⁹² Diodorus had previously described military action against Aigina under the year 464/3 (a date which in any case is impossibly early), and was perhaps basing himself on Ephorus. Here the Aiginetans provoke the confrontation by a revolt from Athens. D.M. MacDowell has tried to redeem the credit of Diodorus in this passage by pointing out that he uses parallel language to describe the revolt of Thasos.⁹³ Hence, his source must have used a similar set of phrases in referring to both Thasos and Aigina. Diodorus' two passages on Aigina, however, echo each other, which suggests either that the wording is in a large part his own or that a common ancestor explains their interrelation. The mention of a war rather than a revolt in Thucydides should be trusted, as this historian is not so succinct that he could not be charged with a serious lapse if he had transposed war for revolt, especially as regards an issue so sensitive as Athenian treatment of Aigina.

91. Thuc. 1.105.2. Few commentators have discussed this passage, and two who do, A. Maddalena (1952) and Classen-Steup⁷ (1866), seem to put the outbreak of the war with Aigina after Kekryphaleia. Another approach, which would put a comma after Ἀθηναίοις, and take μετὰ ταῦτα with the main clause of the sentence, goes back to Poppe-Haack (1866). If Thucydides meant to put the war's outbreak after Kekryphaleia, it is unfortunate that he did not give μετὰ ταῦτα the place at the beginning of the sentence that it holds elsewhere in the Pentekontaeteia. Most of the translators put the outbreak of the war after Kekryphaleia: W. Smith (1815), R. Crawley (1876); B. Jowett (1900); C.F. Smith (1928); R. Warner (1954). The Budé translation (1953) of J. de Romilly is careful to construe μετὰ ταῦτα with the main verb alone, and to have the genitive absolute implying simply priority to the main verb, as it must.

92. Meiggs *Athenian Empire* 455–56. To Meiggs, Diodorus has drawn on Ephorus for one member of the doublet in a garbled fashion, while reporting Thucydides' account correctly for the other. [See Figueira *Colonization* 104–13.]

93. MacDowell *JHS* (1960) 120–21, would have Aigina, desirous because of its eastern trade of driving the Persians back, joining the Delian League. Assuming that so integral a connection between commerce and the creation of foreign policy can be admitted, would not Aiginetan trade have benefited most from peace, no matter who had the advantage? The picture of Aiginetan trade oriented solely toward the East may be without a factual basis, as the Sostratos inscription would indicate. See A.J. Johnston, "The Rehabilitation of Sostratos," *PdclP* 27 (1972) 416–23; *Aegina* 262–80; and p. 39 above.

In other words, the Aiginetans initially made no move to aid Sparta's allies against Athens. According to this chronology, the beginning of the war can be assigned (in principle) plausibly to either Athens or Aigina. Probably the Athenians, recognizing that the navies of Corinth and its allies had been badly weakened at Kekryphaleia, turned on the Aiginetans, who could expect little help from that quarter.^{93a} Alternatively, it is possible that the fighting at Kekryphaleia, an island near to Aigina, was menacing enough to the Aiginetans as to prompt their intervention. Deliberately or not, the Aiginetans found themselves fighting on the side of Corinth and its allies. However, this does not in itself indicate membership in the Peloponnesian League—any more than for Thasos and Mytilene, who found themselves forced toward Sparta for help against Athens—and certainly has no bearing on previous membership.

A realization that the Athenians had taken on the League fleet and the Aiginetan fleet separately and successively may contribute to putting the Athenian accomplishment in its proper perspective. Even if we take a minimizing estimate of the continuing Athenian naval commitment in Egypt (and it is by no means certain that we should do so), it would be difficult to credit Athens with enough ships to defeat handily the combined Aiginetan and Peloponnesian fleets.⁹⁴ The Athenian success is of more manageable proportions when it is recognized that at Kekryphaleia the Aiginetan fleet had been absent.

Another matter that bears on Aiginetan affiliation in the mid-fifth century concerns the terms of the Thirty Years Peace. It has been suggested that a special clause existed in the Peace guaranteeing autonomy to Aigina.⁹⁵ Such a clause has been seen as a sop to Sparta's abandonment of its ally.⁹⁶ The argument for the existence of this clause depends on the passages in Thucydides

93a. I have subsequently concluded that Perikles' remark about eradicating "the eyesore of the Peiraeus" and the credit which he was given for the subjugation of Aigina indicate that Perikles and other Athenian "democrats" advocated the attack on Aigina. Athens began the war. See pp. 212, 214–16, 326, and 330–31 below.

94. Neither the literal approach (based on Thuc. 1.104.2, 109–10) (two hundred ships lost) nor the minimizing approach (ninety to one hundred ships lost) is satisfactory (for the former, see J. Libourel, "The Athenian Disaster in Egypt," *AJP* 92 [1971] 605–16; for the latter, see P. Salmon, *La politique égyptienne d'Athènes* [Brussels 1965] 151–58, 181–85). [See now A. J. Holladay, "The Hellenic Disaster in Egypt," *JHS* 109 (1989) 176–82.] The Athenian losses in Egypt can only be estimated, and their impact depends on estimates for total Athenian and League strength. It is unlikely that an Athenian fleet of more than 150 triremes could have been available in the Saronic Gulf, when we consider the fleet sizes of the Peloponnesian War. The Corinthians collected seventy-five ships (Thuc. 1.29.1) and ninety ships, in a total fleet of 150 (Thuc. 1.46.1), against Corcyra. The Aiginetans had seventy ships c. 490, at least fifty ships in the year of Salamis, and the seventy ships captured in the final battle with Athens indicate that Athens' opponents had a large fleet. For source material, see *Aegina* 29–33. Yet Athens was sufficiently strong to manage this fleet handily. It may be that Corinth and its allies were too weak after Kekryphaleia to give much support to Aigina. The *epikouroi* dispatched to Aigina by Corinth and Epidaurus, and the Corinthian diversion in the Megarid, were measures taken on land to compensate for a weakness at sea (Thuc. 1.105.3).

95. *ATL* 3.303 and n. 11, 320; cf. Gomme *HCT* 1.225–26. See pp. 274–76 below.

96. Meiggs *Athenian Empire* 182–84.

involving the events leading up to the Peloponnesian War. Thucydides informs us that the Aiginetans sent envoys in secret to Sparta to complain that they were not being given the autonomy due to them by treaty.⁹⁷ In and of itself, the Aiginetan appeal should not trouble us. Athenian allies such as Thasos, which had no prior alliance with Sparta, alike appeal to the Spartans.⁹⁸ There was no one else to whom they could turn.

If such a clause existed in the Thirty Years Peace, it is generally agreed that it could not have had much substance.⁹⁹ No Athenian document or literary source offers any sign of special treatment accorded to the Aiginetans on the grounds of the Thirty Years Peace. Moreover, it is difficult to see how Aigina, without fortifications or a fleet (minimum criteria used to establish the autonomy of the more independent allies of Athens: Samos, Lesbos, Chios), could possibly have been considered autonomous.¹⁰⁰ The fortifications and harbor facilities of Aigina show damage that is suggestive of systematic demolition rather than simply the destruction attendant upon the hostilities themselves. There is no literary evidence concerning the date for this devastation, but it seems probable archaeologically that it is to be connected with the Athenian conquest of Aigina.¹⁰¹ The scale of this destruction ill fits any grant of autonomy, if we judge such a grant a concession to allow the Aiginetans a residual defensive capability. It is not surprising, then, that there is no hint in Thucydides that the Athenians met any resistance in expelling the Aiginetans from their island in 431.¹⁰² It is clear that when it came to Aigina, the Athenians were not prepared to settle for a symbolic breach of the walls.

The Athenians treated the Aiginetan appeal to Sparta as a substantive cause of the Peloponnesian War.¹⁰³ There is nothing in accounts of the prelude to the war indicating that the Athenians provoked the appeal by an infringement of the Thirty Years Peace. Even in Aristophanes, where such a charge might have found its place beside the Megarian Decree(s) in the dispute over the causation of the war, there is not a whisper of this. To give substance to the Aiginetan charges is to convict Thucydides of serious omission. He presents Perikles as acting in confidence in regard to Athens'

97. Thuc. 1.67.2, 1.139.1.

98. Thasos: Thuc. 1.101.1; or perhaps Samos: 1.40.5, 41.2, 43.1.

99. P.A. Brunt, "The Megarian Decree," *AJP* 72 (1951) 269-82; D. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca 1969) 258-61.

100. De Ste. Croix, *Origins* 293-94, believes that the *autonomia* referred to in Thuc. 1.67.2 was guaranteed by the Thirty Years Peace, which may have had a general clause guaranteeing the autonomy of the allies on both sides. To him, this is a Spartan compensation for the relinquishment of their ally, Aigina. While the existence of such a clause might be argued from a known Aiginetan membership in the League, one cannot argue from the mere possibility of an autonomy clause to Aiginetan membership.

101. See P. Knoblauch, "Die Hafenanlagen der Stadt Ägina," *AD 27A* (1972) 50-85; also pp. 271-72, 330-31 below. [Note now *Colonization* 31-32].

102. Thuc. 2.27.1.

103. Thuc. 2.27.1.

non-infringement of the Thirty Years Peace, and as treating the Spartan demand that Aigina be allowed its autonomy as merely rhetoric.¹⁰⁴

When Plataia capitulated to Sparta in 427, the Plataians based their plea before Spartan judges on their membership in the Hellenic League, as well as both on the fact that they honored Spartan dead buried in their territory and perhaps on guarantees sworn after the battle.¹⁰⁵ The Plataians, like the Athenians and Aiginetans, had done service to Sparta during the Helot Revolt, presumably under the terms of the anti-Persian alliance (Thuc. 3.54.5). For his own part, the Theban speaker, encouraging the Spartans to take drastic measures against the Plataians and arguing the Theban claim to Plataian territory, is put in a delicate position by Theban service to the Persian cause. The Theban tries to undermine the Plataian claim as a member of the Hellenic League by pointing out that Plataia had violated the terms of that alliance by collaborating in the conquest of Aigina, and of other unnamed allies.¹⁰⁶ Would the Theban, at pains to win his point with the Spartans, have referred thus to Aigina, if the Spartans had betrayed an alliance with the island as a member of the Peloponnesian League? The emphasis here is on Aigina as a member of the Hellenic League, suggesting that Sparta, justifying aggression against Athens by proclaiming an espousal of liberty for the Greek cities, may have made something of an Athenian betrayal of the oaths of the Hellenic League in the subjugation of Aigina (pp. 281–84 below).

CONCLUSIONS

An attempt has been made here to make the best possible case against the membership of Aigina in the Peloponnesian League. The view is justified from our consideration of the evidence, which, however, is too lacunose to permit certainty. Accepting that Aigina was never a member of the Peloponnesian League, what are the wider conclusions and questions for future consideration which we can draw? (1) As it had no obvious legal standing in the rights of the *hēgemōn* of the Peloponnesian League, Spartan intervention on Aigina in 491/90 deserves emphasis in explaining the direction of Spartan foreign

104. Thuc. 1.140.3, 144.2. It seems safe now to disregard *IG* I² 18 [= *IG* I³ 38] on Aiginetan autonomy. The garrison of the inscription was thought to be connected with the terms of either the Aiginetan capitulation to Athens or the Thirty Years Peace. See A.S. Nease, "Garrisons in the Athenian Empire," *Phoenix* 3 (1949) 102–11; D.M. Lewis, "Notes on Attic Inscriptions," *BSA* 49 (1954) 17–50, esp. 21–25. H.B. Mattingly, "Athens and Aegina," *Historia* 16 (1967) 1–5, dating it to the eve of the Peloponnesian War, saw the garrison as the specific infringement of autonomy complained of to Sparta. Lewis argued strongly against this date. Doubt has also been raised whether the inscription is to be connected with Aigina at all (H.B. Mattingly, "Athens and Aegina: A Palinode," *Historia* 26 [1977] 370–73). Dated to the time of Aiginetan capitulation, or to the Thirty Years Peace, the inscription would be prior or contemporaneous to any guarantee of autonomy in the Thirty Years Peace, and thus irrelevant to the autonomy question, unless we assume that any garrison must preclude autonomy. [See now *Colonization* 120–26.]

105. Thuc. 3.53–59. See pp. 257, 280–82 below.

106. Thuc. 3.64.3.

policy. Such a decisive action should lead to speculation concerning the intensity of Sparta's commitment to an anti-Persian policy. This, then, raises the question of what factors (e.g., the existence of a faction seeking a rapprochement with Persia) kept Sparta from taking more effective steps to meet the Persian danger in the 490s and especially at the time of Marathon. (2) The eventual conflict of two power blocs may not have been seen ahead as clearly as some would have it. Aigina, as late as the 460s, could continue on an independent policy course, hoping to stand aloof from both alliances. (3) There has been a tendency to treat the Argive alliances with Athens as a foreordained result of hostility toward Sparta. Argos' Medism and its attempt to create an independent power bloc after the Peace of Nikias should not be seen as aberrations. That Aigina appealed to Argos as late as the early 480s for help against Athens may indicate that Aiginetan independence in policy was related to Argos' foreign policy.^{106a} The darkness in which Argos is shrouded in the early years of the Pentekontaeteia makes it difficult to come to firm conclusions on this issue. Athens' decision to attack Aigina may not be unrelated to the Athenian alliance with Argos. The Athenians may only have been willing to attack Aigina (if they, in fact, did so) when two preconditions had been met: Corinth had been weakened, and the previous relationship of Argos with Aigina was no longer a factor.¹⁰⁷ (4) If Aigina was not a member of the Peloponnesian League, Spartan concessions to Athens in the Thirty Years' Peace take on a much more limited extent. Sparta handed over to Athens no ally. Sparta allowed the Athenians to recover Euboia, in revolt from the Delian League. Yet, Sparta not only recovered those of its allies in Athenian hands (Troizen, Nisaia, and Pagai, the latter two dependencies of Megara), but also curbed Athenian pretensions toward building up an alliance in mainland Greece.¹⁰⁸

106a. See *Figueira Colonization* 110-13.

107. Argos' independent policy line is shown by the inscription where that city plays an important role in an agreement with Knossos and Tylissos (Meiggs-Lewis 42).

108. I thank Professors M.H. Jameson and A.E. Raubitschek of Stanford University, Professor Martin Ostwald of Swarthmore College, and Professor Malcolm B. Wallace of the University of Toronto, who read this paper in draft and who kindly offered many helpful suggestions and criticisms.

The Chronology of the Conflict Between Athens and Aigina in Herodotus Book Six

INTRODUCTION

As the ancient historian diverges from well-attested Athenian history, chronology becomes a preoccupation. Even slight adjustments in dating disproportionately affect our insight into events, documented by few data. The chronology of the confrontation between Athens and Aigina in 491 is typical of such problems. Herodotus describes the episode in 6.49–94.1. Time references during the preceding account of the Ionian Revolt give 491, the year before Marathon, for Dareios' demand for submission conveyed to the Aegean islanders, the cause of the affair. From chapter 94, describing events directly leading to Marathon, the reader concludes that the whole episode precedes the battle. Generally, both historians and commentators on Herodotus have asserted that he was mistaken.¹ This suggests that the question for close analysis (which I consider below) is when the pre-Marathon series of events is to end, and where the post-Marathon series to begin. Recent scholarship, however, provides a sharp contrast to this anticipation. This work has taken two opposing lines of approach. N.G.L. Hammond (amplified by L.H. Jeffery) argues that the pre-Marathon chronology is defensible. However, another view holds that Herodotus has incorrectly united into a single narrative details which belong to different stages of the Athenian/Aiginetan struggle (Andrewes, Podlecki).²

Clearly, however, the ingenuity of these scholars is not wasted. To attribute to Herodotus even the simplest error appears to assign him a gross error indeed, that of losing sight of an event central to his narrative, namely, the Battle of Marathon. Thus, there is an understandable tendency to redeem a valuable source from error by making the mistake our own (a failure to credit the text's correct chronology), or by showing the text's confusion to be complex, with its origins in methods of research or of composition. This study is offered to demonstrate that a pre-Marathon date is untenable. Kleomenes'

1. See the works cited in L.H. Jeffery, "The Campaign between Athens and Aegina in the Year before Salamis (Herodotus, VI, 87–93)," *AJP* 83 (1962) 44–54, esp. 44 n. 1, and in T.J. Figueira, *Aegina and Athens in the Archaic Period: A Socio-Political Investigation* (Diss., University of Pennsylvania 1977) 396–97, n. 14.

2. A. Andrewes, "Athens and Aegina, 510–480 B.C.," *BSA* 37 (1936–1937) 1–7; N.G.L. Hammond, "Studies in Greek Chronology of the Sixth and Fifth Centuries B.C.," *Historia* 4 (1955) 371–411, esp. "V. The War between Athens and Aegina circa 505–481," pp. 406–11; Jeffery *AJP* (1962); A.J. Podlecki, "Athens and Aegina," *Historia* 25 (1976) 396–413. Note also G. De Sanctis, "Gli ostaggi egineti in Atene e la guerra fra Atene ed Egina," *RFIC* 8 (1930) 292–99, who dates the hostilities after Marathon, but would dissociate them from Aiginetan submission to Persia, which he believes apocryphal.

death probably, and the fighting between Athens and Aigina almost certainly, were after Marathon. A table has been composed for the reader's convenience in referring to the events under discussion (pp. 144–45 below). When this chronology has been defended, it is possible to create a synthesis of the historical conclusions which have been revealed in the process.

THE STRICT CHRONOLOGY

The obvious reading, or strict chronology, as we shall name it henceforth, would put chapters 49–94.1 entirely before Marathon. It has been argued by Hammond, whose outline is reproduced in the table.³ Though much of our discussion is directed at Hammond's scheme, it has, nevertheless, a general validity, inasmuch as any strict chronology must follow along lines similar to Hammond's suggestions.

A. Some Cautionary Thoughts

The strict chronology raises the question whether Herodotus can have had such precise information, a nearly week by week record of events in 491/90. The difficulties in correlating events between any two calendars suggests that such information may not have been retrievable after even one generation. For instance, there is no certainty that the Spartan and Athenian calendars were in their correct absolute relationship either to each other or to natural phenomena. *Ad hoc* adjustments reconciling calendars with seasonal phenomena were made irregularly, and at the discretion of officials.⁴ Thus, political considerations, as well as sheer inattention, operated, as seen in manipulation of the month Karneios, and its festival, the Karneia.⁵ It is a short step from exploitation of such religious prohibitions internationally to their factional use to promote or hinder a line of policy.⁶ Motivation for calendaric

3. Hammond *Historia* (1955) 410–11.

4. In their reason for not moving to aid Athens at Marathon, the Spartans take for granted that their calendar is not synchronized with the moon (Hdt. 6.106.3–107.1); see W.K. Pritchett, "Julian Dates and Greek Calendars," *CP* 42 (1947) 235–43, esp. 238–40, who notes discrepancies between the few attested Athenian dates and other calendars. On extreme calendaric confusion: Arist. *Nubes* 615–16 (Athens); Hesych. s.v. ἐν Κέφ τις ἡμέρα, 3156 Latte (Keos), for which note G. Grote, *A History of Greece*² (London 1888) 5.466–68, n. 1. Systematic efforts to correct calendars in the fifth century (esp. before 432) are unattested. See A.E. Samuel, *Greek and Roman Chronology* (Munich 1972) 52–55; B.L. van der Waerden, "Greek Astronomical Calendars and their Relation to the Athenian Civil Calendar," *JHS* 80 (1960) 168–80, esp. 177–79. Thucydides' dates in 423 and 421 (Thuc. 4.118.12, 119.1; 5.19.1) suggest that the Spartan and Athenian calendars were being intercalated differently (Samuel, *op. cit.* 93). See also *HCT* 3.713–15.

5. Argos manipulated the Karneia in 419 (Thuc. 5.54.3) and during the Corinthian War (Xen. *HG* 4.7.2–3; 5.1.29). See *HCT* 4.75. Spartan tampering with the Gymnopaïdai: Thuc. 5.82.3.

6. W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War* (Berkeley 1971–1985) 1.119, notes that Herodotus' statement (Hdt. 6.106.3–107.1) that the Spartans did not wish to break their *nomos*, implies the possibility of not observing it. This opens the way to factional manipulation. Moreover, at Marathon, specifically, the moon, awaited by the Spartans, need not have been that of the Karneia (Pritchett, *op. cit.* 1.116–26), nor should it be doubted that the battle occurred on 6 Boedromion (E. Badian & J. Buckler, "The Wrong Salamis?," *RhM* 118 [1975] 226–39). Cf. W.W. How &

tampering here might be expected in the confrontation between Spartan factions: those Spartans like Kleomenes, eager to resist Persia, and those like Demaratos, who resisted Kleomenes about Aigina and later fled to the Persians. Thus, it would be no negligible achievement for Herodotus to create a weekly chronology, juxtaposing data about contemporaneous events from several cities. Yet, such data were translated into his narrative disappointingly, with so few explicit pointers to the passage of time. To reconstruct such a timetable is to forget that calendars were open to manipulation and to imply unjustified unanimity among the parties to the episode about the hostages. |

Hammond's use of the Attic calendar as a temporal framework is also quite questionable.⁷ Herodotus, in his narrative of the 490s and 480s, used a format based on campaigning seasons.⁸ It lent itself to military activity, and compensated for a lack of absolute chronological data. Periods of quiescence between campaigns were more easily retained in the memory of informants, and the historian could often group a single campaign's events on internal grounds. The adoption of the Attic calendar could only inject a note of parochialism, more fitting to a local historian, and opposed to the panhellenic dimensions of Herodotus' work. For him, the value of the Attic calendar would have been as a time-scheme already correlated with historical events. This it was not before the publication of Hellanicus. For the reader, it would have value only if it were explicit, which it is not. Thucydides sides with Herodotus in this matter.⁹ If Hammond's outline is converted to a seasonal calendar, some time in late spring or early summer 491 thereby lies open for the early events of the incident. Yet this does not relieve the pace of events, as, according to Hammond, Demaratos was deposed as early as late August 491, if he stood for election by the end of the month. Concomitantly, the seasonal calendar precludes that March to July 490 be employed in the strict chronology.

To Hammond, Herodotus was aware of conditions of contemporary travel and diplomacy. The situation in 491 required immediate action. Distances were short; diplomatic and judicial proceedings in these small cities were simple.¹⁰ Yet, in a parallel case, Kleomenes' attempt to insure a cooperative government at Athens took place over, at least, five archon years.¹¹ At

J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus* (Oxford 1912) 2.108–9; D. Hereward, "The Flight of Demaratos," *RhM* 101 (1958) 238–49, esp. 241–44.

7. Hammond *Historia* (1955) 381–85, 410–11.

8. That contemporary with the spring, Mardonius went down to the sea (6.43.1) is a clear indication (cf. 7.20.1; 7.37.1; 8.113.1). See H. Strasburger, "Herodots Zeitrechnung," *Historia* 5 (1956) 129–61, esp. 135–36, n. 3; 151–54; also M.E. White, "Herodotus' Starting-Point," *Phoenix* 23 (1969) 39–48, esp. 43.

9. Thucydides, with typical technical awareness, defended his seasonal organization with a polemic directed against local history (5.20.2–3), and may have recognized Herodotus' use of a seasonal calendar to treat the Persian invasion, the section of the latter's work most parallel to the Peloponnesian War. Cf. *HCT* 3.685–87.

10. Hammond *Historia* (1955) 410–11.

11. Hdt. 5.63–94.1. One difference, however, is that Kleomenes' moves involving Athens entailed preparations for expeditionary forces.

issue was not a single, simple diplomatic interchange, however important; there was rather a series of discrete interactions: Athens' appeal to Sparta, Kleomenes' trip to Aigina, the Spartan embassy to Delphi, Kleomenes' second journey to Aigina, his negotiations in Thessaly and Arkadia, Sparta's embassy recalling Kleomenes, the Aiginetan embassy accusing Leotykidas, his embassy to Athens, Athenian negotiations with Nikodromos, their purchase of ships from Corinth, and Aigina's request to Argos. An enumeration impresses us with the possible complexity of each stage. These diplomatic and judicial proceedings, inseparable since diplomacy initiates legalities, had a simplicity in a sense other than intended by Hammond. Without standing foreign services, diplomacy waited either on the assembly of an oligarchy's leading politicians or on a meeting of the *dēmos*. Such occasions were doubtless vulnerable to obstruction where unanimity was lacking, as it must have been on almost every occasion involved here. For instance, as Podlecki observes, the Athenians got Spartan help *φοιτῶντες τε ἐς τὴν Σπαρτὴν*, which ought to mean that they made a series of representations of their case to them (Hdt. 6.49.2).^{11a}

Also, it was not advantageous to all parties to expedite this diplomacy. Initially, Kleomenes was indeed anxious to scotch Aiginetan cooperation with Persia. Demaratos' conduct and Kleomenes' inability to bring him to heel (however momentary) show that the Spartans did not unanimously share Kleomenes' anxieties. If the Persians arrived with Aigina still recalcitrant, Sparta was helpless to offset directly this increase in Persian strength. Thus, it was advantageous to Spartans seeking rapprochement with Persia to delay the extraction of the hostages, because anti-Persians at Sparta may have had greater difficulty in urging a now unpromising policy line, when Aiginetan Medism dimmed Athenian hopes of repelling the Persians. At other junctures, Demaratos and Leotykidas, the former threatened with deposition, the latter with *atimia*, may have suspected that a judgment against them was in the offing.¹² Thus, they ought to have tried to postpone condemnation as long as possible. The notion that the Spartans had every reason to hurry such business has its foundation in a view that sees an unreal, unitary Sparta, instead of the reality of Spartans with disparate attitudes.

The Athenians were in a hurry to get the hostages; the Aiginetans to get them back. Aiginetan leaders hoped that Kleomenes would be stymied by Demaratos. Should he get Spartan permission to use force, a last resort, they would have time to change their policy. The Aiginetans were motivated to draw out negotiations until it would be too late for Kleomenes to act. Later, when the Athenians had the hostages, they had reason to prolong the protection which the hostages afforded them. They echo the original Aiginetan refusal to provide hostages by saying that they would not return to one king what two had entrusted to them. The desperate Aiginetan counter-measure suggests

11a. Podlecki *Historia* (1976) 398.

12. On the legal moves against Demaratos and Leotykidas: see pp. 95–102 above.

this was no mere delay—rather, an outright refusal—if the Athenians meant they would return the hostages only to Kleomenes, who was dead or at least incapacitated. The Spartans may not have played their final trump, the embassy of Leotykidas, prematurely, before lower-level Spartan or Aiginetan appeals were over. Nor would the Athenians have made a provocative refusal until Spartan resolve had been tested. Aigina countered by kidnapping an Athenian *theōris*, a desperate act risking the hostages' lives, not to have been undertaken lightly. That there were other diplomatic initiatives is possible, because Herodotus gives little sign of completeness here.

Undoubtedly, at some points, the participants believed speed was essential: the Athenian purchase of Corinthian ships, which, as it turned out, caused them to be late; the Aiginetan dispatch of envoys to Sparta after Kleomenes' death; or the Aiginetan appeal to Argos. But these were balanced by times when a wait-and-see approach was fitting.¹³

B. Internal Chronological Evidence

1) The Later Career of Demaratos

Hammond draws our attention to several facets of the incident to create synchronisms compatible with the strict chronology. Demaratos entered office in late August/September 491 (when the ephors began their term), so as to preside at the Gymnopaidiai of mid-summer 490.¹⁴ [This is possible, but must be accepted cautiously, as we possess little information about other officials' terms at Sparta. In conservative Sparta, the terms of religious officials may not have been made to coincide with the civil year. Moreover, an election not long before the beginning of the official year would then be assumed, although this is perhaps no problem in Sparta. "Childish" elections there may have almost immediately preceded duties.¹⁵ Yet, though it is conceded that Demaratos was popular (witness the lengths that Kleomenes was forced to go to discredit him), it is astounding that a man recently stigmatized by a Delphic pronouncement could have been elected to religious office so soon afterward.¹⁶

13. The term *αὐρίκα* indicates that events fell in close succession (6.73.1: Kleomenes' second trip to Aigina after Demaratos' removal; 6.75.1: the onset of Kleomenes' madness after his return to Sparta). In Hammond's outline, Herodotus could equally have appended *αὐρίκα* to any phase of the incident, so rapid was the succession of events. Yet, Hammond (*Historia* [1955] 410–11) allows mid-September to the end of October for the hostages' extraction and deposit in Athens (6.73.1). As this is not accelerated in terms of his outline, *αὐρίκα* has little force, an interpretive lapse inherent in the strict chronology.

14. Hammond *Historia* (1955) 410–11. On the ephors' term: Thuc. 5.36.1; see Busolt & Swoboda, *GS* 2.686–87. Navarchs, at least during the Ionian War, served with the ephors, but perhaps earlier only for the duration of assigned operations. Cf. Beloch *GG*² 2.2.269–84; Busolt-Swoboda *GS* 2.715–16 (for the earlier work); R. Sealey, "Die spartanische Nauarchie," *Klio* 58 (1976) 335–58.

15. Aris. *Pol.* 1270b25–28, cf. 1265b38–40. The new board of ephors was elected in 421 after the Peace of Nikias (Thuc. 5.17.1–20.1) and the Spartan-Athenian alliance (5.22.3–24), and is to be connected with the period of suspicion at Sparta "in the summer" (5.35.2 with 5.36.1).

16. Demaratos scarcely conducted the festival as ephor. Leotykidas' contempt for him makes best sense if he held some less prestigious office (see How & Wells *Herodotus* 2.90). Their

An examination of the implications of Herodotus' account of the encounter of Demaratos with Leotykhidas demonstrates that it cannot be placed after Kleomenes' death. If Demaratos was still in Sparta after Kleomenes' downfall, why did he not seek justice by demanding the restoration of his kingship, at least for his posterity, if religious sanction forbade this for himself? For Herodotus, the machinations of Kleomenes were known before his death (6.74.1). After Kleomenes' death, Leotykhidas was very soon condemned, and almost haled off by the Aiginetans. Leotykhidas' condemnation for violent acts against Aigina vindicated Demaratos' policy on this issue. Vilification from someone in this situation would be exceedingly bold, and not likely to have so shamed Demaratos that he abandoned his duties. Demaratos' anxious questioning of his mother on his parentage is senseless unless the implicit dramatic date for this conversation was before Kleomenes' duplicity was uncovered. Demaratos cloaked his flight with a story of a trip to Delphi, which should have been to obtain a reversal of the pronouncement against him. His flight to Persian territory shows that a favorable response could not be anticipated. Thus, Kleomenes was not yet discredited for his moves against Demaratos, and his Delphic accomplices had not yet been exposed.¹⁷ Demaratos incurred accusations of Medism before the discovery of Kleomenes' acts could swing public sentiment at Sparta back in his favor. Even if Herodotus was wrong in saying that Kleomenes' misdeeds concerning Demaratos became known before his death, the fighting between Athens and Aigina must follow the incident at the Gymnopaïdai, since the fighting follows Leotykhidas' condemnation, inconceivable before the incident at the Gymnopaïdai.¹⁸ This incident can be no earlier than mid-summer 490. Hammond grants this by virtue of his (mistaken to my mind) chronology of archon years. We may assert the same conclusion because this is the earliest celebration of the Gymnopaïdai after the likely date for the deposition of Demaratos. Thus, Athenian/Aiginetan hostilities were after Marathon, as time must still be left for the discrediting and death of Kleomenes, and the trial of Leotykhidas.

2) *The Penteteric Theōris*

The penteteric *theōris*, ambushed by the Aiginetans, has been connected with a boat race, attested by Lysias at Sounion, and thought to be in honor of Poseidon on the strength of that god's association with the site.¹⁹ Hammond

suggestion that he was one of the *bideoi*, gymnastic supervisors (Paus. 3.11.2, 12.4; see Busolt-Swoboda, *GS* 2.735–36), though possible, is only a guess. The whole Spartan official establishment can be assumed to have been in attendance. If the encounter is dated to 490, one is tempted to see Demaratos in an office with a term not coinciding with the official year, or in an office limited to duties at the Gymnopaïdai. Note Hereward *RhM* (1958) 241.

17. Demaratos' flight: Hdt. 6.70.1; the incrimination of Kleomenes: 6.66.2–3, 74.1. See Hereward *RhM* (1958) 247 and n. 34.

18. See pp. 123–24 below.

19. Hammond *Historia* (1955) 411; Andrewes *BSA* (1936–1937) 6. The penteteric *theōris*: Hdt. 6.87; boat race at Sounion: Lys. 21.5. See L. Deubner, *Attische Feste* (Berlin 1932) 215. On the chthonic aspects of Poseidon in Poseideon, *JG* II² 1367.16–18; Deubner, *op. cit.* 214–15;

opines that the festival took place in Poseideon, corresponding to December. Not all festivals of Poseidon took place in this month, and, in addition, it is possible that chthonic aspects of the god were primary in cult activity during Poseideon. The boat race points to the maritime attributes of the god. It would be odd in December, when sailing was feared, and would be more appropriate early in the sailing season to propitiate the god.²⁰

The conjunction of the boat race and the *theōris* cannot accommodate a date in 491. The speaker of Lysias 21, who boasts of his victory in the race, achieved his majority in 411/10 (Lys. 21.1). Presumably, one could not be victorious in a warship race until reaching the age for holding the trierarchy. The speaker lists his liturgies through 403/2, so that 402/1 is the date of the speech.²¹ He mentions seven years as trierarch, 411/10–405/4, the year of Aigospotamoi, from which his ship was one of the few to escape (Lys. 21.2; 21.9–11). A penteteric festival in 491/90 would repeat in 411/10, 407/6, and 403/2. The verbs of the speaker's list are aorists (21.1–4), with appended imperfects, and are dated by archons. The perfect (21.5) for the victory in the race breaks the pattern. Another perfect then describes unspecified services at festivals totalling 30 mn. The speaker would have been greatly tempted to attach the victory to the list by an aorist, had it taken place in 403/2. The liturgies were presumably unavoidable duties. The race and religious functions listed with it were voluntary. Perhaps the services at festivals were too insignificant to list or date separately, but the race's circumstances may have been such as to have been instantly recalled by the audience.

Naturally, it was not necessary for the entire festival to be cancelled, but merely for the race to be curtailed or eliminated. I should contend that 411/10 can be ruled out for the boat race. The speaker undertook the *khoregia* for tragedy at the city Dionysia (for 30 mn.), and a liturgy of 2000 dr. at the Thargelia (21.1). He would have to be thought of as spending 15 mn. on the race, perhaps in the same spring (if the race was held then) as the Dionysia and Thargelia. Also, 411/10 was an inauspicious year in the main for boat races. Since winter 413/12, Sounion had been fortified to protect the grain ships. The 400 came to power in June, 411. In late summer, a Spartan squadron sailed to Euboia. An Athenian force following it was decisively defeated at Eretria, and the island was lost, save for Oreos/Hestiaia. In Boedromion (August/September), the 400 were deposed. In fall 411, a critical struggle ensued in the Hellespont, where Mindaros had moved in September. At Kynossema, the Athenians achieved a victory. A further engagement at Abydos, also to Athens' advantage, ended the season's fighting. While the Spartan ships lay off Euboia, it was highly improbable that a boat race would be held at

F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques* (Paris 1969) #52, pp. 102–3. D. Hegyi, "Athens and Aigina on the Eve of the Battle of Marathon," *Acta Antiqua* 17 (1969) 171–81, esp. 179–81, suggests the festival is the quadrennial Panathenaia which is unlikely in light of Lys. 21.

20. On the season of the year for the *theōris*: H.W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians* (London 1977) 97–98.

21. F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*² (Leipzig 1887–1893) 1.498–99.

Sounion: triremes would have to have been detached for the race, while others went ahead to Sounion to cover against a foray by the Peloponnesians. The enemy ships had left by the time Theramenes, with a flotilla raised in Athens, operated there early the next year. Yet, every ship was critical at this time, a situation only relieved when Mindaros' fleet was annihilated at Kyzikos. There is a slight possibility for a boat race between Kyzikos and the end of the year, but only if the earliest possible date for Kyzikos, March, 410, is taken.²² The speaker was a trierarch this year, but most Athenian ships were in the Hellespont.

407/6 can also be excluded. The speaker's list of liturgies is interrupted after the Lesser Panathenaia of Hecatombaion 409/8. We do not know how long he remained in Athens. The latest date for his departure was when Alkibiades left Athens, since Alkibiades chose his ship as his flagship (21.6). The speaker mentions his return in 405/4, after Aigospotamoi, when he provided gowns at the Promethea (21.3). The dating of Alkibiades' activities during 410–406 is controversial. At the earliest, Alkibiades returned home by Thargelion 408, staying long enough to celebrate the Mysteries in Boedromion, fall 408. In this chronology, Alkibiades and our speaker were not in Athens in 407/6. In the lower chronology, Alkibiades' return took place in 407, so that the speaker would have been in Athens for the first three months of the Attic year.²³ Nevertheless, this does not give a possible date in 407/6 for the race. Even the tightest chronology in 491/90 cannot accommodate a race before Boedromion. Hammond puts the race in Poseideon, three months later.

The last possibility is 403/2. It is barely possible that the speaker won his race after the Thirty fell in September. A race during the troubled ascendancy of the tyrants is improbable. Nonetheless, a boat race is so redolent of naval hegemony, as witnessed by the departure of the Syracusan expedition (Thuc. 6.32.2), that it scarcely fits the restored democracy's cautious policy toward Sparta.²⁴ The speaker testifies to the state's lack of funds (21.13). For a race in 403/2, the speaker must be supposed a trierarch of one the twelve warships legally possessed by Athens in terms of the peace treaty (Xen. *HG* 2.2.20).

22. General chronology: W.S. Ferguson, *CAH* 5.336–43; fortification of Sounion: Thuc. 8.4; Euboian campaign: Thuc. 8.95; Mindaros' move to the Hellespont, Kynossema: Thuc. 8.99–106; DS 13.39.1–40.6; Spartan ships summoned from the Euripos: Thuc. 8.107.2; DS 13.41.1–3; engagement at Abydos: Xen. *HG* 1.1.2–7; DS 13.45–46; second battle in the Euripos between Thymokhares and Agesandridas: Xen. *HG* 1.1.1; Theramenes in the Euripos: DS 13.47.3–6; Kyzikos campaign: Xen. *HG* 1.1.11–26; DS 13.49.2–51.8. The earliest date for Kyzikos is late March (L. Breitenbach, *Xenophons Hellenika*² [Berlin 1884] 1.80–81), but May/June 410 is to be preferred (Beloch *GG*² 2.2.241–42, 245, 392).

23. The lower chronology: Beloch *GG*² 2.2.245–54; Ferguson, *CAH* 5.483–85; A. Andrewes, "The Generals in the Hellespont, 410–407 B.C.," *JHS* 73 (1953) 2–9. The higher chronology: Busolt *GG*² 3.2.1561–65 with n. 1, 1562 for citation of sources. Alkibiades' return: Xen. *HG* 1.4.12; DS 13.68.2–6; Plut. *Alc.* 32–34.

24. Athenian submissiveness toward Sparta: e.g., *Hell. Oxy.* VI(I)–VII(II).1; in general, see M. Cary, *CAH* 6.34–35. Boat races (?): Plato *Com.*, fr. 183 K (*apud* Plut. *Them.* 32.6).

On the other hand, an ambush after Marathon in 489, for example, makes 410/9 a possible date for the speaker to win the race. He was at the Greater Panathenaia in Hecatombaion, and the Dionysia in Elaphebolion (21.1–2). After Kyzikos, in spring or early summer 410, the balance of naval power had swung back to Athens. Thereafter, the restrictions on the democracy under the 5000 were erased. The *diobelia* was soon instituted, and work on the Erechtheum went ahead. The Athenians were sufficiently confident to rebuff Spartan peace offers. Here the boat race would reaffirm ideologically the naval hegemony upheld militarily at Kyzikos. The race, perhaps otherwise suspended, was performed sumptuously, if the 15 mn. outlay of the speaker was characteristic. This would have been comparable to Alkibiades' self-assured escort by land of the Sacred Procession to Eleusis. We cannot be sure that the race was not held at a seemingly difficult time. Yet, our evidence points to a date for the victory which would render a post-Marathon chronology for the interception of the *theōris* rather than a pre-Marathon dating.²⁵

3) Sophanes and Miltiades

In support of Hammond, L.H. Jeffery has introduced a notice in Plutarch's *Cimon* where Miltiades, seeking a crown from the Assembly for the victory at Marathon, is opposed by Sophanes of Dekeleia (Plut. *Cimon* 8.1–2).²⁶ Sophanes said that Miltiades should make this request when he had defeated the enemy single-handedly, a reference to his own killing of the Argive commander Eurybates on Aigina. If a date of late 490 or of spring 489 is granted for the Paros expedition (the beginning of Miltiades' downfall), Sophanes' victory was before Marathon. Jeffery suggests Ion of Chios (less likely) or Stesimbrotus as Plutarch's source.²⁷ Ion's *Hypomnemata* were probably not his source. The incident is too early to be based on autopsy. Ion would

25. 489/8 is an alternative for the ambush, and gives a date of 409/8 for the victory of Lys. 21. The year 488/7 allows 408/7 for the victory. A date in 408 for Alkibiades' return will not accommodate this date, unless the race can have occurred before Alkibiades' departure in the fall. There is a possibility, not to be pressed, that the speaker's list of *chorēgiai* broke off in Hecatombaion 409/8 because he left Athens shortly thereafter. This speaks on behalf of 410/9 for the victory, and 490/89 for the ambush of the *theōris*.

26. Jeffery *AJP* (1962) 54. The manuscripts have Sokhares, a mistake repeated in *Mor.* 873D, where Sokhares and Deipnistos win the *aristeia* at Plataia, instead of Sophanes and Arimnestos or Acimnestos (cf. Hdt. 9.64.2, 73.1, 74.1). Plutarch knew of Sophanes' *aristeia* (*Arist. et Cat. Comp.* 2.2). That Miltiades' interlocutor was an unknown Sokhares (the anecdote making equally good sense) cannot be entirely ruled out. But the repetition of the mistake where the original must have read Sophanes makes this unlikely.

27. Paros expedition: Hdt. 6.132–36; Nepos *Milt.* 7; Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 63 (Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Πάρος) (cf. Zenob. 2.21 [*CPG* 1.28]; Diog. 2.35 [*CPG* 1.200–1]); ΣAristid. 3.531–32, 572, 677–78, 691 D. See K. Kinzl, "Miltiades' Parosexpedition in der Geschichtsschreibung," *Hermes* 104 (1976) 280–304. The expedition is usually dated on the strength of Hdt. 6.132.1: μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν Μαραθῶνι πρῶμα γενόμενον . . . and of Ephorus F 63, which seems to assume that the Persians could be in the vicinity of Paros. Autumn 490 is a common date (e.g., J.A.R. Munro, *CAH* 4.253). Beloch (*GG*² 2.2.57) prefers to date it to spring 489, so as not to attribute foolhardiness to the Athenians. [See now N.G.L. Hammond, *CAH*² 4.519.] In this case, Herodotus' terminology would be interpreted as merely transitional, not demanding immediate succession.

have had to have learned of it from Kimon, as he perhaps learned of Kimon's exploits at Sestos. The disparaging tone toward Miltiades is hardly Kimon's, nor is it Ion's, generous in his admiration of Kimon. Ion was offering a portrait of his relations with leading Athenians that put his Atticism in a favorable light. There was no material for extolling the services of Athens to the Greek world here.²⁸

Stesimbrotus (used elsewhere in the *Cimon*), derogatory toward Athenian statesmen, is a better conjecture. In this case, the notice no longer supports the strict chronology. Stesimbrotus believed that Themistokles was opposed by Miltiades during debate over his naval bill in the reign of Dareios. Therefore, he cannot have placed the Paros expedition, closely followed by Miltiades' death, as early as spring 489. We may reject Stesimbrotus on Miltiades' career or follow him in that Miltiades lived longer into the 480s. In either case, the scene between Sophanes and Miltiades is then of no use to us.²⁹ | It is indeed possible that there was some less obvious source for the episode—anything from an *Atthis* to a rhetorical school exercise would be theoretically possible. In that case, however, we cannot begin to evaluate an isolated story such as this one.

4) The Athenian Fleet c. 490

Andrewes, who holds that a part of the fighting of our incident belongs before Marathon, compares the 70 ships used by Athens against Aigina with Miltiades' 70 ships at Paros.³⁰ For him, if we date the Nikodromos coup after Marathon and Paros, Athens had lost 20 ships in two years, and needed to buy 20 from Corinth. With a pre-Marathon date, the fleet reached 70 after the purchase, and maintained it at Paros, a preferable alternative. This point of his is only telling if one insists that the Paros campaign must closely succeed Marathon, before any fighting with the Aiginetans could occur. Nonetheless,

28. Ion on Kimon: *FGH* 392 F 12–14. See F. Jacoby, "Some Remarks on Ion of Chios," *CQ* 41 (1947) 1–17.

29. Plutarch's use of Stesimbrotus: *Them.* 2.5 (*FGH* 107 F 1), 4.5 (F 2), 24.6 (F 3); *Cimon* 4.5 (F 4), 14.5 (F 5), 16.1 (F 6), 16.3 (F 7); *Per.* 8.9 (F 9), 13.16 (F 10b), 26.1 (F 8), 36.6 (F 11). Miltiades' opposition to Themistokles: F 2. Plutarch on Stesimbrotus' hostility to Athenian statesmen: F 3, 4, 5 (all Kimon). Disparagement couched in terms of their family life: F 6 (Kimon), 10, 11 (Perikles). See F. Jacoby, *FGH* 2, 343–44 (cf. F. Schachermeyr, *Stesimbrotos und seine Schrift über die Staatsmänner*, *SBAWW Phil.-Hist. Kl.* [1965] esp. 19–23). E.S. Gruen, "Stesimbrotus on Miltiades and Themistokles," *CSCA* 3 (1970) 91–98, sees the juxtaposition of Miltiades and Themistokles' naval bill as a mistake of Plutarch, not Stesimbrotus. Plutarch confused Stesimbrotus' correct data on a debate over military policy in the 490s with the Herodotean tradition on the naval bill (cf. Schachermeyr, *op. cit.* 13). To the alternatives that Stesimbrotus was wrong, or his evidence on the 490s was misdated, a third can be added. If hostilities between Athens and Aigina are post-Marathon, the Themistoclean reaction to their disappointing results may have been to agitate for more ships. It is unlikely that Stesimbrotus described a debate before 490 so like the one on the naval bill as to mislead Plutarch. A confrontation between the two statesmen in the early 480s permits the preservation of cooperation between the two down to Marathon, which, while undocumented, has been an attractive hypothesis: e.g., H.T. Wade-Gery, "Themistokles' Archonship," *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford 1958) 171–79.

30. Andrewes *BSA* (1936–1937) 5; Miltiades' fleet at Paros: *Hdt.* 6.132.

that both fleets consisted of 70 may be coincidental. The 70 ships used against Aigina cannot simply be 50 ships from the naucraries plus 20 from Corinth, even if we believe that the naucratic system improbably permanently locked Athens into a fleet of 50 regardless of contingencies. The Athenians had recourse to Corinth on discovering ships which did not happen to be "battle-worthy" against the Aiginetans. The paper strength of the Athenian fleet, as well as the number of hulls in Athens' possession, must have been greater than 50. Otherwise, the tardiness of an effort to get more ships is inexplicable. The Athenians were supposedly in the process of surprising the Aiginetans so that there was nothing to be learned about Aiginetan capabilities except for the number of triremes available in harbor, a fact scarcely discovered at the last moment. Athenian preparations would have entailed knowing how many were their vessels on hand and the number of crews needed. The only plausible excuse for missing a prearranged rendezvous must have been a last-minute discovery about the status of previously available ships (see pp. 167–69 below).

The Athenian and Aiginetan navies were changing over in their standard warship type from pentekonter to trireme (Thuc. 1.14.3). The process of decommissioning pentekonters and replacing them with triremes may obscure increases or declines in ship numbers. The seven ships captured at Marathon ought to figure in the totals of fleets after Marathon (Hdt. 6.115). In the second of the naval battles at Aigina, the Aiginetans captured four Athenian ships (Hdt. 6.93). There may have been losses, unknown to us, in the first battle (Hdt. 6.92.1). It is unlikely that Athenian losses and gains in the fighting balanced each other, allowing us to equate the fleets at Paros and at Aigina. Athens could confidently man 70 ships for any one expedition at this time. Despite the loss of ships wrecked or decommissioned, fleet size tended to creep back to that number until the naval bill. The fleets at Aigina and Paros, although of the same size, need not have been the same ships.

5) The Deposition of Demaratos

The deposition of Leonidas II may shed some light on the removal of Demaratos from the kingship. In Plutarch, we learn that the ephors observed the heavens every eight years for a sign regarding the kings.³¹ On the appearance of a negative sign, a judicial proceeding ensued, attributing responsibility to one of the kings, who was deposed pending an appeal to Delphi or Olympia. The observation of the heavens was to evaluate the kings' mediation of relations between gods and men. The time of the year for the observation is subject to conjecture, but a strong possibility is the beginning of the ephors' year in office, in early fall.³² The speed of the deposition procedure depended on the

31. Plut. *Agis* 11.2–9. For the deposition procedure: H.W. Parke, "The Deposing of Spartan Kings," *CQ* 39 (1945) 106–12, who sees Phylarchus as Plutarch's possible source. To him, the appearance of Olympia and Delphi as authoritative oracles attests to the procedure's antiquity. If it was used against Demaratos, Herodotus must be imagined to be abbreviating the sequence of procedures.

32. M. Cary, *A History of the Greek World from 323–146 B.C.*² (London 1951) 153–54, has winter 243 or spring 242 for the deposition of Leonidas II, both consonant with Spartan year 491/90

proximity of Kleomenes' move against Demaratos to the official time of observation. Hammond's time scheme allows only two to four weeks for Demaratos' deposition. Thus, it depends on a narrow coincidence between the date of Kleomenes' decision to move against Demaratos and the date it was legally possible to do so. Moreover, in Herodotus, there may be a hint that detailed proceedings have been abbreviated; "at last (τέλος), since these things were at issue, the Spartans sent to Delphi" (Hdt. 6.66.1). That Herodotus has summarized here tallies with our impression of Spartan conservatism, i.e., the deposition of a king could not be a simple procedure. Note their hesitation in punishing Pausanias (Thuc. 1.128.3–134.1), or their willingness to take back Kleomenes (Hdt. 6.74–75.1). The last stage of deposition was, in Demaratos' case, a consultation of Delphi. This raises problems because the Pythia originally prophesied yearly, and it is uncertain at which date monthly sessions became the rule.³³ With annual sessions in February/March—a rule which is unlikely to have prevailed without exceptions—the strict chronology is improbable, since special arrangements would take time and many events in the incident must follow Demaratos' deposition. In the case of monthly consultations, a lack of coincidence would entail several weeks' delay, a serious distortion in Hammond's chronology. In this regard, Demaratos' later actions are not a great help: even if he left for Delphi in fall 490, we cannot be sure that he did not intend to preempt an annual cycle of consultation by an act of suppliance (cf. Hdt. 7.141.1–2) or did not in fact hope to get a response favorable to his legitimacy at the oracle at Olympia (he was traveling via Elis).

The year 491 appears to be a year in the observation cycle, when we reckon back from a probable date for Leonidas II's deposition. It is possible, then, that Kleomenes initiated measures against Demaratos at the beginning of the Spartan year, in fall 491.

for Demaratos' removal on an eight-year cycle. [See now, for Spartan year 243/2, P. Cartledge & A. Spawforth, *Hellenistic and Roman Sparta: A Tale of Two Cities* (London 1989) 43–44.] Beloch *GG*² 4.1.625, 4.2.161–62, puts the deposition in autumn 242, in the next Spartan year, and irreconcilable with 491/90. Hereward *RhM* (1958) 239–40, suggests 244/3 for Leonidas II's deposition, which gives Spartan year 492/1 for Demaratos' deposition. 492/1 is compatible with the strict chronology, if Demaratos was deposed at the very end of the Spartan year.

33. On Delphic procedure: H.W. Parke & D.E.W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle* (Oxford 1956) 1.17–45; yearly consultation: Callisthenes *FGH* 124 F 49 (= Plut. *Mor.* 292E–F). They were held in the Delphic month of Bysios, approximately February/March. Monthly consultations: Plut. *Mor.* 398A. H.W. Parke, "The Days for Consulting the Delphic Oracle," *CQ* 37 (1943) 19–22, believes monthly consultation to have begun surely by 480, guessing that the change was made during the First Sacred War. R. Flacelière, "Le fonctionnement de l'oracle de Delphes au temps de Plutarque," *Études d'archéologie grecque* 2 (1938) 69–107, esp. 71–73, 106–7 (cited by Parke), believes that monthly sessions began in the fourth century, but also believes special consultations were possible and fairly common. Note also that J. Fontenrose, in his sceptical treatment, *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1978) Q137, p. 314, concedes the historicity of this consultation.

C. Historical Enigmas Caused by the Strict Chronology

1) Actions during the Marathon Campaign

Doubtless, Kleomenes desired to support Athens firmly by extracting hostages from Aigina. His freeing Athens from the fear of Aiginetan aid to Persia is analogous to his preemptive strike against Argos at Sepeia, which freed Sparta's hands to face an anticipated Persian arrival (Hdt. 6.76–82). A faction existed around Demaratos that sought a less provocative policy toward Persia. Yet, there is no evidence for a dramatic *volte-face* in Spartan foreign policy. If the Spartans had truly slain Dareios' envoys, they had embarked on a deliberate collision course with Persia (Hdt. 7.133.1). The eventual arrival of Spartan reinforcements in Attica during the Marathon campaign demonstrates that views prevailing at that time in Sparta held that Athens should still be supported. Demaratos' actions after deposition are comprehensible only if Sparta was still anxious over Persia and Medism. On departure, Demaratos deceived the Spartans about his destination. When his deceit was discovered, he was pursued (Hdt. 6.70.1–2). One is tempted to put the flight of Demaratos after Marathon.

Accordingly, I do not believe that Kleomenes was already mad or dead by the date of Marathon, although he might have still been in Arkadia. Spartan behavior at that time does not yet show signs of so great a dislocation. If the Spartans, however, are thought to have wavered in their determination to act forcefully against Persia in the summer of 490, it was under the impact of Kleomenes' activities in Arkadia (and unaffected by his later misadventures). In summer 490, this vacillation, which must have been short-lived, is too late to be accommodated by the strict chronology (see the table, pp. 144–45 below), however useful some may find it for understanding Spartan attitudes at the moment of crisis for the Athenians.

Another problem involves the willingness of a Spartan court to condemn Leotikhidas before Marathon. The Spartans appear thoughtless of the disruption in their leadership which this act would cause. Is it not more likely that, with the recession of the immediate Persian threat after Marathon, the balance of Spartan feeling turned against Kleomenes' high-handed tactics, and eventually found its butt in his protégé Leotikhidas? The Spartans could indulge their honor with minimal political consequences by a move against Leotikhidas, since his services as a commander were, for the moment, dispensable. In the strict chronology, the Spartans must be supposed to have deposed Demaratos, lost Kleomenes, and envisaged exiling Leotikhidas in rapid succession, and all before Marathon.

By condemning Leotikhidas, Sparta reversed a policy concerning the hostages, formerly thought essential for freeing Athenian hands. Yet, there is no hint in Herodotus of this aspect of the decision. Leotikhidas' diplomacy at Athens gives a very different indication. There he preached about the tragic results of the bad faith of Glaukos of Sparta. The story has point because Glaukos refused to return goods entrusted to him, much as the Athenians kept

the hostages when the reason for Sparta's entrusting them had passed.³⁴ Before Marathon, this is pointless. Sparta (not Athens) was acting in bad faith for reversing policy over the hostages. In answer, the Athenians do not protest that, on the hostages' return, Aigina would no longer be deterred from aid to Persia. Nor are they anxious over non-compliance with Sparta. It is as if Spartan aid against Persia were not contingent on Athenian cooperation in this issue at all. The Athenians can resort to a quibble (i.e., that what was entrusted to them by both kings should not be returned to one) only with their victory at Marathon recently past. Their defiance reflects both their new-found confidence after a victory achieved without Spartan assistance and a realization that Spartan policy had wavered when the moment of crisis came upon them.

Aiginetan behavior toward Athens is also incomprehensible in a pre-Marathon setting. By the capture of the *theōris*, Athens' advantage in holding Aiginetan hostages was offset. Both sides undertook hostilities, presumably without the fear of summary execution of each other's prisoners. It is odd that the Athenians would initiate such hostilities rather than an exchange of prisoners with Dareios' arrival near—the exchange must have been later, after the account of Herodotus breaks off. These inconclusive hostilities of considerable scale are put by Hammond in winter 491/90, itself an anomalous turn of affairs. Both sides mobilized their navies in other than the sailing season. There is no comment on these unusual circumstances by Herodotus.

Also, there is no impression made by the fighting on the Marathon campaign or its historiography. Apparently, inconclusive fighting before Marathon must be seen to have had no effect on Athens' ability to defeat the Persians. No subsequent Athenian panegyric literature mentions the difficulties of the warfare with Aigina to extol Athens' victory, thereby greater. On the Aiginetan side, their determination or fighting power was scarcely curtailed by the encounters with the Athenians. However, they do not offer their island as a Persian base, an obvious step. That Datis believed that he retained a force capable of subduing Athens is shown by his sailing into the Saronic Gulf after Marathon. Because he could not bring the Athenians to battle on his own terms before winter, he was stymied. Had Datis a base capable of supporting him on Aigina, he might well have remained, hoping for the aid of treachery or waiting for reinforcements to permit an offensive in the spring. Without such a base, he could only withdraw his fleet to Asia. One may object that this is to attribute to Datis firmer resolve than he possessed, and that no evidence tells of a request for an Aiginetan base. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the Aiginetans did not even carry on a campaign of raids, a measure that they had used in support of Thebes in c. 506 (Hdt. 5.81.3, 89.1–2).

34. Hdt. 6.85.3–86. See H.W. Stubbs, "The Speech of Leotychidas in Herodotus VI 86," *PCA* 56 (1959) 27–28. While the speech's homiletic character, and the absence of detail relevant to the diplomatic context, may suggest to some a free composition, analysis indicates that Herodotus' dramatic date for it (at least in this passage) was after Marathon.

Rather, it was the retention of the hostages that compelled the Aiginetans to remain inactive. The grave actions and counteractions concerning the hostages were predicated on the belief that Aiginetan Medism marked a significant change in the power balance. In the strict chronology, this belief becomes nonsensical, as events indicate that the Medism was in the end of no moment. There is no suggestion in Herodotus why such a reversal of expectations should have occurred. Although we may reasonably differ over an exact date for the death of Kleomenes, this line of analysis seems to place solidly the trial of Leotykhidas and the actual Athenian/Aiginetan hostilities after Marathon.

2) Kleomenes' Absence from Sparta

The last period of Kleomenes' life took shape from his intervention on Aigina. With his plot against Demaratos suspected, Kleomenes withdrew to Thessaly, and then to Arkadia. Hammond allots two weeks for his total absence from Sparta, little more than the time necessary for a round trip, if that. Kleomenes' actions are meaningless in this chronological context. Thessaly is a strange choice for a mere refuge from Sparta. Arkadia would have been far enough for that.³⁵ Rather, only Thessaly and Thebes possessed substantial cavalry establishments in mainland Greece. At some point, Dareios' provision for horse-transports for Datis' fleet would have become known in Greece. Hating Athens, Thebes would offer no help. The Spartans had already faced one Thessalian force, supporting Hippias, who would be returning with the Persians. However, if the Aleuads had already begun their Medism, their Thessalian opponents might well have been receptive to Spartan overtures.³⁶ Kleomenes is not known to have accomplished anything in Thessaly, though he could have changed the balance between pro- and anti-Persians in a situation about which we know virtually nothing. His motivation for going was perhaps soon forgotten. Later, when Kleomenes was viewed with hostility at Sparta, Spartan suspicions about the king became the journey's cause. If information about provision of horse-transports came quickly to Greece, almost any date from spring 491 would be possible for the Thessalian trip. If, however, the

35. Exiled Spartan kings in Arkadia: Hdt. 6.72.2; Thuc. 5.16.3; Xen. *HG* 3.5.25. Possibly, Kleomenes' trip to the north is a mirage, and the Arkadian town of Sellasia is to be read (D. Hereward, "Herodotus vi.74," *CR* 1 [1951] 146).

36. Thessalians aiding Hippias: Hdt. 5.63.3–64. Medism of the Aleuads: Hdt. 7.6.2, 5; 7.130.3; 9.1.1, 58.1–2; Paus. 3.7.9. H.D. Westlake, "The Medism of Thessaly," *JHS* 56 (1936) 12–24, dates Aleuad Medism as early as 492, when Larissa began coining on the Persian standard. Cf. C.M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1976) 115, who dates this coinage to the late sixth century. T.R. Martin, who is sceptical about the political symbolism of coinage, accepts the presence of a Medizing intention behind this idiosyncratic issue (*Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece* [Princeton 1985] 34–36). Therefore, the policy of the Aleuads would have been known to Kleomenes in 491. The Skopads or the Ekhetratids (if a separate family) would have been naturally disposed to a Spartan request. During Xerxes' expedition, the Thessalian opponents of the Aleuads had the upper hand momentarily, and called in a Greek expeditionary force (e.g., Hdt. 7.172–74, cf. 7.232). See N. Robertson, "The Thessalian Expedition of 480 B.C.," *JHS* 96 (1976) 100–20, esp. 108.

Spartans learned of the transports only on the fleet's assembly in Cilicia, the trip to Thessaly would follow April 490.³⁷

Returning from Thessaly, Kleomenes, fearful of the Spartans, conspired with the Arkadians. At first sight, this appears to be a premature and disproportionate reaction to the mere possibility of subsequent prosecution. Measures calculated to topple the Peloponnesian hegemony of Sparta are incongruous in one who had raised Spartan influence to previously unreach heights. After his pains to extract the hostages, so allowing Athens to face Persia, must Kleomenes then be assumed to have ruined this same prospect by threatening Spartan ability to help Athens, with the spectre of an Arkadian dissidence? Was he already mad?

The Arkadians reacted to his diplomacy as though Kleomenes was quite sane. Hereafter, Arkadia began to issue federal coinage.³⁸ This was a backward region, where small, loosely affiliated political units, i.e., groups of villages, still existed. Important centers, like Tegea and Mantinea, the presumptive beneficiaries of regional consolidation, had not yet absorbed them. Unification was suspended by the relative interstate balance, but perhaps more significantly by the intervention of Sparta, to whom the predominance of sub-political units was advantageous. Sparta was on hand for appeals from Tegea or Mantinea, if the other was moving toward cantonal hegemony.³⁹ With Arkadia restive, this traditional policy may have seemed unsustainable.⁴⁰

Kleomenes had the Arkadian leaders swear their holiest oath to follow his lead. This group commitment ought to be juxtaposed with the creation of the confederacy. Kleomenes may have hoped to achieve Arkadian acquiescence in Sparta's leadership of the Peloponnesus by conceding an opportunity for regional unity under a closer, perhaps more personal, subordination to the Spartan king. In effect, he was attempting to alter the "constitution" of the Peloponnesian League concerning the kings' executive power.⁴¹ This policy,

37. Beloch *GG*² 2.2.55–56.

38. W.P. Wallace, "Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots, and Arkadia," *JHS* 74 (1954) 32–35, who rightly insists that the Arkadian League was a real political entity. Kraay, *Coins* 97, argues for a looser connection between Kleomenes' Arkadian stay and the beginnings of Arkadian Federal coinage, dated by him to 470–65.

39. E.g., Spartan intervention in early fifth-century Arkadia: at Tegea and Dipaia: Hdt. 9.35.1–2; Paus. 3.11.7, 8.8.6; Isoc. 6.99; cf. DS 11.65.4; during the Peloponnesian War (422): Thuc. 4.134.1–2; 5.29.1, 64–74; in the Corinthian War: Xen. *HG* 5.2.1–7; after Leuctra: Xen. *HG* 6.5.4, 10 (371); Xen. *HG* 7.5.1–2 (362).

40. See A. Andrewes, "Sparta and Arcadia in the Early Fifth Century," *Phoenix* 6 (1952) 1–5. On Spartan acquiescence in the League's existence: Wallace *JHS* (1954) 34–35.

41. Hdt. 6.74.1: ἡ μὲν ἔψεσθαι σφῆας αὐτῷ τῇ ἂν ἐξηγήται. Compare the fifth-century Spartan treaty with the Erxadiis (*SEG* 26.461), an Aetolian sub-group, restored by Peek as (in ll. 4–7):

... ἡπειο]-

[μ]ένος ἡόπυι κα Λα[κεδαιμόνι]

[ο]ι ἡγίονται καὶ κα[τὰ γὰν]

[κ]αὶ καθάλαθαν...

See W. Peek, "Ein neuer spartanischer Staatsvertrag," *Abhandl. sächsischen Akad. Wissen. zu Leipzig*, Phil.-Hist. Kl., 65.3 (1974) 3–15; P.A. Cartledge, "A New 5th-century Spartan Treaty,"

with its potential for change in Spartan internal policies, not the threat of an Arkadian uprising led by Kleomenes, provoked the Spartan fears.

Plato attests a Helot revolt at the time of Marathon. Even if one grants that Helot troubles in the period of Marathon are quite possible, there are problems with the next step of extrapolation from them (as usually formulated). Some have suggested that Kleomenes stirred up problems with the Helots and with the Arkadians.⁴² This, however, may be reasoning *post hoc propter hoc*, unduly crediting Herodotus' appraisal of Kleomenes' predicament; he in fact did not yet need such desperate measures. Sparta decisively defeated Argos during the 540s. It must have become obvious by the mid-490s that the Argives would soon try matters again, especially if a 50-year truce had been made in the 540s. Arkadia had been the field over which Argive and Spartan ambitions had previously played. Argos was an obvious ally (as were, and had been, the Arkadians) of the Messenians, who could only prosper from Spartan absorption elsewhere.⁴³ Kleomenes' victory at Sepeia forestalled this development, and has obscured it from modern scholars. Yet Sparta could little afford to fight against Arkadians and Helots on the eve of the Persian arrival. Thus Kleomenes may have undertaken negotiations with the Arkadians in order to preclude Arkadian aid to the Helots. It cannot be ruled out that Kleomenes was partially successful in Arkadia. The Arkadians remained quiescent until the Battle of Tegea (468?), and the Helot troubles were weathered (apparently) without great difficulty. From this analysis, two points deserve mention. If the Arkadian situation was critical, a few weeks is very little time for Kleomenes' reaction. Secondly, if the situation were exacerbated by Datis' imminent arrival, then the Arkadian trip should precede Marathon, but ought not precede it by a great span of time.

D. External Data

A passage in Justin has the Sicilian Greeks sending to Leonidas, described as the "brother of the king", for help against Carthage. Gelon, speaking to the envoys of the Hellenic League, seems to suggest a date for this war early in his reign at Gela.⁴⁴ Justin's description makes sense on the assumption that

LCM 1 (1976) 87–92; [now Meiggs-Lewis² 67 *bis*, p. 312.] See also, for a date of 402 or later, D.H. Kelly, "The New Spartan Treaty," LCM 3 (1978) 133–41; cf. P. Cartledge, "The New 5th-century Spartan Treaty Again," LCM 3 (1978) 189–90. Cf. Xen. *HG* 2.2.20, 5.3.26 for later examples.

42. Plato *Laws* 3.698E, cf. 692D. Wallace *JHS* (1954) 32–33, connects a Spartan dedication at Olympia (*IG* V.1 1562) with this revolt (cf. L.H. Jeffery, "Comments on Some Archaic Greek Inscriptions," *JHS* 69 [1949] 25–38, esp. 26–30), and with the flight of Messenians to Anaxilaos of Rhegion (Paus. 4.23.6). See also G. Dickens, "The Growth of Spartan Policy," *JHS* 32 (1912) 1–42, esp. 31–32.

43. On the Argives and the Messenians: Paus. 4.15.7; Apollodorus *FGH* 244 F 334 (= Strabo 8.4.10 C362). See pp. 16–19, 28–32 above.

44. Justin 19.1.9: ad Leonidam fratrem regis Spartanorum. An emendation often made is: *Doricum Leonidae fratrem* . . . (F. Rühl, "Die Textesquellen des Iustinus," *Jahr. f. Class. Philol.* Suppl. 6 [1872] 1–160, esp. 156–57). This would be an error of Justin's, not a corruption of the

Leonidas had responsibility for foreign affairs by virtue of his relationship to his brother Kleomenes. If Leonidas was *de facto* or *de iure* regent for Kleomenes during his incapacitation, that period is unlikely to have been but a few weeks, and it cannot have preceded summer 490, as becomes clear when we consider the likely course of events in Sicily. Gelon came to power in late summer or fall 491 at the earliest. Leaving some time for his consolidation of power, scholars have opted for placing the appeal to Leonidas after Marathon and most probably in the earliest 480s. That conclusion implicitly dates Kleomenes' death after Marathon also. The earliest date for the beginning of a "regency" by Leonidas in the place of Kleomenes would have been Kleomenes' absence in Arkadia, and we have already seen that this episode should not be long before Marathon. Justin's source may be Timaeus. If Pompeius Trogus and Justin transmitted him correctly, this would be weighty evidence, since the exact status of Leonidas at the time of the appeal is typical of the precision after which the fastidious Tauromenian strove.⁴⁵

Cornelius Nepos, in his *Themistokles*, informs us that a war with Corcyra was Themistokles' first service to Athens (*Them.* 2.1–4). As *stratēgos* (praetor), Themistokles introduced his naval bill, and won victory in the war. Thereupon, he swept the seas clear of pirates. In fact, Themistokles advocated the naval bill against Aigina. He had arbitrated a dispute between Corinth and Corcyra, and earned the gratitude of the Corcyraeans (Plut. *Them.* 24.1). Editors going back to Lambinus have even emended to Aeginetico.⁴⁶ Alternatively, Nepos himself confused the arbitration with a war. His mistake was perhaps fostered by recollections of Corinthian charges of Corcyraean piracy in Thucydides (Thuc. 1.37.3–5), and by the mention of the naval bill in the

text (O. Seel, *M. Iuniani Iustini: Epitoma Historiarum Philippicarum* [Stuttgart 1972] 165). T. J. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks* (Oxford 1948) 411–12, takes issue with the emendation, which connects the request with Dorieus' expedition, about whom the description, brother of the king, is very odd, since Leonidas would not yet be king for some time, when Dorieus left. Dunbabin connects the notice with Gelon's war to avenge Dorieus (pp. 411–12; cf. Hdt. 7.158.1–2) during his reign at Gela, and suggests that an appeal to Leonidas was natural, with Kleomenes involved in political intrigue. The war is the fighting mentioned in Justin 4.2.6. See also A. Schenk Graf von Stauffenberg, "Dorieus," *Historia* 9 (1960) 181–215, esp. 191–92.

45. 491/90: Dunbabin (*Western Greeks* 410), who puts the appeal in 489; R. van Compernelle, *Étude de chronologie et historiographie sicéliotes* (Brussels 1959) 262–64, 293–96 (cf. Paus. 6.9.4); summer or autumn 490: A. Schenk von Stauffenberg, *Trinakria* (Munich 1963) 176, appeal in 490/89 (*Historia* [1960] 192); at the latest in 488: G. Vallet, *Rhégion et Zancle* (Paris 1958) 346–54. Timaeus as Justin's source in Bk. 19 is probable, as he lies behind the narrative on Carthaginian history. See A. Enmann, *Untersuchungen über die Quellen des Pompeius Trogus für die griechische und sicilische Geschichte* (Dorpat 1880) 149–54. On Agathocles (Bks. 22–23): J. Beloch, "Zur Geschichte Siciliens vom Pyrrhischen bis zum Ersten Punischen Kriege," *Hermes* 28 (1893) 481–88. Justin's source was not Ephorus: contrast 19.1.10–13 with Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 186.

46. P. K. Marshall, *Cornelii Nepotis Vitae cum Fragmentis* (Leipzig 1977) 8 cites Lambinus' edition of 1569. K. Nipperdey, *Cornelius Nepos*¹², ed. K. Witte (Berlin 1913) 44–45, points out that Thucydides' remark about the early naval battle between Corinth and Corcyra (1.13.3–4) may also have lingered in Nepos' memory to mislead him.

same book (1.14.3). But something in his source may have encouraged his mistake. This factor may have been the prominent portrayal of the Aiginetans as pirates. Moreover, Nepos confused the intention of the bill with an apocryphal result, a victory over Aigina. His source probably recorded military activity between Athens and Aigina with Themistokles as *stratēgos*, but correctly associated it with Themistokles' urging of development of the navy. Conceivably, the account of the ambush of the *theōris* was used as corroboration for an emphasis on Aiginetan piracy. Perhaps Themistokles was given credit for the initial Athenian victory at sea over the Aiginetans, and managed to dodge responsibility for the eventual failure of the expedition (see pp. 167–70 below).

Nothing in Nepos' biography is from Themistokles' career, or supposed career, before Marathon: no archonship, no beginning of the Peiraieus fortifications, and no *stratēgia* at Marathon. Nepos' source put Themistokles' rise to prominence no earlier than Marathon, as perhaps did Herodotus.⁴⁷ Thus, for this source, the hostilities after the ambush of the *theōris* have an upper limit in that battle. Ephorus, known to have been interested in Aiginetan seapower, was used by Nepos in his fifth-century lives, and may well have been the original source here.⁴⁸

THE EMENDED CHRONOLOGIES

A refutation of the chronologies that displace a part of the events described by Herodotus partly runs over the same ground as our discussion of the strict chronology. Specific arguments can also be introduced to supplement our treatment of the historical enigmas. In Andrewes' chronology, the Nikodromos coup and the Argive expedition were in 493. The ambush of the *theōris* and resultant hostilities were in 487.⁴⁹ Herodotus confused the two confrontations. He gave himself a *terminus post quem* of 491, the date for submission to Darius, and a *terminus ante quem* in Marathon, since he or his source knew that some detail (e.g., the Nikodromos coup) was before Marathon.

Andrewes makes several points in support. A discrepancy exists between Herodotus and Thucydides 1.41.2, where the Corinthian speaker declares that an Athenian *epikratēsis* resulted from Corinth' sale of ships. Herodotus

47. See Thuc. 1.93.3; cf. DH AR 6.34.1. Note D.M. Lewis, "Themistocles' Archonship," *Historia* 22 (1973) 757–58. Cf. Hdt. 7.143.1: ἀνὴρ ἐς πρώτους νεωστὶ παριών. A similarity may be noted between Nepos 2.1: non solum praesenti bello, sed etiam reliquo tempore ferociorem reddidit civitatem; Justin 2.12.12: namque Athenienses post pugnam Marathoniam praemonente Themistocle, victoriam illam de Persis non finem, sed causam maioris belli fore, CC naves fabricaverunt; Plut. Them. 3.5: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι πέρας ᾤοντο τοῦ πολέμου τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι τῶν βαρβάρων ἦνταν εἶναι, Θεμιστοκλῆς δ' ἀρχὴν μεζόνων ἀγώνων, ἐφ' οὓς ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ὅλης Ἑλλάδος ἤλειφε καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἥσκει, πόρρωθεν ἤδη προσδοκῶν τὸ μέλλον. See M. Mohr, *Die Quellen des plutarchischen und nepotischen "Themistokles"* (Berlin 1879) 17.

48. See Mohr *Quellen* 17 and n. 1, who suggests that the three passages cited in n. 47 above are from Ephorus. On Nepos' use of Ephorus in the Miltiades: R.W. Macan, *Herodotus: The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Books* (London 1895) 2.206–11. [See now J. Geiger, *Cornelius Nepos and Ancient Political Biography* (Stuttgart 1985) 56.]

49. Andrewes *BSA* (1936–1937) 4–7.

ends with Athens defeated at sea, no *epikratēsis* to be sure. Moreover, the behavior of the Argive volunteers seems adventurous in 487, but is comprehensible in 493, according to Andrewes. Another point, on the Athenian fleets at Aigina and Paros, has been discussed above, as it can support the strict chronology. The difficulties are in the Nikodromos episode. The fighting is poorly integrated textually with what follows. If the Nikodromos story is shifted to 493, a bout of confused fighting is left that stimulated the naval bill.

Andrewes observes that the transition from 6.92.3 (Athenians victorious on land) to 6.93 (Athenians at sea) is jarring, but whether it is particularly so in an obviously hurried and abbreviated narrative is questionable. The narrative directly leading up to Marathon had been suspended for a long stretch of text. Herodotus may have been anxious to return to the main line of his history. Nor is the possibility of a lacuna to be ruled out.⁵⁰ However, the sudden change from victory on land to defeat at sea need not necessarily trouble us. It may not be a displacement in time, but a sudden change in perspective. The nature of warfare between Athens and Aigina entailed sudden thrusts on land and sea, with equally sudden changes in fortune (see pp. 344–47, 352–53 below for examples from the Corinthian War). This scenario may be offered. The Athenians, successful in the initial sea battle, landed an expeditionary force, which devastated the countryside. In time, it met the Argives in the field. Here there is no mention of the Aiginetans; the Argives opposed the Athenians alone. With their numbers strained by the task of manning a 70-ship fleet, the Aiginetans, specialists in naval warfare, concentrated on filling their ships. Although successful against the Argives, the Athenians could not seize the city, and had to withdraw upon the defeat of their fleet. Such a series of engagements ill fits the conventions of hoplite warfare. It challenged the skill of a narrator, perhaps insensitive to this sort of combat, on a subject about which he was already impatient to conclude.

Concerning the *epikratēsis*, to call this an abuse of language, as Andrewes does, misses the point of the partisan character of the speech. To justify the Corinthian's phrase, all that was needed was that the Corinthians had aided Athens against an enemy later subjugated. There is no reason to suppose that Thucydides would specifically refer to obvious inaccuracies in this speech. Another of the services cited by the Corinthian, their dissuasion of the Peloponnesians bent on aiding the Samian rebels in 440, is also doubtful.⁵¹

No external evidence corroborates a consideration of so infeasible an undertaking as timely help to Samos would have been. Even an abortive Peloponnesian commitment to war would have scarcely escaped Athenian notice. Yet, Athens does not react to such a Peloponnesian debate. It is not mentioned

50. See Podlecki *Historia* (1976) 400. His argument, however, for the incompleteness of the text here is not completely compelling, namely the absence of an antithesis to *τῇσι νηυσὶ* (cf. 6.92.1: *νηυσὶ ἐβδόμηκοντα*). It would be more than speculation to attempt to fill any lacuna here.

51. A.E. Raubitschek, "Corinth and Athens before the Peloponnesian War," in K. Kinzl (ed.), *Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory: Studies Presented to Fritz Schachermeyr* (Berlin 1977) 266–69.

in Thucydides' Pentekontaeteia, where it should have been emphasized as a stage in growing Spartan fear of the Athenians. The attribution of inaccuracies to the Corinthian was a comment on the alleged ties of friendship between two states, so obviously hostile, that had fought a generation before.

Concerning the Argives, it is hard to see a real difference between 493 and 487. The Argive counter-revolution occurred when the sons of the fallen at Sepeia were mature enough in numbers to recover control of the polity, around 470.⁵² In 487, Andrewes tells us, the aristocrats should have been saving their strength in order to take power. But is looking forward from 493 to the late 470s, or from 489–87, so very different a thing? They could not foresee that their counter-revolution would be successful far in the future. Yet, they could see an effort to aid Aigina, an old ally whose navy complemented their land forces, as a means to achieve their own political aspirations.

The refusal of official aid and the subsequent volunteer expedition may lie in Argos' delicate situation after Sepeia. Although the regime of former dependent classes had straitened resources, it was not reduced to a Spartan satellite. Advances were made to Persia, aloofness from the Spartan bloc in the Peloponnese was maintained, and efforts were made to re-establish control over the Argolid, when conditions became propitious.⁵³ Argos may have been willing to help Aigina, but fearful of Spartan retaliation on evidence of renewed vitality. The fiction of a volunteer force was concocted so that Argos could intervene without involving the city in risks *vis-à-vis* Sparta. One thousand volunteers from the aristocracy of any city, as Andrewes says these were, let alone from weak, post-Sepeia Argos, is hard to believe. Argive corps of 1000 picked troops are otherwise attested. Eurybates' volunteers may well have had official encouragement.⁵⁴

For Andrewes, the background of the Nikodromos hostilities was a revival of Athenian confidence during Themistokles' archonship. The fighting led to Aigina's decision to Medize in 491. In itself, the coup was not so successful as to prompt this decision. Rather, Aiginetan Medism is more explainable directly in terms of the collapse of Argos, their traditional ally (and possibly in background terms influenced by the Persian conquest of Egypt and with it Naukratis).

A more extreme approach has been suggested by Podlecki.⁵⁵ To him, the fighting of 6.87–93 occurred after Aigina aided Thebes in c. 506. He finds

52. Hdt. 6.83.1–2. See W.G. Forrest, "Themistokles and Argos," *CQ* 10 (1960) 221–41, esp. 227–29.

53. Continuity in early fifth-century Argos' foreign policy: Argive Medism: Hdt. 7.150.1–152.3; 9.12.1–2; the fine on Sikyon for helping Kleomenes: Hdt. 6.92.1–2; the grant of *proxenia* to Gnosstas, a Spartan *perioikos*: *SEG* 13.239; the harboring of Themistokles: Thuc. 1.135.3. Forrest *CQ* (1960) 225–27, 229–32, argues that the *douloi* were still in power when Argos attacked Mycenae (DS 11.65.3–5; Paus. 7.25.5–6; Strabo 8.6.19 C377).

54. R.A. Tomlinson, *Argos and the Argolid* (Ithaca 1972) 100, 181. Cf. Thuc. 1.107.5; 5.67.2, 81.1; DS 12.75.7.

55. Podlecki *Historia* (1976) 398–403. On the central role of retribution in archaic historical causation, cf. Mimnermus fr. 3 GP (= fr. 9 W) with B. Gentili & G. Cerri, *Storia e biografia nel pensiero antico* (Rome-Bari 1983) 5–6.

6.87.1 incongruous because, in Herodotus, the Aiginetans never *δίδουσι δίκας* 'make amends'. Is not Herodotus, however, making this very point? The Aiginetans broke the normal pattern of injury-reparation by a second outrage. He meant that in c. 506, the Aiginetans got off scot-free, a very different result from the hostilities of 6.87–93, where, while not defeated, they suffered losses. The Aiginetans are not to be thought of as giving requital until c. 457 or 431. The verbal echoes between 5.89.3 and 6.88 are not as striking as Podlecki views them. Presumably, Herodotus, adopting the Athenian perspective of his informants, uses the stock language of injured victims for justifying retaliation. This was not unreasonable. The retaliation of 5.89.2 answered an attack made after a long period of peace, without a previous alliance with Thebes. In 6.88, Herodotus' language also has its origins in his anti-Persian stand, because Aiginetan Medism necessitated the taking of hostages by anti-Persians. The retention of them by the Athenians caused the ambush. Similar phrasing came from a similar evaluation of separate incidents; an evaluation also grounded in Athenian politics, where, in each case, popular outcry may have overcome politicians' counsels of restraint. The hostilities should not be moved before 500. The Argives refused official help to Aigina because of Aiginetan aid to Kleomenes in the Sepeia campaign. To precede hostilities before 500, Sepeia must be dated early in Kleomenes' reign. While such a date is attested, c. 494 is preferable to such a date.^{55a} Another obstacle, admitted by Podlecki, concerns Sophanes, a participant in the fighting. It is unbelievable that Sophanes remained so vigorous in 479 as to win the *aristeia* at Plataia, or that, as an active officer in the 460s, he fell in Thrace. There is no reason to separate the Sophanes/Eurybates incident from the events resultant on the ambush. Finally, there is the unlikelihood of a pre-Marathon Athens instigating an uprising of the *dāmos* on Aigina before 500. That strategem looks much more plausible as an initiative of post-Marathon Athens, confident and energized by Themistoclean populism. Presumably, Nikodromos and his supporters were activated by a record of success achieved by Athens over some years after the Cleisthenic reforms.

HERODOTUS AND HIS EVIDENCE

Does placing some of these events after Marathon convict Herodotus of serious error, or can his narrative admit such a possibility? If Herodotus was mistaken, how can an error of this magnitude be explained when mid-fifth-century veterans of Marathon survived to correct him? The second question tacitly adopts the view that the narrative is Athenian in perspective, possibly compiled before Herodotus left for Thourioi. The connection of the narrative to its context is through the relevance of Aigina's Medism to a description of the extension of Persian power down to Marathon. To be contrasted with the Athenian/Persian emphasis of the context is the narrative section's emphasis on Sparta, clear not only in long digressive or excursive passages (on the rights

55a. I.H.M. Hendriks, "The Battle of Sepeia," *Mnemosyne* 33 (1980) 340–46, is the latest in a long line to review the evidence and opts for c. 494.

of Spartan kings, and on the careers of Kleomenes, Demaratos, and Leotikhidas), but also because the Spartans are generally the initiators of the actions recounted. The Athenians and Aiginetans react to these initiatives until the actual outbreak of hostilities.

To Herodotus, Athens embroiled mainland Greece with Persia by aiding the Ionians, while Sparta did not. Datis' expedition resulted from Athenian participation in the revolt. This impression was reinforced by an accidental event: the Spartans arrived too late to fight at Marathon. A proper appreciation of Sparta's actions on the eve of Marathon entails a development of the Spartan theme in the background of the Persian invasion of Greece. Yet, only intermittent light is shed by Herodotus on Spartan foreign policy toward Persia. Pertinent data appear not in their correct chronological context, but in a form rather like a footnote, where relevance to another situation is foremost.⁵⁶ Within the narrative on the hostages, Herodotus focused on internal politics at Sparta. The discrediting of two Spartan kings and another's death could not be ignored. Thus, we glimpse Spartan divisions over Persia. They are not in the foreground. The narrative's character presumably mirrors the sources, probably Spartans, until the account of the hostilities.

Much of the material which Herodotus presented on Kleomenes is included in the narrative about the hostages. The history of Aigina's three conflicts with Athens is treated in several locations in the text. Alternative patterns where the information on Kleomenes could have been presented chronologically, or where most of the evidence on Athens and Aigina could be contained in the narrative concerning the hostages, are conceivable. This reminds us that it is not transparent at what stage of composition Herodotus combined, separated, or juxtaposed large blocks of material. The final product remains, and, with it, the practical assumption that all the information from one set of informants on one topic must have been filed together initially (if only mentally). When a chronological problem concerns the transition from one relatively large block of text to another (e.g., the episode about the hostages [6.48–94.1] to the Marathon campaign [6.94.1–124] or the Spartan narrative within the episode on the hostages to the actual hostilities), it is difficult to believe that an audience's reaction to an oral presentation played any role.

The actual hostilities are appended to a largely Spartan narrative on the results of Kleomenes' intervention. No internal evidence suggests that Herodotus' Athenian or Aiginetan informants set the hostilities in their correct chronological relation with regard to the Spartan context. Herodotus connects all three conflicts between Athens and Aigina. The early war is adduced to explain the Aiginetan decision to aid Thebes in c. 506, and in the description of the hostilities of 6.87–93, Herodotus makes a back reference to the Aiginetan misdeeds of 506 (6.87). Some details (Aiginetan piracy, Argive help to

56. Macan *Herodotus* 2.80–82. Contrast De Sanctis *RFIC* (1930) 292–96, who reasons from a belief that the Athenian and Spartan execution of Dareios' ambassadors (Hdt. 7.133.1) are not historical to an unwarranted doubt of the historicity of the Persian demand for Aiginetan submission.

Aigina, the intervention of sacrilege) link the accounts (see pp. 44–46, 55–57 above). Herodotus does not give us a detailed political history of the hostilities, but highlights a single facet, the Nikodromos coup, with its aftermath, the Aiginetan sacrilege toward the suppliant survivors from the *dāmos*. This suggests that Herodotus' informants responded to his questioning with an eye toward the entire history of the Aigina/Athens struggle. His emphasis on the Nikodromos coup suggests that their interests lay in material useful for partisan purposes and not for chronology. The textual juxtaposition of the hostilities with Kleomenes' career or with Marathon was not in the foreground for Herodotus' sources, but was the result of a deliberate stylistic choice which was not grounded in historical analysis. A gulf stands between the hostilities and the preceding and following sections, regardless of chronology. Even on a pre-Marathon date, the hostilities have nothing to do with Marathon.

Herodotus did not ask a question of vital interest to us, whether Kleomenes was already dead when Marathon was fought, and, if not, what he was doing. A consideration of what material Herodotus may have had to work with on Kleomenes helps explain his silence. Sparta was not the relatively open society that was Periclean Athens. Herodotus was more dependent on leading Spartans, who were unlikely to have been completely candid about Kleomenes. To Herodotus, he was a violent and impious man. His actions are not understood against the background of deliberate policy. Kleomenes, an activist king, turned rather opaque when seen from a perspective uninterested in foreign policy. Kleomenes' intervention on Aigina was irreconcilable with this negative appraisal. Yet, Herodotus makes little of this, merely stating somewhat baldly that Kleomenes was benefitting Greece. Concomitantly, the treatment of Demaratos is generous. He opposes Kleomenes on grounds of personal enmity, by fifth-century standards innocuous. Demaratos' Medism is not treated negatively, like that of Hippias, and is obscured by a portrayal of him as a mouthpiece of Hellenic ideals in the Persian camp, a dramatic foil to Xerxes, the oriental autocrat. Demaratos' treasonous flight is palliated by its close connection to Kleomenes' treacherous designs against him. The anecdotal material favorable to Demaratos transcends this episode, and points toward a source(s) close to Demaratos. One informant may well have been the Athenian exile Dikaïos, son of Theokydes, who is clearly the source for the story of the apparition of the Eleusinian procession (Hdt. 8.65.1–6). Demaratos was in his company, appearing in his *persona* of a philhellene in the camp of Xerxes. The personality-centered interpretation of the feud between the two kings trivialized the Spartan background to the incident involving the hostages.

Kleomenes' lurid end (parallel in Herodotus to the deaths of Kambyses and Miltiades) stems from Herodotus' reworking of Spartan views of him, already negative. His death was mysterious, as shown by the contemporary explanations of his madness. Since contemporary folk-science could not evaluate such a breakdown, whether somatic or psychosomatic, supernatural, along with mundane, explanations were produced. However, more than one modern

scholar has seen a successful plot against the king in Herodotus' account.⁵⁷ If a group of Spartans was guilty of engineering Kleomenes' death, a conspiracy of silence would surely ensue. Besides guilt, there were other reasons for a lack of candor at Sparta. Kleomenes had tried to strengthen his position relative to other organs of government. By legislation that provided that only one king be on campaign, the other king's veto was removed (Hdt. 5.75.2). Receiving embassies, he conducted a foreign policy in a fashion that would undoubtedly have later trespassed on the sphere of the ephors (e.g., Hdt. 5.49–51, 6.84.3). Regarding the extraction of hostages, it is possible that Kleomenes was stretching the kings' discretionary powers to their limit.⁵⁸ His actions in Arkadia seem to show an attempt to alter the traditional pattern of interrelations with Spartan allies. Good reasons could be advanced for these changes, perhaps too good. Kleomenes' success may have been ominous to conservatives at Sparta. Much as Lysander's constitutional reforms were equated with treason, and were suppressed posthumously, a negative and superficial construction may well have been subsequently broadcast about Kleomenes' last activities.⁵⁹

One place where material hostile to Kleomenes may have touched Herodotus' account is in the sequence: discovery of Kleomenes' guilt in deposition of Demaratos—his withdrawal from Sparta—recall—madness and death. In order for anyone to believe that Kleomenes plotted against Sparta in Arkadia, a powerful motivation would need to be assigned to the king. Such a stimulus was available in the incrimination for bribery at Delphi. Its use by pro-Demaratos source(s) may have been posthumous retaliation for Kleomenes' treachery, even if, in fact, the bribery was discovered after the Arkadian trip. Herodotus also thought that Kleomenes' death followed his return by no great period. This impression may come from Spartan minimization, out of guilt or reticence, of his last actions. Nevertheless, herein may have lain the critical predicament for Herodotus. At some stage of the composition of his work, he may well have pondered the absence of Kleomenes from his evidence about Marathon. An absence in Arkadia, or inactivity due to incapacitation, were both possible reasons. But the prevailing interpretation of Kleomenes' actions, an insurrection against Sparta, had nothing to do in Herodotus' mind with Marathon. Also, to Herodotus, the period of incapacitation was too short to explain anything. Reasoning seemed to point toward Kleomenes' death falling before Marathon.

Nevertheless, there is evidence that he did not commit himself wholeheartedly to that date. To him, Marathon took place because of Athenian

57. Beloch *GG*² 2.1.36; Dickens *JHS* (1912) 32; Munro *CAH* 4.261–62. [More recently, L.H. Jeffery, *CAH*² 4.366–67, juxtaposes the possibility of an actual mental breakdown with an assassination.]

58. See pp. 96–99 above.

59. Lysander's proposed reform: DS 14.13.2–8; Plut. *Lys.* 24.2–26.4, *Mor.* 212C–D, 229E–230F; Nepos *Lys.* 3.5; Aris. *Pol.* 1301b19–21. Cf. Strabo 8.5.5 C366 on Pausanias II's treatise. See C.D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories* (Ithaca 1979) 92–95; [also P. Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (London 1987) 94–95.]

participation in the Ionian Revolt. Emphasizing the forward thrust of events inherent in the Persian victory, Herodotus brought us straight ahead from the fall of Miletos. The sixth year of the revolt, probably 494, saw the fall of Miletos. In the next year, the Persians mastered Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos (6.31.1). In the next spring, Mardonios campaigned in Thrace (6.43.1). Then, in the next year, Thasos was reduced to a Persian satellite (6.46.1, cf. 6.43.4–44.1). The Persian request for Aeginetan submission is attached to this by *μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο* (6.48.1). Our whole narrative concerning this episode follows with few chronological signposts. After Marathon, Herodotus specifies two events separately, Dareios' order for horse transports, and the catastrophe at Mt. Athos, as being in the previous year (6.95.1–2). Yet, the latter, in his account, must be two years before, although the provision of the transports, associated with the demand for submission sent to Aigina, is properly described as in the previous year.

Herodotus was uncertain about spacing over time the Persian preparations before Marathon. In 6.48.2, between the dispatch of Persian heralds to Greece and the submission of the islanders, orders for triremes and horse transports are reported. After the treatment of the incident about the Aeginetan hostages, Herodotus resumes Persian preparations with *Ἀθηναίοισι μὲν δὴ πόλεμος συνῆπτο πρὸς Αἰγινήτας, ὃ δὲ Πέρσης τὸ ἐωυτοῦ ἐποίει*, a statement purposefully vague that merely signals events leading directly to Marathon (6.94.1). These two short narrative sections, 6.48.2 and 6.94.1, can be interpreted as marking off a rudimentary ring composition. The *μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο* of 6.48.1 is no true chronological signpost, but rather a loose connective. Nothing in 6.94.1 suggests that Persian preparation had advanced. There is no indication of time elapsed from the Persian perspective. Herodotus does not insist that 6.48–94 was concluded before Marathon. The Athenian/Aeginetan confrontation belongs to a different chronological process from the events leading to Marathon. At 6.94, two sections of the narrative abut on each other without truly chronological transition.

The foregoing analysis can be briefly contrasted with that of Jeffery. Her technical point, that the aorist participle *συστάς* (in the context of Themistokles' naval bill) cannot mean "continue" (as Hammond suggests), is generally correct, but this should not be pressed to compel that, when Herodotus wrote 7.144.2, he thought war had just broken out before 484–82, and that the hostilities of 6.87–93 were therefore unknown to him.⁶⁰ In the first place, it is worth observing that a formula is attested in historical diction where the aorist participle of *συνίστημι* is used in summations of wars. For example, Dionysius of Halicarnassus offers this formulation: *ὁ μὲν δὴ πρὸς Λατίνους συστάς Ῥωμαίοις πόλεμος εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τέλος κατέσκηψε* (DH AR 3.54.3, cf., e.g., 3.62.2; Polyb. 25.2.15; DS 13.114.3). Here *συστάς* ought to mean

60. Jeffery *AJP* (1962) 46–47. Cf. Hammond *Historia* (1955) 409. Powell *Lexicon* 345 translates *συστάς* as 'rage'.

'prevailing' or 'existing'. In 7.144.2, Herodotus is clearly summing up the impact of the Aiginetan war for the salvation of Greece after its mediation.

Moreover, we cannot be sure that Herodotus would not have described a war breaking out in 489/8 or a little later by such a participle in his treatment of 483/2. This is especially telling, if we remember that Herodotus views the naval bill as a newcomer's initiative which quickly met success. If Themistokles had urged for some time that revenues be employed to subsidize fleet building against Aigina, only achieving success in 483/2, in the favorable environment of the strike at Maroneia, then Herodotus' juxtaposition of the Aiginetan war and the agitation for the bill can be maintained factually, without prejudice to the date. In other words, Herodotus was misinformed about Themistokles, and this led to vagueness as to the context in which hostilities with Aigina prompted the naval bill.

Conventions, both of language and of diplomacy, were attuned to hoplite warfare. Naval warfare between Athens and Aigina, often akin to piracy, poorly fit this model (*vid. πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος*). Whether the struggle from 506 to 483/2 ought to be a single war or several was questionable. Herodotus writes in 6.94.1 Ἀθηναίοισι μὲν δὴ πόλεμος συνῆπτο πρὸς Αἰγινήτας 'war was joined for the Athenians against the Aiginetans'. Yet, we would be mistaken to insist that the conflict discussed in 6.87–93 constituted the outbreak of hostilities with the Aiginetans, as there is no reason to think ourselves or to believe that Herodotus thought that the earlier πόλεμος ἀκήρυκτος had somehow ended. Judging from periods of quiescence or low-grade activity, one could make each flare-up the outbreak of war. Herodotus chose to remind us that the two states were at war in 483/2, but it seems incautious to seek from his phrasing a precise relationship between the two states at any previous point in time.

For Jeffery, certain factors indicate a late inclusion of 6.87.1–94.1. 1) The Argive fine of Aigina (6.92.1) is not mentioned in the treatment of Sepeia (6.76). 2) Sophanes of Dekeleia is mentioned not only in this narrative (6.92.3), but there is a cross reference to this passage in a context with specific reference to the Peloponnesian War and thereby a late insertion (9.73–75). 3) The Corinthian sale of ships and citation of the pertinent law may have become known to Herodotus when mentioned on the eve of the Peloponnesian War. 4) The fighting is compressed, with an abrupt end. 5) In 6.87, the Aiginetans' non-payment of the penalty for their deeds has no connection with Leotychidas' embassy preceding it, but introduces well the seizure of the *theō-ris* and events following. In the 440s Herodotus, with no further information, concluded Kleomenes' intervention with Leotychidas' embassy. Thus, to him, the war prompting the naval bill had just broken out. The expulsion of the Aiginetans in 431, traced to their earlier impiety, revealed new data. These were inserted in 6.87–94.1, perhaps unsatisfactorily regarding conclusions and dating, but, except for a cross-reference to Sophanes in 9.75, the remaining narrative was left unchanged.

This approach, concentrating on Herodotus' composition, merely lessens the incongruities of the strict chronology, but does not confront the historical implausibilities associated with it, nor refute indications arguing a post-Marathon date. Fundamental to Jeffery's views is a publication (or, rather, abandonment) of Herodotus' work not long after 431. The later Herodotus terminated his work, the more inexplicable the inadequate insertion of 6.87–94.1 becomes. There is always the risk of confusing the few references to the Peloponnesian War with the supposition that little of the final draft was composed in the 420s. Herodotus' blindness to the war can equally have been deliberate; contributory to his panhellenic emphasis. There is equally little about the "First Peloponnesian War", doubtless a dominating political event of his maturity. Evidence points toward a "publication" date of 421 or later.⁶¹ If such dating is correct, Jeffery's hypothesis collapses. New information in 431 will not excuse the text's inadequacies, since sufficient time will have passed between its discovery and publication.

The hypothesis that recollection of earlier confrontations between Athens and Aigina was prompted by the expulsion of the Aiginetans in 431 will not bear examination. Herodotus appears to have visited Aigina (presumably before he travelled west). He collected the variant traditions on the beginnings of the feud between Athens and Aigina at this time. His occasional sympathy for Aigina shows the influence of Aiginetan or pro-Aiginetan informants, contacts made long before 431.⁶² The three narratives on Aiginetan/Athenian hostility show similarities (as has been mentioned) that speak against a separate provenience for any of them.⁶³ The scattered references to Aigina in the later books

61. The traditional date is after 431–30, based on Hdt. 7.137.1–3 (the fates of the sons of the Spartan envoys Boulis and Sperkheios) and 6.91.1 (the expulsion of the Aiginetans in 431). See F. Jacoby, "Herodotus," *RE Supplbd.* 2 (Stuttgart 1913) cols. 205–520, esp. 231–32. For a date not earlier than the 420s, note: 1) 6.98.2, the earthquake at Delos is after Artaxerxes' death, and probably after the Peace of Nikias; 2) 7.235.2–3, the mention of Kythera is made in light of its capture in 424; 3) 9.73.3, the immunity of Dekeleia implies the end of the Archidamian War. [Cf. J.A.S. Evans, "Herodotus 9.73.3 and the Publication Date of the *Histories*," *CP* 82 (1987) 226–28.] A date after the Archidamian War is argued by C.W. Fornara, "Evidence for the Date of Herodotus' Publication," *JHS* 91 (1971) 25–34, citing reminiscences of Herodotus in Arist. *Av.* 1124–38, Eur. *El.* 1280–83. J.A.S. Evans, "Herodotus' Publication Date," *Athenaeum* 57 (1979) 145–49, suggests a date as late as 424, but not much later (on the traditional view of Arist. *Ach.* 68–94, 523–29 as burlesques of Herodotus). Citing R. Lattimore, "The Composition of the *History* of Herodotus," *CP* 53 (1958) 9–21, Evans hypothesizes that the work appeared serially on papyrus rolls as he revised, as early as 425. Against Jeffery's hypothesis, 6.98.2 ought to have appeared in the late 420s. Linear revision, proceeding end to end, cannot accommodate Jeffery's view of spot revision on Aigina in Book 6 without alterations in later sections to accommodate the insertions. Piecemeal publication allows a two-way process, where Herodotus could make corrections, if only in later sections, and incorporate new information. This precludes tracing the inadequacies of the narrative on the hostages to new material which emerged in 431.

62. Herodotus' visit to Aigina: Jacoby *RE Supplbd.* 2, cols. 268–69.

63. On Herodotus' Aiginetan sources, most obvious in the early confrontation between Athens and Aigina (e.g., 5.86.1–4; 5.87.1): see pp. 35–57 above. On the similarities between the three Athens/Aigina conflicts: U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin 1893) 2.280–88.

show that Herodotus did not lose interest in the island during the composition of his work.⁶⁴ Much of this data has a partisan character, but I doubt that anyone would care to call them late insertions, as though the last books of Herodotus were not late enough.

The details considered by Jeffery to have been remembered in 431 are unlikely to have ever been forgotten. The lack of mention of Kleomenes' use of Aiginetan ships before Sepeia is not surprising. Herodotus did not feel bound to give a connected history of Sparta in this period. The Sepeia campaign itself is introduced only tangentially as one reason for Kleomenes' breakdown. Sophanes' exploit in killing Eurybates does not seem easily forgettable. His *aristeia* at Plataia, admittedly in the earliest account of the battle, must have kept alive many of his accomplishments. The annihilation of the Argive volunteers was an unusual accomplishment in hoplite warfare, and thus intrinsically memorable. The Argive defeat is the counter-image of an Argive destruction of Athenian invaders on Aigina (save for one survivor) in the first war between Athens and Aigina (Hdt. 5.87.1–2). The two battles, which balance each other, should not be given proveniences for Herodotus independent in time. The story of the early victory patently compensates for the later defeat, and was told during the Pentekontaeteia.

The reprisals campaign had relevance for the rights and wrongs of the conflict between Athens and Aigina. The Aiginetan atrocity toward the suppliants was a religious justification for their eventual expulsion. Yet, such justifications did not become controversial only in 431. They were an issue during the Thirty Years Peace, as evinced by Pindar's support of the Aiginetan cause (e.g., Pin. *Pyth.* 8, esp. vv. 98–100), and by the Spartan belief that capital could be made of Athenian treatment of Aigina by a demand for Aiginetan autonomy (Thuc. 1.139.1: see pp. 267, 294–97 below). There must have been a rationale for the harsh treatment dealt Aigina in the 450s, but we have little direct evidence. However, Herodotus' linking of the ambush of the *theōris* with earlier Aiginetan crimes, and the absence of any elaboration of (what might even have been viewed as) the treachery of Nikodromos, together with the account of the sacrilege, was certainly justificatory of Athenian subjugation of Aigina, as well as expulsion of the inhabitants in 431 [see Figueira *Colonization* 90–93, 104–13]. If Herodotus was adapting raw material in praise of Athens, the abrupt shift in scene is explicable, since Herodotus' Athenian informants gave no details to flesh out the Athenian defeat.⁶⁵ Herodotus merely had the fact of the closing defeat at sea, which even his Aiginetan informants would have supplied. [If I am correct that Xanthippos was implicated by Themistoclean propaganda in the failure to have sufficient ships ready for

64. Mention of the Aiginetans in the accounts of Salamis and Plataia was compulsory. More striking are the 5 unconnected notices, some passing, in the course of 10 chapters of Book 9: a cross-reference to the killing of Eurybates (9.75); Pausanias sends a Koan lady to Aigina (9.76.1–77.1); Lampon urges the outrage of the corpse of Mardonios (9.78.1–79.2); the Aiginetans cheat Spartan Helots over Persian booty (9.80.1–2); the Aiginetan monument at Plataia (9.85.3).

65. Hdt. 6.92.3–93. See pp. 135–37 above.

supporting Nikodromos, reticence in the official circles of *Periclean Attica* would be understandable. See pp. 168–70, 172 below.]

If the Corinthian speaker in Thucydides has been deliberately made to misrepresent Corinth's services to Athens, it follows that his audience, Athenians of 431, were thought by Thucydides to have already had the correct information about the incidents mentioned. The sale of ships to Athens ought to have been known to politically active Athenians before the First Peloponnesian War, when the wisdom of confronting Corinth by aid to Megara should have been a matter for open discussion. A final point deserves emphasis. The narrative on the hostages can never have ended with Leotikhidas' embassy. The ambush of the *theōris* answers an obvious question, if only implicitly; did the Aiginetans ever get their leaders back? The prominent Athenians captured not only freed Aiginetan hands against Athens, but also served as an exchange for the hostages. Mutual exchange of prisoners was widespread, but is seldom mentioned in our sources. That an exchange eventually took place may have been a rather more natural assumption to Herodotus' audience than it is to us, but it is the only one that allows for a satisfactory close to the episode.⁶⁶

HISTORICAL CONSIDERATIONS

A hypothetical revised chronology has been set out in the table (pp. 144–45), with references to the relevant sections above. Some accent should be placed on two events that provide brackets for Marathon: Kleomenes' activities in Arkadia belong before the battle; the trial of Leotikhidas and the ambush of the *theōris* belong after it. The chronological relationship of events after Marathon depends on the relationship of the hostilities with Aigina to the Paros expedition. The points cited by Andrewes and Jeffery are not strong enough evidence that the hostilities must precede Paros. However, the view that Athenian ability to go against Paros depended on the retention of the hostages to ensure Aiginetan quiescence has some attraction.⁶⁷ The sequence: Paros expedition—hostilities has been adopted by those who opted for a date of 488/7 or 487/6 for the oracle in Herodotus' account of the confrontation of 506, which they believe apocryphal.⁶⁸ The oracle mentions thirty years for the period of Athenian forbearance before the gods would grant the conquest of Aigina. The oracle has seemed *post-eventum* to many scholars, concocted during Athenian moves against Aigina in the 450s, and the thirty year period runs from 487/6 to 457/6, a likely date for the Aiginetan capitulation to Athens. The grounds for

66. See P. Ducrey, *Le traitement des prisonniers dans Grèce antique* (Paris 1968) 267–70, for the fifth-century evidence. Aiginetan seizure of the *theōris*: De Sanctis *RFIC* (1930) 298. [On a possible dedication of staters received for the ransom of a prisoner (c. 500), see N.G. Ashton, "What does the Turtle Say?," *NC* 147 (1987) 1–7; for counter-arguments, see also P.J. Bicknell, "Turtle Tattle," *NC* 150 (1990) 223–24.]

67. See De Sanctis *RFIC* (1930) 298; Beloch *GG²* 2.2.57. See note 27 above.

68. Wilamowitz *Aristoteles* 2.280–81; Walker *CAH* 4.254–59, who would collapse the three wars into one conflict in 487.

this view are flimsy.⁶⁹ Without the oracle, the two possibilities for the ambush of the *theōris* appear to be spring 489 or 488.⁷⁰ In the former case, the Paros expedition can only precede the Aiginetan hostilities if it was in autumn 490. In the case of 488, it is likely that the Paros expedition had already occurred. Both of these alternatives are included on the table, pp. 144–45. One might incline slightly toward 489 for the ambush, which would not give a great delay before Aiginetan steps to recover their leaders. Even this impression must be treated cautiously, as the duration of the proceedings against Leotykidas, or of the diplomacy to recover the hostages, is unknown. In addition, it is also possible that the Athenians would not have given Miltiades a fleet for service against an unknown target had hostilities against Aigina already begun (cf. Hdt. 6.132). Counter-balancing is the story of the confrontation between Sophanes and Miltiades before the Parian expedition which hints that the struggle over Aigina preceded the Parian campaign.

Even in the early 480s, hostilities between Athens and Aigina should be put in the context of Themistoclean foreign policy. Incidental details point us in this direction. Polykritos, son of the Aiginetan leader Krios, played verbal one-upmanship on Themistokles at Salamis in asking him whether the Aiginetans were still Medizers. This suggests that Themistokles had something to do with this charge when it had been broadcast before, in 491 (Hdt. 8.92.2). Simonides, who put his poetical talents in the service of Themistokles and Athens on several occasions, seems to have ridiculed Krios, Polykritos' father, a leading Aiginetan held as hostage by the Athenians in 490: ἐπέξαθ' ὁ Κρίος οὐκ ἀεικέως|ἐλθὼν ἐς εὐδενδρον ἀγλαὸν Διὸς|τέμενος.⁷¹ The source behind Nepos' garbled account of Themistokles' early career seems to have associated him with a sequence of real fighting against Aigina. Moreover, although we have no direct evidence, Athens' handling of Nikodromos and his followers

69. See Andrewes *BSA* (1936–1937) 1–4 against Wilamowitz and Walker.

70. See pp. 117–23 above.

71. Themistokles and Simonides: Plut. *Them.* 5.6; Cic. *De Fin.* 2.32.104; cf. *Suda s.v.* Σιμωνίδης, σ 439 Adler. On Krios: *PMG* fr. 507 (Page) (= Arist. *Nubes* 1355–56 with scholia 1356a–b Holwerda). Simonides cannot have spoke punningly of Krios having been shorn when he arrived at Olympia or Nemea in an *epinikion* in his honor, as has long been recognized. See C.M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*² (Oxford 1961) 312–14; D.L. Page, "Simonidea," *JHS* 71 (1951) 133–42, esp. 141. Cf. Wilamowitz, who vacillated over his interpretation: *Aristoteles* 2.284–85, n. 4; *Sappho und Simonides* (Berlin 1913) 145, n. 1; *Pindaros* (Berlin 1922) 118, n. 1; see also Podlecki *Historia* (1976) 399. A long haired aristocratic athlete's hair would have been cropped only in defeat (cf. Hdt. 1.82.7), and such a crude reference to even an opponent's defeat is unconventional. And then there is the problem of chronology: Krios was one of the leading Aiginetan politicians in 491 and his son, a senior officer at Salamis in 480. Krios' athletic career (as a *pais*?, as most Aiginetan champions were) would have been many years before, in the sixth century, and it is not beyond doubt that he was a contemporary of Simonides himself (557/6?–468/7). The poem was probably a parody of an *epinikion*, exploiting the athletic pretensions of the Aiginetan aristocracy. That is just the sort of thing that would fit the taste of the unabashedly non-aristocratic and patriotic Strepsiades. It may be that some Athenian leader like Themistokles had bested Krios in a meeting at Olympia or Nemea which Simonides compared to an athletic defeat. A parallel would be the abuse by Timokreon of Rhodes of Themistokles for supposedly serving "cold meat" at Isthmia (*PMG* 727).

HERODOTUS 6.49-94

<i>Text outline</i>	<i>Chronological Notes</i>	<i>Hammond</i>	<i>Revised Chronology</i>
6.49: Aigina submits to Persia; Athens appeals to Sparta	Ath. appeal to Sparta ἰδέω	491: mid-July	After year's beginning: first week March 491 (HCT 3.698-703; pp. 114-17)
6.50: On Aig., Kleomenes is rebuffed by Krios at urging of Demaratos		end July	
6.51: Dem.'s hostility to Kleomenes	Dem.'s plot against Kleo.: τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον		
6.52-60: Digression on Spartan kingship			
6.61: Returning from Aig., Kleo. plots to depose Demaratos			Plot against Dem. after Spartan New Year (Sept. 491): pp. 123-24
6.62-64: Digression Dem.'s birth			
6.65: Leotikhidas accuses Dem. of illegitimacy, at Kleo.'s urging		mid-August	
6.66-67: Delphi influenced by Kleo. & decides against Dem.; he is deposed		end August	Delphic Oracle against Dem.: Feb./March 490? p. 124, esp. n. 33
6.67-72: Later careers of Dem. & Leo.	Concluding note: παῦτα μὲν δὴ ἐγένετο χρόνον ὕστερον (τότε δέ) After Dem.'s deposition, the kings go to Aig.: αὐτίκα	(confrontation Dem. & Leo.: Gymnopaia. 490)	(mid-summer 490: pp. 117-18)
6.73: Kleo. & Leo. take 10 Aiginetan hostages; deposit them in Athens		mid-Sept. 491	late winter 490?
6.74: Kleo.'s plot against Dem. discovered; he goes to Thessaly, then plots with the Arkadians	Kleo. withdraws: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα: goes to Arkadia: ἐντεῦθεν δέ	end Oct. 491	Thess.: early summer; Arkad.: summer 490 (pp. 127-29)
6.75: Spartans fear Kleo.'s actions recall him; his madness and death	Kleo. goes mad after return: αὐτίκα	mid-Nov. 491	fall/winter 490
6.76-84: Reasons for Kleo.'s madness: impiety (Sepeia & aftermath); drunkenness			

6.85: Death of Kleo.; trial & condemnation of Leo.; Leo. to Athens on Aigina's behalf	Aig. appeal to Sparta: τελευτήσαντος δὲ Κλεομένεος	end Nov. 491	winter 490/489 or later; pp. 129–31; cf. pp. 99–101
6.86: Leo.'s embassy to Athens; Athenian refusal to hand back hostages		mid-Dec. 491	
6.87: Aig. capture of <i>theoris</i> to Sounion	Aig. plots against Ath.: ἀπολάσσετο (Leo.'s return to Sparta)	mid-Dec. 491	ambush of <i>theoris</i> : spring 489 or 488: pp. 118–21
6.88: Athens plots with Aig. noble Nikodromos to overthrow Aiginetan government		Jan./Feb. 490	
6.89: Nik. takes Aig. Old City; Ath. delays to buy 20 ships from Corinth		Jan./Feb. 490	Allow several months for the Ath. plot against Aig. & the fighting on Aigina: pp. 121–22, 131–34, 142–43
6.90: Nik. flees Aig., later is given Sounion; harasses Aigina	ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ὕστερον ἐγένετο	Jan./Feb. 490	
6.91: Aig. ruling class massacres rebels; is cursed			
6.92: Athenians arrive, defeat Aig. at sea; Aig. appeal to Argos; 1000 vols. come to help; leader Eurybates killed by Ath. Sophanes		Ath. defeats Aig.: Feb./March 490	
6.93: Aig. finds Ath. ships in disarray; attack, capture 4 ships		Feb./March 490	
6.94: Resumption of Marathon narrative			

seems appropriate to Themistoclean policy. The attempt to foment an uprising of the *dāmos* on Aigina was a revolutionary turn in Athenian foreign policy. Here, interstate warfare, for the first time, began to work on an ideological level, and to have in its background features of class warfare. That this was in a sense a conscious effort to export the Athenian constitution may be judged from the subsequent incorporation of the fugitive Aiginetans into the Athenian body politic (see Figueira *Colonization* 105, n. 4). An uprising on Aigina, timed to coincide with the descent of the Athenian fleet, was a stratagem with which the wily Themistokles would have found no fault.⁷² The strengthening of the fleet by purchase of ships from Corinth, and the subsequent use of the Aiginetan émigrés as privateers against their homeland, is consonant with Themistokles' policy of orienting Athens toward the sea. The Aiginetans may later have reciprocated Themistokles' enmity, for an Aiginetan namesake of Aristeides Lysimakhos is said to have accused Themistokles of Medism ([Them.] *Ep.* 11, p. 751.31 Hercher; see pp. 193–95 below).

[The Athenians had not yet mastered the techniques of combined operations which they were to perfect under Kimon in the Delian League campaigns against the Persians. We can, however, just glimpse their first trial in this expedition. An attempt was made to seize Aigina's harbor in conjunction with the followers of Nikodromos. Although that effort miscarried the Athenians did try to exploit their subsequent victory at sea by landing an expeditionary force which seems to have assaulted the town, for how else could it have brought the Argive allied force to battle? An early trial of *epiteikhismos* was probably to follow up the decisive victory over the Argives. The latter, however, seem to have won time for the Aiginetans, who are not mentioned as participating in the land battle. The Aiginetans were presumably manning their fleet which came on the Athenians in disorder. Were they guarding the beachhead, while the hoplites from the ships moved on the city? After the loss of four ships, the Athenians were defeated at sea. While Herodotus' account is too compressed to permit certainty, that setback compelled the Athenians to withdraw to Attica. The whole sequence is reminiscent of the attacks on Aigina of Khabrias during the Corinthian War. The lesson does not appear to have been lost on the Aiginetans, who surround their city with new fortifications during the 480s. The military harbor was separated from the commercial harbor in what was perhaps an inward-looking security measure. The seaward entrance to the military harbor and the shore of Cape Colonna, the acropolis, was heavily fortified in order to forestall another sudden incursion by the Athenians. The fifty or sixty shipsheds accommodated there shows that steps were being taken to maintain a high quality force of triremes (the ships that later won the *aristeia* at Salamis) to which type the change was far advanced (cf. Thuc. 1.14.3).]

Here is the place for a piece of evidence more important for the political situation than as a chronological signpost. Pausanias saw tombs, erected at

72. Cf. Themistokles' plan to burn the allied fleet at Pagasai: Plut. *Them.* 20.1–2.

state expense, of slaves, who had fallen at Aigina, buried next to citizens (Paus. 1.29.7). Pausanias' expression in itself, *πρὶν ἢ στρατεῦσαι τὸν Μῆδον*, probably allows for pre- or post-Marathon dates.⁷³ The burial is comparable to the gesture made after Marathon, where fallen slaves were accorded burial with the Plataians. State burial for slaves suggests that these were not simply hoplites' attendants. Their presence is better explained when we recognize that Greek states only freed slaves for military service in times of extreme peril.⁷⁴ The fighting on Aigina was not itself such a crisis—arming slaves would have forfeited the element of surprise in any case—but slaves mobilized to meet the critical Persian danger may well have continued to serve afterwards against Aigina. Possibly, the inscription honoring the fallen ex-slaves was meant to testify to the concord between different social groups at Athens, providing a deliberate contrast to Aigina, where the depressed population, having risen, was so brutally suppressed.

[The unresolved confrontation between Athens and Aigina had the effect of inflaming the attitudes of the two peoples toward each other to the extent that in the Herodotean account a sufficient rationale for Aiginetan Medizing could be given by the Athenians as simply hatred of Athens and a willingness to campaign with the Persians against Attica (6.49.1–2). Against that Athenian judgment may be set the difference in Aiginetan behavior in 480, namely avid participation in the Hellenic League (as the Aiginetan Polykritos himself noted: Hdt. 8.92.2). It may be that Xerxes' invasion threatened a much more intrusive Persian hegemony: the expectation of a satrap at Thebes (let us surmise) was quite a different thing from the acceptance of an authority that was to be exercised from distant Sardis. Yet, in the context of 491, the predicament of Argos may also have been a factor for the Aiginetans. Argos had been Aigina's most significant ally, and Argos had been crippled at Sepeia, just a few years before in c. 494. As can be seen from the modest help offered by the Argive volunteers after Marathon, the Aiginetans may already have realized that not much could be expected from Argos against Athens, and the other obvious allies, the Thebans, were seemingly unwilling to try conclusions with their neighbors to the south. The addition of Persian support counter-balanced the loss of prospect of major help from Argos. It may also be that using Persia against one's Greek enemies was a present issue on Aigina because of Argos. At some point the Argives must have considered using the Persians to redress their grievances against Sparta (much as the Thebans or the Aleuads of Thessaly would against their enemies), since the record of their later inclination is clear (Hdt.

73. Thucydides' phrase (1.41.2), *ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικὰ*, used by a Corinthian speaker for his city's service to Athens, is no true parallel, as it can only mean "before Xerxes' invasion" in the mouth of a Corinthian, who would scarcely adopt an Athenian perspective by taking Marathon into account.

74. Pausanias (1.32.3) states that slaves first fought at Marathon, suggesting a post-Marathon date for slaves' service against Aigina. On slaves' emergency service in war: Corcyra (Thuc. 1.55.1); Chios (8.15.2); Athens at Arginoussai (Xen. *HG* 1.6.24; Arist. *Ranae* 33, 190–91, 693–94; *JG* II² 1951). See R.L. Sargent, "The Use of Slaves by the Athenians in Warfare," *CP* 22 (1927) 201–12, 264–79.

7.150–52; 9.12.1–2). Whether the opening toward Persia was a product of the loss of so many soldiers at Sepeia or indeed had preceded the campaign and had provoked Kleomenes to a preemptive slaughter, Argive sympathies toward Persia may well have been known to Aiginetan leaders by 491.

Athenian decisions on Persia had no economic dimension to their causation, a situation which has had the effect of blinding us toward the role of economic concerns in *poleis* where a larger portion of the economy was commercial. It cannot be excluded that a background influence for the Aiginetans militating in favor of friendship with the Persians was the need to conduct business unimpededly at Naukratis in Persian-controlled Egypt. No evidence speaks to the question—nothing indicates anything like embargoes were ever implemented—but the incident where Xerxes encountered on his march Greek merchant ships in the Hellespont shows that seizures could be contemplated (Hdt. 7.147.2–3). The exploitation of supplies of Pontic grain, indicated by this same episode, might suggest an endeavor to lessen dependence on Egypt had taken place during the decade of the 480s. The ramifications of such trends are unfortunately obscure in the absence of direct evidence.]

Next we may briefly consider the effects of the hostilities on Athenian policies. Themistokles may have turned his thoughts toward removing the Aiginetan threat to the Peiraeus as early as when he began the fortification of the port in his archonship of 493/2 (Thuc. 1.93.3). Although the Athenians had not overthrown the Aiginetan government, or subdued the island, they still had reason for some satisfaction. The defection of Nikodromos and his party was an increment to Athenian strength, and a corresponding diminution of Aigina's. The Athenian victory over the Argive volunteers marked a striking demonstration of the prowess of the Athenian hoplite. Nothing in the fighting, which the Athenians perhaps viewed as defensive, discredited a policy of confrontation with Aigina. However, the discovery that a portion of the fleet was not battle-worthy must have quickly become a *cause célèbre*. It is uncertain whether Themistokles' proposals to direct revenues to the development of the fleet, and to make changes in the naval establishment, though eventually associated, had a simultaneous birth, as Stesimbrotus' dating and context for the debate on the naval law implies. Nevertheless, the failure to bring support to Nikodromos can reasonably be seen as a cause of the decision to supersede the naucraric system, with its quasi-private ship procurement (see pp. 163–68 below). If the association of Themistokles with fighting against Aigina in 489 or 488 be admitted, then it is proper to see the eventual passage of the naval bill as a product of a long educative process, rather than an adventitious initiative prompted by the happenstance of a state surplus. The Aiginetans were doubtless aware of the propagandizing on behalf of a stronger fleet and had taken their steps in reaction (as noted above). Thus one may well judge favorably the credibility of Stesimbrotus on Miltiades' opposition to the naval bill.

A final conclusion touches on the political conflict between Aristides and Themistokles. Aristides spent his ostracism on Aigina, where tradition had him the recipient of Persian overtures. Friendship with the Aiginetans surely

stood as one of the motivations of Aristeides' opposition to the naval bill, as they were its ostensible targets, perhaps along with fears of a centralization of military functions, and an increase in liturgies (if that term can be used anachronistically). The opposition could have had its beginning in the period before the magnitude of the Laurion surplus became known, and so was more understandable in its anxiety over the fiscal and social costs of armament. Raubitschek has called attention to the traditions on Aristeides and Aigina.⁷⁵ The Athenians feared that Aristeides would Medize during Xerxes' invasion. Furthermore, an ostrakon accuses Aristeides of an act of impiety toward a group of suppliants, identified by Raubitschek as fugitives from the Nikodromos coup.^{75a} He further connected this act of impiety with a charge of judicial tyranny levelled against Aristeides by Themistokles (Plut. *Aris.* 7.1; for hearing cases of usurpation of citizenship by Aiginetan fugitives?). While his second point is problematical, a post-Marathon date for the hostilities with Aigina renders Raubitschek's hypothesis more probable because of an increased proximity of Aristeides' ostracism to the acceptance of the suppliants. | All the accusations leveled in connection with Aristeides' links to the Aiginetan aristocracy may have been sustained by the fact that he was the Aiginetan *proxenos* at Athens (see pp. 192–95 below).

In the campaign against Aristeides, Medism, impiety, and tyranny were served up in an improbable but highly effective mixture. He could be called a Medizer because he associated with the Aiginetans, who had Medized at a moment traumatic for the Athenians, because he had opposed ships being built against Aigina, which could also be used against Persia, and perhaps because he was connected with the Alkmeonids, already discredited for Medism. If Aristeides had spoken against the fugitive Aiginetans, he could be described as an enemy of suppliants, like his Aiginetan friends whose massacre of suppliant rebels became a theme for Athenian anti-Aiginetan propaganda. To be pro-Aiginetan provided a link, unfortunately for Aristeides, between opposition to the naval bill in the late 480s and actual or imagined treason (at home and abroad) at the time of Marathon.

75. Aristeides' ostracism on Aigina: [Dem.] 26.6; Aristodemos *FGH* 104 F 1.4; cf. Plut. *Aris.* 8.1; *Them.* 11.1; Hdt. 8.79.1; *Suda s.v.* Ἀριστείδης, α 3903 Adler; δαρείκους, δ 872 Adler.

75a. A.E. Raubitschek, "Das Datislied," *Charites: Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft* (Bonn 1957) 234–42. His emendation of the ostrakon (P 5978):

[Ἀριστείδης]
[ho Λυσίμ]αχο
[hὸς τὸ]ς ηἰκέτας
[ἀπό]λεσ]εν or ἀπείσ]εν

See Figueira *Aegina and Athens* 299–305; [now M.L. Lang, *Ostraka, The Athenian Agora* 25 (Princeton 1990) #44, p. 37.]

Xanthippos, Father of Perikles, and the *Prutaneis* of the *Naukraroi*

THE STRIKING, unexpected juxtaposition of my title suggests the central point of the analysis that follows.¹ I shall argue that an ostrakon naming Xanthippos, son of Aripbron and father of Perikles, shows the continued existence in the early fifth century of the *prutaneis* of the *naukraroi*, otherwise attested only in Herodotus' narrative on the Kylonian affair (5.71.2). The determination of a correct reading of the ostrakon not only provides confirmation of the very historicity of the *prutaneis*, but also sheds light on the Athenian naval establishment before the legislation of Themistokles. Moreover, an identification of the *prutaneis* encourages a rethinking of those aspects of Xanthippos' career that involve sea warfare. Finally, the duties assigned to the *prutaneis* suggest a specific incident in the early 480s which provides a historical context for the ostracism of Xanthippos.

THE XANTHIPPOS OSTRAKON

So little evidence is in our possession about the crucial decade of the 480s and about Xanthippos, one of its leading statesmen, that a short, enigmatic document such as the Xanthippos ostrakon necessitates an exhaustive investigation. This ostrakon contains an elegiac couplet inscribed in two concentric circles on a kylix foot. Found on the lower part of the western slope of the Areiopagos by the excavators of the Agora (Agora Inv. P 16873 [= Agora #1065]), it was published first by Raubitschek, whose text (without accentuation) is presented here.²

Χσανθ[ιππον κατα]φρ[ε]σιω ἀλειτερον πρ[υτ]ανειον
τὸστρακ[ον] Ἀρρι[φ]ρονος παιδα μα[λ]ιστα ἀδικεν|

Other ostraka against Xanthippos exist. Both Vanderpool and Meiggs-Lewis report 17 Xanthippos ostraka, of which 15 come from the Agora.³ I count 23

1. The following works are cited by author: A.E. Raubitschek, "The Ostracism of Xanthippos," *AJA* 51 (1947) 257-62; O. Broneer, "Notes on the Xanthippos Ostrakon," *AJA* 52 (1948) 341-43; E. Schweigert, "The Xanthippos Ostrakon," *AJA* 53 (1949) 266-68; A. Wilhelm, "Zum Ostrakismos des Xanthippos, des Vaters des Perikles," *AnzWien* 86 (1949) 237-43; R. Merkelbach, "Das Distichon über den Ostrakismos des Xanthippos," *ZPE* 4 (1969) 201-2. [See M. Lang, *Ostraka, The Athenian Agora* 25 (Princeton 1990). My references to her catalogue of ostraka will be abbreviated using Agora and the symbol #, e.g. Agora #1.]

2. Raubitschek 257. In v. 1, a disyllabic word beginning with a consonant, such as *τὸδε*, may have stood in place of the *κατα*- in *κατάφρ[ε]σιω*, of which the only other fifth-century instance is Soph. *OT* 506 (Raubitschek 258 and n. 5). Cf. Merkelbach 202.

3. E. Vanderpool, "Some Ostraka from the Athenian Agora," *Hesperia*, Suppl. 8 (1949) 394-412, esp. 411, for those known prior to 1946; Meiggs-Lewis 21, p. 47.

as the total number recorded in publications.⁴ The *Athenaion Politeia* reports his ostracism in 485/4, and distinguishes him from the first three ostracized, who were connected with the Peisistratid tyrants: Hipparkhos Kharmou; Megakles Hippokratous; and another whose name is not reported (22.6). As the only ostrakon possibly informing us about his ostracism (the others bear only his name), one might assume that the Xanthippos ostrakon is from the very year of his ostracism, but caution is advisable, since the ostrakon was an isolated find.⁵ The character, however, of the Xanthippos ostrakon will be seen to suggest that the charge it contained arose from the campaign against Xanthippos in the year of his ostracism.

That the charge against Xanthippos is put into poetic form is significant. Acceptance has been accorded Raubitschek's suggestion that the inscriber of the sherd composed the poem to provide a reason for his vote.⁶ Composing and inscribing an epigram, however, seems a premeditated act, intrinsically different from casually inscribing an insult like "Traitor" (Kallixenos [Agora #589]), "Persian" (Kallias), or "Brother of Datis" (Aristeides [Agora #56]).⁷ The inscriber is a possible author, but such an attribution does not mean that he composed the poem extemporaneously to be read only by those who would tally the vote. Certainly, such a notion is not consonant with the oral character of archaic and even fifth-century poetry, including compositions in elegiacs.⁸ Elegy was used for admonitory, often gnomic pronouncements meant to instruct its audience, and was primarily disseminated through symposia.⁹ In

4. IG I² 909.1, from Acropolis, with patronymic: A. Brueckner, "Mitteilungen aus dem Kerameikos," *AM* 40 (1915) 1–26, esp. 6, #3; IG I² 909.2, road to Peiraieus, with patronymic: Brueckner *AM* (1915) 6–7, #4; #1313 from Acropolis, with patronymic: B. Graef, *Die antiken Vasen von der Akropolis zu Athen* (Berlin 1909–1933) 2.115. Fourteen known from Agora [seventeen: Agora #1053–69]: T.L. Shear, "The Campaign of 1935," *Hesperia* 5 (1936) 1–42, esp. 39 [six inc. Agora #1054]; *id.*, "The Campaign of 1937," *Hesperia* 7 (1938) 311–62, esp. 361; *id.*, "The Campaign of 1940," *Hesperia* 10 (1941) 1–8, esp. 2–3 [inc. Agora #1058]. BK 1312: B. Petrakos, "Chronika," *AD* 17.2 (1961–1962) 35–36. Kerameikos Inv. 3026, with patronymic: F. Willemsen, "Ostraka," *AM* 80 (1965) 100–26, esp. 102–4; 1 from the Kerameikos, with patronymic: Willemsen, "Die Ausgrabungen im Kerameikos, 1966," *AD* 23.2 (1968) 24–29, cf. G. Daux, *BCH* 92 (1968) 732–33. Agora Inv. P 10275 [= Agora #1066], with patronymic: C.G. Boulter, "Graves in Lenormant Street, Athens," *Hesperia* 32 (1963) 113–37, esp. #37, p. 135. Inv. R 243, with patronymic: A.E. Raubitschek, "Drei Ostraka in Heidelberg," *AA* (1969) 107–8. Our ostrakon brings the total to 23 [26].

5. Compare the Kerameikos deposit, representing in one of its components the ostraka of 487/6: Willemsen *AD* (1968) 28–29.

6. Raubitschek 257; E. Vanderpool, "Ostracism at Athens," *Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple, Second Series, 1966–73* (Cincinnati 1973) 223 = #6 (1970) 9. Cf. Merkelbach 202–3; pp. 158–59 below.

7. Note Kallias in Daux, *BCH* (1968) 732; Kallixenos in G.A. Stamires & E. Vanderpool, "Kallixenos the Alkmeonid," *Hesperia* 19 (1950) 376–90, esp. #32, #33; Aristeides in A.E. Raubitschek, "Das Datislied," in K. Schauenburg (ed.), *Charites: Studien zum Altertumswissenschaft* (Bonn 1957) 234–42.

8. See Theognis 239–43; 1055–58; cf. 531–34; 943–44 and Solon "Salamis," fr. 1 W.

9. P. von der Mühl, "Das griechische Symposion," *Ausgewählte Kleine Schriften* (Basel 1976) 483–505, esp. 497–504; D.M. Levine, "Symposium and the Polis," in *Theognis* 176–96.

symposia, partisan poetry kept its oral dimension, as the poems of Alcaeus show.¹⁰ Thus a political faction is a likely initial context within which the epigram of the ostrakon circulated.

While dissemination of poems among a restricted circle of *hetairoi* served to reaffirm factional solidarity, at Athens, where political power was socially dispersed, poetry sought a wider audience. Late sixth- and early fifth-century Athens saw several political campaigns mediated through poetry. Witness the attempt by the Peisistratid Hipparkhos to associate his family's regime with a reign of *sōphrosunē* ([Plato] *Hipparch.* 228C).¹¹ Opponents countered with the Attic *skolia*, celebrating anti-Peisistratid heroes (*PMG* 893–96, 906, 907, 911; cf. Arist. *Vesp.* 1222–23). Perhaps most to the point is the poetic campaign of Timokreon of Rhodes against Themistokles (*PMG* 727–30; Plut. *Them.* 21.3–7). In fr. 1 (*PMG* 727), in language similar in tone to the Xanthippos ostrakon, Timokreon calls Themistokles *ψεύσταν ἄδικον προδότην* 'duplicitous evil traitor', and then alludes to speculation in his management of exiles and restorations. There exist, then, parallels to support the supposition that our distich belonged to the campaign before Xanthippos' ostracism, a campaign rather like the one against Themistokles wherein a group of confederates collaborated in preparing ostraka for distribution at an ostracism.¹²

Perhaps our couplet intended to cast in easily memorable metric form the substance of a culpable action of Xanthippos. The subject of the verb *φρσίν* (or *καταφρσίν*) seems to be the ostrakon itself, which is made to aver Xanthippos' guilt.¹³ Perhaps the ostrakon stands metonymically for the campaign against Xanthippos, for the voting process, or for the ostracism itself (cf. Philochorus *FGH* 328 F 30).¹⁴ Therefore, while it was circulated before the ostracism, the poem planted a suggestion in Athenian minds about how they should vote.

Furthermore, the couplet may be literally mnemonic, because it emphasizes the identity of the father of Xanthippos; he is . . . Ἀρρί]φρονος παῖδα. . . His enemies were perhaps anxious to distinguish him from his homonym, the Alkmeonid Xanthippos Hippokratous (one ostrakon), a man either thought worthy of ostracism on his own account or mistaken for Xanthippos Ariphronos (6 ostraka) in the Kerameikos deposit.¹⁵ Xanthippos Hippokratous, probably the eponymous archon of 479/8, was an eminent man in his own right (*Marmor Parium FGH* 238 A 52; *DS* 11.27.1; cf. Plut. *Aris.*

10. J. Trumpf, "Über das Trinken in der Poesie des Alkaios," *ZPE* 12 (1973) 139–60.

11. P. Friedländer, with H.B. Hoffleit, *Epigrammata: Greek Inscriptions in Verse* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1948) 139–41, #149; cf. *IG* I² 837.

12. O. Broneer, "Excavations of the North Slope of the Acropolis, 1937," *Hesperia* 7 (1938) 161–263, esp. 228–43; see also Vanderpool *Semple Lectures* 225–26 = 6.11–13.

13. Raubitschek 257; Broneer 341; Schweigert 267; Wilhelm 238. Cf. Merkelbach 202.

14. Cratinus fr. 71 K has a similar idiom: (Perikles) *τοῦστρακον παροίχεται*. Because the couplet could exist without inscription, the ostrakon uses the third person rather than addressing the reader in the first person, more usual for dedications or funeral stelai (i.e., contexts for elegiac verse inscriptions analogous to the couplet [e.g., *IG* I² 585 = Friedländer-Hoffleit #96; *IG* I² 920 = #59; *IG* I² 1014 = #80; and esp. *IG* XII.5 216 = #110]). Cf. *IG* XII.9 285 = #140.

15. R. Thomsen, *The Origin of Ostracism* (Copenhagen 1972) 94; cf. Willemssen *AD* (1968) 29.

5.10).¹⁶ His father's name Hippokrates, associated with early fifth-century Alkmeonids, promoted confusion, for it is well represented among the ostraka.¹⁷ Xanthippos Ariphronos and Xanthippos Hippokratous may have been cousins.¹⁸ Note the marriage of Xanthippos Ariphronos to the Alkmeonid Agariste (Hdt. 6.131.2; Plut. *Per.* 3.2).

The status of the distich as political poetry suggests the following criteria for evaluation of modern interpretations. 1) Clarity of reference: the anecdote alluded to must have been instantly recognizable to Athenians of the 480s. Note that Plutarch possessed the evidence to give details about the anti-Themistokles poems of Timokreon (Plut. *Them.* 21.3–7). 2) Significance and non-controversiality: a short elegiac poem or a fragment of such a poem is not an invitation to rethink one's political philosophy. The incident alluded to is unlikely to have been one about which Athenians disagreed, although there may have been disagreement about Xanthippos' responsibility. 3) Selectivity and non-offensiveness: the charge against Xanthippos ought to have incriminated him and not gratuitously inculpated others. Ostracisms were political occasions fraught with the potential for distractions. Nearly 150 men are named on ostraka, most of whom were scarcely viable candidates. The distich ought to have focused guilt rather than have refracted it.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COUPLET

It is relatively easy to make a beginning at interpreting the ostrakon. Something—most have thought the ostrakon itself—says (φασίν) or assents (καταφασίν) that Xanthippos, the son of Arriphron (in literary texts, Ariphron), has harmed or mistreated the most (μάλιστα ἀδικῆν [= ἀδικεῖν]). To move to specifics, it is necessary to interpret the syntax and meaning of the words αλειτερον πρυτανειον. I have outlined the suggestions of previous scholars on these words.

Raubitschek:	αλειτερον = acc., ἀλειτηρός = ἀλιτήριος 'malefactor' with Χσανθιππον. πρυτανειον = acc., πρυτανεῖον 'townhall', internal obj. of ἀδικεῖν.
Broneer:	πρυτανεῖον, dir. obj. of ἀδικεῖν.
Schweigert:	αλειτερον = acc., ἀλειτηρός = ἀλιτήριος, agreeing with Χσανθιππον. πρυτανειον = gen. pl., πρύτανις 'president', dependent on αλειτερον.
Wilhelm:	αλειτερον = gen. pl., ἀλιτήριος, qualifying πρυτανειον (gen. pl.) πρυτανειον = gen. pl., πρύτανις, dependent on μάλιστα.

16. Xanthippos Ariphronos was *stratēgos* in this year (Hdt. 7.33; 8.131.3; 9.114.2; 9.120.4), and the holding of both offices simultaneously seems improbable: P. Bicknell, "The Archon of 489/8 and the Archonship of Aristides Lysimachou Alopekethen," *RFIC* 100 (1972) 164–72, esp. 171–72. Cf. Davies *APF* 456.

17. Thomsen *Ostracism* 94 (cf. Willemsen *AD* [1968] 29); Meiggs-Lewis p. 46; Vanderpool *Seppel Lectures* 235 = 6.21.

18. Bicknell *RFIC* (1972) 172.

Merkelbach: αλειτερον = gen. pl., ἀλητέροι (comp. deg. of ἀλήϊος 'poor-in-land'), poss. gen. with πρυτάνειον (nom. sing.)
πρυτάνειον = nom. sing., πρυτανείον 'townhall', subj. of φεσίν.

These interpretations fall into two groups: one group construes the two words separately (Raubitschek, Broneer) and another puts them into the same syntactical unit (Schweigert, Wilhelm, and Merkelbach). In terms of word order, the latter alternative appears preferable.

Broneer offers a literal reading.¹⁹ To him, the *prutaneion* is the public dining hall²⁰ where Xanthippos has abused public hospitality much as Kleon is accused of doing in Arist. *Equites* 280–81. Broneer believes that the term *alitērios*²¹ was connected with religious offenses involving eating, and notes etymologies for the word in anecdotes about religious offenses during a famine.²²

A first objection is that the phrase ἀδικεῖν πρυτανείον is an odd one, which to my knowledge is unparalleled. Broneer cites Arist. *Ach.* 56: ὧνδρες πρυτάνεις ἀδικεῖτε τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, but this is hardly comparable. The *ekklesia* is foremost an aggregation of citizens rather than a place or a building. Moreover, while the Greeks spoke (as we do) of political corruption as a feeding at public expense, most of Broneer's passages on eating and the charge of being an ἀλιτήριος do not demonstrate strong affinities between the two concepts.²³ Attic Old Comedy transmuted political interaction into alimentary and sexual activity. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that gluttony stood for self-aggrandizing politics in the *Equites* (e.g. 50–60, 250–65, 573–76), and that the counter-image of politicians like Paphlagon/Kleon and the aptly-named Sausage-seller feeding old Demos also appeared (e.g. 213–16, 353–62, 642–82, 1131–1225). The charge that Paphlagon/Kleon is one of the *alitērioi* appears in a grossly exaggerated medley of charge and counter-charge (445–46), and is not closely tied to the theme of the violation of the *prutaneion*.

19. Broneer 341–43.

20. In general, see S.G. Miller, *The Prytaneion: Its Function and Architectural Form* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1978) 4–24, 38–66.

21. On ἀλιτήριος, see W.H.P. Hatch, "The Use of ΑΛΙΤΗΡΙΟΣ, ΑΛΙΤΡΟΣ, ΑΡΑΙΟΣ, ΕΝΑΓΗΣ, ΕΝΘΥΜΙΟΣ, ΠΑΛΑΜΝΑΙΟΣ, and ΠΙΟΣΤΡΟΠΑΙΟΣ: A Study in Greek Lexicography," *HSCP* 19 (1908) 157–86. For phonetic and semantic evolution, see E. Tichy, "Griech. αλειτηρός, νηλειτής und die Entwicklung der Wortsippe αλειτής," *Glotta* 55 (1977) 160–77.

22. The lexica trace the term either to people grinding grain or to those stealing from persons grinding: ΣPlato *Laws* 854B; *Suda* s.v. ἀλιτήριοι, α 1258, cf. 1257, 1259–60 Adler; *EM* s.v. ἀλιτήριοι, 65.32–45 Gaisford; *Anec. Bekk.* 1.377. Note also the illogical etymology calling the *alitērioi* those who inform on those grinding (and hoarding) grain: Plut. *Mor.* 523A–B, cf. *Mor.* 297A. Hoarding food in a famine is obviously antisocial, which prompted such fallacious etymologizing (from ἀλέω 'grind'). See P. Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque* (Paris 1968–1980) 1.56–57. Most versions, however, assert that *alitērios* was extended to all who use βία and also report the genuine connection with the verb ἀλιτράινειν (ΣPlato; *EM*; *Anec. Bekk.*; *Suda*).

23. For example, Broneer's Demosthenic passages (Dem. 18.159; 19.226) use ἀλιτήριος for Aeschines, but not where he is accused of feasting with Philip (18.287; cf. 19.229). To Aeschines, Demosthenes was an ἀλιτήριος (3.131, 157), but in a context emphasizing his ill-starred fecklessness (3.131; cf. Din. 1.77). Quite different is Lys. 6.52, 53 which sees Andocides as polluted, hence an *alitērios*, echoing official terminology (And. 1.51).

Without the metaphorical framework of the *Equites*, such a charge against Xanthippos appears trivial.

Indeed, the notion of politicians dining (or indulging themselves) in the *prutaneion* appears often in the *Equites* (167–68, 280–83, 573–76, 709, 766, 819, 1404–5; cf. *Pax* 1084) and it is not always intrinsically bad (573–76, 1404–5; cf. 538). At Athens, some officials, like certain or perhaps all the *stratēgoi* (Aesch. 2.80; 3.196), and victors in the panhellenic games (*IG* I² 77 = *IG* I³ 132; Plato *Apol.* 36D; Timokles fr. 8 K), had the right of *sitēsis* ‘dining’ in the *prutaneion* (see also Dem. 23.130; ΣThuc. 2.15.2).²⁴ Leading politicians like victorious generals, along with the descendants of public benefactors like Harmodios and Aristogeiton (Is. 5.47; Din. 1.101; cf. *IG* I³ 132) could win permanent *sitēsis*. A direct equation of a recipient of *sitēsis* with an *alitērios* would be both indiscreet and non-discrete.

Raubitschek’s interpretation of the ostrakon treats *πρυτανειον* as an internal accusative with a word such as *πολύν* as the implied direct object. Such a construction would palliate but does not altogether remove objections to the phrase *ἀδικεῖν πρυτανεῖον*. To Raubitschek, the word *αλειτερον* is the operative word in the epigram, as it connects Xanthippos with the Alkmeonids, *alitērioi* in popular feeling because of the murder of the Kylonians (Thuc. 1.126.11–12; ΣArist. *Equites* 445a J/W). Raubitschek assigns Xanthippos to the *genos* of the Bouzygai,²⁵ whose ritual duties, involving the hearth and the *prytaneion*, may be envisaged here (ΣAristid. 2.130.1, vol. 3.473 [Dindorf]). The scholion quotes from the *Demoi* of Eupolis (fr. 96 K), *ὁ Βουζύγης ἄριστος ἀλιτήριος* (a *rhētor*), refers it to Perikles of the Bouzygai, and then elucidates *ἀλιτήριος* on the basis of the accursedness of the Alkmeonids. Yet, this identification raises problems. The same play (fr. 97 K) also contains the phrase *Βουζύγης ἀδικούμενος*, as indicated by a scholion to Arist. *Lys.* 397 (Dübner). Yet *Lys.* 391–97 refers to the orator Demostratos as an enemy of the gods and a Bouzyges, so that Demostratos may have been the subject of both allusions to a Bouzyges in the *Demoi*. He earned the appellation *alitērios* for proposing the decree authorizing the Sicilian Expedition (*Lys.* 391–92; cf. Plut. *Nic.* 12.6; *Alcib.* 18.3). The name Demostratos may be independently attested for the *genos* of the Bouzygai.²⁶ It seems farfetched that both Perikles and Demostratos were called *Bouzugēs* in the same play, especially one which presented Perikles among past great statesmen in contrast to degenerate contemporaries.²⁷ If Demostratos is the *alitērios* of fr. 96 K, the information in the

24. Cf. *IG* II² 832. See M.J. Osborne, “Entertainment in the Prytaneion at Athens,” *ZPE* 41 (1981) 153–70; Miller *Prytaneion* 7–9, for full citations.

25. J. Toepffer, *Attische Genealogie* (Berlin 1889) 146–49 and esp. n. 1, p. 148.

26. The other known *gennētēs* was Demainetos (Aesch. 2.78; cf. Xen. *HG* 5.1.10, 5.1.26; *Hell. Oxy.* VI[I].1, 3; VIII[III].1). The names Demainetos and Demostratos appear in a family of the deme Paiania: Davies *APF* #3276, pp. 103–6. Another family from Kerameis, however, using the name Demainetos, is another possibility (*APF* #3273).

27. T. Kock, *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta* (Leipzig 1888) 1.282; Beloch *GG*² 2.2.33; cf. Davies *APF* p. 459.

scholion about Perikles the *Bouzugēs* is suspect, but not necessarily untrue. Nevertheless, considerable doubt is thrown on the proposition that a late fifth-century Athenian audience would automatically associate the term *alitērios* with Athenians tainted by the Kylonian pollution.

There are terminological reasons to doubt that *alitērios* connoted the Kylonian curse when the distich was composed. The usage of the term most nearly contemporary to our ostrakon is a stele mentioned by Lycurgus in which the metal of a statue of Hipparkhos Kharmou was reused for a list containing the names of *alitērioi* and *prodotai* (1.117). Here, the meaning of *alitērios* appears primarily political (i.e., Medism). The use of ἀλιτήριος (or ἀλιτρός) in poetry and particularly in elegy seems to connect it with the hybriistic individual, offensive to the gods (*Il.* 23.595; *Od.* 5.182; cf. *Il.* 8.361; Alcman *PMG* 79; Solon fr. 13.25–28 W; Sem. fr. 7.7 W; Theognis 377–80, 731–36, 743–46; cf. Pin. *Ol.* 2.58–60, *Nem.* 8.38–39).²⁸ By the end of the fifth century ἀλιτήριος is used often of religious pollution.²⁹ Nonetheless, Attic Old Comedy, where ἀλιτήριος was used rather more casually as a term of abuse (Arist. *Equites* 445–46; Eupolis fr. 146 K), led into the the orators' usage (mostly fourth-century) of ἀλιτήριος, one in which it was used of personal enemies and destructive political malefactors with only a residual sense of their offensiveness to the gods.³⁰ As the lexica observe, an ἀλιτήριος could be anyone who used βία. This sequence of connotations seems to suggest that ἀλιτήριος in an early fifth-century context is not likely to have necessarily reminded its hearers of the Kylonian curse, but was appropriate for any individual whose condemnation by the community was assumed to include an offensiveness to the gods.

There are also objections about the practicality of invoking the Kylonian pollution against Xanthippos. The *Athenaion Politeia* distinguishes Xanthippos from earlier victims of ostracism, the friends of the tyrants (22.6). But, for Raubitschek, the ostrakon indicates that affinity to the Alkmeonids was a leading accusation against Xanthippos. Why, then, did the Attidographic traditions lying behind the *Athenaion Politeia* not also consider him, like Megakles, a tyrannist?³¹ Furthermore, after the first expulsion of the Alkmeonids engineered by Myron (*Ath. Pol.* 1.1; Plut. *Solon* 12.2–4), the Kylonian miasma was, to the best of our knowledge, employed only by non-Athenians. Kleomenes was acting under his authority as king of Sparta (Sparta being *hēgemōn* over her ally Athens?) when he expelled the accursed c. 508 (*Hdt.* 5.70.2, 5.72.1; *Thuc.* 1.126.12). The Spartans again brought up the Kylonian pollution during the propaganda campaign against Perikles' leadership on the eve of the Peloponnesian War (*Thuc.* 1.126.2, 127.1–2). The figure of 700

28. Cf. Hatch *HSCP* (1908) 157–65.

29. *Thuc.* 1.126.11; *And.* 1.51; *Lys.* 6.52, 53; 13.79; cf. *Soph.* *OC* 371–73.

30. *And.* 1.130–31; *Aesch.* 3.131, 157; *Dem.* 18.159; 19.197, 226; *Din.* 1.77. The most attenuated deployments of the term appear in Middle and New Comedy: Euboulos fr. 88 K; Damoxenos fr. 2.8 K; Menander, *Epitrep.* 574; fr. 746 Koerte. See A.W. Gomme & F.H. Sandbach, *Menander: A Commentary* (Oxford 1973) 362.

31. See A.W. Gomme, "Athenian Notes," *AJP* 65 (1944) 321–39, esp. 324–25, 330–31.

families for those expelled by Kleomenes (Hdt. 5.72.1) suggests that intermarriage had dispersed the Kylonian taint throughout the Athenian elite. After exiles of such an extent, Isagoras, in whose interest Kleomenes was acting, was compelled to try a narrowly-based oligarchy controlled by a council of 300 supporters (Hdt. 5.72.1). Many political factions may have had prominent men touched by the *agos*, so that only an external power, Sparta, and its collaborators could take up this weapon. Even the son of Xanthippos' enemy Miltiades (Hdt. 6.136.1), Kimon, could be tainted through his marriage to the Alkmeonid Isodike (Plut. *Cimon* 4.10).

A final objection can be brought against Raubitschek's interpretation. Would the inscriber of the ostrakon not have used *ἀσεβείν* instead of *ἀδικεῖν*, if Xanthippos had polluted the communal hearth?³² Note that Aristophanes (*Th.* 367) writes *ἀσεβοῦσιν ἀδικοῦσιν τε τὴν πόλιν* when he wants to charge secular and sacred transgressions.³³ *Asebeia* and *adikia* are similarly distinguished in *SIG*³ 372.10–11 (288–81), honoring Lysimakhos for intervention against trespassers in the sanctuary of the Samothracian gods. Aristotle distinguishes *asebeia*, *pleonexia*, and *hubris* (*VV* 1251a30–b3).

Raubitschek has thus offered a concatenation of associations to be triggered in the minds of Athenians by the ostrakon. Yet there is some doubt whether *ἀλιτῆριος* and *ἀδικεῖν* would have primarily involved religious or ritual guilt at the time of Xanthippos' ostracism. Moreover, even if *ἀλιτῆριος* connoted pollution of the prytanial hearth, the explanation that such pollution would involve Xanthippos through his marriage to an Alkmeonid is unproven. It is uncertain whether cult activity as a Bouzyges (if in fact Xanthippos belonged to the *genos*, a questionable proposition) would be important enough to swing enough weight in an ostracism.

Next, those interpretations that treat the words *αλειτερον πρυτανειον* as a phrase may be considered. To Merkelbach, the words are to be read *ἀληιτέρων πρυτανείων* 'town-hall of the landless'! The term *πρυτανειον* is in the nominative and is the subject of the sentence, while *ἀληιτέρων* is a possessive genitive. Many objections can be raised against this interpretation. The use of the obscure term *ἀληιτέροι*, otherwise unattested, fails a test of ease of comprehension. The word would be the comparative degree of *ἀλήϊος*; that term, however, is confined to epic (*Il.* 9.125 = 9.267) where, strikingly, it appears only in litotes.³⁴ That *ἀληιτέρος* would be used in an elegiac couplet seems improbable, especially since the well-attested reproach *ἀλιτῆριος* could be easily mistaken for it. Furthermore, to have the prytaneion speak, that is, to personify a building, seems a novel turn of speech, one quite different from an ostrakon or a *mnēma* being thought to speak when someone reads it.

32. Wilhelm 240.

33. Note *IG* VII 2418.3, where *ἀσεβίοντας* has the direct object *τὸ ἱερόν* in a Theban reference to the Phokian profanation of the Delphic sanctuary.

34. E.-M. Geiss, s.v. *ἀλήϊος* in B. Snell (ed.), *Lexikon der frühgriechischen Epos* 1 (Göttingen 1979) cols. 478–79.

Merkelbach's suggestion that the ostrakon represents a record of the official condemnation of Xanthippos founders on the epigrammatic form of the inscription.³⁵ The distich has no affinities with official language, where *δοκέω* is used in reports of legislation. *Prutaneion* can never have stood in place of *dēmos*, for it was merely the public hearth, a place of public entertainment and civic ritual, and not a site for deliberative activity by the *ekklēsia*, *boulē*, or even the prytaneis themselves. The ostrakon only makes sense prospectively, inscribed before the ostracism. While there is some evidence for a division of Athenians into two parties during the 480s (*Ath. Pol.* 28.2), the "landless" cannot have been a name for the democratic party. Compare the agricultural names for the first three Solonian classes. Nor does the term *thetes* connote landlessness, but the group's servile or salaried character (*Poll.* 3.82; *Hesych. s.v. θῆς*, 541 Latte). According to Thucydides the majority of the Athenian population still lived in the countryside at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War (2.14.2, 16.1–2), which suggests that the landless were not a majority. Finally, when the *Athenaion Politeia* speaks of two parties, Xanthippos is the leader of the democratic party, the presumed "landless" (28.2).

A final group of interpretations sees the word *πρύτανις* 'president' behind *prutaneion*, with an epsilon lengthened to *ει* for the sake of the meter.³⁶ [Schweigert compares *Dem.* 18.159: *κοινὸν ἀλειτήριον τῶν μετὰ ταῦτ' ἀπολωλότων ἀπάντων*, and interprets *ἀλειτερον πρυτανειον* as 'a curse of the leaders'. Thus, Schweigert believes *πρύτανις* is a non-technical term to denote politicians opposing Xanthippos, and perhaps especially Miltiades, whom he prosecuted (*Hdt.* 6.136.1). Such a connotation for *πρύτανις* is unparalleled, as it cannot mean "leading politician" or "aristocrat/oligarch", like *δυνατός* or *γνώριμος*. The term *πρύτανις* is used for officials, whether single high office holders, as in cities where the *prutanis* was the eponymous magistrate, or colleges, like the *prutaneis* of the *boulē* at Athens.³⁷ By extension other officials not technically *prutaneis* and even the gods could be called *prutaneis*.³⁸

35. L. Robert, *BE* 1970 (*REG* 83) #234, p. 386: "En un distique?"

36. Schweigert 266–67 cites C.D. Buck, *The Greek Dialects*² (Chicago 1955) §9.1, p. 21; *Tod GHI* #171D.2, 2.208 (4th century). Wilhelm independently cites several grave epigrams: *IG* XII.5 675.2 (A.D.); *IG* I² 1063; Peek, *GVI* 1.1989, p. 626 (2nd–1st century). On short *ε* commonly written as *ει* from the third quarter of the fifth century, see L. Threaght, *The Grammar of Attic Inscriptions* (Berlin 1980) 1.147–52, who believes that *-ειον* in the ostrakon is employed mainly to achieve a long syllable, on the analogy of variants like *τέλεος* and *τέλειος* in epic.

37. In general, see F. Gschnitzer, "Prytanis," *RE* Supplbd. 13 (Munich 1973) cols. 730–816. Early individual *prutaneis*: Pittakos at Mytilene: Theophr. *apud* Stob. *Flor.* 44.22; Miletos: *Aris. Pol.* 1305a15–18; Corinth: *DS* 7.9.6; Paus. 2.4.4; Halikarnassos (mid-fifth century): *SIG*³ 45. Early collegial *prutaneis*: Miletos: *DGE* #724; *ATL* 2.D11.67 = *IG* I³ 21; Rhodes: *SIG*³ 110 (see pp. 316–20 below).

38. Cf. Charon of Lampsakos, "Prytanis of the Lakedaimonians" (*FGH* 262 T 1); cf. Paus. 10.2.3; *Plut. Mor.* 602A. The term *πρυτανική* 'presidency' for the rotating command of *stratēgoi* at Marathon might be another such transference (*Hdt.* 6.110; see Gschnitzer *RE* Supplbd. 13, col. 813; cf. R.W. Macan, *Herodotus: The Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Books* [London 1895] 1.367–68). Divine *prutaneis*: *Hymn to Apollo* 3.68; Bacchylides 19.43 (Epaphos, son of Io); *Aes.*

Prutanis and related terms can be used figuratively or literally for anyone said to be presiding, but only over a specific activity.³⁹ An Attic usage of the term near in time to the ostrakon is Aes. *Suppl.* 370–75 (463?) where the king of Argos is described as a *πρύτανις ἄκριτος ὢν*, a notion of which he quickly disabuses the chorus.

A final hypothesis for consideration is that of Wilhelm, who has *πρυτανειον*, for him also the genitive plural of *πρύτανις*, depend on *μάλιστα*.⁴⁰ Also genitive plural is *αλειτερον*, so that the ostrakon charges that Xanthippos is one of a group of *prutaneis* who were *alitiērioi*. This understanding of the syntax of the couplet has received considerable support without much comment.⁴¹ It has the advantage of construing the two words as a single phrase, and is not vulnerable to the criticism directed at interpretations that see *prutaneion* as the town-hall. Although this grammatical interpretation of the couplet should be accepted, a historical interpretation is left to be posited. |

TO WHICH BOARD OF PRYTANEIS DID XANTHIPPOS BELONG?

Scholars have assumed that the prytaneis of the ostrakon were the bouleutic prytaneis. For instance, Wilhelm sees Xanthippos' prosecution of Miltiades behind the charge. But the one attractive context within this episode for an intervention of the bouleutic prytaneis can be ruled out (Hdt. 6.136; Nepos *Milt.* 7.5–6). Plato *Gorgias* 516D–E states that Miltiades would have been condemned to be thrown into a pit, had the *prutanis* presiding over the trial not intervened. Could the ire of the composer of the distich have been directed against Xanthippos and the remaining *prutaneis* save the one who intervened?⁴² There has been a tendency to reject this anecdote out of hand.⁴³ To accept its relevance one would have to believe that, while Miltiades was on trial before the *dēmos* (Hdt. 6.136.1: *ὑπὸ τὸν δῆμον*), the *prutaneis* were presiding with one acting as *epistatēs*. Why the *epistatēs*, however, is not called *epistatēs* but *prutanis* is in any event difficult to understand. Rhodes suggests that the case reached the *ekklēsia* through *ephēsis* from the jurisdiction of the archon.⁴⁴ In this case, the *prutanis* would be the presiding archon who was

Prom. 169; Eur. *Tr.* 1288; Pin. *Pyth.* 6.24; Stesichorus *PMG* 235. For other metaphorical uses: Ion *PMG* 744; Mel. *Adesp.* *PMG* 954.

39. Plato *Protag.* 338A; Arist. *Ach.* 59–60; Aes. fr. 182 M = 236 R; Isoc. 4.121; Dem. 15.3; Alexis fr. 110 K. See below n. 51.

40. Wilhelm 241, who cites Hdt. 2.37.1; Plato *Protag.* 315A, to which might be added (e.g.) Hdt. 6.128.2; And. 1.103; Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.64; Ages. 10.4; Plut. *Them.* 7.6.

41. Davies *APF* p. 459; Meiggs-Lewis p. 42; Thomsen *Ostracism* 142, n. 189; Vanderpool *Simple Lectures* 223 = 6.9.

42. Cf. Wilhelm 242.

43. H. Berve, *Miltiades: Studien zur Geschichte des Mannes und seiner Zeit* (Berlin 1937) 101; Busolt *GG*² 2.600.

44. P. J. Rhodes, *The Athenian Boule* (Oxford 1972) 199–200. Cf. R. Sealey, "Ephialtes," *Studies in Greek Politics* (New York 1965) 42–58, esp. 47–52; H. T. Wade-Gery, "The Judicial Treaty with Phaselis and the History of the Athenian Courts," *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford 1958) 180–200, esp. 192–95.

called a *prutanis*, as in the passages noted above where the term is used functionally. The intervention of this archon/*prutanis* could not then provide a context for the ostrakon, because the ostrakon implies a group of *prutaneis*.

Moreover, not only this particular attempt to make the ostrakon refer to the prytaneis of the *boulē* but all similar hypotheses strain both probability and our criterion of non-offensiveness. For the *prutaneis* of the ostrakon to be the prytaneis of the *boulē*, Xanthippos, allotted as a *bouleutēs* several years before his ostracism, must have been a prytanis with his tribesmen when some crucial event occurred. To believe this occurrence to have been the trial of Miltiades necessitates in addition that Xanthippos accused Miltiades in the same year as his bouleutic service and that the trial came before the *ekklēsia* in the prytany of his tribe. Regardless of the nature of the matter before the council (Miltiades' trial or some other issue), under the leadership of Xanthippos, the prytaneis would have had to have acted in unison and then to have won the support of the entire *boulē* and *ekklēsia*. But alas, hindsight advised the composer of the distich, and given Xanthippos' ostracism, to an extent, presumably a majority of Athenians, that this action was gravely unjust. Even if one disregards the inequity of the resulting charge on the grounds that Athenian voters tended to absolve themselves, the tracing of responsibility back to Xanthippos appears disproportionate. Nonetheless, if this sequence of improbabilities eventuated, such a coincidence does not make the accusation of the epigram any less offensive. The prytaneis of Akamantis are to be held as *alitērioi* just like traitorous Medizers and the supporters of the Peisistratids. It is just not credible that such a charge would be levelled in an ostracism campaign, where it might alienate a cross-section of citizens from a whole tribe. If the couplet was a part of a campaign against Xanthippos, the reference to the *prutaneis* ought not to refer to the prytaneis of the *boulē*.

Consequently, our criteria of clarity and non-offensiveness appear to be in confrontation, because the former suggests that the ostrakon refers to an easily discernible group of *prutaneis* like the bouleutic prytaneis, while the latter advises that the clarity of such a reference makes it counter-productive. This contradiction can be resolved only if the prytaneis of the *boulē* did not yet exist and the referants of the couplet are sought among another board of *prutaneis*.

First, consider the evidence for the introduction of the system of bouleutic prytaneis. The first known Attic decree with a fully-developed prescript, mentioning a prytany, *grammateus*, and *epistatēs*, is the Phaelis Decree (Meiggs-Lewis 31 = *IG* I³ 10). The Decree dates after the Eurymedon campaign (not earlier than 469?), when the Chians brought Phaelis into the Delian League (Plut. *Cimon* 12.4). For our purposes, it is important only to consider whether the Decree precedes or comes after 462, the date of the Ephialtic reforms. If the prytanic system existed before Ephialtes, it is quite possible that it had existed since Kleisthenes. Wade-Gery argued in dating the Decree to 469–62 that the term *καταδικάσσει* (ll. 18–19) to describe the judgment of the archon suggests something nearer to 'delivering judgment' than is reconcilable with a

presiding officer, a role which the archon held in the fully formulated dikasteric system.⁴⁵ Sealey and Harrison, however, cite examples showing that such subtle nuances of meaning in the use of *δικάζειν* and *καταδικάζειν* do not always prevail.⁴⁶ Yet surely the provision to fine the archon 10,000 dr. for admitting the case to the wrong court suggests that his admission is not merely procedurally incorrect, but self-aggrandizing.⁴⁷ One solution is that of Hignett, who sees the removal of jurisdiction from the magistrates as a change set in motion by the Ephialtic reforms but one taking time to realize itself.⁴⁸ In other words, if the stripping of powers from the Areiopagos necessitated the dikasteric system, it may not have been until that system was in place that it became feasible to shift jurisdiction from the archontic courts. If the Leon who proposed the Decree is the same man who proposed the treaty between Athens and Hermione c. 450, then a date after 462 is slightly supported.⁴⁹ Other presumed early references to the prytanic system are even less satisfying. Plutarch (*Mor.* 628E; cf. *Dem.* 19.303) cites the prytany from the pre-script of the decree proposed by Miltiades before Marathon, but a fully developed pre-script suggests that that decree is in part at least a later composition.⁵⁰ In the Hekatompedon Decree, a prytanis is empowered to levy a fine, but he is probably merely the treasurer presiding at any particular time (a usage similar to those cited in notes 38, 39 above).⁵¹

Just as the Phaselis Decree fails to show the prytanic system in operation before 462, so too do other considerations suggest its absence. The decrees providing rules for the supervision of the treasures stored on the Acropolis, and particularly in the Hekatompedon (*IG* I² 3, 4 = *IG* I³ 4), are dated only by the archon year (485/4). The activities of the treasurers of Athena are organized by months and not as later by prytanies.⁵² Furthermore, an ostrakophoria was presided over by the nine archons and the whole *boulē*. The participation of the archons is perhaps a holdover from the normal dispositions made before

45. Wade-Gery *Essays* 182–86.

46. Sealey *Essays* 50, citing Plato *Laws* 958B–C. A.R.W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens* (Oxford 1968–1971) 2.38 n. 1, comparing *δικάζειν* and *καταδικάζειν*, cites *IG* I² 115.11–12 = *IG* I³ 104; *Ath. Pol.* 52.3, 57.4; *Lys.* 26.12.

47. Cf. Meiggs-Lewis p. 68 for the view that the whole stress is on the archon in the Decree.

48. C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford 1952) 397.

49. *IG* I³ 31. J.H. Oliver, "Selected Greek Inscriptions," *Hesperia* 2 (1933) 480–513, esp. #12 (Agora Inv. 3558 I 317 = *SEG* 10.15), pp. 494–97; Tod *GHI* #32, 1.58–59. Cf. Bengtson *SVA*² #149, 2.57–59.

50. See C. Habicht, "Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter der Perserkriege," *Hermes* 89 (1961) 1–35, esp. 17, 20.

51. U. Kahrstedt, *Untersuchungen zur Magistratur in Athen, Studien zum öffentlichen Recht Athens* 2 (Stuttgart 1936) 164–65, esp. n. 2; K.J. Dover, "ΔΕΚΑΤΟΣ ΑΥΤΟΣ," *JHS* 80 (1960) 61–77, esp. 71, where a prytanis is cited for the *diatētai* (*Dem.* 21.87) and for the *pōlētai* (*Poll.* 8.99).

52. F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques* (Paris 1969) #3, pp. 4–6. See U. Kahrstedt, "Untersuchungen zu athenischen Behörden: IV. Bemerkungen zur Geschichte des Rats der fünfhundert," *Klio* 33 (1940–1941) 1–12, esp. 10.

Ephialtes.⁵³ Another argument concerns the tholos, the building serving as a meeting-place for the prytaneis. This structure was dated by its excavators to 470–460.⁵⁴ Thus, even if a pre-Ephialtic 460s date for the tholos may be admitted as a possibility, the whereabouts of the headquarters of the pre-Ephialtic prytaneis for most of their existence would not be known. The forerunner of the tholos, Building F, was not well suited to the activities of the prytaneis.⁵⁵ While the buildings preceding the tholos were part of a governmental complex which had been important since 550, the accommodation of the prytaneis within them would have been improvisational. Nor in fact is there any aspect of the form of the tholos itself that indicates use by prytaneis. The entire body of the prytaneis could not dine within the building.⁵⁶ Thus, there is no assurance that the tholos was designed expressly for the prytaneis. Finally, Gschnitzer believes that the presidency over the *ekklēsia* by the archon before 462 can be shown by Solon's provision for him to hear cases of improper exportation of foodstuffs, perhaps at the beginning of the year.⁵⁷ Therefore, notwithstanding the fact most of the evidence is negative in character, indicating the absence of the prytaneis, the prytanic system seems to have been originated no earlier than the reforms of Ephialtes in order to facilitate the increased business of the *boulē*, a beneficiary of the powers stripped from the Areiopagos.⁵⁸

The only exit from this dilemma is to hypothesize another group of *prutaneis* for the Xanthippos ostrakon. Such a group lies ready to hand in the prytaneis of the *naukraroi*, who are known from the narrative of Herodotus on the execution of the Kylonians (5.71.2). In considering them, our purpose is not to adjudicate the responsibility for the Kylonian executions by judging between Herodotus and the account of Thucydides assigning responsibility to

53. Philochorus *FGH* 328 F 30; ΣArist. *Equites* 855b J/W; cf. Plut. *Arist.* 7.6. See Kahrstedt *Klio* (1940) 10; *id.*, *Magistratur* 88. Rhodes, *Boule* 18, objects that the threat of disorder may have prompted an unusually strong presiding body. Why this would be so when there is no evidence for discussion during an ostracism is hard to understand. The decision to include the whole *boulē* with the archons suggests that the archons originally presided over the assembly and short of introducing the whole *boulē*, there was no way to strengthen the executive. The prytaneis did not exist or they might have been added to the archons as sufficiently authoritative to control the assembly.

54. H.A. Thompson, *The Tholos of Athens and its Predecessors*, *Hesperia*, Suppl. 4 (1940) 126–28; Miller *Prytaneion* 64; Rhodes *Boule* 19 and n. 1.

55. O. Broneer, rev. Thompson *Tholos*, *AJA* 45 (1941) 127–29; Miller *Prytaneion* 63–65; cf. Thompson *Tholos* 40–44. On the archaic buildings on the tholos site, see Thompson *Tholos* 15–39; *id.*, “Buildings on the West Side of the Agora,” *Hesperia* 6 (1937) 1–226, esp. 115–35.

56. On form, see J. Charbonneaux, “Tholos et prytanée,” *BCH* 49 (1925) 158–78; Miller *Prytaneion* 25–27. Less than 34 prytaneis could be accommodated for dining, although there is no doubt that the prytaneis dined in the tholos (e.g., *Ath. Pol.* 43.3); see Miller *Prytaneion* 57–59, fig. 2 (p. 55). Cf. J. Travlos, *Pictorial Dictionary of Ancient Athens* (New York 1971) 553–54, esp. figs. 692–93. A trittys of the prytaneis with the *epistatēs* slept overnight in the tholos, ready for emergencies, perhaps because more could not be easily accommodated in the tholos (*Ath. Pol.* 44.1). The size of the tholos would fit a board of nine, like the archons, or a board of ten, like the *stratēgoi*, with their attendants and assistants.

57. Gschnitzer *RE* Supplbd. 13, cols. 757–58, who also admits the possibility that the *stratēgoi* presided between 487/6 and 462/1.

58. Cf. Rhodes *Boule* 18–19, 209–11.

the archons (1.126.8). In any case, the Herodotean story represents traditions current in mid-fifth century Athens which diverted guilt from the archon Megakles the Alkmeonid.⁵⁹ Several conclusions follow from this observation. The prytaneis of the *naukraroi* must have once existed and have been credible alternatives to the archons. One does not try to divert suspicion from its|obvious target, the archons, onto something of which the auditors of the defense had never heard.⁶⁰ To make such a diversion credible, the prytaneis cannot knowingly have been merely another name for some other magistracy, like the pre-Solonian Council or the archons themselves.⁶¹ While the term prytaneis by itself would be susceptible to this interpretation if it is thought to be used non-technically, it is the added appellation τῶν ναυκράρων that is impossible to explain by positing confusion with another office. Their precise functions may have been obscure to the contemporaries of Herodotus, but they cannot have been a magistracy without military associations, or else they could never have been connected with the suppression of the Kylonians.⁶² Of the possible meanings for *prutanis*, the one that seems forced by the qualifying phrase “of the *naukraroi*” is “president”. The term ναύκραρος originally denoted ‘ship’s captain’, so that the early Athenian *naukraroi* can be seen as private individuals experienced in seafaring (pirates, merchants, exporting land-owners), who

59. Hignett *Constitution* 69; cf. Macan *Herodotus* 1.213–14. On submerged polemics in Thucydides’ account concerning the role of the Diasia, see M.H. Jameson, “Notes on the Sacrificial Calendar from Erchia,” *BCH* 89 (1965) 154–72, esp. 167–72. Yet, the complexities of the source material involve much more than attempts to correct the “Alkmeonid” bias of Herodotus. F. Jacoby, *Atthis: The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens* (Oxford 1949) 186–88, finds in Thucydides’ very different reconstruction that his emphasis on the archons’ collective action is another exculpation of the Alkmeonids. If tradition sometimes set the totality of the archons up against Megakles (and his descendants) the question whether the guilt from the affair tainted the descendants of the other archons is further complicated. [The bibliography on the *naukraroi* is exhaustively presented by V. Gabrielsen, “The Naukrariai and the Athenian Navy,” *C&M* 36 (1985) 21–51. His inclination to dissociate the *naukrariai* from the Athenian navy should be resisted.]

60. Jacoby *Atthis* 368–69 n. 84; Hignett *Constitution* 69, who believes, however, the prytaneis of the *naukraroi* to be Peisistratid in date.

61. Pre-Solonian Council: E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*² (Stuttgart 1937) 3.324–25, 591; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin 1893) 1.93–97; cf. Busolt-Swoboda *GS* 2.846 and n. 1. Archons: F.R. Wüst, “Zu den πρυτάνεις τῶν ναυκράρων und zu alten attischen Trittyes,” *Historia* 6 (1957) 176–91, erected on the frail support of lexical notices describing τοὺς ἄρχοντες as *naukraroi* (Harpokration, s.v. ναυκραρῖκα; *Suda* s.v. ναυκραρία, v 57 Adler). The lexical notices cite Herodotus (5.71.2) and Aristotle, who did not in fact equate *arkhontes* (= eponymous, *basileus*, etc.) with the *naukraroi*. Here Harpocration somewhat confusedly treats the *naukraroi* —n.b. not their *prytanies*—as *arkhontes* ‘magistrates’, for who else could have *prutaneis* ‘presidents’.

62. This consideration tells against the suggestion of B. Jordan, “Herodotus 5.71.2 and the Naukraroi of Athens,” *CSCA* 3 (1970) 153–75, that the phrase ἐνέμον τότε τὰς Ἀθήνας ‘they governed Athens at that time’ should be emended to ἐνέμοντο . . . ‘they drew revenues from . . .’ The middle voice of *nemō*, however, means to ‘draw revenues on one’s own behalf’ (Hdt. 3.160.2; 7.112; 8.136.1). It is also rather unlikely that the *tamiai* of Athena did not exist before Solon as guardians of the treasures of the Acropolis, but that this duty was discharged by the prytaneis.

provided the Athenians with ships, equipment and crews, and served as commanders.⁶³ In that time of primitive finances, before coinage became common, the state possessed no bureaucratic apparatus for the provision of warships except to entrust this duty to shipowners or *naukraroi*. So, the *naukraroi* had a quasi-public character. Accordingly, a *naukraria* could be compared to a trierarchic *summoría* and one could speak of disputing (verb: ἀμφισβητέω) over a *naukraria* as though membership in a naucrery was like being assigned a liturgy (Phot. *s.v.* ναυκραρία; cf. Kleidemos *FGH* 323 F 8). Yet, *naukraroi* were also magistrates (*Ath. Pol.* 8.3; Harpocration *s.v.* ναυκραρικά; *Suda s.v.* ναυκραρία, ν 57 Adler).

There were originally twelve *naukrariai* for each of the four Ionian tribes (*Ath. Pol.* 8.3; Pollux 8.108; cf. Kleidemos *FGH* 323 F 8); hence the *naukraroi* numbered at least 48. Some reports have one *naukraros* for each *naukraria* (Hesych. *s.v.* ναύκληρος, 118 Latte; cf. Poll. 8.108, one for each *trittys*?) and compare them to demarchs (*Ath. Pol.* 21.5; Phot., Harp., Hesych.). The tax-collecting duties of the *naukraroi* (*Ath. Pol.* 8.3; Poll. 8.108; Hesych.) and the similarity of *naukrariai* to demes as geographical subdivisions (*Anec. Bekk.* 1.275.20–21; cf. *Ath. Pol.* 21.5) justify the comparison of *naukraroi* and demarchs. It is possible that the lexicographers falsely deduced the number of *naukraroi* from the number of *naukrariai* on analogy with the demarchs.

There are indications that there was more than one *naukraros* for each *naukraria*. Photios cites a Peripatetic collection of Athenian laws for the phrase: τοὺς ναυκράρους τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ναυκραρίαν ‘the *naukraroi* in (connected with[?]) the *naukraria*’. The *naukraroi* are also described as τριηραρχοῦντες ‘commanding a trireme’ and ὑποτεταγμένοι ‘subordinated’ to the polemarch, so that a *naukraros* was tactical commander over each warship (*Anec. Bekk.* 1.283.20–21). As a practical matter, only one *naukraros* could command a single ship at any one time. Each *naukraria* probably needed to keep a warship ready for action at all times (cf. Poll. 8.108), so that there would be only one *naukraros* in charge, except when the fleet was mobilized.⁶⁴ There were enough *naukrariai* (48 or 50) to make a board of prytaneis necessary. The individual *naukraroi* of the *naukrariai*, commanding the “ready” warship of each *naukraria* and thereby presiding, might have been the prytaneis.⁶⁵ Thus, one might even give credence to the sources that speak of one *naukraros*/*naukraria*. Yet, it is also possible that various of the *naukraroi* of a single *naukraria* may have commanded ready warships at different times, but that the board of prytaneis

63. Chantraine *Dictionnaire s.v.* ναύκληρος 3.736–37; H. Frisk, *Griechisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Heidelberg 1960–1972) *s.v.* ναύκληρος, 3.291–92; F. Solmsen, “Ναύκραρος ναύκληρος,” *RhM* 53 (1898) 151–58. On their origins: U. Kahrstedt, *Staatsgebiet und Staatsangehörige in Athen, Studien zum öffentlichen Recht Athens*, 1 (Stuttgart 1934) 245–48.

64. It is doubtful that the naucratic system limited Athens to a fleet of 48 ships from the late seventh to the early fifth century. The changeover from the pentekonter to the trireme would be irreconcilable with a system mandating one ship per *naukraria* (cf. Thuc. 1.14.3). See pp. 122–23 above.

65. Kahrstedt *Staatsgebiet* 248.

presided over the whole apparatus. Thus, the prytaneis may have numbered 4, presiding originally over the *naukraroi* of each of the four Ionian tribes.⁶⁶

The responsibility of the prytaneis for the coordination of the *naukrariai* may explain their appearance in the Kylonian incident. Hoplite warfare was a leisurely affair, since its preparations gave enemies advanced warning and hoplite armies moved slowly across borders to threaten agricultural plains. Attack from the sea left the Athenians much less time to collect their forces in reaction, which, along with the long coastline of Attica to be defended, may have compelled the Athenians to keep one ship per *naukraria* ready for action, as has been noted (cf. Poll. 8.108). The groups of *naukraroi* were scattered along the Attic coast. *Naukrariai* took their names from the places in which the *naukraroi* were based. Only one name is known, Kolias (*Anec. Bekk.* 1.275.20; cf. Paus. 1.1.5), a place so small that it was later one part of the deme Halimous, which provided only three *bouleutai* to the Cleisthenic *boulē*, or 0.6% of the total (being 47th in size).⁶⁷ The Attic tribes were not, as far as we know, geographical entities; their members were spread through Attica.⁶⁸ While the *naukraroi* as ship-captains were quite localized (witness Kolias), the members of the *naukraria* as a twelfth of a tribe would have been spread throughout much of Attica. In an emergency, the *naukraroi* would need to alert the members of the *naukraria*, a task achieved by use of the two horsemen of the *naukraria* (Poll. 8.108). These mounted men, numbering only 96, were too few for the cavalry of archaic Attica, which drew on the manpower of the two highest census classes. Also, the horsemen may have acted as emergency messengers to adjoining naucratic bases, which would then use their horsemen to alert their own members and other bases.⁶⁹ The prytaneis will thus not only have coordinated the preparation of the fleet, in a manner similar to the fifth- and fourth-century *boulē* (*Ath. Pol.* 46), but they will also have overseen the reaction of the *naukrariai* to emergencies.

The relative ease with which Kylon and his followers occupied the Acropolis suggests that the Athenians (not surprisingly) had no special procedure to react to *coups d'état*. Someone, however, must have alerted the Athenians in order for them to rush to the city *πανδημεί* (Thuc. 1.126.7). Perhaps it was the *naukrariai* through means of their horsemen that alerted the Athenians.⁷⁰ If this supposition is correct, as the Athenians arrived to besiege the Acropolis,

66. Cf. Busolt-Swoboda *GS* 2.817–18. The prytaneis could also have numbered 12 (= 1/trittys; cf. Poll. 8.108), but there is no certainty that the divisions of tribes into trittyes and *naukrariai* were not independent of each other. See Hignett *Constitution* 71; also Wüst *Historia* (1957) 182–83.

67. J.S. Traill, *The Political Organization of Attica*, *Hesperia* Suppl. 14 (Princeton 1975) 47, 68.

68. D. Roussel, *Tribu et Cité* (Paris 1976) 193–201.

69. Cf. W. Helbig, "Les ἱππείες Ἀθηναίων," *Mém. Acad. des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres* 37 (1904) 157–264, esp. 168–69. [Cf. G. Bugh, *The Horsemen of Athens* (Princeton 1988) 4–6.]

70. On the possibility that the *naukraroi* mustered the hoplites: Busolt *GG*² 2.190 n. 2; Hignett *Constitution* 71.

the prytaneis of the *naukraroi* will have naturally directed their activities.⁷¹ On the arrival of the archon and polemarch, however, the prytaneis would have given way to their leadership. Herodotus says that the prytaneis *ἐνεμον τότε τὰς Ἀθήνας* 'governed Athens at that time' (5.71.2). While the verb *νέμω* usually describes long-lived regimes (Hdt. 5.92β1, 7.158.2), it is in one case used for a more temporary expedient (namely, for the Milesians to whom Parian arbitrators granted authority over Miletos: 5.29.2). Yet, it is doubtful that Herodotus fully understood that in the tradition on which he was drawing, the transfer of command from the prytaneis to the archons may have been controversial. A line of defense for the archon Megakles might have been that the archons would have been entirely blameless, on grounds of tyrannicide, save for the grant of suppliance made by the prytaneis before the arrival of the archons (the prytaneis having exceeded their authority). A similar excuse appears in Plut. *Solon* 12.1, where the breaking of a cord attaching the Kylonians to the image of Athena demonstrates the goddess' rejection of their suppliance. In another parallel, the Thucydidean account also notes a transfer of authority; in this case implausibly the Athenians entrust the siege of the Acropolis to the archons, as though the eponymous archon and polemarch would not have held command automatically (1.126.8: *τότε δὲ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν οἱ ἐννέα ἄρχοντες ἐπρασσον*).

The absence of the prytaneis from sources on the early fifth century is hardly surprising. On the basis of *Ath. Pol.* 21.5, describing the supersession of the *naukrariai* by the demes, one would have suspected that the naucratic system no longer existed, but for a fragment of Kleidemos preserved in Photios (FGH 323 F 8). Until Athens, however, undertook the building of triremes from state funds and their equipping and command through liturgies, some quasi-public institution like the *naukraroi* had to exist, as presumably did prytaneis to preside over their activities.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE OSTRACISM OF XANTHIPPOS

The pre-Themistoclean fleet was commanded by the polemarch, whose orders the *naukraroi* commanding ships obeyed (*Anec. Bekk.* 1.283.20–21). The prytaneis may have acted as subordinates, commanding separate contingents during the sixth century and earlier. Such functions, however, are unlikely to have been behind the Xanthippos ostrakon; the *stratēgoi* were the subordinates of the polemarch after Kleisthenes. Before Kleisthenes the prytaneis may also have coordinated the naucratic treasury (*τὰ ναυκραρικά*: Andro- tion FGH 324 F 36; *ἐκ τοῦ ναυκραρικοῦ ἀργυρίου*: *Ath. Pol.* 8.3), but their tax-collecting duties presumably fell later to the demarchs (cf. Poll. 8.108), and according to Andro- tion the *kōlekretai* disbursed funds for *theōroi* from the

71. Jameson, *BCH* (1965) 168–69, envisages a tradition that the coup occurred during the Diasia, which the Athenians celebrated *pandēmei* at Agrai, presided over by the prytaneis, behaving like demarchs. As the Athenians marched on the Acropolis from Agrai, the prytaneis commanded. In our view, it would be hard to explain the absence of the archons from the Diasia.

naucratic treasury (F 36). Therefore, only their preparatory activities may have been left to them in the early fifth century.

Let us now return to the Xanthippos ostrakon. There was an event shortly before the ostracism of Xanthippos which involved the quality of military preparations rather than Athenian leadership or fighting skills. The Athenians had attempted to spring an elaborate surprise attack on their Aiginetan enemies. A dissident Aiginetan aristocrat named Nikodromos had agreed to rise with his followers (Hdt. 6.88). Nikodromos seized the so-called “Old City” on Aigina, probably the old harbor in the bay to the north of Cape Colonna.⁷² The Athenians, however, failed to arrive on the pre-arranged day, delayed because there were not enough ἀξιόμαχοι ‘battle-worthy’ ships to confront the Aiginetans (6.89). The Athenians managed to acquire 20 ships from their Corinthian friends at a nominal price (6.89). The delay, however, was fatal; Nikodromos and some of his followers fled from the island (6.90), but other rebels from the *dāmos*, numbering 700, were slaughtered (6.91.1–2). On their arrival, the Athenians fought well, defeating the Aiginetans in a naval battle (6.92.1). They landed troops on the island, who overcame an Argive relief force of 1000 volunteers (6.92.2–3). Nonetheless, in a second battle, the Aiginetan fleet was victorious and the Athenians presumably withdrew (6.93). (See pp. 131–32, 138–39 above.)

The Athenians had nearly dealt a deadly blow to their arch-enemies, with whom they had been at war intermittently since the late sixth century (Hdt. 5.81.2–3, 89.1–3). Had the Athenian fleet arrived on time, while Nikodromos still held a harbor, perhaps the Aiginetan oligarchy would have fallen, to be replaced by a pro-Athenian regime. As it happened, the Athenians did enjoy some success in battle against the initially dispirited Aiginetans. The overall Athenian failure depended on a last-minute discovery of the inadequacy of some of their ships, ones which they expected to be ready for use. Herodotus’ emphasis on the remarkable sale of ships by the Corinthians at the nominal price of 5 dr. for each trireme shows the Athenian desperation to arrive on time (6.89). If the Athenians had discovered the unserviceable ships sufficiently early, they would have built ships or gathered funds to buy ships, and would not have needed to depend upon Corinthian generosity. In the end, the Athenians had come away with a defeat, one which made a great impact on their collective consciousness. Herodotus, working from the evidence of Athenian informants, justified the expulsion by the Athenians of the Aiginetans from their island in 431 as a divinely-sanctioned retaliation for the pollution incurred in the suppression of the rebels (6.91.1–2).

The failure of the Nikodromos coup fulfills the criteria for a context for the ostrakon. Warfare with Aigina was a dominant preoccupation of the 480s, providing the chief rationale for Themistokles’ naval legislation (Hdt. 7.144.1). The date for the failure is uncertain, but sometime in 489 or 488 is

72. See *Aegina* 189–91.

the most probable context.⁷³ If the prytaneis of the *naukraroi* were held responsible for the insufficient number of suitable ships on the eve of the attack on Aigina, then the inscriber of the ostrakon and others may have seen them as *alitērioi*. Surely, the aborting of a such a carefully-prepared plan was something more than mere inadvertence or error. How could it not have been that the prytaneis were traitors, when the Athenians fought so bravely against the Aiginetans and Argives? To believe the ostrakon, Xanthippos was the most eminent of the prytaneis and therefore most guilty. These prytaneis would not have been the allotted representatives of a whole tribe (like the bouleutic prytaneis), which could be offended by an indiscriminate charge, but politicians who were elected to their position by virtue of their experience.

THE OSTRACISM IN THE CONTEXT OF XANTHIPPOS' CAREER

It should be remembered that the ostrakon as a document of poetic propaganda would have been easily decipherable if only one set of prytaneis existed, those of the *naukraroi*. As for an identification of the Aiginetan setback as the motivating charge, note that few controversial incidents could have turned on the preparation of the fleet. Thus, another such occurrence, unknown to us, in the early 480s, shortly before his ostracism, seems unlikely. If the event behind the Xanthippos ostrakon has been correctly identified, certain other conclusions about Xanthippos' career can be ventured. The description of Xanthippos in the *Athenaion Politieia* as distinguished from the earlier victims of ostracism is underscored. He was not accused of Medism or pro-Peistratid sentiments; rather, an administrative failure involving an otherwise popular anti-Aiginetan policy was at issue (cf. Hdt. 5.89.2–90.1 on Athenian impatience to attack Aigina c. 506). The policy of Perikles, son of Xanthippos, toward the Aiginetans was an intelligible extension of his father's. The Athenians took advantage of their defeat of the Peloponnesians at Kekryphaleia in c. 457 to undertake hostilities against the Aiginetans (Thuc. 1.105.2; [see now Figueira *Colonization* 104–14]). Defeat in this conflict left the Aiginetans stripped of their defenses and fleet and reduced to tributary status in the Delian League (Thuc. 1.108.4). On the eve of the Peloponnesian War, the Aiginetans were expelled from their island because of their guilt in fomenting the conflict (Thuc. 2.27.1–2; cf. Hdt. 6.89.2). The proverbial remark of Perikles that Aigina was the eyesore of the Peiraeus (Plut. *Per.* 8.7, *Mor.* 803A; Aris. *Rhet.* 1411a15–16) suggests that Perikles was an advocate of these actions. Lycurgus actually credited him with capturing Samos, Euboia, and Aigina (Lyc. fr. 9.2 Conomis). Moreover, the expulsion in 431 was under his direction. Thus, both father and son seem to have advocated harsh measures toward Athens' leading regional adversary.

The office of *naukraros* was comparable to a liturgy, so that it could be held over a period of time. In turn, the *naukraroi* may have tended repeatedly to choose the same prytaneis. The alacrity with which the Athenians turned to

73. See pp. 118–22, 142–43 above.

Xanthippos for naval leadership after his recall from ostracism in 481 (see pp. 185, 195–96 below) indicates his reputation for experience in warfare at sea. Again, Perikles' own interest in naval affairs, so well documented in Thucydides, is an extension of his father's interest. He named his son Paralos (e.g., *IG* I³ 49; Plato *Protag.* 315A, cf. 319E–320A; Plut. *Per.* 24.8, 36.8), a name connected with a heroic patron of Athenian sailors.⁷⁴ Both men drew support from the Athenians who manned the fleet and saw it as the chief instrument in Athenian foreign policy. The deme of Xanthippos and Perikles was Kholargos, which, while it was a city deme, lay well inland at the foot of Mt. Aigialeos (e.g., *IG* II² 7768; 7789). The incongruity of naval enthusiasts whose home lay away from the coast is palliated by a recognition that the *naucratic* system, reaching into all Attica through the *naukrariai* (personal not geographical subdivisions of the tribes), was their special sphere of interest.

Ariphron, the father of Xanthippos, seems to have been a partisan of Peisistratos. Such a conclusion is indicated by *POxy* 4.664 and 50.3544, containing fragments of a philosophical dialogue on government, which mentions the familial vicissitudes of the Corinthian tyrant Periander.⁷⁵ Among the interlocutors are Peisistratos, Ariphron, and Thrasyboulos, son of Philomelos, who became Peisistratos' son-in-law (Plut. *Mor.* 189C, cf. 457F; Val. Max. 5.1.2 [ext.]; Polyae. 5.14). Ariphron is as natural a part of the Peisistratid circle as the tyrant's son-in-law, suggesting that Ariphron appeared as a Peisistratid courtier in the Attidographic tradition as known to this Peripatetic author (see p. 15 above). Xanthippos, son of Ariphron, can be independently set within the court circle of the Peisistratids, since Anacreon seems to have saluted or invoked (*προσφθέγγασθαι*: cf. *AP* 7.656) his name (*τὸν μέγαν* 'the great' Xanthippos) at the court of the Samian tyrant Polykrates (*PMG* 493 = Himer. *Or.* 39.11 C).⁷⁶ On the Athenian Acropolis, statues of Perikles, Xanthippos, and Anacreon stood together (Paus. 1.25.1). Pausanias, who mentions Anacreon's erotic poetry, notes that he is portrayed as a drunken singer, i.e., *komast*. Anacreon may have honored Xanthippos as a *kalos* in a pederastic context (cf. Max. Tyr. 18.9, 20.1, 21.2; *SPin. Isth.* 2.1b; Simonides

74. Harpocration s.v. Πάραλος; *Suda* s.v. Πάραλος, π 389 Adler. See also Davies, *APF* p. 547, who cites *IG* II² 1254; cf. Thuc. 8.73.5; also Eur. *Supp.* 659; J.D. Beazley, *Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters*² (Oxford 1963) 2.1512, #19 (Jena Painter).

75. B.P. Grenfell & A.S. Hunt, *The Oxyrynchus Papyri* 4 (London 1904) 72–80. The dialogue is Peripatetic (Heraclides Ponticus), as its editors cite several phraseological parallels with the *Ath. Pol.* There is no reason to doubt the historicity of the historical context of the dialogue, whatever our judgment of the factuality of its contents (cf. Xen. *Hiero*). Cf. M.W. Haslam, *POxy* 50 (1983) #3544, pp. 93–99.

76. C.M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*² (Oxford 1961) 301–2, holds this to be a reference to Xanthippos Ariphronos, against U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, "Commentariolum grammaticum III," *Ind. Lect. Gött.* (1889) 3–30, esp. 22 [= *Kleine Schriften* 4 (Berlin 1962) 647], who suggested one emend to ξανθὸν Μεγιστήν (cf. *PMG* 352, 353, 416; J. Sitzler, "Jahresbericht über die griechischen Lyriker," *Bursians Jahrbuch* 104 [1900] 76–164, esp. 124). But Bowra also believed that the Samian setting for the fragment was wrong. F.G. Welcker, "Anakreon," *Kleine Schriften* (Bonn 1844–1861) 1.251–70, esp. 253–54 (followed by B. Gentili, *Anacreon* [Rome 1958] 95 on fr. 178), argued that Anacreon had already visited Athens before the death of Polykrates.

AP 7.25; Cic. TD 4.71; Anacreon PMG 357, 359, 402, 433 [see n. 76 above]).⁷⁷ Anacreon had already visited Athens when he hailed Xanthippos (cf. [Plato] *Hipparch.* 228B–C), while Polykrates, who died c. 522, was still alive. The occasion for the poem may well have been Anacreon's return to Polykrates from an embassy to sons of Peisistratos. Hence, the conjunction of an audience before Polykrates and the invocation of an Athenian *kalos*.

Remarkably, Ariphron and Xanthippos were not tainted by their associations with Peisistratos. Xanthippos did not bear the stigma of his contemporaries, Hipparkhos Kharmou and Kallias Kratiou, who, as young men brought up in the Peisistratid court, were thereby so suspect that they could be ostracized in the 480s as tyrannists.⁷⁸ It is also noteworthy that Perikles himself was prepared to advertize his father's association with Anacreon in a manner that emphasized the political aspect of his father's and his own career. They were portrayed as generals and the statues seem to have been erected in the fifth century, presumably under the sponsorship of Perikles himself.⁷⁹

One conjecture is that Xanthippos inherited his influence among the *naukraroi* from his father, Ariphron, the confidant of Peisistratos. The Athenian fleet, however, made no effort to intervene on behalf of Hippias when the first Spartan expedition under Ankhimolios landed in Attica (Hdt. 5.63.2–4). This inactivity may also be related to the failure of Hippias to make use of Mounikhia, which he had been fortifying (*Ath. Pol.* 19.2; cf. Plut. *Solon* 12.10). If Ariphron aided in this defection from the Peisistratids, he may have received in return a marriage alliance between his son Xanthippos and the Alkmeonid Agariste. Whether we accept this hypothesis or not, some event late in the reign of the Peisistratids made the anti-Peisistratid credentials of Xanthippos unimpeachable.

Let us close our speculation on the wider ramifications of a determination of a context for the Xanthippos ostrakon by offering some suggestions about factional politics in the 480s. Xanthippos' prosecution of Miltiades takes on a new light. In principle, he may not have been opposed to such imperialistic adventures as the Parian expedition, but the fact that Miltiades had been given a fleet without a debate before the *dēmos* on how he planned to use it might have been provocative to a leader who claimed to speak with authority on naval affairs (Hdt. 6.132). Hence, Xanthippos prosecuted Miltiades on grounds of *apatē* 'deception' (6.136.1–2). While Xanthippos and Miltiades may not have differed on the Persian threat nor on the profits to be gained from a policy of regional expansion, the *Athenaion Politeia* provides evidence for the view that

77. For Anacreon as the leader of the *kōmos* at Athens: S. Papaspyridi-Karouzou, "Anacréon à Athènes," *BCH* 66–67 (1942–1943) 248–54; L.D. Caskey & J.D. Beazley, *Attic Vase-Paintings in the Museum of Fine Arts, Boston* (Boston 1931–1963) 2.55–61.

78. Note Kallias Kratiou featured as a komast and invoked as a *kalos* in late Peisistratid Athens: H.A. Shapiro, "Kallias Kratiou Alopekethen," *Hesperia* 51 (1982) 69–73.

79. G. Hafner, "Anakreon und Xanthippos," *JDAI* 71 (1956) 1–28, offers possibilities for the statues of Anacreon and Xanthippos, which he believes to be the works of Kresilas, dedicated before 430.

they differed on internal politics (28.2). The responsibility of *stratēgoi* to clear their activities with the *dēmos* may have been one of the populist issues on which Xanthippos disagreed with Miltiades. Xanthippos was more responsive to the need to involve the *ekklēsia* in decision-making than was a Miltiades, much of whose adult life had been spent in isolation from popular institutions. [See *Colonization* 134–38.]

Concerning naval expansion and opposition to Aigina Xanthippos found himself in agreement with Themistokles; no tradition existed about an antipathy or competition between these two men similar to that between Themistokles and Aristides. Thus both were also anti-Persian and anti-Aiginetan. They may have disagreed, however, on how an exploitation of Athens' naval potential was to be managed. Themistokles wanted an expanded navy, subsidized by public revenues and private expenditures (*Ath. Pol.* 22.7). In my hypothesis, Xanthippos may have had too much of his political capital invested in the *naukrariai* to find such changes attractive. Yet, once the naval bill of Themistokles passed, this dispute became a dead letter. Xanthippos could return from ostracism to find few grounds for conflict with Themistokles. There is no reason to think that his prominence after Salamis represents an eclipse of Themistokles. Perikles was later associated with Ephialtes (*Plut. Per.* 7.7–8, 9.5, 10.7 = Idomeneus *FGH* 338 F 8; *Mor.* 812D), although, as the more famous figure, Perikles has usurped his primacy for the reform of the Areiopagos (cf. also *Per.* 16.3; *Cimon* 15.2). Ephialtes in turn followed a similar ideological line to Themistokles (*Isoc.* 7, *Hypoth.*; *Ath. Pol.* 25.3–4). If the grounds for confrontation between Xanthippos and Themistokles are limited to the role of the *naukrariai*, Perikles' association with Ephialtes and, thereby, in a sense with Themistokles does not appear unnatural.

CONCLUSION

The chief conclusions of our analysis may now be recapitulated. The Xanthippos ostrakon bears an elegiac distich which contains a segment of the propaganda campaign against Xanthippos conducted in the year of his ostracism, 485/4. It states one of the leading accusations raised against him, namely that he was the ringleader of a group of prytaneis who had harmed Athens. These prytaneis were the "presidents" of the *naukraroi*, a clear reference inasmuch as the bouleutic prytaneis did not yet exist. These officials were confined to duties concerning the maintenance and mustering of the fleet at this time. The failure of a surprise attack on Aigina was primarily a failure in the fleet's preparation that was discerned too late to be remedied. This failure was charged to Xanthippos. He may have inherited his involvement in naval operations from his father, so that he opposed both those to his right like Miltiades, who adopted an authoritarian style of command, and those to his left such as Themistokles, who sought to eliminate the naucratic system.

Residential Restrictions on the Athenian Ostracized

I SHALL OFFER an explanation for the Athenian decision to restrict the places of residence for ostracized politicians.¹ My conclusion will be that the Athenians were concerned lest the ostracized continue factional activism or even collaborate with foreign adversaries of Athens, if permitted to establish themselves in the vicinity of Attica, and especially on Aigina. Institutionally, an ostracism served to terminate the rivalry between two leading claimants to leadership, an outcome that was impeded by the opportunity for continued participation in politics.

THE SOURCES

In the archonship of Hypsikhides, 482/1 or, more probably, 481/0, the Athenians recalled those previously ostracized during the 480s, and restricted for the future places of habitation for the ostracized.² Our authority is the *Athenaion Politeia* 22.8:

τετάρτῳ δ' ἔτει κατεδέξαντο πάντας τοὺς ὠστρακισμένους ἄρχοντος Ὑψιχίδου, διὰ τὴν Ξέρξου στρατείαν· καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ὥρισαν τοῖς ὠστρακιζομένοις, ἐντὸς Γεραιστοῦ καὶ Σκυλλαίου κατοικεῖν, ἢ ἀτίμους εἶναι καθάπαξ.

Any historical discussion of the residential clause must begin with an observation on motivations, which should not be controversial. The limit on the place of residence is to be connected with the decision to recall those ostracized earlier, for a change of such practical significance for the continued viability of this institution would hardly have been made in the atmosphere of crisis during the lead-up to the Persian invasion without specific relevance. The recall

1. The following works will be cited by author: R. Develin, "Two Notes concerning *Ath. Pol.* (1 and 22.8)," *LCM* 9.5 (1984) 76; R. Goossens, "Le texte d'Aristote, Constitution d'Athènes, XXII, 8, et l'obligation de résidence des Athéniens ostracisés," *Chronique d'Égypte* 20 (1945) 125–38; A.E. Raubitschek, "Theophrastos on Ostracism," *C&M* 19 (1958) 72–109. P.J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford 1981) will equal *AP*.

2. The relative date for the archonship of Hypsikhides is τετάρτῳ δ' ἔτει 'in the fourth year', which if reckoned inclusively from 483/2, the archonship of Nikodemus, would yield 480/79. Yet, that year belongs to Kalliades (e.g., *DS* 11.1.2; *Marm. Par. FGH* 239 A 51). Inspired by F. Blass, *Aristotelis ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ*⁴ (Leipzig 1908) 133, J. Carcopino, *L'ostracisme Athénien*² (Paris 1935) 153–54, wished to count from 485/4, the year of Xanthippos' ostracism, which marked for him a watershed for account of the 480s in the *Athenaion Politeia*. Rhodes *AP* 281 finds this improbable and opts for a mistake in composition or transmission (e.g., τρίτῳ δ' ἔτει of earlier editors). *Plut. Arist.* 8.1 has τρίτῳ δ' ἔτει, presumably counting from 483/2, yielding 481/0 for the recall and the year of Hypsikhides, but also puts Xerxes in Thessaly and Boiotia, properly belonging to 480/79 rather than 481/80. If we discount, however, a tendency to delay the recall and to exaggerate the imminence of the invasion of Attica, Plutarch might be taken to direct us slightly toward 481/0, e.g., early 480 (cf. n. 31 below).

and the restriction could have been linked in several ways, not necessarily mutually exclusive: the restrictive clause might have furthered the intention behind the recall itself; it might have been a precaution meant to insure the effectiveness of the recall; it might have been designed to render such a recall unnecessary in the future. Our best information on the ostracized of the 480s concerns Aristides, who is said to have been recalled through the agency of Themistokles (Plut. *Them.* 11.1; Nepos *Arist.* 1.5; cf. Plut. *Them.* 5.7, 12.6; *Arist.* 7.1–2, 25.10; Nepos *Arist.* 1.2–4). Like *Ath. Pol.* 22.8, Plutarch recalls a *psēphisma* by which all the ostracized were permitted to return. Therefore, when we consider the relationship between the act of recall and the imposition of the residential restrictions for the future, we are also, in fact, deciding whether a connection can be made between the reconstruction of the significance of the restrictive clause and Themistoclean policy.

The essential feature of the limitation on allowable sites of residence is a matter of geography, and here there is controversy. The testimony of the *Athenaion Politeia* is suspect because of information contained in a fragment of Philochorus (*FGH* 328 F 30).

ὁστρακισμοῦ τρόπος· Φιλόχορος ἐκτίθεται τὸν ὁστρακισμόν ἐν τῇ τρίτῃ γράφῳ οὕτω· «ὁ δὲ ὁστρακισμὸς τοιοῦτος· προεχειροτόνει μὲν ὁ δῆμος πρὸ τῆς ὀγδόης πρυτανείας, εἰ δοκεῖ τὸ ὁστρακὸν εἰσφέρειν. ὅτε δ' ἐδόκει, ἐφράσσετο σάνισιν ἢ ἀγορά, καὶ κατελείποντο εἰσοδοὶ δέκα, δι' ὧν εἰσιόντες κατὰ φυλὰς ἐτίθεσαν τὰ ὁστρακα, στρέφοντες τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν· ἐπεστάτου δὲ οἱ τε ἐννέα ἄρχοντες καὶ ἡ βουλή. διαριθμηθέντων δὲ ὅτῳ πλεῖστα γένοιτο καὶ μὴ ἐλάττω ἑξακισχιλίων, τοῦτον ἔδει τὰ δίκαια δόντα καὶ λαβόντα ὑπὲρ τῶν ἰδίων συναλλαγμάτων ἐν δέκα ἡμέραις μεταστῆναι τῆς πόλεως ἔτη δέκα (ὑστερον δὲ ἐγένοντο πέντε), καρπούμενον τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, μὴ ἐπιβαίνοντα ἐντὸς Γεραιστοῦ τοῦ Εὐβοίας ἀκρωτηρίου». *** μόνος δὲ Ὑπέρβολος ἐκ τῶν ἀδόξων ἐξωστρακίσθη διὰ μοχθηρίαν τρόπων, οὐ δι' ὑποψίαν τυραννίδος· μετὰ τοῦτον δὲ κατελύθη τὸ ἔθος, ἀρξάμενον νομοθετήσαντος Κλεισθένης, ὅτε τοὺς τυράννους κατέλυσεν, ὅπως συνεκβάλαι καὶ τοὺς φίλους αὐτῶν. |

After ἀκρωτηρίου Jacoby reckoned both a lacuna and a shift in source, but there is no good reason to follow him in the latter.³ His text also reflects a crucial emendation: the manuscripts contain the words ἐντὸς πέρα τοῦ, which Dobree corrected to ἐντὸς Γερα(ι)στοῦ.

This fragment is compiled from lexical notices.⁴ Much of the same passage is also transmitted in a papyrus containing fragments of a commentary of Didymus on Demosthenes *Against Aristocrates*, on 23.205 (*P. Berol.* 5008).⁵

3. Cf. pp. 178–80 below; see also J. J. Keaney, "The Text of Androtion F 6 and the Origin of Ostracism," *Historia* 19 (1970) 1–11, esp. 6–8.

4. *Lex. Rhet. Cantab.*, ed. E. O. Houtsma (Leiden 1870) s.v. ὁστρακισμοῦ τρόπος, pp. 23–24; cf. *Lexicon Vindobonense*, ed. A. Nauck (St. Petersburg 1867) 354–55; Claudios Casilon (of Alexandria) s.v. ὁστρακισμοῦ τρόπος in E. Miller, *Mélanges de littérature grecque* (Paris 1868) 398.

5. Ed. prin.: F. Blass, "Neue Papyrus Fragmente im Ägyptischen Museum zu Berlin," *Hermes* 17 (1882) 148–63; see also H. Diels & W. Schubart, *Didymi de Demosthene commenta cum anonymi in Aristocrateam lexico* (Leipzig 1904) 46–47; id., *Kommentar zu Demosthenes (Papyrus 9780) nebst Wörterbuch Demosthenes' Aristocratea (Papyrus 5008)* (Berlin 1904) 81–82.

The lexical notices are, in all likelihood, also derived from Didymus.⁶ Unfortunately, the papyrus does not preserve the crucial clause relating to the limitation on place of residence for the ostracized.

The expression ἐντὸς πέρα τοῦ is meaningless, and it is difficult to suggest any other word beginning with περα- which could be the object of the preposition ἐντός. We must either accept the emendation Γεραιστοῦ, or posit the abbreviation of a longer phrase. The preposition ἐντός is often juxtaposed with πέρα (and with πέραν and περαιότερος) so that Philochorus may actually have said something like μὴ ἐπιβαίνοντα ἐντὸς Γεραιστοῦ τοῦ Εὐβοίας ἀκρωτηρίου καὶ Σκυλλαίου, ἄλλα κατοικοῦντα πέρα Γεραιστοῦ . . .⁷ A possible parallel abbreviation appears in the indication of the date for the *prokheirotonia* in F 30 as it now stands (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 43.5).⁸ It is, in any event, the negation in Philochorus of the clause specifying Cape Geraistos that is chiefly significant, for some editors have opted to emend the *Athenaion Politeia* in response. Wyse suggested emending ἐντός to ἐκτός, and Kaibel proposed to insert μὴ before κατοικεῖν.⁹ The alternative of emending Philochorus to bring him into line with the *Athenaion Politeia* is less attractive since the simplest error, an insertion of the negative into F 30 seems less likely than the corruptions hypothesized for the *Athenaion Politeia*.¹⁰ As will be seen below (pp. 182–88), the

6. On Didymus' use of the *Atthis* of Philochorus and his great importance as the source of later notices on ostracism, note Jacoby *FGH* 3b (Suppl.) 1.315; Raubitschek 81–83.

7. Cf. e.g., App. *Lib.* 32 (135); Strabo 4.3.4 C194, 5.1.4 C212, 7 fr. 34, 14.1.47 C650, 15.1.27 C697–98; Plotinus *Enn.* 4.5.7. Raubitschek 103–4 emends Philochorus to agree with the *Ath. Pol.*: μὴ ἐπιβαίνοντα εἰς τὸ πέραν τοῦ Εὐβοίας ἀκρωτηρίου. He cites *HG* 1.3.17 and Xen. *Anab.* 3.5.2 where διαβαίνω and διαβιβάζω appear with εἰς τὸ πέραν. The syntax of διαβαίνω, however, differs distinctly from that of ἐπιβαίνω, which is not found with εἰς τὸ πέραν. Note, e.g., *DS* 13.49.6: τοὺς μὲν ἐπιβεβηκότας στρατιώτας διεβίβασαν εἰς . . .; Liban. *Ep.* 1518.3 Foerster: νῦν δὲ ἐπιβαίνειν Σπάρτας καὶ διαβαίνειν Εὐρώταν; App. *Celt.* 16 (59): (Ariovistus) ἐπιβαίνων τῆς πέραν Αἰδοῦοις . . . ἐπολέμει. *LSJ s.v.*, A.III.1 notes *DS* 14.84.1 (ἐπέβαινε εἰς Βοιωτίαν), but here the meaning is not 'disembark' or 'enter' but 'invade' (cf. Plut. *Caes.* 23.2, 'land an expedition'). Later, ἐπιβαίνω took on a variety of constructions with εἰς in [Callisthenes] *Hist. Alex.*: 'invade' (rec.α 3.18.5 Kroll); 'mount' (rec.β 1.41.33 Bergson); 'devolve' (rec.β 2.7.3). At *Acts* 20.18, 21.4 it means 'go to' or 'enter'. Yet these are hardly relevant for the text of Philochorus.

8. Jacoby *FGH* 3b (Suppl.) 1.316.

9. W. Wyse in "Notes on the Text of the ἈΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ," *CR* 5 (1891) 105–22, esp. 112, who was received by F.G. Kenyon (with much hesitation): *Aristotle on the Constitution of Athens*³ (London 1892) 80–81; J.E. Sandys, *Aristotle's Constitution of Athens*² (London 1912) 96–97. G. Kaibel, *Stil und Text der Πολιτεία Ἀθηναίων des Aristoteles* (Berlin 1893) 177, whose emendation was printed by Kenyon in *Aristotelis Atheniensium Respublica* (Oxford 1920) *ad loc.* 22.8; cf. Carcopino *L'ostracisme* 48–51. Note also A. Tovar, *Aristóteles: La constitución de Atenas* (Madrid 1948) 102–3; also *id.*, "Sobre la naturaleza de la 'Constitución de Atenas' de Aristoteles, con algunas notas críticas," *REC* 3 (1948) 153–66, esp. 163. C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century* (Oxford 1952) 164, accepting the emendation ἐκτός, asserts that the limitation belonged to the ostracism law from its inception.

10. Cf. G. De Sanctis, Ἀρχαί³ (Florence 1975) 476–77 n. 40. Rhodes' observation (*AP* 282) that the defect of the lexical notices, mentioning only a single point, means that fr. 30 cannot be used to emend the *Ath. Pol.* seems to undervalue the clear negation of the phrase. See also M.A. Levi, *Commento storico alla respublica Atheniensium di Aristotele* (Milan 1968) 1.241–42.

historical evidence supports the view that the residence restriction barred the ostracized from the proximity of Attica. Of the two emendations, I should prefer Kaibel's suggestion that the clause be negated.¹¹

OSTRACISM IN THE ATTHIDOGRAPHERS

An alternative to emendation is simply to accept a disagreement between the two authorities as to the content of the limitation on habitation.¹² This is *prima facie* unlikely, if only because both passages seem to mention Cape Gerastos, which suggests that the same original evidence (rather than a lack or an ambiguity of testimony) lay behind both accounts. Consideration of the other evidence on ostracism presented by Philochorus leads to the same conclusion. Fragment 30 is derived from the third book of his *Atthis*, as are fragments 20–33. Fragment 22 mentions the tricephalic Hermes, dedicated by Prokleides or Eukleides, an *erastēs* of Hipparkhos, son of Peisistratos.¹³ Fragment 20 describes an Areiopagos of fifty-one non-Eupatrids, an arrangement that was possibly implemented by the Peisistratids.¹⁴ Fragments 24–29 involve the names, their derivation, and the tribal affiliation of various demes. They belong to the narrative on the Cleisthenic reforms of 508/7 (and somewhat thereafter). The foundation of the cult of Hermes Agoraios with an archon date is noted in F 31. Unfortunately, the archon Kebris is otherwise unattested, but a Peisistratid date is most probable.¹⁵

Therefore, while the inclusion of Solonian material is arguable (*pace* Jacoby), Book 3 did demonstrably treat Athens under the Peisistratids and

11. It may have been rather more natural to use *ὀρίζω* 'bound' in the same general context as *ἐντός* 'within' rather than *ἐκτός*. Cf., e.g., Eur. fr. 14.3–4 Page (*Literary Papyri*) = H. von Arnim, *Suppl. Eur.* (Bonn 1913) p. 26; *AP* 14.114.4–5; Strabo 4.2.1 C189. [Another indication that this sort of prohibition was customarily phrased in the negative may be offered in the legal tradition that even justified killers were barred from Attica, being allowed to live on Salamis. A scholion to Dem. 23.71 contains the phrase *διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξεῖναι τῆς Ἀττικῆς ἐπιβαίνειν τὸν ὄλως φονεύσαντα*, in which the significant parallel of *ἐπιβαίνειν* deserves especial notice. See Sakellion, "ἐκ τῶν ἀνεκδότων τῆς πατμιακῆς βιβλιοθήκης: Scholies de Démosthène et d'Eschine d'après un manuscrit inedit de Patmos," *BCH* 1 (1877) 1–16, 137–55, esp. 138. It is not necessary to believe in the historicity of such a grant of residence to murderers of Myrrhine, the daughter of Peisistratos, the exemplum proposed by the scholion, in order to lend credence to the general proposition that killers of public enemies may have been accommodated in this fashion. See M. Moggi, "L'insediamento a Salamina di Antidoro Lemnio e degli uccisori di Mirrina," *ASNP* 8 (1978) 1301–12; Figueira *Colonization* 146–48.]

12. Develin 76, and also note the improbable (to my mind) hypothesis of Goossens (128) that Philochorus adverts to a separate restrictive clause which was exactly opposite to ours, dating from the Peloponnesian War.

13. Also Lysandros of Sikyon, a *kitharistēs* mentioned in F 23, might have been promoted and patronized by Hipparkhos. See Jacoby *FGH* 3b (Suppl.) 1.313.

14. Jacoby *FGH* 3b (Suppl.) 1.251, 312; 2.226 opts for a Solonian date for F 20, F 21, but the oath mentioned in the latter could have been discussed in connection with Kleisthenes (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 22.2). The banning of Eupatrids in F 20 suggests a Peisistratid measure.

15. Unknown archons from 540s, 6; 530s, 8; 520s, 3; 510s, 7 or 8; 500s, 3 or 4; 490s, 1 or 2; 480s, 2.

Kleisthenes. Its point of termination is less clear. Mention of the Lakonian town of Aithaia in connection with the Helot revolt of c. 465 (cf. Thuc. 1.101.2), would, as Jacoby suggests, bring the book down another thirty years, but this link is speculative. If Philochorus incorporated a discussion of the tradition on Spartan troubles with the Helots around the time of Marathon (Plato *Laws* 692D; 698E), it is not inconceivable that a Perioecic town in Messenia might have been mentioned in the course of his treatment of Spartan behavior in 490.¹⁶

Consequently, Philochorus' general discussion of ostracism, preserved in F 30, was probably attached either to his narrative on the Cleisthenic reforms or to an account of the first utilization of this procedure in 488/7 (or even, as a third alternative, to the ostracism of Themistokles). Philochorus preserves the following details on ostracism, which are compared below with the two other most detailed treatments of the institution and with the less detailed, but similar treatment of Pollux (y = substantially the same data; p = partial reproduction).¹⁷

Philochorus F 30	Plut. <i>Arist.</i> 7.2-5	ΣArist. <i>Eq.</i> 855b J/W	Pollux 8.19-20
preliminary vote		y	
vote in enclosed agora with 10 entrances	p	y	p
voting by tribes on an inscribed sherd	p	y	p
archons/ <i>boulē</i> preside	p*	y	
counting of votes/6000 minimum	y	y	y
conclusion of business/ departure in 10 days		y	
(leaders ostracized, through <i>phthonos</i> : not in F 30)	y*	p	y
exile for 10 (later 5?) years	y		p
enjoyment of property	y		
residence clause			
last ostracism, Hyperbolos	y*	y	
establishment by Kleisthenes against tyranny			

*Order differs from F 30.

16. F 33 explains the derivation of the *theōrikon*. Jacoby (*FGH* 3b [Suppl.] 1.318-20) prefers 454-49 to earlier suggestions of the 460s, but would like to emend the book number to 6. Alternatively, the *theōrikon* may have been introduced as an analogy into a treatment of the disbursements of the fiscal surplus from Laurion, which were made before the Themistoclean naval legislation (Hdt. 7.144.1).

17. The ancient testimonia are extensively quoted and discussed in Raubitschek, and the most significant or independent sources are also reproduced in Jacoby *FGH* 3b (Suppl.) 1.315-16.

As Raubitschek argued, the similarities are quite noticeable, especially when the parallel order of Σ*Eq.* 855b and F 30 is considered.¹⁸ Particularly striking is the notice taken of the demise of the institution—which is invariably traced to the unworthiness of its last victim, Hyperbolos—in F 30, Σ*Eq.* 855b, and *Arist.* 7.2–4. There is, however, no intrinsic reason that Philochorus or anyone else had to treat the end of ostracism in the context of its beginning, early use, and procedures. A common portrayal of ostracism appears to lie behind these accounts.

Raubitschek traces the common features of post-Aristotelian accounts of ostracism to Theophrastus' *Nomoi*. Following Bloch, he observes that Σ*Lucian Timon* (34) 30 (p. 114 Rabe), citing Theophrastus, contains similar language on the end of ostracism to that in Σ*Arist. Equites* 855b J/W and Philochorus F 30.¹⁹ Σ*Lucian*: ἐπὶ τούτου δὲ καὶ τὸ ἔθος τοῦ ὀστρακισμοῦ κατελύθη. Σ*Arist.*: . . . ἐπ' αὐτοῦ κατελύθη. . . . F 30: μετὰ τοῦτον δὲ κατελύθη τὸ ἔθος. Adding the correlations between Σ*Equites* 855b J/W and Philochorus F 30, one might posit Theophrastus as the common authority, but it seems unlikely that Philochorus derived his information from Theophrastus, rather than from earlier Attidography. The undeniable similarities observed between Philochorus and sources assumed to derive their information on ostracism from Theophrastus may stem from their mutual derivation from earlier *Attides*. Theophrastus himself (and probably the author of the *Athenaion Politeia*) drew upon an uncontroversial treatment of ostracism in an earlier Attidographer. It is unlikely that Theophrastus had the time to do independent or far-ranging research for the *Nomoi*, a work which, to the best of our knowledge, was synthetic and possibly prescriptive in character. It is noteworthy that the scholiast of *Lucian's Timon* also cites Androtion on the ostracism of Hyperbolos with the same emphasis on his character as Philochorus (*FGH* 324 F 42: διὰ φανλότητα; F 30: διὰ μοχθηρίαν τρόπων). It is a reasonable conclusion that the similar language on the desuetude of ostracism cited above is also owed to Androtion, possibly through the mediation of Theophrastus.

Another serious shortcoming of Raubitschek's hypothesis is that it compels him to argue that the account of ostracism in DS 11.55.3 is derived from Timaeus, and not from Ephorus, the main source for the Athenian history in Book 11.²⁰ Diodorus is linked to the posited single authority on ostracism by

18. DS 11.55.1–3 offers several similarities on a smaller scale: see Jacoby *FGH* 3b (Suppl.) 1.315–16, and n. 23 below.

19. Raubitschek 77–83, following H. Bloch, "Studies in Historical Literature of the Fourth Century B.C.," *HSCP* Suppl. 1 (1940) 303–76, esp. 357–61, who, however, saw Σ*Equites* 855b J/W as combining Theophrastus and Philochorus, an impression which is also traceable to the descent of both from an earlier Attidographic authority. See also W.R. Connor & J.J. Keaney, "Theophrastos on the End of Ostracism," *AJP* 90 (1969) 313–19, who support Raubitschek's thesis.

20. Not probative for Raubitschek's hypothesis is his argument (93–96) that since Diodorus connects his general treatment of ostracism to the specific case of Themistokles, his source mentioned no other ostracisms. Σ*Eq.* 855b J/W seems to indicate that the original source had a list of the ostracized (incomplete in the existing citations). Any intermediary, such as Ephorus, could attach an excerpt from the general survey to that ostracism which was felt by him to be the most

his characterization of the institution as involving *ταπείνωσις* 'abasement', rather than *κόλασις* 'punishment', the very same terms used in Plutarch's *Aristides* (7.2), where they are linked to the prominent theme of *φθόνος* and ostracism. Thus, the balance of evidence indicates that Diodorus used Ephorus, who in his turn used an Atthidographer. Still another objection is that the main tradition presented in Plutarch *Nic.* 11.4–10, *Alcib.* 13.4–9; *Arist.* 7.3–4 traces the ostracism of Hyperbolos to a compact between Alkibiades and Nicias. Theophrastus, however, is cited for the minority view (*Nic.* 11.10 = fr. 129 W) that Phaiax conspired with Alkibiades against Hyperbolos (cf. *Alcib.* 13.8).²¹ If Theophrastus rather than an Atthidographer is the key figure in the transmission of the ancient consensus on ostracism, why did not his view on the agents in the ostracism of Hyperbolos prevail? Theophrastus does not appear to be the primary source used by Plutarch on the ostracism of Hyperbolos or on ostracism in general. Plutarch's accounts of the ostracism of Hyperbolos sound the theme of ostracism as abasement not punishment (*Nic.* 11.6; *Alcib.* 13.6) and use the same language of moral disparagement of Hyperbolos (*Nic.* 11.4, 6; *Alcib.* 13.9) that is characteristic of the general treatments of the institution outlined above. The general treatments are equally unlikely to have originated in Theophrastus rather than in Atthidography.

The likelihood of this view is enhanced if the most notorious discrepancy in the evidence on ostracism, namely its origin, is removed. If we accept the argument that Androtion has been distorted by Harpocration to state that ostracism originated shortly before it was first used, we avoid conflict with its attribution in the *Athenaion Politeia* to Kleisthenes.²² Philochorus F 30 also attributes the creation of ostracism to Kleisthenes, and indeed this *recovered* underlying similarity between the *Athenaion Politeia* and Harpocration on the origins of ostracism parallels the agreement I am suggesting between the phrasing of the *Athenaion Politeia*'s statement on the residence clause and that of Philochorus. Accordingly, the general treatment of ostracism was transmitted from one Atthidographer to another (or, at the very least, from Androtion to Philochorus) without major alteration.²³ Similarly, it is unlikely that

significant, e.g., that of Themistokles. Plutarch or his source attached extracts from the same overview to his treatment of the case of Aristides, and Didymus commented on a Demosthenic passage referring to Themistokles.

21. Cf. A.E. Raubitschek, "Theopompos on Hyperbolos," *Phoenix* 9 (1955) 122–26.

22. See U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin 1893) 1.123 n. 3; K.J. Dover, "Androtion on Ostracism," *CR* 77 (1963) 256–57; G.V. Sumner, "Androtion F 6 and *Ath. Pol.* 22," *BICS* 11 (1964) 79–86, esp. 79–83; Keaney *Historia* (1970) 1–11. [See now K.H. Kinzl, "AP 22.4: The Sole Source of Harpocration on the Ostrakismos of Hipparkhos Son of Kharmos," *Klio* 73 (1990) 28–45.]

23. Other discrepancies, such as the 5-year term of ostracisms (cf. Philochorus F 30; DS 11.55.2) and the nature of the 6000 vote threshold (cf. F 30 with Plut. *Arist.* 7.6), can be explained as extrapolations from specific cases or distortions of intermediaries rather than discordances in the primary authorities. See Jacoby *FGH* 3b (Suppl.) 1.316–17; Hignett *Constitution* 165–66; also A.E. Raubitschek, "Philochoros Frag. 30 (Jacoby)," *Hermes* 83 (1955) 119–20; Raubitschek 82–83 on an emendation to Didymus in *P. Berol.* 5008; and 102–3 on the duration of ostracism.

there was major divergence of views on the residential limitation among Atti-dographers that would justify emending Philochorus instead of the *Athenaion Politeia*. This conclusion can also be supported by considering the significance of the configuration of the prohibiting clause.

THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE RESTRICTIVE CLAUSE

In Philochorus F 30, the residential limitation appears in conjunction with a provision that the ostracized leave Attica within ten days of his rejection by the voters. Presumably, before the limitation was added, he might exit Athenian territory by land or sea, just crossing the border if he chose. In point of fact, however, the first victims of ostracism seem to have mainly gone to Aigina (see pp. 182–86 below). A departure by ship would, in any event, have been advisable, since such an exit from Attica through the Peiraeus (or Phaleron) could be a declarative action and a public event, and so more verifiable than a claim to have crossed the border by land at a particular time. Leaving by sea, the ostracized vitiated attempts to prosecute him (probably with *atimia* as a punishment) for failing to observe the ten-day limit (or later, possibly, a five-day limit), and could also save the time needed to reach the border by land if there were any difficulty or delay in settling his affairs. The limit for the settlement of persons ostracized might thus represent conditions in popular geography, set in anticipation of a departure from Attica by ship. Hence, the Athenians had no reason to lay out four points in order to create a quadrilateral within which (or outside which, if one does not emend the *Athenaion Politeia*) the ostracized could not dwell: their purpose was served by establishing that the ostracized should not disembark (ἐπιβαίνειν) or settle (κατοικεῖν) until his ship had passed Cape Geraistos or Cape Skyllaion. Although Geraistos and Skyllaion do not appear elsewhere together, each is used individually as a landmark, as a stage on a journey, or as a reference point.²⁴

In this interpretation, the geographical provisions of the residential clause are parallel to stipulations of the “Peace of Kallias”, supposedly concluded between Athens and Persia during the height of the Athenian ἀρχή. In the predominant tradition, the Persians agreed, *inter alia*, not to sail within the Kyanean rocks or Khelidonian islands (ἐνδον δὲ Κυανέων καὶ Χελιδονίων μακρᾷ νηὶ καὶ χαλκεμβόλῳ μὴ πλέειν: Plut. *Cim.* 13.4; for similar formulations, cf. Dem. 19.273; DS 12.4.5; Lyc. *Leoc.* 73; Ael. Arist. 13.169, cf. 153 [Dindorf]; Aristodemus *FGH* 104 F 13.2).²⁵ The corresponding restriction for Persian land forces is sometimes phrased in similar terms: οὐτ’ ἐντὸς Ἀλυος πεζῷ στρατοπέδῳ καταβαίνειν (Isoc. 12.59; note also 7.80; cf. Dem. 19.273; DS 12.4.5; Aristodemus *FGH* 104 F 13.2). The geographical restrictions on

24. Geraistos: Hom. *Od.* 3.177; Hdt. 8.7.1; Dem. 4.34; Call. *Del.* 4.199; Strabo 10.1.7–8 C446; Plut. *Ages.* 6.6; Ael. Arist. 3.22, 1.35 D; Liban. *Or.* 1.16; Eustath. 1.430 (*ad Il.* 2.537). Skyllaion: Thuc. 5.53; Strabo 8.6.1 C368; 10.5.1 C484; Paus. 2.34.7, 8.

25. For other expressions reporting the same provision: Isoc. 7.80, 12.59, cf. 4.120; *Suda s.v.* Κίμων, κ 1620 Adler.

the Persians are conceptualized in terms of limitations on their possible movements (not as linear boundaries), as are the restrictions on departures from Attica by the ostracized. Moreover, when an area is distinguished, often by a word like *ἐντός*, it is almost always the forbidden, rather than the permitted, zone (cf. *Suda s.v. Κίμων*, κ 1620 Adler). An unemended *Athenaion Politeia* and previous understandings of the significance of the two capes in the residential restriction remove these two similarities (see immediately below). One is justified in remaining sceptical of the historicity of the Peace (cf. Callisthenes *FGH* 124 F 16; Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 153).²⁶ Yet, even a sceptic may grant that these testimonia probably preserve fifth-century formulations on what constituted acceptable behavior by the Persians (if not the actual terms of Athenian proclamations to or truces with the satraps).

The two capes are not then the two termini for a line of demarcation,²⁷ but simply two landmarks to be observed by an ostracized traveling by sea. Nor, on this interpretation, can Geraistos and Skyllaion be the eastern and western limits of the area within which the ostracized had to dwell, for the two capes do not inscribe a geometric figure within or without which habitation was mandated.²⁸ The import of Skyllaion, the southeastern promontory of the Argolic Akte, is easy to deduce: the ostracized had to leave the Saronic Gulf. But if that were the sole purpose of the clause could not the other marker have been provided by Cape Sounion? The setting of a boundary within Athenian territory may, however, have been perceived as open to distortion. Although the law directed a removal of the ostracized from Athenian territory, a reference to Cape Sounion in this amendment might have been twisted to imply the introduction of the permissibility of an establishment on the eastern shore of Attica (or even at Oropos, an Athenian dependency outside Attica). Thus Cape Geraistos was chosen, as the next point of orientation to the northeast. Another factor in naming Cape Geraistos was probably more important. Just as the Athenians tried to bar the ostracized from the Saronic Gulf, they may also have wished to close the Euripos (and with it Chalcis and Eretria) to their residence.

On this understanding of the clause, what was to stop the ostracized from sailing into the Argolic Gulf or around the northern coast of Euboea, and next reaching the Isthmus or Boiotia by land. Kimon may have done something like this, if he traveled from the Chersonese to Tanagra (see below, p. 186).²⁹ One must assume that the Athenians did not distinguish between an initial disembarkation in a prohibited locale and the subsequent appearance of the

26. See R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 487–95. [E. Badian, "The Peace of Callias," *JHS* 107 (1987) 1–39, offers the most recent conspectus.]

27. Develin 76 posits such a line which, sufficiently extended, would allow Kimon to remain within even while in the Chersonese! See also Goossens 126.

28. Cf. Kenyon *Constitution* 80–81.

29. It is not certain that, in the 480s, it was anticipated that the ostracized would move about, or known whether they, in fact, did so. With so much of Greece in Persian hands, transience might have been suspect as Medism. In any case, good reasons will be suggested below for the ostracized to stay in as close contact with Attica as possible.

ostracized in a location on the coast. Hence, a visit to Eretria or Kenkhreai by one of the ostracized left him open to a prosecution leading to *atimia*. Nonetheless, one should also conclude that mere proximity to Attica was not the primary consideration in the limitation on residence. Kimon was not, it seems, forbidden from Tanagra, which, after all, is much closer to Attica than many places within the Saronic Gulf. Rather the significance of phrasing the residential limitation in terms related to sailing from Attica suggests that an establishment by the ostracized in a littoral site within the prohibited area was its chief concern. This conclusion, in turn, suggests that ease of communication with Attica played a larger role in the formulation of the clause than did linear distance from Athens. In other words, residence in Plataia, for instance, was less objectionable than an establishment at Troizen. Regular and expeditious contact with Attica took place by sea, and this sort of facility of interaction may be precisely what bothered the Athenians (see pp. 190–95 below).³⁰

To recapitulate: the limitation on place of domicile for the ostracized forbade them the shores of the Saronic Gulf and perhaps the Euripos, so barring them from places with easy contact with Athens, i.e., from Aigina, Eretria, and Megara, but not Thebes, Argos, and perhaps even Corinth (as distinguished from Kenkhreai, its port on the Saronic Gulf).

THE HABITATION OF THE OSTRACIZED IN THE 480s

Why the Athenians should have wanted to implement a restriction on habitation is explained by the behavior of the first group of the ostracized during their exile. The whereabouts of Aristeides is most clearly attested. All sources agree that Aristeides spent his ostracism on Aigina.³¹ That he was not alone in choosing a refuge there can be inferred from a fragment of Old Comedy (Kock *Adespota* 3.40, p. 406) which preserves a proverbial expression explained by Zenobius: Βουκολήσεις τὰ περὶ τὸν βοῦν: ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλείστον οἱ δστρακίζόμενοι μεθίσταντο εἰς Αἴγιαν (ms. Ἀργίαν), ἐνθα ἦν βοῦς χαλκῇ παμμεγέθης.³²

30. Compare Kaibel *Stil und Text* 177.

31. [Dem.] 26.6; *Suda* s.v. Ἀριστείδης, α 3903; Δαρεικούς, δ 72 Adler; Aristodemus *FGH* 104 F 1.1.4. Reflecting Attidography, Plut. *Them.* 11.1 attributes his recall to a proposal of Themistokles. The Themistokles Decree has the ostracized recalled just before the evacuation (Meiggs-Lewis 23.45–47). Herodotus seems to portray Aristeides as coming home directly from Aigina before the battle of Salamis (Hdt. 8.79.1; Plut. *Arist.* 8.2; ΣAristid. 46.194, 3.613 D; Aristodemus *FGH* 104 F 1.5.4), but this notion may have been encouraged by a conflation of Aristeides' return from exile with his return from an embassy to Aigina: one escorting the statues of the Aiakidai (Hdt. 8.64.2; 8.83.2): see J.B. Bury, "Aristides at Salamis," *CR* 10 (1896) 414–18; or another to deal with Athenian refugees on the island. See H.B. Mattingly, "The Themistokles Decree from Troizen: Transmission and Status," in G.S. Shrimpton & D.J. McCargar (eds.), *Classical Contributions: Studies in Honour of Malcolm Francis McGregor* (Locust Valley, NY 1981) 79–87, esp. 83–84; R.W. Macan, *Herodotus: the Seventh, Eighth, & Ninth Books* (London 1908) 1.2.482–83. Plut. *Arist.* 8.1 has Xerxes virtually on the borders of Attica before the recall. Nepos *Arist.* 2.1 marks the next, erroneous deduction: *interfuit autem pugnae navali apud Salamina, quae est prius quam poena liberaretur*. Cf. Nepos *Arist.* 1.5: *sexto fere anno*. See n. 2 above.

32. Zenobius *ap.* Miller *Mélanges* 384; see Goossens 129–33. A. Meineke, "Bemerkungen zu

The ox lurking behind the expression "caring for affairs concerning the ox" ("tending the matters of the ox" or "cheating in the affairs of the ox") was a bronze dedication. Pliny mentions the same or a similar monument, when he notes that an ox constituted from metal which was characteristic of Aiginetan bronze had been carried as loot from the island to Rome (*NH* 34.5.10). The ox of the proverb presumably stood in some conspicuous place (e.g., the marketplace) in the city of Aigina, where it may have acted as a landmark at which Athenians congregated while conducting local business. As such, it served as a haunt for ostracized Athenians seeking to maintain contact with their fellow citizens and home.

We have already accounted for one of those ostracized who, for the most part (*ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον*), went to Aigina, namely Aristides. Among those ostracized later, the only possibility is Thukydides Melesiou (a doubtful one, I shall argue below). Accordingly, the gloss ought to be referring to others of the first group of the ostracized. Their prominence and collective residence on Aigina was striking enough to promote the expression *βουκολεῖν τὰ περὶ τὴν βοῦν* to proverbial status as a byword for political intrigue.³³

No evidence excludes that others ostracized in the 480s stayed on Aigina. We do know from the "Against Leocrates" of Lycurgus that Hipparkhos Kharmou was accused of *prodosia*, presumably for Medism, and condemned to death *in absentia*. Quite possibly Hipparkhos, fearing the mood of the *dēmos*, did not return to Salamis (*Lyc. Leoc.* 117–18; *Harp. s.v.* "Ἰππαρχος"), when the ostracized were directed there to await (individual?) disposition (Meiggs-Lewis 23.45–47). That his defection took place as late as 481–80 rather than earlier (after his ostracism) may be inferred from an implicit comparison with Leocrates, the defendant whom Lycurgus prosecuted for his absence from Attica during war. A flight by Hipparkhos when the arrival of the Persians was imminent would indicate a similar pattern. In contrast, Xanthippos returned to command against the Persians (*Hdt.* 7.33; 8.131.3; 9.114.2; 9.120.4), and Megakles Hippokratous seems to have returned, for his son retained his citizenship.³⁴ Megakles may well have spent his ostracism on Aigina. It is likely that his uncle, the Alkmeonid reformer Kleisthenes, had been responsible for a Delphic oracle urging a delay in retaliation against Aigina in c. 506 (*Hdt.* 5.89.2).³⁵ The fate or later actions of Kallias Kratiou, the likeliest candidate

den *Mélanges de littérature grecque* par M.E. Miller. Paris 1868, "Hermes 3 (1869) 451–58, esp. 457 compared this line to *Eq.* 284–302. Goossens supposed a trochaic dimeter standing behind the line being glossed.

33. Nothing compels us to follow Goossens (131) in believing that the comedy which Zenobius cites to illustrate the proverb has to have been contemporary with the events—the presence of the ostracized on Aigina—that gave it currency.

34. Davies *APF* #9688, p. 381, who cites *ΣPin. Pyth.* 7, *inscr.* a; *IG* I² 237–39 (I³ 297–99), 261–63 (I³ 322–24); *Arist. Ach.* 614–17.

35. A parallel for Cleisthenic involvement in the oracle concerning Aigina is the almost contemporary Delphic campaign, at Alkmeonid prompting, for Sparta to expel the Peisistratids (*Hdt.* 5.63.1–2, 90.1). See T.J. Figueira, *Aegina and Athens in the Archaic and Classical Periods: A Socio-Political Investigation* (Diss. Univ. of Pennsylvania 1977) 261–62. Although counseling

for the victim of ostracism in 486/5, unnamed in the *Ath. Pol.*, is unknown.³⁶ Consequently, it is possible that, besides Aristides, some or all of the other four ostracized were present on Aigina in order to be recalled by the Athenians. A striking by-product of this conclusion is that the unemended residential restriction unnecessarily legislates that the ostracized go to exactly the area where they seem to have preferred to live anyway.

As has been observed, the Themistocles Decree (Meiggs-Lewis 23) contains a clause directing the ostracized to go to Salamis until the *dēmos* can reach a decision about them: . . . τοὺς μὲν μεθεστηκότας τὰ [δέκα] ἔτη ἀπιέναι εἰς Σαλαμῖνα καὶ μένειν αὐτοὺς ἐ[κεί] ἕως ἄν τι τῷ δήμῳ δόξῃ περὶ αὐτῶν (ll. 45–47). Here a recall initiated by Themistokles is combined with provisions for manning the fleet and for evacuation of Attica. This is not the place to review the mass of scholarship on this inscription;³⁷ in my view, the document is not a later revision of a single, authentic proposal by Themistokles, but rather draws on fifth-century traditions (possibly through an *Atthis*), including documentary material such as *psēphismata* proposed by Themistokles in 481–80.³⁸ Plutarch seems to treat the decree ordering the evacuation and that directing the recall as two separate enactments (Plut. *Them.* 10.4, 11.1). Most commentators have doubted that the prohibitions on residence, associated by the *Athenaion Politeia* with the recall, can have followed (in ll. 47ff.) what survives of the Decree.³⁹ The use, however, of τοὺς μεθεστηκότας for the ostracized and the two-stage restoration procedure suggest derivation from a genuine *psēphisma* as these unanticipated details are unlikely to have been fabricated retrospectively.⁴⁰

delay in retaliation against Aigina does not demonstrate a pro-Aiginetan stance for Kleisthenes and other Alkmeonids, it does provide a reason why Aigina would be a sympathetic refuge for Megakles.

36. E. Vanderpool, "Ostracism at Athens," *Lectures in Memory of Louise Taft Semple, Second Series, 1966–73* (Cincinnati 1973) 215–70, esp. 235–36. P.J. Bicknell, *Studies in Athenian Politics and Genealogy* (Wiesbaden 1972) 64–71; *id.*, "Athenian Politics and Genealogy; Some Pendants," *Historia* 23 (1974) 146–63, esp. 148–49.

37. As introduction, see Meiggs-Lewis, pp. 48–52; M.H. Jameson, "Waiting for the Barbarian: New Light on the Persian Wars," *G&R* 8 (1961) 5–18. In favor of authenticity: B.D. Meritt, "Greek Historical Studies," *Lectures in the Memory of Louise Taft Semple: First Series (1961–1965)* (Princeton 1967) 95–132, esp. 119–32; and the works specified in n. 40 below. *Contra*: C. Habicht, "Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter Perserkriege," *Hermes* 89 (1961) 1–35, esp. 1–11. For the recall: S.M. Burstein, "The Recall of the Ostracized and the Themistocles Decree," *CSCA* 4 (1971) 93–110.

38. I. Hahn, "Zur Echtheitsfrage der Themistokles-Inschrift," *Acta Antiqua* 13 (1965) 27–39, esp. 32–37, discerns three constituent decrees including one in 481/0 for the recall of the ostracized. On fifth-century provenience: C.W. Fornara, "The Value of the Themistocles Decree," *AHR* 73 (1967) 425–33; G. Huxley, "On Fragments of Three Historians," *GRBS* 9 (1968) 309–20, esp. 313–18.

39. Cf. A.E. Raubitschek, "A Note on the Themistocles Decree," *Studi in Onore di Luisa Banti* (Rome 1965) 285–87.

40. D.M. Lewis, "Notes on the Decree of Themistocles," *CQ* 11 (1961) 61–66, esp. 65–66, who, citing the parallel passages, notes specifically the appropriate use of *μεθίστημι* to describe the

The evacuation of this inscription dates the recall to 480/79, not the archonship of Hypsikhides (482/1 or 481/0), as asserted in the *Athenaion Politeia* and probably in Attidography. Even the multi-staged restoration envisaged in the Decree should have ended before 480/79.⁴¹ On the most economical assumption, Xanthippos returned early enough in 480 to be elected general for 480/79 (Hdt. 8.131.3) before he participated in the evacuation of Attica (Plut. *Them.* 10.10; Aris. fr. 399 R; Philochorus *FGH* 328 F 116). Some even argue that Aristides commanded as a *stratēgos* at Psytalleia (Hdt. 8.95; Plut. *Arist.* 9.1). That the Decree cites the need for *homonoia* (ll. 44–45) also renders a protracted procedure of restoration, spanning 481/0 and 480/79, improbable.⁴² Attempts to reconcile the Decree with the remaining evidence through a rewritten schedule for events in 481–80 are necessarily desperate. Consequently, the segregation of the ostracized on Salamis cannot have followed their return to Athens; moreover, the nature of the decision on them by the *dēmos* would become completely intractable for us in that case.⁴³ In the Decree, the ostracized could be easily directed to Salamis, perhaps from a single place, nearby Aigina.

Like the sources which had Aristides returning around the time of Salamis (see ns. 2, 31 above), the compiler of the inscription has the recall at a moment of intense drama, the evacuation of Attica. He might well have been influenced by the instruction that the ostracized go to Salamis in a decree which he used as raw material. This allusion to Salamis, however, is probably

ostracized. See also Raubitschek *Studi Banti* 285–87. On the two stages: M.H. Jameson, "A Decree of Themistokles from Troizen," *Hesperia* 29 (1960) 198–223, esp. 222. The criticisms of Habicht *Hermes* (1961) 8 on the supposed anachronism of recall were addressed by H. Berve, *Zur Themistokles-Inschrift von Troizen*, *SBW* (1961) 21–25.

41. C. Hignett, *Xerxes' Invasion of Greece* (Oxford 1963) 463, 465; M. Chambers, "The Significance of the Themistocles Decree," *Philologus* 111 (1967) 157–69, esp. 162–65; Burstein *CSCA* (1971) 96–98. Cf. Raubitschek *Studi Banti* 286–87 who finds confirmation for Nepos *Arist.* 1.5–2.1 (see ns. 2, 31 above).

42. Hignett *Invasion* 465; cf. Burstein *CSCA* (1971) 107–10, who over-emphasizes the decree's suspiciousness toward the ostracized—I should term the predominating mood, one of caution. C.W. Fornara, *The Athenian Board of Generals from 501–404* (Wiesbaden 1971) 42 accepts the *stratēgia* of Xanthippos, but rejects a generalship for Aristides. [See also R. Develin, *Athenian Officials 684–321 B.C.* (Cambridge 1989) 63.]

43. See Meiggs-Lewis, p. 51 for the possibility that the ostracized were already in Athens. Burstein (*CSCA* [1971] 98–102) noted that the ἀπείναι does not belong to normal usage for restorations. Yet, in our interpretation, the *psēphisma*, used by the compiler, did not so much restore the ostracized as mark a first step toward a decision on restoration. Moreover, an exception occurs in a decree of 363/2 on the reincorporation of Iulis on Keos into the Second Confederacy (Tod *GHI* #142). In ll. 49–51, three pro-Athenian Keans in exile (cf. 36–37, 53) are sent home: ἀπείναι εἰς Κέω ἐπὶ τὰ ἑαυτῶν. One is not forced, however, on this analogy to conclude with Burstein that the ostracized in the Themistocles Decree are to "depart" Athens for Salamis. If ἀπείναι suggests that a single place was visualized from which they would leave for Salamis, that place might well have been Aigina. See N.G.L. Hammond, "The Narrative of Herodotus VII and the Decree of Themistocles at Troezen," *JHS* 102 (1982) 75–93, esp. 86–87, n. 44.

coincidental, and does not prepare for or predict a battle there.⁴⁴ Salamis was not Attica, but was under Athenian control, so that an order to go there could test the reaction of the ostracized and thereby their loyalty—a test which Hipparkhos failed. Hence, there is no need to imagine a rump assembly on Salamis (cf. Hdt. 8.41.1) to decide on the ostracized (the sort of decision perhaps normally lying with the *stratēgoi* during wartime or, in extraordinary cases the *boulē*, as at Tanagra).⁴⁵ The decree used by the compiler of the inscription belonged to the archonship of Hypsikhides, when the Athenian government continued in being at Athens to decide the fate of the ostracized.

PLACES OF EXILE FOR THE LATER VICTIMS OF OSTRACISM

My interpretation of the nature of the limitation on residence is further supported by the surviving evidence on the activity following ostracism of those ostracized after 480.⁴⁶ Let us consider them in chronological order:

1) Themistokles was ostracized c. 470. He lived in Argos and traveled in the Peloponnesus (Thuc. 1.135.2–3; DS 11.55.3–4; Plut. *Them.* 23.1–6; Nepos *Them.* 8.1–3; Aristodemus *FGH* 104 F 1.6.1, 1.10.1; cf. Plato *Gorgias* 516D; Cic. *De amic.* 12.42).⁴⁷ Thus his behavior during his ostracism is accommodated by my understanding of the amendment on residence.

2) Kimon was ostracized in 462/1 (Plut. *Cimon* 17.3; *Per.* 9.5; Nepos *Cimon* 3.1–3; Plato *Gorgias* 516D). When he was eventually recalled, he seems to have been living in the Chersonese (And. 3.3; cf. Aesch. 2.172).⁴⁸ While ostracized, Kimon appeared at Tanagra, where he offered to fight alongside his tribesmen (Plut. *Cimon* 17.4–5; *Per.* 10.1–3). The *boulē* ordered the generals to turn him away, which suggests his petition was referred to them. There is no suggestion that either his domicile in the Chersonese or his mere appearance at Tanagra were illegal. In either case his legal status is explained by my hypothesis on the residence clause.

3) Associated with fall of Kimon is the ostracism of Menon the Thessalian (Hesych. s.v. *Μενωνίδαι*, μ 66 Latte), if Menon was indeed ostracized.⁴⁹ He had received citizenship, presumably under the patronage of Kimon, for the

44. Hammond *JHS* (1982) defends an authentic, unitary decree dated to September 481, and sees the ships posted at Salamis as a guard against a still hostile Aigina.

45. Cf. Jameson *Hesperia* (1960) 222; id. *G&R* (1961) 13.

46. Kenyon *Constitution* 81 noted that Themistokles, Hyperbolos, and, with reservations, Kimon were counter-indicative to an unemended *Ath. Pol.*; Sandys *Constitution* 96–97 admits Themistokles and Hyperbolos; Beloch *GG²* 2.2.143 n. 1 notes Themistokles, Kimon, and Hyperbolos.

47. See A. Andrewes, "Sparta and Arcadia in the Early Fifth Century," *Phoenix* 6 (1952) 1–5. W.G. Forrest, "Themistokles and Argos," *CQ* 10 (1960) 221–41, esp. 232–40.

48. The emendation *Κίμωνα τὸν Μιλτιάδου* for *Μιλτιάδην τὸν Κίμωνος* is virtually compulsory, given the context. The similarity of the notice of Andocides with the other testimonia suggests concord in the Attidographic tradition (cf. Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 88; Plut. *Cimon* 17.8; *Per.* 10.4–5; Nepos *Cimon* 3.2–3).

49. See A.E. Raubitschek, "Menon, Son of Menekleides," *Hesperia* 24 (1955) 286–89, who cites the relevant ostraka in his n. 2. [See M. Lang, *Ostraka, The Athenian Agora* 25 (Princeton 1990) 96 on Agora #643–46; she knows of 749 elsewhere.]

military aid which he brought to the Athenians besieging Eion, perhaps in 477/6 (Dem. 23.199; cf. [Dem.] 13.23). Raubitschek tentatively identifies him with the Menon of Pharsalos, who brought help to Athens in 431 (Thuc. 2.22.3), but the latter could equally be the son of the ostracized Menon.⁵⁰ A Thukydidēs the Pharsalian, son of a Menon, who was an Athenian *proxenos* at Pharsalos and present in Attica in 411, was probably the son of the Menon of 431 (Thuc. 8.92.8; Marcellin. *Vit. Thuc.* 28; ΣArist. *Ach.* 703a, d Wilson; *Vespae* 947b Koster; Polemon fr. 5, *FHG* 3.117). If these Pharsalians are correctly associated with the Menon who was ostracized, that man withdrew to his home city after his ostracism, an action reconcilable with the hypothesis presented above.

4) The movements of Thukydidēs Melesiou after his ostracism present the only significant challenge to my reconstruction. The biographical tradition on Thucydides, the son of Oloros, the historian, preserves information derived from the life of Thukydidēs, the son of Melesias. The anonymous biographer of Thucydides the historian concludes an account composed in large part out of details from the life of Thukydidēs Melesiou (including his rhetorical skill and opposition to Perikles) with the statements that he composed his history on Aigina, and practiced there usury ruinous to the Aiginetans (6–7). The last details—exile and usury on Aigina—are also reported by Marcellinus (*Vit. Thuc.* 24). One reaction has been to attribute them to the career of Thukydidēs Melesiou also.⁵¹ Yet, the assertion that the history of Thucydides was written on Aigina should be treated cautiously, for it suggests that there were more points of congruence in the biographical traditions about these two prominent namesakes than the simple confusion caused by the identity of their names. Perhaps both men had connections with Aigina: Thukydidēs through his father Melesias' patronage of Aiginetan athletes (Pin. *Ol.* 8.53–55; *Nem.* 4.93; 6.65–66) and Thucydides the historian through a period spent in the Athenian *apoikia* on Aigina. In that case, one might suggest a chronological context during his ostracism for the encounter of Thukydidēs with King Arkhidamos of Sparta in which the Athenian was asked who was the better wrestler, he or Perikles (Plut. *Per.* 8.5; *Mor.* 802C). Thukydidēs answered that his victories were negated by Periclean rhetoric. Surely, this episode makes best sense if its dramatic frame was after the final fall, so to speak, when Thukydidēs was ostracized.⁵² In that case, Thukydidēs visited Sparta during his period of ostracism, a visit reconcilable with my hypothesis and not with reconstructions based on an unemended *Athenaion Politeia*. Nevertheless, the lack of unequivocal testimony on the movements of Thukydidēs after

50. *HCT* 5.312–13.

51. H.T. Wade-Gery, "Thucydides the Son of Melesias," *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford 1958) 239–70, esp. 261–62; Goossens 132 n. 1; cf. Beloch *GG*² 2.2.143 n. 1, who considered the notice worthless.

52. F. Jacoby, "Some Remarks on Ion of Chios," *CQ* 41 (1947) 1–17, esp. 7–9, who observes that Stesimbrotus is a possible source (rather than Ion of Chios).

his ostracism renders his case inconclusive as evidence on the provisions of the residential clause (see pp. 198–200 below).

5) Hyperbolos represents a straightforward case: he was assassinated on Samos in 411 during his period of ostracism (Thuc. 8.73.3; cf. Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 96; ΣArist. *Pax* 681b Holwerda; *Vespae* 1007b Koster). His place of residence clearly lay outside Geraistos and Skyllaion on any interpretation.⁵³

THE RESTRICTIVE CLAUSE IN ATHENIAN POLITICS

Alternative understandings of the amendment to the law of ostracism are less consistent with the evidence. Clearly, the interpretation offered above cannot simply be reversed so that the ostracized were confined to the Saronic Gulf. Themistokles' settlement in Argos so soon after the amendment should be proof against that suggestion. Thereafter all the ostracized, with the arguable exception of Thoukydides Melesiou, lived outside the limits. One is then forced back on the interpretation which proposes that Geraistos and Skyllaion were the termini of a line east or west of which the ostracized must stay.⁵⁴ This notion seems more appropriate to modern scholars who habitually think of fifth-century boundaries in terms of lines of demarcation on which they look down in maps (see pp. 180–81 above on the Peace of Kallias). Would not an Athenian tend to lump together passing Cape Skyllaion on the way to Argos and on the way to Rhodes, though the two places are on either side of the proposed line? The movements of Kimon seem to undermine this approach: he was on both sides of the line during his ostracism, in the Chersonese and visiting Tanagra.

Another line of approach is to invalidate most of the evidence from the later ostracisms by assuming that the ostracized were later freed from any restriction or that they were eventually confined to places within the Athenian ἀρχή.⁵⁵ Nothing, however, supports such an assumption, and perhaps a fatal objection may be raised against it. Philochorus F 30 provides a general overview of ostracism (shared by other Attidographers): although it was appended to the passage of the ostracism law by Kleisthenes or to an account of the early ostracisms, this survey previewed the end of the institution in the ostracism of Hyperbolos. Philochorus may note the change in the number of days allowable for the ostracized to leave Attica. The survey may also have contained a list of the victims of ostracism (cf. ΣArist. *Eq.* 855b J/W and n. 20 above). Such an overview would not have troubled to treat a short-lived alteration in the institution, one which affected only one ostracism (that of Themistokles). On the contrary, such a sketch would discuss a longer-lived restriction—one confining the ostracized to the *arkhē*, for example—or the lack of

53. Connor & Keaney *AJP* (1969) 314, with n. 9 (314–15) rightly reject the possibility that the phrase μὴ ὑπακούσαντος τῷ νόμῳ, used by ΣArist. *Eq.* 855b J/W to explain the desuetude of ostracism, can mean that Hyperbolos flouted the residence clause; they prefer to emend.

54. Develin 76; Goossens 126.

55. For the former: Wilamowitz *Aristoteles* 1.114 n. 25; Kenyon *Constitution* 80–81; Goossens 127–28; Develin 76; for the latter, Raubitschek 104–5.

any restriction at all, a situation possibly involving the ostracisms (and possible ostracisms) of Kimon, Menon, Alkibiades the Elder, Thukydides, Damon, and Hyperbolos.

This interpretation is borne out by *ΣVespae* 947a (Koster), which derives from the same tradition as *ΣEq.* 855b J/W (an Atthidographer via Didymus: see pp. 174–75 above). The former passage distinguishes ostracism from exile by noting that victims of permanent exile have no fixed place of habitation nor term of exile, while the ostracized do (καὶ τοῖς μὲν καὶ τόπος ἀπεδίδοτο καὶ χρόνος).⁵⁶ This seems to be a condensed reference to the limitation clause given at greater length in Philochorus F 30, and indicates the general relevance of the clause in separating exile from ostracism in popular perspective.

A final consideration urges that the restrictive clause in *Ath. Pol.* 22.8 continued to be valid throughout the fifth century. If the ostracized did not obey the restriction of residence, they became ἀτίμους . . . καθάπαξ ‘without civil rights . . . immediately (or absolutely)’. The term καθάπαξ, when used to specify a variety of *atimia*, has a technical sense (*Dem.* 21.32, 87; [*Dem.*] 25.30; cf. *παντάπασι* ἄτιμοι: *And.* 1.75); unfortunately there is debate over its precise sense. Paoli and Harrison argue that it denotes an *atimia* falling short of its archaic connotation as outlawry (less likely in my view), while Swoboda and Rhodes reserve its use for precisely the most stringent sense of *atimia*.⁵⁷

In contrast, Hansen makes the attractive (though inconclusive) argument that καθάπαξ distinguishes permanent *atimia* from the *atimia* created by indebtedness to the state which might be remedied through payment.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, the mere existence of such distinctions is more important, for our purposes, than their definition or precise significance. It is then tempting to enter the debate on just when *atimia* in its original sense of outlawry (where its victim might be killed with impunity) was supplemented by other less drastic deprivations of civil rights. Here, however, one encounters a similarly complex and confused set of hypotheses in which less than absolute forms of *atimia* might have appeared as early as Draco or as late as 460–405.⁵⁹

56. Cf. *Anec. Bekk.* 1.285.26–27, *Suda s.v.* ὀστρακισμός, ο 717 Adler. See Sandys *Constitution* 97.

57. A.R.W. Harrison, *The Law of Athens* (Oxford 1968–1971) 2.169–71; U.E. Paoli, *Studi di Diritto Attico* (Florence 1930) 316 and n. 2; cf. H. Swoboda, *Beiträge zur Griechischen Rechtsgeschichte* (Weimar 1905) esp. 6; Rhodes *AP* 282–83; *id.*, “Bastards as Athenian Citizens,” *CQ* 28 (1978) 89–92, esp. 89–90.

58. M.H. Hansen, *Apagoge, Endeixis and Ephegesis against Kakourgoi, Atimoi and Pheugontes* (Odense 1976) 67–68.

59. See Swoboda *Beiträge* 5–6 which opts for a pre-Solonian origin; cf. *id.*, “Arthmios von Zeleia,” *Archaeologisch-epigraphische Mitt.* 16 (1893) 49–68, esp. 54–63; who is followed, most significantly, by M. Ostwald, “The Athenian Legislation against Tyranny and Subversion,” *TAPA* 86 (1955) 103–28, esp. 107–8. Adduced in support of this view are *Ath. Pol.* 8.5, 16.10; *Plut. Solon* 19.4. Hansen *Apagoge* 78–80 proposes a Cleisthenic date. E. Ruschenbusch, *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des athenischen Strafrechts* (Cologne 1968) 20–21, esp. n. 58 adopts a date after 460 (with reservations over disparities between legal terminology and actual punishments).

It is enough for our purpose to note that the variety of *atimia* denominated by *κατάπαξ* in *Ath. Pol.* 22.8 must be near complete loss of civil rights or even outlawry, inasmuch as it represented a further and lasting degradation from exile as one of the ostracized. The most closely contemporary instance of *atimia* is the declaration against Arthmios of Zeleia as *polemios* and *atimos* (an outlaw, as the orators specify), an enactment which is variously assigned to Themistokles or to Kimon.⁶⁰ Another parallel is in a law against subversion, especially by members of the Areiopagos, proposed by Eukrates in 337/6 (*SEG* 12.87.20–21), which seems to preserve the terminology of legislation of, at least, the Cleisthenic period.⁶¹ Neither document utilizes the term *κατάπαξ*. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the restriction on residence originally used the qualifier *κατάπαξ* for *atimia*, which is not then attested before the fourth century. Thus the restriction was not a short-lived provision, but one that lasted long enough (perhaps at least until the codification of the Athenian laws at the end of the fifth century) so as to undergo routine modernization of its terminology.

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO THE RECALL OF THE OSTRACIZED

In order to preserve the reading of the papyrus with an interpretation of the two capes as the termini of a line of demarcation not to be passed, it has been argued that in 481/0 it was more important to exclude the ostracized from contacts with the Persians than to bar them from the vicinity of Attica.⁶² This approach seems to confound the very nature of ostracism with legal procedures directed at prosecutable offenses. Ostracism was framed to preempt a potential tyrant before he committed acts attempting tyranny, actions punishable with *atimia*. Accordingly, an assumption by an ostracized politician of residence in Persian territory would have been interpreted as Medism on the analogy of the behavior of the Peisistratids. So imprudent a person would have been condemned to death *in absentia* like Hipparkhos Kharmou. The Athenians were quite ready to stone to death the councilman who did nothing more than suggest that Mardonios' proposals of 479 to the Athenians be tendered to the *ekklēsia* (*Hdt.* 9.5.1–3; cf. *Dem.* 18.204; *Lyc. Leoc.* 122; *Cic. Off.* 3.11.48). As for secret, treasonous communications with the Persians, these could be conducted from

60. *Atimos* and *polemios*: *Dem.* 9.41–43, cf. 19.271–72; *Ael. Arist.* 13.190 with scholia: 3.327 [Dindorf]; 46.218 with Craterus *FGH* 342 F 14; *Plut. Them.* 6.4; cf. *Aesch.* 3.258; *Din.* 2.24–25. Kimon: Craterus; Themistokles: *Plut.*; *Ael. Arist.* 46.303. In addition to Swoboda, cited in n. 59 above, note more recently Meiggs *Athenian Empire* 508–12. Cf. Habicht *Hermes* (1961) 23–25.

61. Special precautions against disloyalty by the Areiopagites might have had precedents after the expulsion of the Peisistratids, when that Council was filled by Peisistratid ex-archons. Cf. Ostwald *TAPA* (1955) 120–25 who finds echoes of Dracontian legislation along with Areiopagite lack of cooperation with anti-Macedonian extremists.

62. See Wilamowitz *Aristoteles* 114; De Sanctis *Atthis* n. 40, 476–77; Rhodes *AP* 282; Develin 76. Goossens 126–27, who also envisages a desire to keep the ostracized nearby Attica to be recalled. Would not a strong expectation of such recalls have vitiated the institution of ostracism itself? It is more likely that the Athenians acted to forestall recalls than to facilitate them. Cf. Carcopino *L'ostracisme* 49.

anywhere—Aigina or even Attica, at least in the minds of the Athenians. The approaches supposedly made to Aristides, which will be discussed immediately below, were of this nature. It should be noted that the first three ostracized were condemned for being friends of tyranny (*Ath. Pol.* 22.6). This charge is likely to have subsumed sympathy for the Peisistratids at the Persian court, indicated by holding political positions which could be interpreted as pro-Peisistratid, rather than provable acts of Medism. In conclusion, other recourses against open Medism were available, while the residential limitation was unavailing against covert communication.

It was against a threat by no means so vulnerable to prosecution as outright Medism that the limitation on residence was introduced. The tradition on Aristides provides the essential evidence.⁶³ The Athenians are said to have been motivated to recall Aristides out of a fear that he would medize, taking many of his fellow citizens into the enemy camp (*Plut. Arist.* 8.1; *Them.* 11.1). The *Suda* reports the Persian approach with greater detail, a bribe of 3000 darics designed to corrupt Aristides on Aigina (s.v. Ἀριστείδης, α 3903; Δαρείου, δ 72 Adler). Just as Herodotus reflects mid-fifth-century Athenian views on Aristides, an incorruptible and unselfish patriotic foil to the devious Themistokles, Plutarch, who probably reflects the *Atticides*, introduces this anecdote into his *Aristides* (8.1) only to emphasize how erroneous was the Athenian judgment of the statesman (cf. *Them.* 11.1). Tradition takes it for granted that there was then no evidence for treasonous, medizing communication initiated by Aristides.

Perhaps even a groundless anxiety among Athenians could become a problem for their leadership because of the ability of Aristides to affect the political decisions of many fellow citizens. This facility was to a large extent predicated on the proximity of Aigina to Athens, and on the regularity and ease of maritime communications between them. Thus, the continuing authority of an ostracized leader was based on his demonstrated capacity for influencing the political decisions of his supporters. Themistokles and others in power could now take no other effective steps to relieve public fears. Removing the ostracized further from Attica would have been difficult, as it demanded the cooperation of the Aiginetans and perhaps even of the ostracized, who could always claim the status of suppliants. The ostracized could even have been frightened into bolting toward territory held by the Persians (note Hipparkhos). Present expedients were unavailing, inasmuch as it was the *prior* political activities of the ostracized that made them dangerous as leaders for both the irresolute and the disaffected. Now the political influence of the ostracized made it necessary to recall them in order to preserve *homonoia* (Meiggs-Lewis 23.44).

63. See A.E. Raubitschek, "Das Datislied," in K. Schauenburg (ed.), *Charites: Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft* (Bonn 1957) 234–42, esp. 240–42; L. Piccirilli, "Aristide di Egina? Per l'interpretazione degli ostraka Agora Inv. P 9945 e P 5978," *ZPE* 51 (1983) 169–76; esp. 171–75. Raubitschek also discusses Agora Inv. P 9945 which identifies Aristides as a brother of Datis (or Dareios: Bicknell *Historia* [1974] 158). [See also Lang *Ostraka* #44, p. 37; #56, p. 38; also T.T. Rapke, "Agora Ostrakon P 9945—Two Possibilities," *AC* 24 (1981) 153–55.]

The decision to recall the ostracized probably was closely connected with the reconciliation between the Athenians and the Aiginetans which was consummated at the meeting at the Isthmus in autumn 481 (cf. Hdt. 7.145.1). In the less likely event that the recall preceded reconciliation (see n. 44 above), it removed from Aigina several influential Athenians, the constructive quality of whose intervention there was not assured. If reconciliation came before the recall (compare n. 2), as I believe, the accession of the Aiginetans to the Greek cause might have reassured the Athenians both that their ostracized politicians had not been advocates of Medism and that they had not been tainted by a prospective Aiginetan Medism. It is not impossible that some greater suspicion did in fact attach to Aristides, who, unlike Xanthippos, does not appear to have been elected general for 480/79.

In the crisis of 481–80, the threat of Persia was paramount, but it was equally possible to envisage similar complications for Athenian policy toward Greek adversaries that arose from the existence of a refuge(s) for the ostracized near Attica.⁶⁴ The stay of Aristides and the other ostracized on Aigina spanned a period of both warfare and reconciliation between the two cities (cf. Hdt. 7.144.2). Athens' policies toward Aigina were undoubtedly complicated by the presence there of leading Athenians, not only available as advisers, but also influential at home. Later, the presence in Argos of Themistokles, who presumably approved of (if he did not encourage) Argive efforts to undermine Sparta's Peloponnesian hegemony, created an analogous problem (see n. 47 above). The majority of the Athenians, unprepared for a breach with Sparta, reacted by receiving Spartan (or Spartan inspired) accusations against him (see pp. 193–95 below).

Moreover, a concealed danger existed. If an Aristides could affect the behavior of his fellow citizens, there was also the risk that he could influence the policy of the people among whom he was living. In 490 the Aiginetans had decided to medize, only to have their intention stymied by the intervention against considerable resistance of King Kleomenes of Sparta (Hdt. 6.50.1–3, 61.1, 73.1–2). On the eve of Xerxes' invasion, the Aiginetans had joined the Hellenic League (7.145.1). Although the decision to recall the ostracized probably succeeded the reconciliation with Aigina, there may have remained considerable doubts in Athenian minds concerning the Aiginetan will (contrasting with the attitude of the ostracized) to persevere against Persia. Accordingly, a defection to Xerxes by Aristides might inspire a cascade of further defections, not only in Athens, but perhaps also on Aigina.

A connection has long been made between the ostracism of Aristides and the promulgation of the Themistoclean naval program, which proposed to use the expanded fleet against Aigina.⁶⁵ The naval bill and the ostracism are

64. Demosthenes exploited the same possibility when he lived on Aigina during his exile in 323 (Plut. *Dem.* 26.5, 27.6; cf. *Mor.* 846E, 849A).

65. Beloch *GG*² 2.2.141–42. For other views, see I. Calabi Limentani, *Plutarchi Vita Aristidis* (Florence 1964) lxiii–lxv, also emphasizing the issue of his friendship with the Aiginetans. Yet,

closely juxtaposed in the *Ath. Pol.* (22.7), especially if the phrase ἐν τοῦτοις τοῖς καιροῖς will bear the meaning 'in this context' here. And Plutarch implicates Themistokles as most responsible for the ostracism of Aristides (cf. p. 174 above). Raubitschek has added another dimension to our understanding of the relationship between Aristides and the Aiginetans by noting an ostrakon (Agora Inv. P 5978 = Agora #44 Lang) that accuses him of hostile acts toward a group of suppliants. Raubitschek attractively identifies these with the fugitives of the uprising of the *dāmos* under the leadership of the Aiginetan politician Nikodromos (Hdt. 6.88, 90–91.2). The Athenians had planted the fugitives from the failed coup at Sounion. The ostrakon, on this interpretation, establishes that the attitude of Aristides toward these two Aiginetan factions was controversial during the campaign leading up to his ostracism. Perhaps Aristides, who may have been acting as Aiginetan *proxenos*, hoped to defuse future conflicts between Athens and Aigina by removing an exacerbating influence, the presence of "renegade" Aiginetans in Attica as citizens.⁶⁶ The beneficiaries of a defeat of the naval bill and those of an expulsion of the Aiginetan fugitives would have been the same Aiginetan elite.

Further direct evidence for the influence of Aristides on Aigina and, concomitantly, both for his ability to affect Aiginetan policy toward Athens and for his willingness to intervene in Athenian affairs on behalf of Aigina, would be provided by the historicity of Aristides of Aigina. This namesake of the statesman is described in the apocryphal epistles attributed to Themistokles as having acted as his accuser on the occasion of his condemnation for Medism ([Them.] *Ep.* 11, p. 751.31 Hercher). Despite favorable assessments of their historical value in recent scholarship,⁶⁷ the epistles do not rank high as

the Themistoclean naval legislation signified radical changes in the Athenian military apparatus and promised, because of its supersession of the naukraric system, changes in the political equilibrium between classes. Even if its opponents did not foresee the emergence of Periclean democracy, they may have risked being perceived as pro-Aiginetan for their preference for compromise with Aigina rather than acquiescing in the "extreme" measures forwarded by Themistokles as necessary against Aigina. See pp. 148–49, 169–72 above.

66. See Raubitschek "Datislied" 241–42. Nonetheless, an argument from the mere fact of Aristides' residence on Aigina during his ostracism should not be the only or prime determinant of a pro-Aiginetan attitude. Cf. Piccirilli *ZPE* (1983) 170–71. The Aiginetan oligarchs might have accepted any ostracized Athenian leader as a matter of policy. Of particular significance (if an answer could be reached) would be whether Xanthippos was among the ostracized who resided on Aigina. It is likely that Xanthippos shared the anti-Aiginetan stance of his son Perikles, for both of whom see pp. 169–70, 172 above. [See also *Colonization* 111–13.]

67. See N.A. Doenges, *The Letters of Themistokles* (New York 1981), with translation and commentary, esp. 64–115; also R.J. Lenardon, "Charon, Thucydides, and 'Themistocles'," *Phoenix* 15 (1961) 28–40, who suggests Charon of Lampsakos as a source for some of the data uniquely found in the epistles, and *The Saga of Themistocles* (London 1978) 154–93. Cf. C. Nylander, "ΑΣΣΥΡΙΑ ΓΡΑΜΜΑΤΑ: Remarks on the 21st 'Letter of Themistokles'," *Opus. Athen.* 8 (1968) 119–36 (esp. 134–36 on Charon), who finds valuable evidence on the scripts of the Persian Empire in *Ep.* 21.

sources of *verifiable* evidence on the career of Themistokles.⁶⁸ Accordingly, a first impulse is to postulate sheer fabrication by the author of *Epistle* 11 in affixing to an Aristeides the epithet *Aiginētēs*, a creation possibly generated by the associations of Aristeides Lysimakhos with Aigina noted above.⁶⁹

Yet, if this Aiginetan is a doublet of Aristeides Lysimakhos, he is an incongruous one: the biographical tradition on Aristeides portrays him as standing aloof from the attacks on his former adversary (Plut. *Arist.* 25.10). Indeed the letters themselves repeatedly (although not consistently) take the position that Aristeides was innocent of guilt for the ostracism of Themistokles (*Ep.* 3, p. 742; 18, 757; 19, 757–58), perhaps only turning on him after his condemnation for Medism (*Ep.* 4 [4], p. 743; 8, 748; 9, 750; 12, 752; cf. Lucian *Cal.* 27). Aristeides the Aiginetan is noted in connection with the hearing leading to the condemnation of Themistokles, when charges were heard from Alkibiades, Stratippos, Lakratides, and Hermokles (?) of Athens and Aristeides of Aigina, Dorkon (?) of Epidaurous, and Molon (?) of Troizen (and still others). Clearly, the dramatic setting is the proceedings *in absentia* against Themistokles by the Hellenic League (DS 11.55.4–8, cf. Plut. *Them.* 23.6; also Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 189). Aristeides and the other accusers were trierarchs who had served at Salamis and had thereafter resented Themistokles' support for the award of the *aristeia* to Ameinias, the brother of Aeschylus, addressee of this letter.⁷⁰ Strikingly, Diodorus reports that Themistokles did not anticipate a fair hearing at these proceedings, specifically because of allied behavior in denying the Athenians the *aristeia* at Salamis (11.55.6), which hints at the controversiality of the battle honors, as they were portrayed in Attidography.

The author(s) of the epistles drew on sources—apparently good ones—other than Thucydides: *Ep.* 9 shows a knowledge of the story (probably Attidographic) how Kallias Lakkoploutos became rich (cf. Plut. *Arist.* 5.7–8; Σ*Arist.* *Nubes* 63a Holwerda; *Suda* s.v. *λακκόπλουτον*, λ 58 Adler). Like the names of Themistokles' Argive friends in *Ep.* 1 (741.4–5 Hercher), or the list of those connected with the oath disavowing complicity with Themistokles in *Ep.* 8 (p. 748.4–5), the list of enemies in *Ep.* 11 (748.17–20) is plausible. But we can do no more than speculate (along with Doenges) that an *Atthis* lies behind the anecdote.⁷¹

68. For a generous view of their literary character, see J.L. Penwill, "The Letters of Themistokles: An Epistolary Novel?," *Antichthon* 12 (1978) 83–103, who postulates two independent series, 1–12 and 13–21, with distinctive characterizations of Themistokles. Cf. W. Niessing, *De Themistoclis Epistulis* (Diss. Freiburg im Breisgau 1929) 55–56; Doenges *Letters* 17–41.

69. Piccirilli *ZPE* (1983) 170–74; Doenges *Letters* 80.

70. A.J. Podlecki, *The Life of Themistocles* (Montreal 1975) 131 is troubled by the implication that Themistokles was accused for his generalship rather than for his dealings with Pausanias. Yet, once the connection had been made between Themistokles and Pausanias' negotiations with the Great King, his enemies were bound to reinterpret his actions as a commander in the fleet as being the first symptoms of Medism, particularly the message of Sikinnos (Hdt. 8.75.1–3; Aes. *Per.* 355–60; Thuc. 1.74.1) and the advice to Xerxes to withdraw (Hdt. 8.110.2–3; Thuc. 1.137.4).

71. Note Doenges' thorough discussion of the sources for the letters: *Letters* 414–55. At 73–74,

If Aristides existed, his role as an enemy of Themistokles is illuminating about Aristides Lysimakhou and the Aiginetans. An Aiginetan accuser of Themistokles attacked the Athenian in connection with his leadership in the allied fleet in 480; from an anti-Persian Aiginetan, such intelligence was received as credible. The name Aristides is not otherwise attested in the Aiginetan aristocracy,⁷² and it may be that he was named after the Athenian Aristides. He may then have belonged to an Aiginetan family which took pride in a connection with Aristides Lysimakhou. He joined in the accusations made by the Alkmeonid Leobotes, whose kinsman Megakles may have spent his ostracism on Aigina (compare Plut. *Them.* 23.1; Craterus *FGH* 342 F 11; cf. Plut. *Arist.* 25.10).

In the crisis of 481–80, the Athenians recalled the ostracized; for the future they insured that they could never be *compelled* to make a similar decision. The ostracized would be removed from cities like Aigina which had been and could be expected to be regional adversaries of Athens. Likewise they were separated from their following in Attica by relegation to locations less opportune for communicating with Athens. Whether the amendment of the law of ostracism was a success can only be gauged through that most difficult form of historical analysis, an inquiry into non-occurrences. No one of the major figures later ostracized is known to have exercised an influence such as that attributed by Plutarch to Aristides in 481/0. Themistokles was convicted of Medism, while ostracized. Whether or not we believe that Kimon was recalled or served out his ten years, it is tolerably clear that his activities on his return were undertaken in cooperation with Perikles and his faction.⁷³ It is only on the return of Thukydides Melesiou, and not by remote control, that his campaign of harassment against Perikles' associates and familiars revived (Satyrus fr. 14, *FHG* 3.163 = DL 2.12).⁷⁴ On the basis of these surviving data, scarcely random, the limitation on place of residence for the ostracized does not seem to have been unsuccessful.

CONCLUSION

Ostracism was designed by Kleisthenes to meet a danger out of the past, namely that an unscrupulous popular politician would exploit *stasis* in order to establish himself as tyrant. Ostracism forced the *dēmos* to confront this possibility every year, and allowed it to preempt a potential tyrant before he had committed illegalities. Kleisthenes, however, had designed his reforms well: the regional parties did not revive and tensions between the old aristocracy and

314, while noting that several names have become unrecognizable, he argues that the whole list derives from an Attidographic source.

72. Cf. Welter *Aigina*² 107–10.

73. Plut. *Cimon* 17.8–9; *Per.* 10.3–6; cf. Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 88; Nepos *Cimon* 3.2–3; And. 3.3; Aesch. 2.172.

74. See D. Kienast, "Der innenpolitische Kampf in Athen von der Rückkehr des Thukydides bis zu Perikles' Tod," *Gymnasium* 60 (1953) 210–29; cf. F. Frost, "Pericles, Thucydides, Son of Melesias, and Athenian Politics before the War," *Historia* 13 (1964) 385–99. See pp. 221–27 below.

other groups lost their place at the center of the political stage. When ostracism was first used, its chief connection with its Cleisthenic origin was the identification of its first victims as partisans of the Peisistratids. The role of ostracism in politics was now to choose between two candidates for political supremacy so that the winner of the vote might acquire a mandate (entirely unofficial), which was especially significant in the upcoming election for the *stratēgoi*. It is a tribute to the quality of Themistoclean propaganda that an artificial struggle against a single antagonist could be imposed on a political reality with many factional leaders, shifting alliances, and partisan successors vying to replace each ostracized leader.

The uninterrupted political activities of ostracized politicians like Aristides from nearby Aigina undermined the rationale for invoking a vote of ostracism. The opportunity for the Aiginetans in the continuing political activity of the ostracized must have been provocative to Themistokles and his sympathizers, to whom the Aiginetan oligarchs were objectionable as hybriatic aggressors, medizers, and enemies of both the Athenian *dēmos* and their own.⁷⁵ The residential restriction was meant to preclude just the sort of extraneous influence that had helped to prompt the recall. The clause also contained an implicit message useful to Themistokles in exerting authority over his returning enemies. The restriction was a permanent reminder that the behavior of the exiles on Aigina had not been entirely blameless; and it suggested that any threat to *homonoia* had come from the side of the ostracized.

Seen in this way, the expansion of the basic law of ostracism confirms two of the several possible links between recall and residential restriction I suggested at the outset: it rendered any future recall unnecessary and it served to encourage political cooperation with Themistokles on the part of the former exiles by associating their rehabilitation with the troubling conduct of (at least) Aristides.

75. See pp. 47–48, 52–53, 148–49 above.

Thoukydides, Melesias, and the Aiginetans

CONCERNING the relations of Athens with its subjects, our evidence conditions the shape of our scholarship. Before the Peloponnesian War, official documents shed limited light on the relationships of individuals with specific states of the *arkhē*; (e.g.) there are the bare names of the proposers of decrees. Nor is Thucydides more helpful about the attitudes of politicians toward specific cities during the Peloponnesian War, let alone during the *Pentekontaetia*. This silence of our sources could indeed reflect an absence of specific rapport between individual leaders and the subject city-states (beyond the traditional responsibilities of *proxeny*): policy recommendations espoused by Athenian leaders in the speeches within Thucydides are presented as though they were mainly determined by general considerations and by ideology (e.g. on Mytilene), and not by ties of clientage between allied communities and members of the Athenian elite.

Nonetheless, valuable material exists for understanding the role of individual mediation in the formation of imperial policy in the friendships of the aristocrats Thoukydides and his father Melesias with the Aiginetan elite, spanning (it seems) 481 to 431. Pindaric *epinicia* help to lay bare the shared attitudes that informed these relations. The Aiginetans, during these years, saw their connection with Thoukydides and Melesias as a means for affecting Athenian policy. The struggle between Perikles and Thoukydides for political leadership allows us to situate their views on Aigina within the context of overall foreign policy. The prominence of Aigina in the debate on possible concessions to Sparta in 432–31 indicates that the imperatives of internal politics and the principles of foreign policy intersected with momentous results.

Thoukydides Melesiou was a pivotal figure in the evolution of Attic politics, as he links the constitutional conservatism, aristocratic style, and “federal” hegemonism of Kimon with the ideological oligarchy of the Peloponnesian War.¹ His career dramatizes the abstraction of policy-making from traditional patronage and its submission to a calculus of hegemony, predicated on a fundamental distinction between oligarchy/aristocracy and democracy and on an insuperable differentiation of the rulers from the ruled.

THOUKYDIDES AND THE FALL OF AIGINA

To explore the relations of Thoukydides with the Aiginetans, we must (paradoxically) start with virtually the last chapter of the story. The biographical tradition on the historian Thucydides transmits unique data on his

1. Unsurprisingly, his son Melesias (II) was one of the Four Hundred and an ambassador to Sparta (Thuc. 8.86.9).

namesake, Thoukydides Melesiou.² Let us start with ch. 6–7 of the anonymous life.³ The ostracism surely directs us away from the historian, a victim of exile (e.g., Marcell. *Vit. Thuc.* 46), toward the son of Melesias. A general temporal dislocation is exhibited in attributing much of this to Thucydides (born c. 454), that is not obviated by the disclaimer *πρὸ τῆς συγγραφῆς*. Pyrilampes was a collaborator, no longer an enemy, of Perikles by the 430s (Plut. *Per.* 13.15). A mission to Sybaris, perhaps as a *stratēgos*, should precede the foundation of the new Sybaris, Thourioi (444/3?). A *protasia* ‘primacy’ distinguishes this man from Thucydides, whose first *stratēgia* appears to have been 424/3 (Thuc. 4.104.4). The opposition to Perikles is another dissonant touch.

Thus a sketch on Thoukydides Melesiou has infiltrated this tradition on Thucydides. The Hellenistic source distorted by the biographer probably offered a brief discussion of Thucydides’ homonyms. Traces of such a treatment exist in various lists of homonyms with Didymus a likely intermediary (ΣArist. *Vesp.* 947b Koster; *POxy* 13.1611.105–20; Marcell. *Vit. Thuc.* 28). Some of the evidence may have been available in the *Kōmōidoumenoi*, work(s) on persons mentioned in Old Comedy (e.g., of Ammonius). Thoukydides Melesiou is almost always mentioned in contexts containing exclusively Athenian material, so some of this material probably derived from Attidography (cf. *FGH* 328 F 120). And the prominent, favorable portrait of Thoukydides Melesiou in the *Athenaion Politeia* may well be owed to Androtion (*FGH* 324 F 37; cf. F 57). As seen below, Theopompus and Ephorus are complicating alternatives in intermediation.⁴ Stesimbrotus wrote a work *περὶ Θεμιστοκλέους καὶ Θουκυδίδου*

2. For fifth-century individuals named Thoukydides and the genealogy of Thoukydides Melesiou, see Kirchner PA #7267–68, 7271–72, 1.469–73; G.F. Unger, “Die Nachrichten über Thucydides,” *NJPP* 32 (1886) 97–111, 145–73; Davies *APF* #7268, pp. 230–37; D.J. Phillips, “Men Named Thoukydides and the General of 440/39 B.C. (Thuc. 1.117.2),” *Historia* 40 (1991) 385–95. E. Cavaignac, “Miltiade et Thucydide,” *RPh* 55 (1929) 281–85, accounted for the names of Thoukydides Melesiou and Thucydides Olorou by positing the historian as a grandson of Melesias through his mother (cf. Marcell. *Vit. Thuc.* 2); see also H.T. Wade-Gery, “Thucydides the Son of Melesias,” *Essays in Greek History* (Oxford 1958) 239–70, esp. 246–47 (cf. Davies *APF* 235–36). Thucydides’ complete silence on his (putative) grandfather, juxtaposed with his praise of Perikles, would imply a negative appreciation.

3. ἦν δὲ τῶν πάνυ κατὰ γένος Ἀθήνησι δοξαζομένων ὁ Θουκυδίδης. δεινὸς δὲ δόξας εἶναι ἐν τῷ λέγειν πρὸ τῆς συγγραφῆς πρόεσθι τῶν πραγμάτων. πρώτην δὲ τῆς ἐν τῷ λέγειν δεινότητος τήνδε ἐποίησατο τὴν ἐπίδειξιν· Πυριλάμπης γάρ τις τῶν πολιτῶν ἄνδρα φίλον καὶ ἐρώμενον ἴδιον διὰ τινα ζηλοτυπήσας ἐφόνευσε, ταύτης δὲ τῆς δίκης ἐν Ἀρείῳ πάγῳ κρινομένης πολλὰ τῆς ἰδίας σοφίας ἐπεδείξατο, ἀπολογίαὺν ποιούμενος ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πυριλάμπους, καὶ Περικλέους κατηγοροῦ ἐνίκᾳ. ὅθεν καὶ στρατηγὸν αὐτὸν ἐλομένων Ἀθηναίων ἄρχων πρόεσθι τοῦ δήμου. μεγάλῳφρων δὲ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι γενόμενος, ἅτε φιλοχρηματῶν, οὐκ εἶατο πλείονα χρόνον προστατεῖν τοῦ δήμου. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ξενοκρίτου, ὡς Σύβαριν ἀποδημήσας, ὡς ἐπαυῆλθεν εἰς Ἀθήνας, συγχύσεως δικαστηρίου φεύγων ἐάλω· ὕστερον δὲ ἐξοστρακίζεται ἔτη δέκα. φεύγων δὲ ἐν Αἰγίνῃ διέτριβε, κακεῖ λέγεται τὰς ἱστορίας αὐτὸν συντάξασθαι. τότε δὲ τὴν φιλαργυρίαν αὐτοῦ μάλιστα φανεράν γενέσθαι· ἅπαντας γὰρ Αἰγινήτας κατατοκίζων ἀναστάτους ἐποίησεν.

4. A.E. Raubitschek, “Theopompos on Thucydides, the Son of Melesias,” *Phoenix* 14 (1960) 81–95, argues for Theopompus as chief source, citing the ἀντιπολιτεύομαι as a telltale term (ΣAristid. 3.446–47 D; ΣArist. *Vesp.* 947b–c = *FGH* 115 F 91; Marcell. *Vit. Thuc.* 28; cf. *FGH*

καὶ Περικλέους (FGH 107 F 10a), but, unfortunately, no surviving fragment deals explicitly with our subject. Yet, a significant possibility exists that allusions to Thoukydides' political experiences like those found here derive in some cases from Stesimbrotus, a contemporary observer. While Stesimbrotus could have portrayed Thoukydides as a virtuous counterpart to the imperialists Themistokles and Perikles, the negative and trivializing tone of the fragments suggest that Thoukydides was incorporated within a sustained anti-Athenian polemic.⁵

That the two men were homonyms, both perhaps related to Kimon (although that is not evidenced here), promoted confusion,⁶ but the extent of the infiltration of material from the career of Thoukydides argues for further coincidences in the lives of the two men. A connection with Aigina is likely to have been one of them. Melesias, the father of Thoukydides, possessed strong ties with the Aiginetan elite.⁷ Not only does the anonymous *vita* place a Thoukydides in exile on Aigina, but Marcellinus' life, otherwise careful about confusion with homonyms, gives a surprisingly similar report (24).⁸ Hence, an exile on Aigina was not simply transferred from Thoukydides to Thucydides in the anonymous life but was more deeply seated in the biographical tradition.⁹ Although the main tradition identified Thrace as the locale for the composition of Thucydides' history (DH *Thuc.* 41; Marcell. *Vit. Thuc.* 46; Plut. *Mor.* 605C), his own statement on his research as well as the specificity of his narrative indicates that much time was spent in Greece (*Thuc.* 5.26.5). He not only

115 F 261). Cf. W.R. Connor, *Theopompus and Fifth-Century Athens* (Cambridge, MA 1968) 38–43. See also n. 35 below.

5. General content: Jacoby *FGH* 2, 343–44; R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 15–16; cf. F. Schachermeyr, *Stesimbrotos und seine Schrift über die Staatsmänner*, *SBAWW Phil.-Hist. Kl.* 1965; K. Meister, "Stesimbrotos' Schrift über die athenischen Staatsmänner und ihre historische Bedeutung (*FGH* 107 F 1–10)," *Historia* 27 (1978) 274–94, esp. 287, on Stesimbrotus' favorable stance toward Thoukydides. Stesimbrotus' negativism bespeaks a reaction to the war after 430 on the part of the politically-conscious metics of tributary background, and not an original hostility based on the subjection of Thasos in the 460s. Why would a victim of earlier troubles choose to emigrate to Athens? See also A. Schmidt, *Perikles und sein Zeitalter* (Jena 1877) 2.194–275, who argues for Stesimbrotus as the main source of Plutarch's *Pericles*.

6. Plut. *Per.* 11.1: ἄνδρα σώφρονα καὶ κηδεστήν Κίμωνος; *Ath. Pol.* 28.2: Θουκυδίδης . . . κηδεστής ὢν Κίμωνος (with κηδεστής owed to an *Atthis*); *ΣAristid.* 3.446 D has γαμβρόν. Wade-Gery *Essays* 247 opts for 'brother-in-law'. Reasoning from birthdates is fruitless: whether any marriage was the first for either man is unknown. The tomb of Thucydides stood among those of the Kimonids (Marcell. *Vit. Thuc.* 17, 32 (Polemon fr. 4, *FHG* 3.116–17; Didymus fr. 27.2 Schmidt).

7. See pp. 205–10 below. The wrestling metaphors associated with Thoukydides' political activity, and the emphasis his son, Melesias II, placed on wrestling in the rearing of his children (Plato *Meno* 94C) guarantee that Pindar's Melesias, a patron of Aiginetan wrestlers, is the father of Thoukydides Melesiu (the name Melesias is unattested outside the family). See Wade-Gery *Essays* 244–45.

8. γενόμενος δ' ἐν Αἰγίνα μετὰ τὴν φυγὴν ὡς ἂν πλουτῶν ἐδάνεισε τὰ πλείστα τῶν χρημάτων.

9. I argue above that Thoukydides Melesiu did not spend his ostracism on Aigina (pp. 187–88).

visited places held by the enemy, but his monitoring of Athenian affairs must have been undertaken from within the *arkhē*. Despite the tendency of scholars toward facile generalization about which places of habitation were allowed exiles, nothing precludes the terms of his exile permitting a stay on Aigina.¹⁰ As noted concerning the ostracized of the 480s (see pp. 182–84 above), the island was a crossroads for travelers, advantageous for collecting information and especially for interrogating informants from Attica. The sequence reported by Marcellinus (25–26)—living in Aigina and then Skapte Hyle—may be correct, even in its suspect context.

In Marcellinus, Thucydides is a money-lender on Aigina, while in the anonymous life, his greed and usury are disastrous for the Aiginetans. This accusation was more probably directed at the son of Melesias, if only because the Aiginetans had been replaced by colonists by the time of a stay by Thucydides. That makes impossible the charge of contributing to their expulsion, a result only feasible with the Aiginetans collectively as borrowers and not Athenian colonists individually. Barring the untestable hypothesis that another story established the greed of Thucydides, this confusion may stem from the treatment of the two men in comedy. Note Aristophanes *Vespae* 288a–89: καὶ γὰρ ἀνὴρ παχὺς ἦκει|τῶν προδόντων τὰπὶ Θράκης|ὃν ὅπως ἐγχυτρίεις, where *παχὺς* connotes hybriatic, self-aggrandizing behavior. Other glancing comedic allusions (lost to us) which were hard for ancient commentators to assign to the right Thoukydides may well have contributed to a reputation for *hubris* for both men (cf. ΣArist. *Vesp.* 947 K).

Thus, we must explain a puzzling contention: the usury of Thoukydides led to the expulsion of the Aiginetans. In contrast, Thucydides traces their removal to two factors (2.27.1). Less significant here is the military advantage from occupying the island (pp. 293–94, 326–28 below), but directly relevant is the charge that, by their complaints at Sparta about their violated autonomy, the Aiginetans provoked the Archidamian War (see pp. 255, 266–71 below; ἐπικαλέσαντες οὐχ ἥκιστα τοῦ πολέμου σφίσιν αἰτίους εἶναι). When he linked Thoukydidean usury with the expulsion, our source was naturally not suggesting an alternative motive for popular *animus* against the Aiginetans. Rather, he was appending earlier stages to the widely-held causation: Thoukydidean greed—usury on Aigina—Aiginetan complaints about autonomy—Spartan ultimata—Athenian non-compliance—outbreak of conflict. No one would discard the Thucydidean account of outbreak of hostilities for these sensational accusations, but such a polemic against the behavior of a major politician on the eve of war provides valuable insights, regardless of its historicity. Before we can return to Thoukydides and the Aiginetans, however, it will be necessary to offer an overview of his career.

10. Cf. (e.g.) Unger *NJPP* (1886) 148; Busolt *GG²* 3.1.496–98, n. 1. See also *Colonization* esp. 30–39.

THOUKYDIDES IN OPPOSITION TO PERIKLES

Although he could not have suddenly moved from obscurity to the center of the political stage c. 450 at an age exceeding fifty,¹¹ the early stages of the emergence of Thoukydides as a statesman appear in general, non-specific attestation. The influence of Kimon as leading conservative statesman has doubtless shrouded him from later observers. Plato, who must be counted as an early authority, emphasizes two aspects of his standing, military accomplishment and personal influence at home and among the allies.¹² His stress on the "great house" of Thoukydides underlines the familial dimension to his standing. The allusions to Melesias in Pindar's *epinicia* hint that the Aiginetans were paying court to father and son in conjunction by the 460s at the latest.

After the ostracism of Kimon and the assassination of Ephialtes, many factional leaders of various political hues vied for attention, as reflected rhetorically in Plut. *Per.* 16.3: ἀλλὰ τεσσαράκοντα μὲν ἔτη πρωτεύων (Perikles) ἐν Ἐφιάλταις καὶ Λεωκράταις καὶ Μυρωνίδαῖς καὶ Κίμωσι καὶ Τολμίδαῖς καὶ Θουκυδίδαῖς (cf. Cic. *De orat.* 3.34.138). Despite the triumph of the Ephialtic reforms, the actual implementation of an expansive foreign policy may often have still lain in the hands of more conservative agents, so that the emergence of Perikles and Thoukydides was doubtless aided by the ineptitude of some aristocratic leaders (*Ath. Pol.* 26.1).¹³ The *Athenaion Politeia* speaks here of τὰς πατρικὰς δόξας in a manner reminiscent of its characterization of the political style of Thoukydides (with Nikias and Theramenes): τῇ πόλει πάσῃ πατρικῶς χρωμένους (28.5). That Thoukydides rose to rival Perikles shows that the generalship noted in the *Anon. Vit. Thuc.* 6 was not isolated service. In Plato's *Laches*, the sons of Aristides and Thoukydides pair the two men as public benefactors in peace and war.¹⁴ Moreover, Plutarch contrasts Demosthenes' lack of military distinction with that of Kimon, Perikles, and Thoukydides, so putting him by implication in the first rank of commanders (*Dem.* 13.6).¹⁵ If he was ἡττον πολεμικός than Kimon (*Per.* 11.2; cf. *Per.* 16.3), so was nearly every other politician. It is likely that Thoukydides held the *stratēgia* a number of times, possibly seconding Kimon; any collaboration would have been encouraged by the marital alliance between the two men.¹⁶

11. If the reference to a combatant at Marathon in Arist. *Ach.* 696–700 is literally applied to Thoukydides, he was born 510–8. For doubts, see Davies *APF* p. 232.

12. *Meno* 94D: καὶ οὐκ ἦσαν αὐτῷ πλεῖστοι φίλοι Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων; καὶ οἰκίας μεγάλης ἦν καὶ ἐδύνατο μέγα ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις Ἑλλήσιν.

13. The only specific instance ready to hand is the disaster at Drabeskos, where Sophanes and Leagros commanded (*Hdt.* 9.75; cf. *Thuc.* 1.100.3; *ΣAesch.* 2.31).

14. *Laches* 179C: καὶ ὅσα ἐν πολέμῳ εἰργάσαντο καὶ ὅσα ἐν εἰρήνῃ, διοικοῦντες τὰ τε τῶν συμμάχων καὶ τὰ τῆσδε τῆς πόλεως.

15. See A. Andrewes, "The Opposition to Perikles," *JHS* 98 (1978) 1–8, esp. 1–2.

16. When Aristophanes mourns the legal humiliation of the aged Thoukydides at the hands of younger prosecutors, he cryptically says *ὅς μ' ἀτὴν Δῆμητρον*, ἐκείνους ἡνίκ' ἦν Θουκυδίδης, | οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὴν τὴν Ἀχαΐαν βραδίως ἠνέσχετο (*Ach.* 708–9). The scholia try to explain by positing a reference to Demeter Akhaia (708a H). It is possible that an allusion to the region Ἀχαΐα has been

Thoukydides came to primacy not only after Kimon's ostracism, but apparently also at the end of the 450s, when Kimon's decision to cooperate with Perikles after his ostracism and his departure overseas (followed by his death) may have been operative factors (Plut. *Per.* 10.5; *Mor.* 812F; cf. Athen. 13.589E). Kimon's disinclination to confront Perikles again brought the opposition to a turning point. While the conservative opposition was manifestly a congeries of factions (re-emerging later as the *hetaireiai*) a choice was made to promote Thoukydides despite his peers.¹⁷ Aristocracy, in order to hold its own against executive democracy, must sacrifice to some degree the display and emulation that underpinned collective leadership: a *protasia* of the "right" must now balance that of the *dēmos*.

The isolation of Thoukydides as a counterpart to Perikles promoted new political tools, ones adjusted to the realities of political life after the Ephialtic reforms: rhetorical and tactical skills in *ekklēsia* and dicasteries. According to Plutarch, the unfavorable comparison with Kimon in military matters was thereby balanced, ἀγοραῖος δὲ καὶ πολιτικός μᾶλλον (Plut. *Per.* 11.2). Such was also the image of Thoukydides in Attidography. Σ*Vespae* 947b K praises his oratory, οὗτος ῥήτωρ ἄριστος τυγχάνων (echoed by Philostr. *VS* 1.493; *Epis.* 1.73). Anon. *Vit. Thuc.* 6 emphasizes δεινὸς δὲ δόξας εἶναι ἐν τῷ λέγειν . . . πρώτην δὲ τῆς ἐν τῷ λέγειν δεινότητος τήνδε ἐποιήσατο τὴν ἐπίδειξιν, going on to note his victory over Perikles, acting as accuser, in the defense of Pylilampes.¹⁸ The capacity for harassing Perikles verbally motivates the characterization of Thoukydides as σκυλακώδης 'puppyish' (ΣAristid. 3.446 D), conjuring up the image of nipping at his adversary's heels. The only specific tactic assigned to Thoukydides is concentrating his elite supporters in the assembly.¹⁹ Aristocrats still commanded respect from their clients, demesmen, and *phrateres*, the same deference leading to their election as *stratēgoi* for genealogical reasons. Collected in the same area of the *ekklēsia*, Thoukydides' eminent allies created the impression that those projecting traditional aristocratic qualities stood united in opposition.

The pattern of referentiality linking wrestling with Thoukydidean politics shapes accounts of his oratorical rivalry with Perikles. After ostracism, Thoukydides jokes to the Spartan king Arkhidamos that his wrestling victories

made, because Thoukydides brought this region into the Attic alliance in the 450s (cf. Thuc. 1.111.3, 115.1).

17. Plut. *Per.* 11.1: οἱ δ' ἀριστοκρατικοί, μέγιστον μὲν ἦδη τὸν Περικλέα καὶ πρόσθεν ὄρωντες γεγονότα τῶν πολιτῶν, βουλόμενοι δ' ὅμως εἶναι τινα τὸν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀντιτασσόμενον ἐν τῇ πόλει καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀμβλύνοντα, ὥστε μὴ κοιμῆθαι μοναρχίαν εἶναι, Θουκυδίδην τὸν Ἀλωπεκῆθεν . . . ἀντέστησαν ἐναντιωσόμενοι, ὅς ἦττον μὲν ὢν πολεμικὸς τοῦ Κίμωνος, ἀγοραῖος δὲ καὶ πολιτικός μᾶλλον . . . τῷ Περικλεῖ συμπλεκόμενος, ταχὺ τὴν πολιτείαν εἰς ἀντίπαλον κατέστησεν.

18. In the 450s; see Davies *APF* p. 330; cf. Wade-Gery *Essays* 261.

19. Plut. *Per.* 11.2: οὐ γὰρ εἶασε τοὺς καλοὺς καὶ ἀγαθοὺς καλουμένους ἄνδρας ἐνδισπάρθαι καὶ συμμεμεῖχθαι πρὸς τὸν δῆμον ὡς πρότερον, ὑπὸ πλῆθους ἡμαυρωμένους τὸ ἀξίωμα, χωρὶς δὲ διακρίνας καὶ συναγαγὼν εἰς ταῦτα τὴν πάντων δύναμιν ἐμβριθὴ γενομένην, ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ ροπὴν ἐποίησεν.

over Perikles were negated by Periclean rhetorical finesse (Plut. *Per.* 8.5; *Mor.* 802C). The metaphors using wrestling pervade other facets of the traditions on the struggle between the two men. In *Per.* 11.1, Thoukydides entwines (συμπλεκόμενος) Perikles in the assembly; the political process becomes a face-off (εἰς ἀντίπαλον).²⁰ That this is more than a literary *topos*, but truly reflective of contemporary perceptions, is shown by Aristophanes' portrayal of the conviction of the aged Thoukydides in wrestling terms (*Ach.* 704, 710). One suspects that more than a simple assimilation of politics and athletics was afoot, that Thoukydides and his faction may themselves have exploited a traditional mode of focusing the attention of the *dēmos*. Did they appeal for the support not only on the basis of his record, or the expediency and justice of his proposals, but also because he faithfully embodied a traditional paradigm for a leader where athletic prowess was fused with *aretē* and military skill and adumbrated a charismatic knack for victory?

Thoukydides was a transitional figure whose adaptations for competition with Perikles portended the emerging irrelevance of archaic aristocratic politics. The two schemes representing him in the succession of Athenian factional leaders and in the evolution of ideology did not do justice to this transitionality. The dominant *schema* situates him as an oligarchic leader in succession to Kimon in a context already polarized ideologically on the basis of economic or "class" distinctions. A clear example is offered by *Ath. Pol.* 28.2 (cf. Plut. *Per.* 7.3–4).²¹ Similar mediations show the influence of the pattern in Attidography.²² The ideological preoccupations of the Peloponnesian War (amid demagogic agitation and subversive *hetaireiai*) shaped fourth-century (and later) Attic historiography, motivating moderate conservatives like Androtion (cf. *FGH* 324 F 37) to view Thoukydides as a programmatic antecessor in treatments shot through with moderate or moderate oligarchic code words.²³ Thoukydidean moderation and social polarization are paired leitmotifs in this pattern.²⁴ Later commentators, reacting against late imperial policies and politics, sought fifth-century exponents with viable alternatives. The exaggeration of the socio-economic and thereby ideological division is almost too obvious to

20. Another reference may be Soph. *OT* 879–82. See n. 102 below. The ostracism is an *agōn* in Plut. *Per.* 14.3.

21. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ μὲν δήμου προεστῆκει Ξάνθιππος, τῶν δὲ γνωρίμων Μιλτιάδης, ἔπειτα Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ Ἀριστείδης· μετὰ δὲ τούτους Ἐφιάλτης μὲν τοῦ δήμου, Κίμων δ' ὁ Μιλτιάδου τῶν εὐπόρων· εἴτα Περικλῆς μὲν τοῦ δήμου, Θουκυδίδης δὲ τῶν ἐτέρων, κηδεστής ὢν Κίμωνος.

22. Plut. *Per.* 8.5: ἦν μὲν γὰρ ὁ Θουκυδίδης τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν, καὶ πλείστον ἀντεπολιτεύσατο τῷ Περικλεῖ χρόνον; *Nic.* 2.2: καὶ Περικλεῖ δημαγωγοῦντι τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν προιστάμενος ἀντεπολιτεύσατο . . . ; *ΣArist.* *Vesp.* 947b: Περικλεῖ ἀντιπολιτευσάμενος; cf. *ΣAristid.* 3.446 D: ὄντα . . . ὀλιγαρχικόν. For Thoukydides in other lists of Attic politicians, cf. Plut. *Mor.* 376B; Dio Chrys. *Or.* 72.1.

23. *Ath. Pol.* 28.5 (cf. Plut. *Per.* 11.1, *Nic.* 2.2): . . . δοκοῦσι δὲ βέλτιστοι γεγονέναι τῶν Ἀθηνησι πολιτευσαμένων μετὰ τοὺς ἀρχαίους Νικίας καὶ Θουκυδίδης καὶ Θηραμένης. καὶ περὶ μὲν Νικίου καὶ Θουκυδίδου πάντες σχεδὸν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀνδρας γεγονέναι οὐ μόνον καλοὺς καγαθούς, ἀλλὰ καὶ πολιτικούς καὶ τῇ πόλει πάσῃ πατρικῶς χρωμένους . . .

24. For *Per.* 11.1, see n. 17 above. Cf. 11.3: διπλοή τις ὕπουλος . . . διαφορὸν ὑποσημαίνουσα δημοτικῆς καὶ ἀριστοκρατικῆς προαιρέσεως.

need comment. *Aristoi* and *dēmos* hardly faced each other c. 450 in such a confrontation (cf. Plut. *Per.* 11.3; 14.3 with an anachronistic *hetaireia*).²⁵ Citizens profiting from the *arkhē* crosscut earlier and later economic groupings, while many who did not still supported Perikles out of satisfaction over the strength of the city. Circa 450, the traditional elite still possessed considerable prestige worth tapping, as the anecdote about Thoukydides concentrating his aristocratic followers in the assembly demonstrates.

A second *schema* is more elusive. A single *testimonium*, ΣAristid. 3.446–47 D, details a less direct factional evolution.²⁶ There are points of contact with the dominant pattern: Kimon's patronal populism and support of his demesmen is mentioned (*Ath. Pol.* 27.3; Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 89; Plut. *Cimon* 10.1–9, *Per.* 9.2–5); his curious ideological position is parallel to the placement of Aristides as *prostatēs tou dēμου* (*Ath. Pol.* 23.3, 24.3, 41.2; cf. Plut. *Arist.* 22.1), whereas in *Ath. Pol.* 28.2 he is the aristocratic leader. In Thoukydides' relationship to Kimon in the scholion, a stage of factional development is omitted in which Kimon, outflanked by Perikles, acquires a "right-wing" party, passing it to Thoukydides. *Ath. Pol.* 26.1, just as it castigates elite commanders for losing *τοὺς ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τοῦ δήμου καὶ τῶν εὐπόρων* 'the sound members both of the *dēmos* and the affluent', has an affinity to the scholion in making Kimon not the *prostatēs* of *τοὺς ἐπιεικεστέρους*, but a leader *faute de mieux*.²⁷ Strikingly, the Periclean outflanking of Kimon does not lead to his own preeminence, but rather to a period of dominance for Thoukydides, as other versions of the scholion to Aelius Aristides point out.²⁸ There the two terms *εὐθυνόμενος* and *διάστροφος* are deliberately converse so that one must assume that the "straightened city" was Athens before the factional or ideological changes after 479. The term *διάστροφος*, especially unusual applied to a person, cannot be complimentary, as it implies that Thoukydides and by extension other factional leaders were distorters of Attic political tradition.

Both ΣAristid. 3.446–47 and *Ath. Pol.* 26.1 seem to assume that Aristides was the last legitimate claimant to *protasia* of the *dēmos*, the leader of the responsible members of common people and elite. Kimon succeeded either to a defective leadership of the upper-class or to control of a demotic party during

25. See F.J. Frost, "Pericles, Thucydides, Son of Melesias, and Athenian Politics before the War," *Historia* 13 (1964) 385–99, esp. 386–89.

26. δύο δὲ ἦσαν Ἀθηναῖσι πολιτεῖαι· οἱ μὲν γὰρ καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί, οἱ καλούμενοι ὀλιγαρχικοί, οἱ δὲ δημοτικοί· καὶ τούτων μὲν προΐστατο Κίμων, πολλὰ διανέμων καὶ συγχωρῶν ὁπωρίσασθαι τοῖς βουλομένοις, ἱμάτια διανέμων τοῖς πένησι· τῶν δὲ ὀλιγαρχικῶν προΐστατο Περικλῆς· κατηγορηθεὶς δὲ ὁ Κίμων ὑπὸ Περικλέους ἐπὶ Λανίῃ τῇ ἀδελφῇ καὶ ἐπὶ Σκύρῳ τῇ νήσῳ, ὥς ὑπ' αὐτοῦ προδομένου ἐξεβλήθη. δειδιῶς δὲ ὁ Περικλῆς μὴ ζητηθῇ ὑπο τῶν δημοτικῶν, πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐχώρησεν· οἱ δὲ ὀλίγοι γαμβρὸν ὄντα Θουκυδίδην τὸν Μελισίου τοῦ Κίμωνος ἐπεσπᾶσαντο, σκυλακώδη ὄντα καὶ ὀλιγαρχικόν.

27. κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους συνέπεσε μὴδ' ἡγεμόνα ἔχειν τοὺς ἐπιεικεστέρους, ἀλλ' αὐτῶν προστάται Κίμωνα τὸν Μιλτιάδου, ἡγεμόντα ὄντα καὶ πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ὁψὲ προσελθόντα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐφθάρθαι τοὺς πολλοὺς κατὰ πόλεμον.

28. ἄλλον τινὰ, ᾧ ποτε Ἀθηναῖοι τὰ πολιτικά ἐπιτρέψαντες ἐπείθοντο πάντες, ἅτε εὐθυνόμενος τῆς πόλεως . . . ἄλλον τινὰ διάστροφον τῆς πόλεως, ᾧ καὶ ὁ δῆμος ἅπας ἐπείθετο.

an incipient breakdown of interclass harmony. Perikles, after having presided over another product of breakdown, an oligarchic party, seized control of the demotic party. Rather than the canonical picture of stable peoples' and aristocrats' parties, a pattern of dissolving cohesion and flanking movements to the "left" moves from Aristides through Kimon to Perikles and Thoukydides. The lost account of Stesimbrotus may have reflected allied views in this treatment of Aristides' role. *Ath. Pol.* 26.1 may derive from Stesimbrotus, restated by Theopompus.²⁹ In that case, ΣAristid. 3.446–47 D might represent an even more polemical Stesimbrotian original.³⁰ This alternative reconstruction should not displace the other, but ought to serve as a graphic proof of the anachronism of both schemes.

MELESIAS IN THE PINDARIC *EPINICIA*

Melesias is introduced into three surviving odes of Pindar dedicated to boy victors in wrestling (*Ol.* 8; *Nem.* 4; *Nem.* 6). Apart from another Athenian, Menander, Melesias is the only extra-familial individual to receive this sort of treatment in the *epinicia* (cf. *Nem.* 5.48).³¹ Both men are usually called trainers (*aleiptai*) on the basis of the scholia (e.g., *Ol.* 8.71b, c, e), but the treatment of Melesias by Pindar, who does not use ἀλείπτῃς, reveals his tutelage of young Aiginetans to transcend mere physical education. Paid trainers appear later and differ from their charges in social class. Muting the notion of imparting athletic skills, Pindar portrayed the victories of Aiginetan youths as reflective (or even a result) of their family's tradition of athletic and moral excellence (cf. *Nem.* 7; *Isth.* 6; *Isth.* 8 for Aiginetans; *Ol.* 10; *Ol.* 11; *Pyth.* 10 for others).³²

We must avoid positing a biography for Melesias which turns him into Greece's best wrestler, our natural choice for a coach. The *epinicia* demonstrate the great distinction achieved by Aiginetan wrestlers so that the necessity for Aiginetan youths to seek an Athenian mentor ought to be seen in all its singularity. Did the Aiginetans really need to enlist an Athenian, if only "coaching" made a connection with Melesias prized? The relationship of mentor and disciple between an Aiginetan youth and Athenian noble involved a transmission of elite values not without its political dimension. Uncontrolled competition among the elite had been the bane of oligarchies (cf. e.g. *Hdt.* 3.82.3) and training in wrestling for aristocratic adolescents strove to inculcate the correct tenor for future political competition.

The existence of Melesias' Aiginetan protégés implies a parallel circle in Attica: all his known pupils are Aiginetan only through their identification by

29. *HCT* 1.48; P. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia* (Oxford 1981) 328–29.

30. Raubitschek *Phoenix* (1960) 86.

31. Menander also appears in Bacchyl. *Epin.* 13.191, dedicated to the same victor as *Nem.* 5, and is improbably restored in *Isth.* 6.69. Cf. M. Woloch, "Athenian Trainers in the Aeginetan Odes of Pindar and Bacchylides," *CW* (1963) 102–4, 121.

32. Note Plutarch on Damon the teacher of Perikles (*Per.* 4.2): τῷ δὲ Περικλεῖ συνῆν καθάπερ ἀθλητῇ τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀλείπτῃς καὶ διδάσκαλος.

Pindar. Melesias was probably about 70 by 460, his earliest indisputable appearance in Pindar.³³ By then his protégés had won the majority of the 30 victories (assigned to him by Pindar); thus his mentorship of Aiginetans lay toward the end of his career. Athenians, some of whom associated with Melesias before 482, must have won many of the 30 victories. 482 was the date of the reconciliation between the Athenians and Aiginetans sponsored by the Hellenic League and the earliest date for mentoring young Aiginetans (see pp. 102–4, 147–48, 191–94 above). There is indeed a slight hint that the Aiginetans looked to Melesias just then.³⁴ In the absence of *epinicia* for Athenian youths, Melesias' Athenian protégés lie hidden among the aristocratic politicians of Attica.³⁵ Thus tutelage under Melesias after 480 provided the Aiginetans entry into a network of political friendships in Attica. Melesias' son Thoukydides was a relative of Kimon, had probably held the *stratēgia*, and was on the verge of becoming one of the greatest men in Athens.

I shall not attempt a full interpretation of the Pindaric *epinicia* mentioning Melesias, limiting myself to a few observations that help in elucidating the relations of Melesias, Thoukydides, and Aiginetan aristocrats.³⁶ As direct political commentary in the odes lay outside the conventions of the genre, political content subsumes psychological orientations for the honorands, audience, and poet himself within the contexts for first performance. Only one of the three odes mentioning Melesias is dated. *Olympian* 8 celebrates a victory by Alkimedon (in wrestling as *pais*) of the clan of the Blepsiadae in 460 (*ΣOl.* 8.inscr.a); its performance at a festive homecoming of the victor probably followed the surrender of Aigina to Athens (*Ol.* 8.10–11). The general content of the ode accommodates such a date, which is supported by several details.³⁷

33. Davies, *APF* p. 231, suggests c. 530 for his birthdate.

34. The Athenian Menander appears in *Nem.* 5, dateable to the late 480s or early 470s. In that passing notice (at the end of the ode: v. 48), Wade-Gery found an allusion to Melesias in the remark that a τέκτον' ἀεθληταῖσιν must be from Athens (*Essays* 245).

35. That further celebrations in poetry of Melesias existed may be shown by Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 91, which asserts (uniquely) that Perikles' opponent was the otherwise unknown Thoukydides Pantainou (in *ΣVesp.* 947c K which corrects with Androtion *FGH* 324 F 37). Theopompus might have erred in believing the general of 440/39 (Thuc. 1.117.2), who might be Thoukydides Pantainou Gargettios (*PA* #7272), to be the great rival of Perikles (a damning mistake). I prefer to see him following a reference to the father of Thoukydides Melesios as πανταῖνος, since 'praised by all' would be an excellent epithet for Pindar's Melesias. Note the analogies πάντιμος (*Soph. El.* 687); παντομότης (*Aes. Eum.* 644); or πάντεχνος (*Pin. Paian* 6.65). I should also trace the comment of Ammonius that Thoukydides was τοῦ στέφανου 'the son of Stephanos (garlanded)' to a similar process (*ΣArist. Vesp.* 947a = *FGH* 350 F 1; cf. Philodem. *Peri Rhet.* 1.188.16–17 Sudhaus). Thoukydides used this epithet of his father for the name of one of his sons (Plato *Meno* 94C; *POxy* #1611.105–20). Cf. M.V. Molitor, "The Third Scholium on Vespae 947," *Hermes* 114 (1986) 306–14.

36. Here I assume that Pindar assimilated the preoccupations of his patrons, especially when he was repeatedly commissioned to celebrate their victories; see *Aegina* 311–15, 322–30 for his thematic immersion in the symbolic lives of his patrons.

37. See *Colonization* 84, n. 15; 107–8. A Nemean victory of Timosthenes, brother of Alkimedon, is also celebrated, suggesting that the Nemean victory followed the Olympic victory and the ode was delayed. The death of the honorand's father and uncle (?) (*Ol.* 8.81–82; *ΣOl.* 8.106, esp. g, h),

Consequently, the central myth (31–46) has extraordinary impact, with its treatment of the participation of Aiakos in the building of the walls of Troy. A portent (a motif unique to Pindar), interpreted by Apollo, foreshadows the later Greek captures of Troy aided by the Aiakids, since the work of the human Aiakos is impermanent but can only be overcome by his descendants (v. 42 with scholia). Sung on an Aigina recently taken in siege, this mediation of the fall of Troy, that exemplar of all fallen cities, is consolatory; it has especial point if the audience recalled the role of Aiginetan fugitives in inciting Athenian revanchism against their one-time homeland.³⁸

An aura of commonality and reconciliation is set up by the unusual joining of Peleus with Telamon at Troy, parallel to the later pair Aias and Achilles (vv. 45–46: see Σ*Ol.* 8.59, 60a–b), so that the Attic/Salaminian branch of the Aiakids is balanced with its other branch. To avoid recrimination, Pindar attenuates the nautical motifs that pervaded earlier Aiginetan odes. Aigina is invoked as *δολιχήρετμον Αἴγιναν πάτραν* (v. 20), and not as *ναυσικλυτός* (*Nem.* 5.9; *Isth.* 8.1) or with *ναυπρύτανιν δαίμονα* (*Paian* 6.130–31). With the capture of its fleet, a more forceful celebration of *euandria* at sea like that in *Nemean* 5 (esp. vv. 9–12) might have been provocative. So too the sustained maritime imagery of *Nemean* 5 and, to a lesser extent, of *Nemean* 3 is absent here.

The theme of *philoxenia* (so prominent before) subserves the goal of cooperation with Athens. After his invocation of “Aigina of the long oars”, Pindar proclaims Aiginetan preeminence in the cultivation of Themis, daughter of Zeus Xenios (vv. 21–23), and then announces that divine ordinance has made of Aigina a *κίονα δαιμονίαν* ‘divine column’ for *παντοδαποῖσιν . . . ξένοις* ‘all sorts of foreigners’ (27–29). A gnomic pronouncement is inserted between (24–26): in important matters (. . . *ὅ τι γὰρ πολὺ καὶ πολλὰ ῥέπη*), it is difficult to exercise judgment with a proper mind without violating timeliness (*ὀρθὰ διακρίναι φρενὶ μὴ παρὰ καιρόν δυσπαλές*). As archaic poetry extols the aristocrat cognizant of *kairos* (*Theognis* 197–202, 401–2; cf. Critias fr. 7 W), we are hearing a commendation for elite political judgment. Accordingly, the adjective *δυσπαλές* ‘difficult to wrestle with’ connotes the *aretē* of the honorand and, by extension, of his social class and of his mentor Melesias, just like the metaphorical system for references to Thoukydides’ political activity.

The scholiasts understood Pindar’s reflection to contain practical advice: common people lack this discretion, which is the preserve of *oligoi andres* (30c, d, i, l; cf. 30f), a point underlined in an allusion to an estimate of 470,000 for Aiginetan slaves (Aris. fr. 472 R). The equation of honorand and family to Melesias is balanced by their differentiation (as endowed with a capacity for justice) from a servile *dāmos*. The scholia seem to hint that commentators detected a subtly-coded rebuff to pressure from the Athenians and pro-Athenian

the victory as compensatory for his grandfather (vv. 70–71), and the participation of the dead in its glory and joy (vv. 72–80) may imply Aiginetan losses fighting Athens (the phrase *ὀξείας δὲ νόσους* being symbolic euphemism [85]).

38. See *Colonization* 82–88, 92–93, 115–20 and pp. 143–46 above, 277–78 below.

Aiginetans both to broaden political participation³⁹ and perhaps to shift jurisdiction in litigation involving *xenoi* to Attic dicasteries. A confirmation of pre-existing *sumbolai* was associated with autonomous status (see pp. 263–64 below), so that confirming the endowment for judgment in the elite of a subject ally encapsulates a polemic in favor of that city's autonomy. A cognate effort defended the traditional Aiginetan constitution by the appropriation of Draco as a common *nomethetēs* for the *patrios politeia* of Athens and Aigina (see pp. 249–54 below).⁴⁰

Melesias is introduced with such emphasis and absorbs the poet's attention for so long (54–66) that ancient commentators saw him as a co-honorand of the poem (Hypoth., inscr.a). Yet, his success as a pancrationist, praised by Pindar (56–59), was so long before the act of performance that another rationale must be proposed. Indeed Melesias has replaced the older relatives/ancestors of Alkimedon as precursor of his victory and participant in its glory, with Alkimedon bringing *geras* to him (65–66). His role as mentor is fundamental. Alkimedon is trying to achieve *aretē* (v. 6), is becoming one of the *agathoi* through *eupragia* (12–14), and is *kalos* in *eidos* and *ergon* (19–20). Thus this maturational process is not narrowly focussed, but embodies nothing less than an absorption of the aristocratic ethos. Melesias can impart proper behavior, knowing it himself, in contrast to someone without *gnomē* 'intellect', whose *phrenes* 'cognitive processes' are *kouphoterai* 'trivial' (59–61)—and there is no reason to limit application to wrestling alone.

Alkimedon's tutelage shows that Melesias was more like a master of one of the oriental martial arts than a secondary school wrestling coach, insofar as norms of comportment were being imparted, not just technical instruction. After his fusion of Melesias and Alkimedon's *patra*, Pindar can close the ode by praying for their good fortune and that of their city (86–90). The salvation of the community lies jointly in the hands of these aristocrats and of Athenians like their counterpart and mentor Melesias.

The importance of the Athenian dimension of the program of *Olympian* 8 is pointed up by *Nemean* 4 and *Nemean* 6, also honoring Aiginetan protégés of Melesias. No ancient evidence dates either ode directly. *Nemean* 4 in honor of Timasarkhos contains the phrase *λιπαρᾶν ἐὺωνύμων ἀπ' Ἀθανᾶν* (v. 18) that is reminiscent of the famous invocation of the city from a lost dithyramb of

39. See *Colonization* 84–86 and 114–20 for the parallel of Attic cults on Aigina (cf. *IG* IV 29–38).

40. Balancing the commonality of values between these Aiginetan aristocrats and Melesias, Pindar also recalled a great, salient difference: Aigina is Dorian (28–30). That is unsurprising until one notes how little he had used the motif previously, compared to his glorification of the Achaean Aiakids. Of the other references to Aigina as Dorian, *Pyth.* 8.20 is later; *Isth.* 9.1a an undated fragment; *Paian* 6.123–24, which precedes *Ol.* 8, refers merely to the Dorian character of the Saronic Gulf (*Δωριεῖ . . . πόρτι*; cf. the Dorian Isthmos: *Nem.* 5.37; *Isth.* 2.15; 8.64). Only *Nem.* 3.3, calling Aigina a "Dorian island", is clearly earlier, and falls far short of the proud *Δωριεῖ λαῶ ταμεινομένην ἐξ Αἰακοῦ* (v. 30). Here the Aiginetan *dāmos* is Dorian; their island "held in stewardship out of Aiakos for the Dorian people." The aristocratic heirs to the Aiakids are legitimized through service to the Dorian *dāmos*.

c. 474.⁴¹ That magnificent verse ought to precede the more offhand reference of *Nem.* 4. Two other features make best sense dated before the fall of Aigina. The epithet 'well-towered' is conventional (11–12), but still appears incongruous (if not tactless) after the demolition of the city's fortifications. Placed right after the complimentary notice of Athens, the prominent treatment of Thebes (19–24), attached to the happenstance of the honorand's victory there, is also problematical after 460, when hostile Thebes alone in Boiotia stood aloof from the Athenians.⁴² We may thus date to the late 470s or 460s.

Melesias plays a more modest role here, introduced near the end somewhat like the praise of Menander in *Nemean* 5 (93–96). A less importuning, more confident message is aimed at Athenian hearers. In the elaboration of Timasarkhos' victory at Thebes, the *philia* and *xenia* between Aiginetan and Theban aristocracy is reaffirmed. The hearers will have recalled what the scholiasts note, namely that the relationship is to be traced to the sisterhood of the nymphs Aigina and Thebe (30, 36a–b). This link had become historically important when exploited in a Theban appeal to Aigina for help against Athens in c. 506. The Aiginetans first responded with the dispatch of the cult images of the Aiakids and later launched raids against Attica (Hdt. 5.79.1–81.3). The hostilities would also have been remembered, as they were by the ancient commentators (*ΣNem.* 4.30). Lest the allusion be missed, the myth that immediately follows involves military aid tendered to Theban Herakles by Aiakid Telamon (vv. 25–30).

Pindar's poetic program is more subtle than a mere justification of those hostilities for their fidelity to mythic precedent. Theban Pindar does more than balance the conciliatory stance of his clients, expressed by their tie to Melesias, with monitory affirmation of Aiginetan solidarity with Thebes. Telamon's service with Herakles culminates in the defeat of the titan Alkyoneus, summarized by the gnomic statement that "it is fitting that the doer also suffer" (25–32). Herodotus' Aiginetan informants excused the calamitous decision to attack Attica c. 506 in similar fashion (see pp. 54–55 above): Aiginetans and Athenians had acted hostilely in a series of action and counteraction receding into mythological time that constituted an "ancient hatred".

In the final section, with its praise of Melesias, Pindar brings in the grandfather of Timasarkhos, Euphanes, in whose mouth the laudation is placed (89–96). All is ordered so as to unite Melesias with the family of the *laudandus*, the Theandridai. Euphanes and Melesias are ἀλῖκες 'contemporaries'. He has learned to be kindly minded to the ἐσλοί 'nobles', but a τραχὺς . . . ἑφεδρος 'difficult next competitor (or higher seed)' to the παλινκότοι 'malignant'. Thus Melesias' association with Timasarkhos and the Theandridai guarantees their *aretē*. Just as the terminology of wrestling links the victor

41. Fr. 76.1: ὦ τὰ λιπαρὰ καὶ ἰοστέφανοι καὶ ἀοίδιμοι . . . For a date, see U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin 1893) 2.300; C. Gaspar, *Essai de chronologie pindarique* (Brussels 1900) 99–100.

42. Wade-Gery, *Essays* 264–65, dates to 477. Gaspar *Chronologie* 116–19, dates to 472. See also Woloch *CW* (1963) 103.

and Melesias, who teaches wrestling with the base, Euphanes wrestles in his praise of him.⁴³ Both men are equated with Peleus, as portrayed in the ode's central myth. Like a wrestler Peleus restrains (σχάσας) Thetis, who can become πανκρατής 'all-conquering' fire (vv. 62–65). Pindar himself stands in the same circle of affinity, for he is wrestling with his *epinicion* (36–38), for which he predicts a fated culmination on the basis of the *aretē* granted by Πότμος ἄναξ. Peleus had fulfilled a "fated future" (τὸ μὀρσιμον Διόθεν πεπρωμένον) in his victory over Akastos. Laudandus, family, mentor, and laudator all stand united in symbolic affinity.⁴⁴

Nemean 6 is the third Pindaric *epinicion* containing a reference to Melesias. The ode seems closer in spirit to *Nemean* 4: it is perhaps from the 460s and probably preceded the subjugation of Aigina.⁴⁵ The honorand, Alkimidas, belonged to the *patra* of the Bassidai, whose extraordinary athletic feats dominate the poem to an unusual extent. With Alkimidas' Nemean victory the family had won 25 major victories, starting from the victor's great grandfather Praxidamos, the first Aiginetan Olympic victor in 544, and the subject of the oldest statue of a victor there (Paus. 6.18.7). That the Bassidai, with their athletic renown and pedigree, were prepared to advertise any affiliation with an Athenian suggests a strong need, even in the highest aristocracy of Aigina, to open channels of communication with elite Athenians.⁴⁶ The development of the ode is atypical in that myth holds a relatively modest place, perhaps because the very accomplishments of the Bassidai were of mythic proportions. Pindar does, however, advert to a twin burden, the need to praise Alkimidas and Melesias (57a–b). Once again, this time explicitly, Pindar incorporates Melesias into the family of the honorand. In the last three lines of the ode, Melesias is likened to a chariot driver (ἀνίοχος) in a metaphor which credits him for guiding the rearing of Alkimidas. Without the programmatic placement of Aigina and Athens within a mythological normative matrix that one senses in *Olympian* 8 and *Nemean* 4, *Nemean* 6 illustrates the congruence of political attitudes within segments of the Athenian and Aiginetan elites.

The prominent place of Melesias in the Pindaric *epinicia* is representative of an attempt by some Aiginetan aristocrats to work with or through conservative leaders like Kimon and Thoukydides. Melesias was probably present when these were performed as a *kōmos* for the victorious athletes. By praising a respected Athenian mentor, Pindar also addressed other Athenians in the audience. If only on the grounds of Melesias' age, Thoukydides ought to be considered as a co-sponsor of the young aristocrats receiving instruction from

43. The wrestling imagery of Thoukydides' struggle with Perikles qualifies it as just such an opposition to a base defector from aristocratic values.

44. Both the mythological *exempla* play on *xenia* and reciprocity. The Athenians could act as Salaminian Telamon playing out his role of *xenos* at the side of Herakles in "programmed" counteraction for earlier Aiginetan disservices, but even better they could vindicate themselves unselfishly like Peleus, acting in the best interests of the Theandridai, mediated through Melesias.

45. Wade-Gery, *Essays* 254, dates to 484; Gaspar, *Chronologie* 161–65, dates to 447.

46. See pp. 311–12 below for the possibility that Alkimidas later fled to Kydonia in Crete.

Melesias. The suggestion is made above that Aristeides, who died c. 467, was the *proxenos* of the Aiginetans in Athens (pp. 149, 192–95 above). The associations of Thoukydides with Aigina (including the story of his usury there) may indicate that Thoukydides was the *proxenos* of Aigina (in succession to Aristeides). The possibility ought to be raised that these three odes all follow the death of Aristeides.

ATTIC PATRONAGE/CLIENTAGE OF AIGINETAN ARISTOCRATS

Aiginetans and Athenians who were well disposed to each other faced a formidable task, having to contend with fellow citizens immured within hostility toward the other community. Among Herodotus' informants were Aiginetans who celebrated the Aiginetan record of conflict with Athens, justifying Aiginetan aggression toward Athens on the basis of an ancient hatred (see pp. 54–55 above). Even in the afterglow of the victory over Persia, the Aiginetan Polyarkhos was eager to inform Sparta that Athens was rebuilding its walls contrary to Spartan wishes (see pp. 106–7 above). Herodotus' Athenian sources were conversely eager to tell stories of unprovoked Aiginetan aggression, of Medism, and of atrocities against the Aiginetan *dāmos*. Athenians also presumably told the historian of the Attic claim to Aigina through the consecration of a cult of Aiakos which had been endorsed by Delphi (see p. 277 below).

It is tempting to judge futile the efforts of Pindar's patrons to achieve a *modus vivendi* with Athenian leaders, as the Aiginetans were subjugated in c. 459–57 and expelled from their island in 431. That appraisal would be excessively negative: some results from aristocratic rapprochement can indeed be reconstructed.

The Athenian claim to Aigina was mediated on a cultic level by the Aiakeion, a *hērōon* for the Aiginetan founding hero Aiakos, modeled after an earlier cult dedicated to Eurysakes, the son of Salaminian Aias and great-grandson of Aiakos through Telamon. If the adherence of Eurysakes to Athens conveyed ownership of Salamis, it could equally validate the Athenian claim to Aigina, for his grandfather Telamon could be considered sole heir of Aiakos—Telamon being exiled unjustly for a murder of a brother Phokos for which his other brother Peleus was alone guilty.⁴⁷ Pherecydes, the early Attic mythographer, publicized a genealogy for the Kimonids, tracing them back to Philaios, the son of Eurysakes, so that Kimon could not only claim descent from Aias, but also point to his ancestor's credit for Athenian ownership of Salamis (*FGH* 3 F 2). He does not, however, validate in similar genealogical terms a Kimonid and Athenian claim to Aigina, as (idiosyncratically) Pherecydes treated Telamon as the friend, not the brother of Peleus (*FGH* 3 F 60; cf. Marcell. *Vit. Thuc.* 2).⁴⁸ As the status of Peleus as an Aiakid was undoubtedly stronger than

47. Paus. 2.29.10; cf. DS 4.72.6–7. For variants with Telamon guilty: (e.g.) Apoll. *Arg.* 1.89–91; Plut. *Mor.* 311E; ΣPin. *Nem.* 5.25a; Apollodorus *Biblio.* 3.160–61; Paus. 2.29.2, 9; 10.30.4.

48. J.P. Barron, "Bacchylides, Theseus and a Woolly Cloak," *BICS* 27 (1980) 1–8, reconstructs a similar poetic campaign by the Kean Bacchylides, equating Kimon with Theseus, and suggests that Pherecydes revised the *stemma* for Kimon to show that Theseus was the father of Aias, not

that of Telamon—Achilles is an Aiakid in the *Iliad*—Pherecydes in effect denied that Telamon and Aias were Aiakids. Hence, the Kimonids were also not Aiakids and their grant of Salamis did not entail rights over Aigina. Pherecydes was active during the period of Kimon's political ascendancy and his treatment of the Philaid *stemma* reflects Kimonian attempts to defuse a confrontation with Aigina during the 470s and 460s (cf. *FGH* 3 T 6).⁴⁹ In contrast, the Aiakid affiliation of Aias and the Philaidai is generally accepted during the Pentekontaeteia, as we have already seen in Pindar.⁵⁰

Kimon had argued that a rejection of the Spartan request for help in 464 would deprive Athens of its "yoke mate" (Plut. *Cimon* 16.10 = Ion *FGH* 392 F 14). This policy of cooperation with the Spartans, which may be called dual hegemonism, involved continued Athenian fidelity to the Hellenic League. Continued adherence to the League in turn maintained the oaths of reconciliation, sworn by the Athenians and Aiginetans, affording the islanders autonomy and immunity from Athens (see pp. 281–84 below). With the growing disparity between Athenian and Aiginetan naval power, these engagements deterred (much more than Peloponnesian military strength) Athenian vindictiveness. In contrast to the period before 482, when the Aiginetans had been the aggressors, they now adopted a more conciliatory posture of which the cultivation of powerful friends in Attica was a part.⁵¹

Thoukydides was important to the Aiginetan elite because he differed from more imperialist politicians like Perikles over the treatment of the allies. Aiginetan aristocrats may be placed among the great following won by Thoukydides among the Greeks (Plato *Meno* 94D; cf. *Ath. Pol.* 28.5). During the 460s, when agitators at Athens may have renewed calls for action against the Aiginetans, the goal of the Aiginetan friends of Melesias was to discourage Athenian revanchism. The hands-off policy foundered on a strategic argument advanced by Perikles, encapsulated in his famous advice to erase the eyesore of the Peiraieus, and on the Athenian sense of unrequited grievance against the Aiginetans (so well reflected in Herodotus). Given the much greater ability of

Telamon (cf. Plut. *Thes.* 29.1; *FGH* 3 F 153). In this view, Pherecydes doubly sundered the Philaids from the Aiakids.

49. See G.L. Huxley, "The Date of Pherecydes of Athens," *GRBS* 14 (1973) 137–43; also D. Viviers, "Historiographie et propagande politique au VI^{ème} siècle avant notre ère: les Philaïdes et la Chersonèse de Thrace," *RFIC* 115 (1987) 288–313, esp. 300–6. Cf. F. Jacoby *FGH* 1A, 538; *id.*, "The First Athenian Prose Writer," *Mnemosyne* 13 (1947) 13–64, esp. 26–33. Note that I argue in *Colonization* 105–11 that agitation for conquering Aigina had begun in the 460s (see also p. 278 below).

50. Cf., e.g., Hdt. 6.35.1; Pin. *Pyth.* 8.98–100; Soph. *Ajax* 596–645; and possibly Hellanicus *FGH* 4 F 22.

51. Herodotus reports that the Aiginetan tomb at Plataia was built ten years after the battle (469, hence in the heart of the Kimonian ascendancy) only through the intervention of the Aiginetan *proxenos* Kleades, son of Autodikos (9.85.3). The author of *De Herodoti malignitate* uses the erection of the *polyandria* as one of his arguments against general shirking at Plataia ([Plut.] *Mor.* 872E–873A), striking the right note when he observes that the Athenians did not begrudge the Aiginetans credit for participation, despite their hostility. In a satellite of Athens like Plataia, the *polyandria* can be taken as another token of bridge-building to the Athenian elite.

the Athenians to dictate to a subject Aigina after 457–56, reconciliatory gestures toward the opposition to Perikles were again tactically unimpeachable. Once it had been subjugated, Aigina may have occupied a disproportionate place as a test case of relations with the tributaries, because of its proximity, wealth, and history of interaction with Attica. Thus, we find that the two claimants to primacy in the direction of Athenian foreign affairs were both prominent in policy toward Aigina.

THE *PROTASIA* OF THOUKYDIDES

The anonymous life of Thucydides states that Thoukydides achieved a *protasia* (πρόεστη τοῦ δήμου). Elsewhere emphasis on Thoukydides' political dominance appears in some variants of ΣAristid. 3.446–47 D. Understanding whether these discussions establish for Thoukydides a predominant position in the whole *polis* (that is, even superiority over Perikles) demands first an exploration of the Athenian colony at Thourioi in southern Italy. Wade-Gery believed that Thoukydides appropriated Perikles' plan to colonize Thourioi and altered it to become a panhellenic project more in keeping with his aspirations toward inter-*polis* cooperation.⁵² Our only evidence is provided by *Vit. Anon. Thuc.* 7.⁵³

The composite character of Thourioi, however, and its subsequent independence from Athens in policy do not demonstrate the intervention of a statesman who was more collaborative with other Greeks.⁵⁴ The site demanded a considerable establishment in order to achieve security against the longstanding enemies of the Sybarites. Alternatives to panhellenic Thourioi and a network of independent allies are hard to envisage for Athenian policy in the west, where multiple non-Greek threats promoted fully militarized allies over tributaries (see pp. 261–62 below). West Greek cities varied over a narrower range of magnitudes than older, synoecized cities, so that creating hegemony over largish polities or building coalitions was intrinsically difficult. Besides checking the regional power Syracuse, the Athenians intended to weaken Taras, a Spartan colony, with which Thourioi was soon at war (Antiochos *FGH* 555 F11 = Strabo 6.1.14 C264; DS 12.23.2 [under 444/3!]; Meiggs-Lewis 57). To recruit so many colonists from Attica was impossible; from the *arkhē* difficult. The Athenians doubtless took pains to insure recruitment from pro-Athenians, but the risk of disaffection was unavoidable. The Athenians had to count on self-selection: persons interested in a community patterned after Athens—DS 12.11.3: συστησάμενοι δὲ πολίτευμα δημοκρατικὸν διεῖλον τοὺς πολίτας εἰς

52. Note Wade-Gery *Essays* 255–58; cf. V. Ehrenberg, "The Foundation of Thurii," *AJP* 69 (1948) 149–70, esp. 153–60; also *Colonization* 162–65.

53. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ Ξενοκρίτου, ὡς Σύβαριν ἀποδημήσας, ὡς ἐπανήλθεν εἰς Ἀθήνας, συγχύσεως δικαστηρίου φεύγων ἑάλω. M. Moggi, "Senocrito, Tucide di Melesia e la fondazione di Turi," *ASNP* 9 (1979) 499–504, would emend to render Xenokritos returning from Sybaris. Cf. L. Piccirilli, "Alcune notizie su Tucide di Melesia (Anon. *Vit. Thuc.* 6–7)," *MH* 42 (1985) 262–67.

54. Note Andrewes *JHS* (1978) 6–7.

δέκα φυλάς...—ought to have been pro-democratic and pro-Athenian.⁵⁵ Hence the Athenian proclamation to the Peloponnesus need not have been a new departure (DS 12.10.4). Peloponnesians who had served on the Athenian side in the First Peloponnesian War—witness the Thourian tribes of Arkas and Akhais—probably constituted a cadre for others (who, in any case, drew off the manpower of the Spartan alliance).

Moreover, it is noteworthy that Thoukydides was returning from Sybaris and not Thourioi. The Sybarites had tried on their own to reestablish their city in 453, but yielded before the strength of Kroton (DS 11.90.4; 12.9.1, 10.1). Thoukydides may well have visited afterward, when the Sybarite exiles requested Athenian aid, or when a first expedition with reinforcements arrived (at Diodorus' date of 446/5?),⁵⁶ or when *stasis* between the Sybarites and the new settlers flared up, which ended with the massacre and expulsion of the Sybarites.⁵⁷ The Sybarites had attempted to marginalize the new settlers, taking the highest offices, religious precedence, and land nearest the city (DS 12.11.1–2), although the first proclamation had probably offered recruits a more equal share in the colony (cf. DS 12.10.4). At the time of Thoukydides' misadventure, Thourioi did not yet exist (although Diodorus betrays a certain looseness of expression), not until the expulsion of the Sybarites and the definitive refounding in 444/3 (Strabo 6.1.13 C263; Plut. *Mor.* 835D; cf. Apollodorus *FGH* 244 F 71). By that time Thoukydides was (at the best) on the verge of his ostracism.

Even at the start the Pericleans had a large role in this affair, if Diodorus is correct that Lampon and Xenokritos accompanied the first wave of reinforcements (12.10.4). If Thoukydides championed aid to the aristocratic Sybarites, who attempted to dominate the reinforcing settlers, it would indeed be in character. On his return, he was charged with tampering with a dicastery (cf. Din. *Dem.* 112). He may have tried to intervene against the detractors of the Sybarites in Athens. When that policy miscarried, Perikles and his faction seem to have taken over the project completely.⁵⁸ Xenokritos, the accuser of Thoukydides, was associated with Lampon (an ally of Perikles), who (significantly) predicted Perikles' victory over Thoukydides.⁵⁹ In view of the role of the *thouriomanteis*, Perikles seems to have orchestrated a campaign centered

55. See Ehrenberg *AJP* (1948) 157–70. Cf. N.K. Rutter, "Diodorus and the Foundation of Thuri," *Historia* 22 (1973) 155–76.

56. DS 12.10.3–4, 11.1–3. See Andrewes *JHS* (1978) 6.

57. Piccirilli *MH* (1985) 266–67; *id.*, *Temistocle Aristide Cimone Tucidide di Melesia fra politica e propaganda* (Genoa 1987) 97, 101 (in 445).

58. Ehrenberg *AJP* (1948) 160–70. Cf. Rutter *Historia* (1973) 167–69.

59. See Plut. *Mor.* 812D, cf. *Per.* 6.2–3; Aris. *Rhet.* 1419a2–5; as *ktistēs* in the foundation of Thourioi: DS 12.10.3–4; Phot. *s.v.* *θουριομάνταις*; cf. Arist. *Aves* 521 with scholia (b, c Holwerda = Cratinus fr. 117 K); Plut. *Mor.* 812D; *Suda s.v.* *θουριομάνταις*, θ 418 Adler; Hesych. *s.v.* *θουριομάνταις*, 666 Latte; *ΣArist. Nubes* 332, 666). Lampon's later career: Thuc. 5.19.2, 24.1; *IG* I³ 78.47, 60; also Arist. *Aves* 521, 988 (with *Σ*988a–b); Eupolis fr. 297 K; Cratinus fr. 57–58 K; Kallias fr. 14 K; Lysippos fr. 6 K; *ΣArist. Pax* 1084 H; Hesych. *s.v.* *ἀγεροικύβηλις*, 461 Latte (Cratinus fr. 62).

around oracles, one probably exploiting a supposed cession of Siris to the Athenians. That contention appears to have been a theme of the democratizers since Themistokles (Hdt. 8.62.2; Plut. *Them.* 32.2).

Thoukydides probably shared much the same policy goals as Perikles' faction toward Syracuse and Taras (otherwise, why go to Sybaris at all), but preferred in a characteristic style of conservative, pro-elite "micro-management" to restore and strengthen the exiled Sybarites, who would then go on to reestablish a version of their ancestral aristocratic polity, albeit allied to Athens. That project foundered not on any imperialistic policies of Perikles but on the failed efforts at rebuilding a community by the Sybarites.

The conviction of Thoukydides after Sybaris was not decisive: he presumably escaped with a lesser punishment. It is likely, however, that it set the stage for his final discomfiture in the ostracism. It is not in the least surprising that Perikles' hand was growing stronger in 446/5.⁶⁰ In 447/6, Athens had been challenged by a series of uprisings in the central Greek states that had provided a security barrier against Peloponnesian attack.⁶¹ The city of Megara was lost to rebellion; Boiotia fell away under the onslaught of returning exiles and a reviving Thebes; the Euboian aristocrats rose against Athens. It had seemed for a time that Athens would be forced to risk a climactic hoplite engagement against the main levy of the Peloponnesian League, but Pleistoanax had withdrawn his army from Eleusis, allowing Perikles to recover Euboia. Pleistoanax and his advisor Kleandridas were said to have been bribed, but prudential reasons for a loss of nerves can also be suggested. Sparta had already made serious inroads into the security network which the Athenians had built in central Greece. Recovered Megara opened the road to Attica to Peloponnesian armies, and resurgent Boiotia both placed on Attica's northern border staging points and promised a significant increase in the heavy infantry that could be levied for future anti-Athenian operations.

Perikles retook Euboia, but Sparta could only have maintained its freedom with difficulty—its northern and southern thirds were so open to attack from a sea dominated by Athenian ships. And how valuable was contesting Chalcis and Eretria, where the Athenians also had many partisans? Liberating Euboia would call for a thorough subversion of the Delian League, but that was a recipe for an open-ended conflict. The size of Pleistoanax' Spartan force (facing a pandemic Attic levy) is unknown, making it difficult to assess his chances for decisive victory. Anything less jeopardized Spartan gains. The Spartans may have punished their king for turning prudence into profit, but they did not renew a conflict easily rekindled.

The weathering of the crisis of 447/6 and the Thirty Years Peace appear in our sources under Periclean leadership. Nothing argues that his domestic opponents on his "right" had any coherent alternative to his firm line against

60. Note Piccirilli *MH* (1985) 263–65.

61. The sources are listed in G.F. Hill (rev. R. Meiggs & A. Andrewes), *Sources for Greek History between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars*² (Oxford 1966) #7.1–6, pp. 344–45.

Sparta and inclination for incremental advances. Thoukydides probably opposed Tolmides' over-bold stroke in Boiotia, was not ready to assault Euboia with the Peloponnesians present, and did not agitate for retaining the Megarian ports, but Perikles shared these positions. The Athenians got the best deal available—on the whole a good one, given the latitude for expansion of their alliance—and the conservatives with all their appeals to a panhellenic aristocratic *ethos* and their willingness to retrench (only modestly after all) on democratization could not have gotten anything more. Perikles was the truer conservative insofar as the Thirty Years Peace reflects an implementation of long-standing Athenian aspirations in central Greece, toward Euboia and toward Aigina (in the latter case, espoused by Themistokles and Xanthippos).

The Thirty Years Peace also proclaimed that the Athenian opposition could not intervene to alter the basic status of the aristocrats of tributaries like Aigina.⁶² If my interpretation of *IG I³ 38* is correct, the Aiginetans already understood their situation, since this fragmentary inscription may show Athens taking precautions in the early 440s for the security of Aigina, with the collaboration of the government in power on the island. The Aiginetans were anxious to advertise (*n.b.* the hurried appearance of the inscription) their cooperation in forestalling their island's use against Attica.⁶³ If Athenian friends like Thoukydides helped, that was why they were cultivated. The result was good enough requital from Attic patrons for many Aiginetans, but it did not suffice for all. Pindar in his *Pythian* 8 reflects the despair of those who had unrealistically expected a restoration of Aiginetan autonomy as a result of the hostilities of 447/6. The mood has been so transformed from that of the *epinicia* invoking Melesias that, although the victory of the honorand Aristomenes is dated to 446 (*ΣPyth.* 8.inscr.), it is sensible to conclude that the terms of the Thirty Years Peace were already known at the time of performance.

From the opening invocation of *Hēsukhia* 'Quietude', the daughter of *Dikē megaloptolis* 'Justice who makes cities great' (1–7), Aigina, a *dikaïopolis* (22–24), is consistently associated with the virtues of the archaic normative code and portrayed as struggling against a counter-force, namely the titanic, hybriatic *polupragmosunē* characteristic of the Athenians. Pindar is sure to whom the victory will fall eventually, closing his proem by observing that *βία* 'force' and *μεγάλανχον* 'arrogance' will miscarry in time (v. 15).⁶⁴ The same message is encoded in the ode's central myth, as the honorand bears a *logos* spoken enigmatically by Amphiaraus (39–40), in which the seer predicts the victory of the *epigonoî* at Thebes. They, like the victorious athlete, breed true (44–45), and will enjoy the reciprocating force of fortune (cf. 48–55). The myth of the *epigonoî* consoles the Aiginetans with the prospect of the same drastic reversal of fortune, experienced by Adrastos, achievable through the innate *aretē* of young Aiginetans like Aristomenes. Pindar also emphasizes

62. Cf. Piccirilli *Themistocle* 101.

63. *Colonization* 120–26.

64. See Wade-Gery *Essays* 251.

life's vicissitudes with the theme of a *daimon*, exalting one and debasing another (74–78). Finally, at the end of the ode, he continues his interweaving of foreboding and joy with an evocation of life's transience. Amelioration is the bright light afforded by heroic victory in accordance with inherent *aretē*; the dark *σκιᾶς ὄναρ ἄνθρωπος* is balanced by *αἴγλα διόσδοτος, λαμπρὸν φέγγος*, and *μείλιχος αἰών* (92–97). The savoring of the light afforded by Aristomenes' victory evokes the possibility of a vindication for the Aiginetans for which the last lines of the poem prays. The nymph Aigina with the collaboration of Zeus and the Aiakids should escort the city of Aigina *ἐλευθέρῳ στόλῳ* 'with free equipage (or expedition)' (98–100).

There is consolation here, but it is not resident in a hope that the Spartans or the Athenian conservatives would achieve Aiginetan freedom, but in the inspired trust that retribution will come from Aiginetan *epigonoι*. There is nothing of reconciliation with Athens, although the honorand's victory at Marathon gave an easy opportunity for complimentary allusion.

THE OSTRACISM OF THOUKYDIDES

The treatment of the colonization of Thourioi, the conviction of Thoukydides thereafter, the predominance of Perikles both in the fighting of 447/6 and (it seems) in the Thirty Years Peace are indications of the weakness of Thoukydides and his faction. Our sources, however, botch the job of contextualizing the triumph of Perikles in its foreign affairs setting, concentrating on the controversy over Athenian building projects as a lead-in to the ostracism of Thoukydides. Plutarch (relying to an unknown degree on earlier writers) created from this confrontation a dramatization of Athens as a divided city (Plut. *Per.* 11.3), a portrait that is overwrought, if not actually deceptive. Anti-imperialist, moderate and conservative, commentators of the fourth century might well take this line because of self-justification. Here alone their ideological forerunners occupied a position not only comprehensible to them, but possessing some strength.

The controversy over subsidizing new building was protracted: *Per.* 8.5: (Thouk.) *καὶ πλεῖστον ἀντεπολιτεύσατο τῷ Περικλεῖ χρόνον*; 14.3: *τέλος δέ*. Thoukydides is lurking behind the *ekhthroi* who attacked Perikles for his plan to use some of the surplus from the tribute for public works (Plut. *Per.* 12.1–2). Their specific argument is revealing, i.e. Perikles had undercut the justification for transferring the league treasury to Athens. That suggests that the transfer of the treasury may have been promoted by the Kimonians as well (cf. Plut. *Arist.* 25.3). This juxtaposition not only supports the contention that Thoukydides' faction was politicking on the basis of its supposedly superior concern for the allies,⁶⁵ but aids in explaining how the controversy preceded the buildings themselves. Because buildings rose slowly, needing many votes, the issue was tailor-made for a weaker group's obstruction, while it strove to create a negative atmosphere rather than necessarily to win individual votes.

65. Cf. Andrewes *JHS* (1978) 4–5.

The rhetoric deployed subserved that goal: Thoukydides and his faction described any diversion as hybriistic and tyrannical.⁶⁶ The image of Athens as a wanton, arrogant woman adorned with temples was a deft ploy, illustrative of how Thoukydides got his oratorical reputation. In practice the denunciation of any diversion seems to have merged into complaints about cost.⁶⁷ The opposition exaggerated the expense of the buildings and cultivated the impression of an exclusive subsidization by the allies.⁶⁸ That the Athenians recognized overstatement as such is suggested by Perikles' exaggerated riposte that their expense could be charged to him (Plut. *Per.* 14.1–2). In fact Athens spent other resources and even the reserves themselves did not accrue from tribute alone (note Dem. 22.13; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 343D).⁶⁹ Onto the substructure of contemporary exaggeration was built an overblown sociological rationale for the building program which is a legitimate target for our scepticism.⁷⁰

In establishing the historical motivations and arguments of Perikles, it is important to note that Plutarch described the building program as a *prophasis* for subvening the urban *dēmos* (*Per.* 12.5); in other words a reconstruction of his real motivation, not what Perikles actually said. It is doubtful whether any mid-fifth-century Athenian did more than observe the obvious: spending rather than treasurizing funds contributed to prosperity (Plut. *Per.* 12.4: εὐπορία δὲ γινομένων ἐτοιμία παρέσται; cf. 12.6). The point of departure for Plutarch's flight of fancy is Perikles' insistence that only those contributing in their persons to the common defense deserved input into decisions about expenditure.⁷¹

66. Plut. *Per.* 12.2: καὶ δοκεῖ δεινὴν ὕβριν ἢ Ἑλλάς ὑβρίζεσθαι καὶ τυραννείσθαι περιφανῶς, ὁρῶσα τοῖς εἰσφερομένοις ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἀναγκαίως πρὸς τὸν πόλεμον ἡμᾶς τὴν πόλιν καταχρυσόουντας καὶ καλλωπίζοντας ὥσπερ ἀλαζόνα γυναῖκα, περιπτομένην λίθους πολυτελεῖς καὶ ἀγάλματα καὶ ναοὺς χιλιεταλάντους (cf. Plut. *Mor.* 349C).

67. Plut. *Per.* 14.1 (cf. 12.2): τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸν Θουκυδίδην ῥητόρων καταβοώντων τοῦ Περικλέους ὡς σπαθώντος τὰ χρήματα καὶ τὰς προσόδους ἀπολλύντος, ἡρώτησεν ἐν ἐκκλησίᾳ τὸν δῆμον, εἰ πολλὰ δοκεῖ δεδαπανῆσθαι φησάντων δὲ πάμπολλα. Cf. Demetrius *FGH* 228 F 8.

68. Cost: R.S. Stanier, "The Cost of the Parthenon," *JHS* 73 (1953) 68–76; *HCT* 2.21–23.

69. See L. Kallet-Marx, "Did Tribute Fund the Parthenon?," *CA* 8 (1989) 252–66, esp. on the role of the treasurers of Athena and their jurisdiction.

70. Perikles supposedly wanted to support the urban *dēmos* with income in return for work, and not just on account of its civic status (Plut. *Per.* 12.4–5). Such a division between military and banausic classes and the organization of crafts is anachronistic. The number of workers is too great and the large proportion of metic workers has been forgotten (as though freedmen were enfranchised?). The available work for citizens (and not for transient specialists) is exaggerated. All this was credible to Wade-Gery (*Essays* 242–43) because of the economic situation in the 1930s. Compare how the specifically class effects of colonization are exaggerated and misapplied in Plut. *Per.* 11.6 (*Colonization* 62–66, 227–28). See also Frost *Historia* (1964) 389–92. The bustle of workers and the ensuing prosperity glowingly painted in Plut. *Per.* 12.6 seems to be an elaboration in keeping with a rhetorical school-piece, based on the social environment of Rome or perhaps of one of the Hellenistic/Roman metropolises like Alexandria. See also W. Ameling, "Plutarch, Perikles 12–14," *Historia* 34 (1985) 43–63, for a good discussion on the embellishments in Plutarch's account of the controversy. I should, however, insist that this elaboration is built on a framework established from recollections from Plutarch's reading of the *Attides*.

71. Plut. *Per.* 12.3: ἐδίδασκεν οὖν ὁ Περικλῆς τὸν δῆμον, ὅτι χρημάτων μὲν οὐκ ὀφείλουσι τοῖς συμμάχοις λόγον, προπολεμοῦντες αὐτῶν καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους ἀνείργοντες, οὐχ ἵππον, οὐ

The force of this counter-argument transcends the issue of the building program, touching on the transformation worked in Attic life by the ascent of the League. It was his grasp of the nature of this transformation that allowed Perikles to best Thoukydides. If the issue had remained one of the seemliness of using some allied money for building or even of risking allied unpopularity by such subsidization, Thoukydides might well have won his point.

In Kimonian Athens, dual hegemonism (under the aegis of a vestigial Hellenic League) cloaked the impact for foreign policy of social change in Attica. Perikles did not create the *emmisthos polis*; its roots were planted by Kimon's encouragement of the allied shift from service to paying tribute (Plut. *Cimon* 11.1–3). As a concomitant, the Athenians were transformed from the citizens of a hegemonal city to members of a caste within a larger political entity, possessing the potentiality for receiving payments for military and political activity. No longer merely an aspect of public existence, participation in this civic caste could become a profession, and with this professionalization came politicization. By that I mean a reorientation toward political processes for economic livelihood and psychological satisfaction.⁷²

Democratization and differentiation of the Athenians as a hegemonic class were two aspects of the same evolutionary process. As Athenian policy advanced beyond simple options like cooperation with Sparta and enmity to Persia, the prerogatives of the Areiopagos, influential for embodying the attitudes of the elite as a *collectivity*, yielded authority to popular governmental organs from which individual members of the elite sought authorization as political agents; they no longer received validation as leaders (as in the archaic period). The psychological adjustment for those choosing to compete for popular favor began an alienation from the international athletic, cultural, and intellectual elite with whom Athenian aristocrats had so many ties. After the collapse of the empire, Attidography (to an extent) trivialized the transformation: Perikles had merely bought the *dēmos* when he could not compete with Kimon in traditional patronage.⁷³

In this characterization Thoukydides and his later admirers missed an essential point: beyond a certain level, political functions could only be subsidized through Periclean transfers of resources. For all his indignation, Thoukydides could not counter a reality wherein Athenian politicization was balanced by allied depoliticization. In the words of Perikles, the subjects provided “no horseman, no ship, no hoplite, but only money,” so that they could not be equated with the Athenian citizen body, who bore a personal risk of death

ναῦν, οὐχ ὀπλίτην, ἀλλὰ χρήματα μόνον τελοῦντων, ἃ τῶν δίδόντων οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ τῶν λαμβανόντων . . .

72. We get intuitively aggregated facets of politicization in *Per.* 11.4–6 between Plutarch's introduction of the conflict between Thoukydides and Perikles and the controversy over buildings: cultural events, regular citizen naval service, colonization.

73. The distinction is artificial, as an isolated reference to Perikles' charity in Plut. *Per.* 16.7 proves.

(προπολεμοῦντες αὐτῶν).⁷⁴ Political participation and risk had been paired since the birth of the *polis*. A public ritual, almost certainly initiated in Periclean Athens, dramatized the distinction in status: the annual tribute was paraded in the theater during the Dionysia, along with a parade of Athenian war orphans (Isoc. 8.82).

Hence a chasm divided the shared aristocratic culture proclaimed by an Ion, Kimon's friend (from autonomous Chios) from Pindar's efforts to forge links between the Aiginetan and Athenian elites through celebrating the mentorship in *aretē* of Melesias for Aiginetan youths. In the 440s, no doubt the Aiginetans and other subject allies greatly desired to achieve autonomy, but who at Athens was ready to trust them with it outside a small, albeit influential, circle of aristocratic politicians?

Thoukydides evidently tried to offer an alternative style for foreign policy, one mediated through aristocratic patronage (rather than a policy with radically different aims).⁷⁵ Such clientelae, however, could never play the same role as that performed by the networks of foreign patronage of the Roman *nobiles*, because they threatened the essential distinction between those serving in their own persons (including the autonomous ship contributors) and the tribute payers. The Athenians wisely preferred a program of cultivating the *dēmos* in the tributary cities, facilitated through favored members of the allied elite whose status was achieved through honors like proxenies and grants of inviolability. For them, "Atticism" was grounded in a common democratic ideology and certified by articulated grants from the *dēmos*, and not by an influence mediated through the Athenian elite.

Wade-Gery hypothesized that the year leading up to the ostracism saw Perikles in retreat. Thoukydides had been strong enough to deny him reelection as general.⁷⁶ We have found little other indication of this eclipse, but the discussion in Plut. *Per.* 16.3 remains for consideration.⁷⁷ Care, however, is needed about the sequence of ideas here. The ostracism of Thoukydides inaugurated Perikles' years of unrivalled influence, illustrated by his fifteen *stratēgiai*. Yet that string may be probative not because it was unique (think of Themistokles or Kimon earlier in the century) or because it followed a defeat, but because no one else achieved a parallel string of electoral successes *at the same time*.⁷⁸ Plutarch's point is valid whether or not Perikles held a generalship the year prior to the first of the fifteen, because, for all we know, Thoukydides could have been accumulating a parallel string during the 450s and early

74. Allied citizens who opted to serve alongside the Athenians in the fleet could receive pay like the Athenians themselves and could unite their fate with the Athenians through metic status.

75. Note H.D. Meyer, "Thukydides und die oligarchische Opposition gegen Perikles," *Historia* 16 (1967) 141–54.

76. Cf. Wade-Gery *Essays* 240–41, 251; Piccirilli *Themistocle* 94–95.

77. μετὰ δὲ τὴν Θουκυδίδου κατάλυσιν καὶ τὸν ὁστρακισμόν οὐκ ἐλάττω τῶν πεντεκαίδεκα ἐτῶν διηνεκὴ καὶ μίαν οὔσαν ἐν ταῖς ἐνιαυσίοις στρατηγίαις ἀρχὴν καὶ δυναστείαν κτησάμενος, ἐφύλαξεν ἑαυτὸν ἀνάλωτον ὑπὸ χρημάτων . . .

78. See Ehrenberg *AJP* (1948) 169–70.

440s so that Perikles' *stratēgia* did not denote *dunasteia* 'political supremacy'.⁷⁹ There had indeed been two *dunasteiai*, exactly the phrasing of Lampon (Plut. *Per.* 6.2: *ὅτι δεῖν οὐσῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει δυνασκειῶν, τῆς Θουκυδίδου καὶ Περικλέους*). It was presumably out of a need to solidify his mandate and to short-circuit obstructionist tactics that Perikles resorted to an ostracism. Despite the origin of ostracism as a device for providing a political, non-legal mechanism against tyranny, since the 480s ostracism had been a means to terminate a rivalry between two claimants to *protasia* (see pp. 190–91, 195–96 above). In fragmented Athenian politics, such a confrontation admittedly had an artificial quality, but the utility of this "executive" election made the procedure a risky but powerful tool in the arsenal of factional politics. Reckoning back from 429, the fifteen years of Periclean supremacy give a likely date of 444/3 for the ostracism of Thoukydides.⁸⁰ There is no sufficient reason for placing the ostracism in the early 430s, as has been suggested recently.⁸¹ Lang lists 64 known ostraka (two from the Agora) of Thoukydides.⁸²

THE RETURN OF THOUKYDIDES MELESIOU

The story of the usury of Thoukydides on Aigina implies financial dealings with his *xenoi* on the island. These could be portrayed by his enemies as exploitation, prompted by avariciousness, in an alternative causation for the Peloponnesian War. The issue of the war's causation first became controversial when, under the effects of the great plague, the Athenians repudiated the leadership of Perikles, who had been chiefly responsible for the rejection of Spartan ultimatums, including the demand for Aiginetan autonomy. The dissatisfaction with Perikles involved seeking terms from Sparta, presumably in line with the conditions announced before the war. A reference in the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes (652–55) shows the relevance of the issue of surrendering Aigina after the beginning of the war.⁸³ If Periclean intransigence over Aiginetan autonomy could be blamed for inciting the war, the charge against Thoukydides makes sense as counter-propaganda: the Aiginetans would not perhaps have pressed the issue of their tributary status—their lack of autonomy—if they had not been under financial pressure from Thoukydides. Regardless of Perikles' advice about Aigina before the war, the Aiginetans needed to slip the halter of Athenian hegemony in order to repay the avaricious Thoukydides. It was good politics to shift blame to Perikles' great rival of the 440s, especially

79. Cf. Piccirilli *Themistocle* 94, 98–99.

80. Other references to the ostracism: *ΣArist. Eq.* 855b MJ/W; Plut. *Nic.* 11.5. 445/4 and 443/2 are the other possibilities.

81. P. Krentz, "The Ostracism of Thoukydides, Son of Melesias," *Historia* 33 (1984) 499–504, identifies the general Thoukydides (serving on Samos in 440/39: Thuc. 1.117.2) as the son of Melesias (*ΣAristid.* 3.447 D; cf. *Vit. Soph.* 1). Cf. Piccirilli *Themistocle* 99–100. See Phillips *Historia* (1991) 387–90.

82. M. Lang, *Ostraka, The Athenian Agora* 25 (Princeton 1990) 132–33.

83. See also *Colonization* 83, and pp. 259–60, 279 below on autonomy.

since Thoukydides appears to have been involved in the attacks on Perikles in 430 (as shall be seen shortly).

If we had the full record of Athenian deliberation over Aiginetan tribute during the 430s, it is possible that further material might be adduced to create a plausible framework for the charge against Thoukydides. After 439, when they can be assumed to have paid 30T, the actual Aiginetan payments of tribute are unknown until 433/2, when they paid 14T or 9T (*IG I³* 279.1.88). This is unlikely to have been a partial payment.⁸⁴ The most economical hypothesis is that the payment of 433/2 constituted the assessed amount, less than half the assessment prior to 438. A change could have been made at reassessment in 438 and 434 or by special intervention at any time during the 430s. It is on inability to continue payments at the higher assessment that a diminution will have been based (cf. *IG I³* 71.22). The Athenian friends of the Aiginetan elite probably supported any such petition. To make the charge of usury, instigating Aiginetan agitation at Sparta, plausible, a linkage of Thoukydides with the reduction is needed. The vagueness of the available chronology makes it difficult to speculate on his mode and degree of involvement; at the least, a recommendation *in absentia* seems likely and certainly in character. If Thoukydides was the Aiginetan *proxenos* at Athens, any Athenian espousal of their cause is likely to have been perceived to have been under his sponsorship. Or was there a loan raised in Athens to supplement a shortfall in the revenues allocated for paying the tribute in one year, which proponents of a reduction in tribute adduced as proof of the destitution of Aiginetan finances and the sincerity of the interest of their supporters?

Thoukydides and other Athenian friends of Aigina did not know of Aiginetan agitation at Sparta which, when it was revealed, cast a negative light not only on the tribute reduction but also on any promotion of concessions on Aiginetan autonomy just before the war. The secret diplomacy at Sparta was tremendously risky. Sparta had done nothing for Aigina in the Thirty Years Peace; general war risked an expulsion (the option in fact exercised) or even an *andrapodismos*. The Aiginetans might have been deluded about the efficacy of Spartan threats to invade Attica. Yet, if Spartan hesitancy and the pessimism of Arkhidamos were not enough (Thuc. 1.80–85), the chance that they would be dead before Athens yielded ought to have concentrated their minds wonderfully.

The key to an answer may have been contained in the lost proposals of Perikles' opponents in 432–31 in answer to Spartan peace conditions. They may have called for Aiginetan autonomy within the *arkhē* (or another reduction in tribute) as they asked for a rescinding of the Megarian Decree (Thuc. 1.139.1–2, 144.1–2). The Aiginetans then were practicing brinksmanship in the hope that Spartan pressure might induce a better deal from Athens, one brokered by their friends, the acquiescence in which they could proclaim while

84. The alternative explanations of dissidence, resistance to Athenian pressure, or sheer provocation lack credibility. See *Colonization* n. 28, pp. 114–15; pp. 274–75 below.

gaining credit for averting war. If that is so, they tragically misconstrued the balance of factions in Athens. The Aiginetans gave their enemies in Attica (and very possibly on Aigina itself) an opportunity to tap popular rage over inciting war so that even subject status was lost.⁸⁵

Thoukydides Melesiou may have been among these anonymous proponents of compromise before the Peloponnesian War, as he probably returned from ostracism in 433.⁸⁶ Aiginetan imprudence may have been owed to a miscalculation concerning what Thoukydides could accomplish. His activism against Perikles has left traces in our evidence, which unfortunately are interwoven with the confusing record of the attacks on Perikles' entourage. Wade-Gery linked these attacks, dated to the late 430s, with the return of Thoukydides, and Kienast amplified this thesis to portray Thoukydides as the mastermind behind a campaign of persecution aimed at discrediting the man who managed his ostracism.⁸⁷ A tightly organized conspiracy is unlikely, and the chronology is extremely vexed.

One factor for distortion in our sources was a wrong-headed attempt to offer a causation of the Peloponnesian War in which Perikles fomented the conflict to extricate himself from his enemies' plots. That scenario demanded two things, exaggerating the threat to Perikles and concentrating the accusations on the eve of the war. Help came from comic invective, of which we possess two examples from Aristophanes. In the *Acharnians*, we are treated to a magnificent parody of Herodotus (with some Timokreon of Rhodes as well: fr. 5, *PMG* 731) leading to the Megarian Decree (vv. 509–39 with scholia, 532 Wilson). In the *Peace*, the plight of Pheidias makes Perikles so fearful that he starts the war (603–24 with scholia 605a–β, 606a–β, 609 H). Lost material is extensive, as the comment of Plutarch that Aspasia was prosecuted by Hermippos the comic poet suggests.⁸⁸ I am inclined to isolate each item of the alternative causation for the war and date it on its own terms, justifying this action from Plutarch's own admission of the composite character of his (the most complete) version: ἡ δὲ χειρίστη μὲν αἰτία πασῶν, ἔχουσα δὲ πλείστους μάρτυρας, οὕτω πως λέγεται (*Per.* 31.2).

The recapitulations of Plutarch and Diodorus would place the attacks virtually on the eve of the war (*Plut. Per.* 31.2–32.6; *DS* 12.39.1–3). The influence of comic "exegesis" of contemporary politics is strong;⁸⁹ Plutarch cites

85. See *Colonization* 84–93, 113–20, 126–28.

86. See D. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca 1969) 319, 327.

87. Wade-Gery *Essays* 258–60; see D. Kienast, "Der Innenpolitische Kampf in Athen von der Rückkehr des Thukydides bis zu Perikles' Tod," *Gymnasium* 60 (1953) 210–29. Cf. Frost *Historia* (1964) 392–99. Cf., in general, R. Klein, "Die innenpolitische Gegnerschaft gegen Perikles," in G. Wirth (ed.), *Perikles und seine Zeit* (Darmstadt 1979) 494–533.

88. Here a dramatic situation has been transferred to reality (*Per.* 32.1; cf. ΣArist. *Eq.* 969a MJ/W; *Suda* s.v. Ἀσπασία, α 4202 Adler; Harpocration s.v. Ἀσπασία). Aspasia's relationship with Perikles was both controversial and disquieting so that her supposed legal troubles were treated by Aeschines the Socratic (fr. 11 K = 25 D) and Antisthenes (fr. 35 = Athen. 13.589D). Those works were another source of distortion.

89. Megareis, who may have been the authors of Megarian local histories, also exploited

Acharnians 524–57 (*Per.* 30.4). Diodorus seems to be following Ephorus (*FGH* 70 F 196), but the role of Alkibiades as an evil genius prompting Perikles to engineer the war is a “red flag”, declaring the anecdote *ex post facto*. Plutarch knew the same story, even though he refrains from telling it here (*Alcib.* 7.3; *Mor.* 186E). Aristodemos provides almost a *florilegium* of motifs: Pheidias’ problems, the Megarian Decree, citations of *Pax* 603–11 and *Ach.* 524–34, and incitement from Alkibiades (*FGH* 104 F 16.1–4). Ephorus is again the source, as Diodorus also cites *Pax* 603–11 (note also Val. Max. 3.1 ext.1).⁹⁰

Clearly, there was some historical basis for these accounts, but no solution ought to command credence unless it fulfills certain conditions. Nothing about the attacks on Perikles’ friends should prompt a rejection of the Thucydidean causation for the war, in which the initiative basically rested with the Peloponnesians with Perikles’ decisions being reactive. Thucydides presents him as firmly in charge before the war, not challenged or weakened as these traditions would have him (*Thuc.* 2.65.9–10). Hence, a part of the confusion about outcomes of pre-war attacks stems from their inconsequentiality for Perikles’ standing. Insignificant legal action and propagandistic and literary sallies were easily mistaken for each other; central charges were mixed with concomitant abuse; and the same accusations were repeated by different persons. Since the primary direct foci of the charges, Pheidias and Anaxagoras, completed their lives outside Attica, the complication of proceedings *in absentia* cannot be avoided.

The balance of the evidence suggests that Pheidias and Anaxagoras left Athens in the early 430s, although the extent to which official proceedings were involved is most uncertain.⁹¹ In the case of Pheidias, he probably left Athens for Olympia c. 438, as Philochorus seems to state (F 121 = *ΣPax* 605 H; cf. Euseb. *Chron. Arm.* 193 Karst; Hier. *Chron.* 113 Helm). A death, possibly at Perikles’ connivance in Plutarch’s version (*Per.* 32.2–5), appears an abbreviation of a longer story in which a death in Elis (cf. Philochorus F 121) might have been attached to charges in Attica (see also DS 12.39.1–2; *Suda s.v.* Φειδίας,

Aristophanes to excuse their fellow citizens’ part in the instigation of war (Plut. *Per.* 30.3 = *FGH* 487 F 13). See *Theognis* 117–18.

90. While Philochorus knew of the legal troubles of Pheidias, it is uncertain to what extent Attidography used such explanations of the background to the Peloponnesian War (*FGH* 328 F 121), because the scholion citing him shows great scepticism over the timing of the charge against Pheidias (*ΣPax* 605a.α).

91. G. Donnay, “La Date du procès de Phidias,” *AC* 37 (1968) 19–36; cf. Jacoby *FGH* 3b (Suppl.) 1.484–96, 2.391–401; Frost *Historia* (1964) 392–98; W. Ameling, “Zu einem neuen Datum des Phidias Prozesses,” *Klio* 68 (1986) 63–66; J. Mansfeld, “The Chronology of Anaxagoras’ Athenian Period and the Date of His Trial,” *Mnemosyne* 32 (1979) 39–69; 33 (1980) 17–95, esp. 25–32, 40–47. For the late 430s: L. Pareti, “Il processo di Fidia ed un papiro di Ginevra,” *RömMitt* 24 (1909) 271–316; E. Derenne, *Les procès d’impiété* (Liege & Paris 1930) 30–38; Kienast *Gymnasium* (1953) 211–15; O. Lendle, “Philochoros über den Prozess des Phidias,” *Hermes* 83 (1955) 284–303; L. Prandi, “I processi contro Fidia Aspasia Anassagora e l’opposizione a Pericle,” *Aevum* 51 (1977) 10–26.

φ 246 Adler). One might emend Philochorus or reformulate the scholion radically to allow a trial in the late 430s, but, without outside (archaeological) data urging that device, nothing recommends such a strategy (surely not saving the credibility of [e.g.] Ephorus). As for Anaxagoras, the chronographic material can (with some difficulty) be made to support a date for his departure in the early 430s (as Mansfeld has tried; cf. Plut. *Per.* 32.2, 5; DS 12.39.2; see immediately below).

Nonetheless, whatever may have happened in the early 430s, it did not end the exploitation of the behavior of Perikles' entourage by his opponents. Plutarch connects suspicions about Anaxagoras with a psephism of Diopeithes that intended to suppress atheism and meteorological speculation.⁹² As Diopeithes was an oracle-monger active during the Peloponnesian War (ΣArist. *Eq.* 1085a, c MJ/W; *Aves* 988b H) who eventually intervened in the succession to the Spartan throne in 400–399 (Xen. *HG* 3.3.3; Plut. *Ages.* 3.3–4; *Lys.* 22.5), the latest feasible date for his psephism should be adopted. According to Plutarch, the next move was that of Drakontides, who tried to set up a special court to judge Perikles, raising the issue of his accounts (an *eisangelīē*?). The transition, however, from Diopeithes' psephism to Drakontides is not elucidated so that it is unclear whether the two psephisms belong together, and, if so, whether they are in the correct order. Drakontides was a *stratēgos* in 433/2, serving at Corcyra (*IG* I³ 364.20–21 = Meiggs-Lewis 61), whose name should appear in emendation in Thuc. 1.51.4 (cf. [Plut.] *Mor.* 834C).⁹³ The involvement of Drakontides, who probably needed the confidence of Perikles to be assigned command at Corcyra, is troubling in the late 430s, before the war.⁹⁴

The further turns of the situation are also disquieting in our sole authority, Plutarch's account (*Per.* 32.3–4).⁹⁵ Drakontides proposed a special provision that, after the *prutaneis* had received Perikles' accounts, the *dikastai* would vote, using ballots taken from the altar on the Acropolis (cf. Dem. 18.134). Drakontides hoped to exploit religious scruples to encourage a presumption in favor of conviction. Maneuvering followed in which Hagnon substituted a court of 1500, and either theft and bribery or *adikion* 'malversation' (probably a lesser charge) as charges. The procedure was thereby desacralized, and this larger court improved the chances of acquittal. If these were not annual *euthunai*—for the *logistai* would then receive the accounts, not the *prytanies*—Hagnon had replaced a "fishing expedition" among old accounts (which might not have still been available) with a procedure where accusers

92. *Per.* 32.2–3: *περὶ δὲ τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον . . .* (unsuccessful prosecution of Aspasia) καὶ ψήφισμα Διοπείθης ἔγραψεν εἰσαγγέλλεσθαι τοὺς τὰ θεῖα μὴ νομίζοντας ἢ λόγους περὶ τῶν μεταρσίων διδάσκοντας, ἀπεριδόμενος εἰς Περικλέα δι' Ἀναξαγόρου τὴν ὑπόνοιαν. Note the chronologically vague transition.

93. Drakontides was on the verge of his own conviction in 422 (*Vespae* 156–61, 438–40). He could be the Drakontides of *IG* I³ 40.2, the Chalcis Decree, of c. 446/5, but not the oligarch Drakontides of Aphidna, a member of the Thirty (*Lys.* 12.73; Xen. *HG* 2.3.2; *Ath. Pol.* 34.3).

94. Cf. Mansfeld *Mnemosyne* (1980) 48–49.

95. See, in general, H. Swoboda, "Ueber den Process des Perikles," *Hermes* 28 (1893) 536–98.

had the onus of proving their charges on the evidence they adduced. Hagnon was acting here as an associate of Perikles and a leading democratic politician (cf. Xen. *HG* 2.3.30).⁹⁶

Nevertheless, that Drakontides' psephism could ever have been passed is baffling in light of the status of Perikles before the great plague (powerful enough to curtail meetings of the assembly: Thuc. 2.22.1). In Plutarch, the trial of Perikles seems to have been preempted by the war, but why or even how that could be true is hard to envision. If Drakontides (and Diopeithes) introduced legislation bringing Perikles to trial, it is most sensible to see this trial as being the only one that is attested by the rest of the evidence, the trial leading to a conviction in 430 (Thuc. 2.65.2–4; DS 12.45.4).⁹⁷ With the immense psychological dislocation created by the plague, occurring after the destruction of the first invasion, Perikles' grip on affairs had weakened so that the *dēmos*, presumably after removing Perikles from office by *apokheirotonia*, fined him. Plato states in the *Gorgias* that Perikles was convicted (*n.b.* his first conviction) of *klopē*, which agrees neatly with one of charges mandated in Hagnon's amendment (515E–516A). The plague stimulated ill-focused religious fears in which the exploitation of oracles has its place (Thuc. 2.54.2–5), so that the passage of Diopeithes' psephism would also make sense in this context.⁹⁸ Plutarch (*Per.* 35.4–5) gives us a list of variant prosecutors of Perikles culled from different sources, most prominently Kleon (Idomeneus *FGH* 338 F9), Simmias (Theophrastus fr. 616 F; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 805C), and Lakratidas (Heraclides Ponticus fr. 47 Wehrli). Lakratidas could be a Eumolpid; hence an aristocrat, a suitable accomplice to Diopeithes, and an expert on *asebeia*.⁹⁹ A challenge to Perikles from Kleon is verified from a fragment of Hermippos (fr. 46 K = Plut. *Per.* 33.8). It is noteworthy that, in contrast to opposition to Perikles in the 430s, Perikles was attacked in the crisis of 430 from both the "right" and the "left" at the same time, reflected in abuse in comedy.¹⁰⁰ Accepting that Ephorus¹⁰¹ placed the legal moves against Perikles and his friends before the war in order to provide a motivation for his incitement of the conflict

96. On the relationship of Hagnon and Perikles, note G.E. Pesely, "Hagnon," *Athenaeum* 67 (1989) 191–209, esp. 198–203.

97. See K.J. Beloch, *Die attische Politik seit Perikles* (Leipzig 1884) 330–35; Swoboda *Hermes* (1893); F.E. Adcock *CAH* 5.477–80; Gomme *HCT* 2.187. Cf. Kienast *Gymnasium* (1958) 216–17, 222–23; F.J. Frost, "Pericles and Dracontides," *JHS* 84 (1964) 69–72.

98. If Diopeithes is the same man who proposed the Methone Decree of 430–29 (*IG* I³ 61.3), he could be seen as initiating another important psephism almost simultaneously. The argument of W.R. Connor, "Two Notes on Diopeithes the Seer," *CP* 59 (1964) 115–19, that he was not an oligarch—a contention I hold doubtful—does not affect my hypothesis, as Perikles was also under attack from his "left" flank after the beginning of the war.

99. Kienast *Gymnasium* (1953) 225, cites Is. 7.9; cf. Philochorus *FGH* 328 F 202.

100. It is tempting to put Hermippos' supposed prosecution of Aspasia (Plut. *Per.* 32.1; which we have seen as a comic situation) in this same context. Note also Cratinus *Ploutoi* (*CGFP* #73 Austin), perhaps dated to 430–29, containing an allusion to Perikles (22–28: the tyranny of Zeus) and an attack on Hagnon (68–72). See *HCT* 2.188–89.

101. And quite possibly others: Plut. *Per.* 31.2: ... ἔχουσα δὲ πλείστους μάρτυρας ...

(as “demonstrated” by comedy), we find that an involvement by Thoukydides Melesiou can also be incorporated in this same interpretative nexus.

In his treatment of the attacks on Anaxagoras and Perikles, Ephorus deploys wrestling terminology characteristic of Thoukydidean politics (DS 12.39.2: *συνέπλεκον δ' ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ διαβολαῖς τὸν Περικλέα*), and a hint of similar symbolism, hostile to Perikles, has also been suggested for Sophocles.¹⁰² Thoukydides' major gambit will have been his prosecution of Anaxagoras for *asebeia* and Medism (Satyrus fr. 14, *FHG* 3.163 = DL 2.12). Clearly, such an accusation could not belong to the initial attacks on the philosopher in the early 430s; ostracized Thoukydides was outside Attica. That conclusion is confirmed by the charge of Medism, then bizarre, even for an indirect attack on Perikles. Yet in 430, fears of Spartan cooperation with Persia caused a sensitivity that such a charge might well exploit (Thuc. 1.82.1, 2.7.1; DS 12.41.1). Moreover, Anaxagoras is known to have withdrawn from Athens to Lampsakos where he died in 428/7 (DL 2.13–15; *Suda* s.v. Ἀναξαγόρας, a 1981 Adler). Anaxagoras had an earlier connection with Themistokles, who had ruled that city by grant of the Great King, so that his choice of domicile was not above suspicion (Stesimbrotus *FGH* 107 F 1 = Plut. *Them.* 2.5).¹⁰³

Although the relationship between Perikles and Anaxagoras was old news in 430, the plague created religious anxiety in Attica. What was perceived to be the reaction of Perikles is demonstrated by an anecdote reported by Plutarch: Perikles had attempted to quell the consternation caused by an eclipse at the outset of the expedition to Epidauros (just before his trial) with a naturalistic explanation, very much in the spirit of Anaxagoras (*Per.* 35.1–3; cf. Thuc. 2.56.1–57; DS 12.45.3).¹⁰⁴ Satyros, as cited by Diogenes, makes excellent sense if understood to describe a trial *in absentia*, while Anaxagoras was living in Lampsakos.¹⁰⁵ The conviction and the death of Anaxagoras' sons was announced to him simultaneously (DL 2.13). That Demetrius of Phaleron reported their burial by Anaxagoras may indicate that he too believed Anaxagoras outside Attica at the time of a final trial (*FGH* 228 F 38). The honors shown Anaxagoras by the leading Lampsakene politicians after his death from natural causes shows the revival of the influence of his Athenian friends after

102. G.H. MacCurdy, “References to Thucydides, Son of Melesias, and to Pericles in Sophocles *OT* 863–910,” *CP* 37 (1942) 307–10, where the treatment of *hubris* (863–910) and the praise of wrestling on behalf of the *polis* alludes to Thoukydides' revived struggle with Perikles (*OT* 879–882: τὸ καλῶς δ' ἔχον πόλει πάλαισμα μήποτε λῦσαι θεὸν αἰτοῦμαι· θεὸν οὐ λήξω ποτὲ προστάταν ἰσχων. This would entail, however, that the *Oedipus* was performed c. 429/8.

103. Cf. L. Woodbury, “Anaxagoras and Athens,” *Phoenix* 35 (1981) 295–315, esp. 310–15.

104. The eclipse actually occurred on August 3, 431, being reported by Thuc. 2.28, perhaps at the time of the expulsion of the Aiginetans (2.27.1). After the plague, Perikles' reaction, which, if it were historical, would be non-inflammatory in its context, was redated for polemical purposes. See also Cic. *Rep.* 1.16.25, who specifically notes Anaxagoras.

105. DL 2.12: Σάτυρος δ' ἐν τοῖς βίοις ὑπὸ Θουκυδίδου φησὶν εἰσαχθῆναι τὴν δίκην, ἀντιπολιτευομένων τῷ Περικλεῖ· καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀσεβείας ἀλλὰ καὶ μηδισμοῦ· καὶ ἀπόντα καταδικασθῆναι θανάτῳ. Cf. Joseph. *Contra Ap.* 2.265.

the restoration of Perikles (DL 2.14; Alcidamas *apud* Aris. *Rhet.* 1398b15–17; Plut. *Mor.* 820D; Cic. *TD* 1.104).

Thoukydides, the old adversary of Perikles, had found an opportunity in the turmoil of 430 to settle scores with him. Drakontides (perhaps with Diopeithes) carried the heavier task of dealing directly with Perikles himself; his *animus* probably betrays the disenchantment of the “right” wing of Perikles’ previous following. If Sophokles with his similar ideological coloration truly commended Thoukydides’ activism against Perikles (n. 102), former Pericleans were seeking an opening toward a wider conservative or aristocratic grouping. Collaboration against Anaxagoras seems to have come from Kleon, whom we have seen attacking Perikles at this same juncture, while he and others to the “left” of Perikles are never attested to have attacked him before the war.¹⁰⁶ Although an earlier procedure may well have been confused with an accusation in 430, Kleon is unlikely *prima facie* to have replaced Thoukydides in transmission.¹⁰⁷ Thus, a marriage of convenience had taken place between two ideological odd fellows with a common immediate goal, undermining Perikles. Rather than a grand conspiracy of oligarchs masterminded by Thoukydides, we find an opportunistic rush of all those disaffected from the leadership of Perikles.¹⁰⁸

THE FALL OF THOUKYDIDES

After a short period of eclipse, Perikles recovered his political primacy, holding it until his death in autumn 429 (Thuc. 2.65.4–6).¹⁰⁹ If the order in Thucydides is right, the Athenians were unable to get satisfactory peace terms from Sparta, even before the removal of Perikles (2.59.2, 65.2; cf. DS 12.45.5), and his later discrediting did not help. The Athenian ambassadors may have offered concessions drawn from earlier Spartan ultimata. The Spartans, however, had no version of dual hegemonism on offer, but perhaps sought to exercise a superior authority, on the basis of their hegemony in the Hellenic League, over relations between Athens and its allies. In the face of the inevitability of continuing the war, any activism of Thoukydides against Perikles and in favor of concessions to Sparta must now have appeared misguided, if not malevolent. It may well have seemed that harassment of Perikles’ entourage had raised unrealistic expectations at Sparta about the extent of likely Athenian concessions, if Perikles were removed.¹¹⁰ Presumably at this time, the anecdote blaming

106. Sotion reports him as prosecuting on a charge of impiety alone, with a defense by Perikles and the punishment a 5 T fine and exile (fr. 3 Wehrli = DL 2.12).

107. Cf. Frost *Historia* (1964) 393.

108. Cf. Kienast *Gymnasium* (1953) 215–16.

109. Note also Plut. *Per.* 37.1–2; DS 12.45.5.

110. Thoukydides’ friendly contact with the Spartans is attested from his meeting with Arkhidamos during his ostracism (see pp. 187–88 above). The targeting of Perikles by the Spartans and specifically by Arkhidamos did not in the end benefit their Athenian friends (cf. Plut. *Per.* 33.2), once the Athenians could not get acceptable terms even after their removal of Perikles (cf. Thuc. 1.126.1, 127.1–3; 2.13.1).

Thoukydides' usury for Aiginetan agitation at Sparta gained currency (as an antidote to anti-Periclean scenarios for the outbreak of the war).

Two passages in Aristophanes allude to the proceedings in which Thoukydides suffered his final humiliation (*Ach.* 703–18; *Vespae* 946–48; cf. *ΣVesp.* 947c = *FGH* 328 F 120 for the identification of Thoukydides Melesiou).¹¹¹ The trial was an event of the recent past in 425, when the *Acharnians* was performed, and apparently still memorable in 422 at the time that the *Wasps* appeared (notice ποτέ). Thoukydides could make no defense, a noteworthy circumstance in light of his previous reputation for eloquence. Inasmuch as the policy toward Sparta and Aigina advocated by Thoukydides had been a complete failure, vigorous defence by a man 75–80 was hardly to be expected.¹¹² The prosecutors, Kephisodemos and Euathles (cf. *Arist. Vesp.* 590–93; fr. 411 K; *ΣAch.* 710b–c W), are described as *sunēgoroi*, i.e., state-appointed prosecutors of those accused of treason (the likely instance in this case) or those individuals committing illegalities as public officials (cf. *Arist. Vesp.* 686–95).¹¹³ Aristophanes makes considerable play over the claim that Kephisodemos' father was a Skythian archer and policeman. If the role of the *sunēgoroi* were not sufficient hint that Perikles was settling scores, Aristophanes also notes the involvement of Alkibiades. As Perikles reassumed the reins of power chiefly at his urging, Alkibiades was probably acting as his guardian's agent here (*Per.* 37.1).¹¹⁴

Acharnians 717–18 suggests that Thoukydides' punishment was exile, later a flight to Persian territory, if Idomeneus can be trusted.¹¹⁵ This parallel to Themistokles is troubling, and some would emend Θεμιστοκλέους.¹¹⁶

111. *Ach.* 703–18: τῷ γὰρ εἰκὸς ἄνδρα κυφόν, ἡλίκον Θουκυδίδην, | ἐξολέσθαι συμπλακέντα τῇ Σκυθῶν ἐρμηίᾳ, | τῷδε τῷ Κηφισοδήμῳ, τῷ λάλῳ ξυνηγόρῳ; | ὥστ' ἐγὼ μὲν ἠλέησα κάπεμορξάμην ἰδὼν | ἄνδρα πρεσβύτην ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς τοξότου κυκώμενον | ὅς μὰ τὴν Διήμητρ', ἐκείνος ἦν ἰκ' ἢν Θουκυδίδης, | οὐδ' ἂν αὐτὴν τὴν Ἀχαιὴν ῥάδιως ἠνέσχετο, | ἀλλὰ κατεπάλαισε μὲν γ' ἂν πρῶτον Εὐάθλους δέκα, | κατεβόησε δ' ἂν κεκραγὼς τοξότας τρισχιλίους, | περιετόξευσεν δ' ἂν αὐτοῦ τοῦ πατρὸς τοὺς ξυγγενεῖς. | ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ τοὺς γέροντας οὐκ ἔαθ' ὕπνου τυχεῖν, | ψηφίσασθε χωρὶς εἶναι τὰς γραφάς, ὅπως ἂν ἢ | τῷ γέροντι μὲν γέρων καὶ νωδὸς ὁ ξυνηγόρος, | τοῖς νέοις δ' εὐρύπρωκτος καὶ λάλος χῶ Κλεινίου. | κάζελαύνειν χρὴ τὸ λοιπόν—κὰν φύγη τις ζημοῦν— | τὸν γέροντα τῷ γέροντι, τὸν νέον δὲ τῷ νέῳ. *Vespae* 946–48: οὐκ, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνό μοι δοκεῖ πεπονθέναι, | ὅπερ ποτὲ φεύγων ἔπαθε καὶ Θουκυδίδης· | ἀπόπληκτος ἐξαίφνης ἐγένετο τὰς γνάθους.

112. C.A. Faraone, "An Accusation of Magic in Classical Athens (*Ar. Wasps* 946–48)," *TAPA* 119 (1989) 149–60, suggests that the "stage fright" described in the *Wasps* is consistent with the effect of a magical procedure. Note that the more naturalistic explanation, frailty owed to age, serves the context equally well in the *Acharnians*. See *Colonization* 88–93.

113. Cf. M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1986) 231–32, for the latter.

114. See Kienast *Gymnasium* (1953) 219–21.

115. *FGH* 338 F 1 = *ΣArist. Vespae* 947a K: ὅτι δὲ ὁ Ἀθηναίων δῆμος ἀειφυγίαν αὐτοῦ καταγνοὺς ἐδήμευσεν τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ πρὸς Ἀρταξερξῇν ἦκε φεύγων, σαφὲς ποιεῖ Ἰδομενεὺς διὰ τοῦ β' τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον· οἱ μὲντοι Ἀθηναῖοι αὐτοῦ καὶ γένους ἀειφυγίαν κατέγνωσαν, προδιδόντος τὴν Ἑλλάδα, καὶ αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία ἐδημεύθη.

116. See Kirchner *PA* #7268, 2.472. Yet, the work of Idomeneus, *Peri dēmagōgōn* (cf. F 2), would scarcely have dealt with Themistokles in its second book.

Timaeus refers to a Thoukydides who died in Italy (*FGH* 566 F 135, 136), the connection of which to Thucydides Olorou is contested by Marcellinus (*Vit. Thuc.* 25, 33).¹¹⁷

Conviction for Medism (if Idomeneus provides a genuine tradition), although unsubstantiated otherwise, is not inconceivable. Aristocratic dissidents in the *arkhē* often dealt with the satraps, and Sparta sent emissaries to the Persian court at the beginning of the war, so that guilt by association might be at work. The charge of Medism would have had the additional advantage of making it more difficult for the Spartans to harbor Thoukydides after conviction.

CONCLUSION

The fourth-century conservatives and thereafter the *Atthides*, reacting to the disastrous collapse of Athenian power in the Peloponnesian War which they associated with trends inaugurated by Perikles, were responsible for rehabilitating the reputation of Thoukydides Melesiou, whom they recognized as the great adversary of that statesman. Hence, the notices on Thoukydides' career are full of vague appreciations of the moral superiority of his statesmanship. Our record contains little to support such an evaluation. Even if Thoukydides had succeeded in insuring that the Parthenon was not built (or, more likely, was built a little more slowly [*n.b.* the Kimonian foundations laid on the Acropolis]), what would he and his faction have offered to replace the Periclean vision of imperial Athens, itself grounded in the politicization of the *dēmos* and the depoliticization of the subject allies?

Thoukydidean advocacy for the elites of subject cities appears too personal and idiosyncratic to have meshed with the emerging style of leadership at home, where a thoroughgoing democratization made influence on behalf of clients discontinuous, tentative, and provisory. In the specific case of Aigina, personal patronage on behalf of an allied community had promoted a counterfeit sense of freedom to maneuver, expressed in the misguided combination of tactics in the late 430s: pressure from Sparta and cajolery from Athenian advocates. The results had been calamitous for all.

The effect of the fall of Thoukydides may have made elite advocacy for allies in the Thoukydidean manner disappear from the *ekklēsia*. Such advocacy retreated to the dicasteries, and then finally went behind the scenes of adjudication. Did Antiphon now become the archetype of the "right-wing", internal resister to Athenian imperialism. Careful not to expose himself by office-holding or by proposing his own program, Antiphon used his support of those in litigation to intervene both on behalf of kindred ideological spirits and in support of allied aristocrats (cf. *Thuc.* 8.68.1; Antiphon fr. IX.25–33, XV.49–56). Rather like a fifth-century "survivalist", the implementation of his own program depended on a catastrophe for Athens, which was duly provided by the Syracusan disaster. Had the misadventures of the "loyal" opposition under Thoukydides and his faction caused the evolution of a disloyal opposition?

117. See Wade-Gery *Essays* 262.

Draco and Attic Tradition

A CURIOUS ANECDOTE describes the death of the seventh-century Athenian statesman Draco on the island of Aigina.¹ The story has not received much attention: its oddity and apparent triviality seem to condemn it as a source for archaic political history. It is, however, informative about fifth-century Athenian and Aiginetan attitudes both toward each other and toward their troubled past relations.² At Athens or on Aigina, what one chose to believe about the biography of Draco could expose one's stance toward Athens' foreign and domestic policies. Moreover, even a tendentious account of archaic history (such as this one) must strive to satisfy an audience immersed in historical traditions, whose knowledge demands our respect for an awareness about the general contours of the archaic intercommunal landscape. For us, accordingly, a recovery of the context for fabricating pseudo-history can sometimes share the value of a discovery or a validation of genuine recollections. While there was undoubtedly some true recollection on Draco, the material on the statesman bears the strong impression of historical reconstruction, which was pervaded by both partisan and moralizing influences.³

The *Suda* reports the anecdote under the rubric Δράκων, Ἀθηναῖος νομοθέτης (δ 1495 Adler), which recounts a journey of Draco to Aigina in order to legislate that ended in his suffocation at the hands of over-ardent Aiginetan admirers. This notice contains the only strictly biographical data on Draco, and stands as a substantial item in the thin dossier on his career. His abortive legislation and death on Aigina dominate the notice in the *Suda* and are more prominently featured than Draco's accomplished legislation at Athens. Before we can assess his misadventure on Aigina, however, it will be necessary to embark on a survey of Athenian traditions about Draco.

THE PLACE OF DRACO IN ATHENIAN POLITICAL TRADITION

Draco cuts a rather poor figure among the attestations, when his testimonia are compared with the wealth of material on Solon. Most references are

1. It gives me great pleasure to dedicate this study to Martin Ostwald, whose maieutic art guided this author's gestation as a student of the Athenian constitution and whose many acts of generous support sustained my work on Aigina.

2. Compare the tendentious material preserved by Herodotus (pp. 35–36, 40–51 above).

3. Beloch's doubts about the historicity of Draco are valid in part (*GG*² 1.2.258–62), but there is no reason to doubt his existence (vouchsafed by a note on a version of the archon list?). Cf. F.E. Adcock, "I. Literary Tradition and Early Greek Code-Makers," *Cambridge Historical Journal* 2 (1927) 95–109, esp. 96–97.

incidental and conventional, and fall into two categories.⁴ First, it was possible to invoke Draco to symbolize early Athenian institutional traditions, just as the whole law code could be characterized as the "laws of Solon". This class of attestations might be termed the "Draco and Solon" category. Our earliest citation is Cratinus' linking of the two men as a source for Athenian law (fr. 274 K; cf. Plut. *Solon* 25.2): *πρὸς τοῦ Σόλωνος καὶ Δράκοντος οἷσι νῦν φρύνουσιν ἤδη τὰς κάχρυσ τοῖς κύρβεσιν*. Andocides gives a similar formulation in describing the recodification of the laws after the democratic restoration: *τέως δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς Σόλωνος νόμοις καὶ τοῖς Δράκοντος θεσμοῖς* (1.81); cf. 82: *τῶν νόμων τῶν τε Σόλωνος καὶ τῶν Δράκοντος*. Such formulations mirror topical constitutional language, as shown by Andocides' citation of the psephism of Teisamenos directing codification: . . . *πολιτεύεσθαι Ἀθηναίους κατὰ τὰ πάτρια, νόμοις δὲ χρῆσθαι τοῖς Σόλωνος . . . χρῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῖς Δράκοντος θεσμοῖς, οἷσπερ ἐχρώμεθα ἐν τῷ πρόσθεν χρόνῳ* (1.83).

Crediting Draco alongside Solon for his legislation becomes conventional hereafter. Aeschines, speaking of their concern for *sōphrosunē*, notes that the statesmen prescribed rules for the upbringing of children and adolescents (*Tim.* [1] 6).⁵ Commending the utility of Draco's legislation for orienting slaves toward law-abiding behavior, Xenophon provides a similar pairing (*Oec.* 14.4). More general reflections are not lacking. Demosthenes praises the two men for the legal heritage of the Athenians (24.211). Later Lucian echoes this type of allusion when he calls Draco and Solon the best of legislators and attributes to them the principles of equity found in Attic courts (*Calumn.* 8). Rhetorical passages of late antiquity are replete with such pairings.⁶ Such passages acted eventually to establish Draco in later catalogues of early lawgivers, after Aristotle's somewhat minimizing inclusion of him in the *Politics*.⁷ In Josephus' treatment of Greek lawgiving, Draco as the earliest codifier of written law illustrates the Greek backwardness in legislation.⁸

As the references from Xenophon and Aeschines indicate, citations in this tradition sometimes provide specifics. Lysias assigns to Draco the law on idleness (with the death penalty!; fr. 10 T with *Or. C*; cf. DL 1.55).⁹ While others

4. Much material is collected in A.C. Schlesinger, "Draco in the Hearts of His Countrymen," *CP* 19 (1924) 370–73. The "Constitution of Draco" of *Ath. Pol.* 4 is reserved for separate discussion below.

5. Harpocration bases his judgment of eminence on Aeschines (*ἐπιφανέστατος νομοθέτης: σ.υ. Δράκων*).

6. [Lucian] *Dem. Enc.* 45; Himer. *Decl.* 1 (cf. Phot. *Biblio.* 243.353b); Themist. *Or.* 2.31b (with Kleisthenes); Liban. *Decl.* 1.1.81 (mentioning Kleisthenes also), 145; 17.1.29; 19.1.33; 21.1.13.

7. Clem. *Stromat.* 1.16.80 (with Zaleukos, Lykourgos, and Solon); Dio Chrys. *Or.* 63.3 (Solon, Numa, Zaleukos); Euseb. *PE* 10.11.30 (Minos, Lykourgos, Solon, Thales); Euseb. *DE*, Prooem. 13 (Draco, Solon); Galen *De meth. med.* 10.106 (Solon, Lykourgos); Methodius *apud* Phot. *Biblio.* 237.311b (Minos, Rhadamanthys, Lykourgos, Solon, Zaleukos); Themist. *Or.* 23.287c. Latin examples include Cic. *De orat.* 1.197, *De rep.* 2.2; Auson. *Com. Prof.* 22.10–11.

8. Joseph. *Contra Apion.* 1.21, which dates his homicide laws, the oldest surviving Athenian documents, shortly before Peisistratos (cf. Euseb. *PE* 10.7.15).

9. A. Dreizehnter, "NOMOS APΓΙΑΣ. Ein Gesetz gegen Müßiggang?," *Acta Antiqua* 26 (1978) 371–86, esp. 382–83, reviews the evidence, rejecting Draco as initiator.

shared this attribution (Poll. 8.42; Plut. *Solon* 17.1–2), significantly, the origin of the law was controversial—both Solon and Peisistratos were also given credit.¹⁰ A similar uncertainty existed over whether Solon or Draco mandated oaths to the three gods Zeus, Poseidon, and Athena (*ΣΙΙ*. 15.36–37 Erbse; Eustath. *Il.* 3.697; cf. Poll. 8.142; Hesych. *s.v.* *τρεῖς θεοί*). Only one penalty other than death is linked to Dracontian legislation: Pollux mentions a twenty-ox fine (9.61). Characteristic of this style of allusion, however, is his introduction of money with an ox type, which stimulates a disquieting observation: Draco has been connected with anachronistic pre-Solonian coinage (see pp. 64–65 above). Even concerning homicide, a topic which Attic tradition generally reserved for the initiative of Draco, there are quite a few attributions of details to Solon (Photius *s.v.* *ἀνδραφόνων*; *s.v.* *ποινᾶν καὶ ἀποινᾶν*; *Anec. Bekk.* 1.428; *ΣΙΙ*. 2.665b Erbse; Eustath. *Il.* 1.492).¹¹ Aside from citations from statutes specifically attributed to Draco (such as those in the orators), passing references to his legislation on homicide betray a spirit similar to the style of allusion to other laws just noted (e.g., Dem. 20.158; Joseph. *Contra Apion.* 1.21; Euseb. *PE* 10.7.17; *ΣAesch.* 1.6; Xenarchus fr. 4.21–23 K). In summation, Draco's place at the beginning of the Athenian legislative tradition is unquestioned (*Ath. Pol.* 41.2), but, when we confront details, a rival Solonian attribution often turns up. Even the explicit statement of Draco's priority may reflect a traditional inhibition against whole-hearted attribution of institutions to Draco: *μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἡ* (= *τάξις* or *πολιτεία*) *ἐπὶ Δράκοντος, ἐν ᾗ καὶ νόμους ἀνέγραψαν πρῶτον* (*Ath. Pol.* 41.2). Note the plural *ἀνέγραψαν* with its unspecified subject.

Whether we consider these more specific comments or the general appreciations of Cratinus, Xenophon, and others, there is little hint that the legal heritage of Draco had been forgotten or largely superseded (see also Maximus Tyrius 3.5c).¹² Instead Porphyry offers what may be considered virtually a prooimion to the Dracontian laws establishing basic Attic religious institutions: *ἐπεὶ καὶ Δράκοντος νόμος μνημονεύεται τοιοῦτος, θεσμός αἰώνιος τοῖς Ἀτθίδα νεμομένοις, [κύριος τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον,] θεοὺς τιμᾶν καὶ ἥρωας ἐγχαρίους ἐν κοινῷ ἐπομένοις νόμοις πατρίοις, ἰδίᾳ κατὰ δύναμιν, σὺν εὐφημίᾳ καὶ ἀπαρχαῖς καρπῶν πελάνους ἐπετείου* (*De abstin.* 4.22).¹³

A confusion of attribution between Solon and Draco has already been noted regarding several laws. In the second category of attestations, thematically quite different, a choice between Solon and Draco occupies the center of

10. Herodotus has the law as a Solonian imitation of Egyptian practice (2.177.2). Plutarch, citing Theophrastus (fr. 99 W), corrects the record: Peisistratos, not Solon, established it. Lysias' observation that Solon mitigated the harshness of Draco's death penalty may indicate an early effort at reconciling traditions.

11. Note R. Sealey, *A History of the Greek City States: 700–338 B.C.* (Los Angeles & Berkeley 1976) 133.

12. Eustath. *Il.* 4.91 cites the two legislators for the rare word *ἰδῆτοι* = *μάρτυρες*, possibly from a part of the homicide laws not cited elsewhere, but more probably from another law, the credit for which was again an issue.

13. Note Adcock *Cambridge Historical Journal* (1927) 106–7.

attention. Except for homicide legislation, Draco's laws were extinct, so that he can be introduced to emphasize Solon's role as a reformer (Plut. *Solon* 17.1): *πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοὺς Δράκοντος νόμους ἀνείλε πλὴν τῶν φονικῶν ἅπαντας διὰ τὴν χαλεπότητα καὶ τὸ μέγεθος τῶν ἐπιτιμίων*. The *Athenaion Politeia* has nearly the same phrasing (7.1): *πολιτείαν δὲ κατέστησε καὶ νόμους ἔθηκεν ἄλλους, τοῖς δὲ Δράκοντος θεσμοῖς ἐπαύσαντο χρώμενοι πλὴν τῶν φονικῶν* (see also Ael. *VH* 8.10; Euseb. *Chron. Arm.* p. 187 Karst). The agreement of these sources shows that the supersession of Dracontian law-making was a standard, received view, which the authors found in Attidography. This class of testimonia then comprise the "not Draco, but Solon" category.

The extinction of Draco's laws was in large part owed to their harshness (a theme persisting even today in the adjective Draconian). Among the witticisms of the late fifth-century sophist Herodicus of Selymbria was an attribution of Draco's laws to a snake rather than a man (Aris. *Rhet.* 1400b20–23): *... Δράκοντα τὸν νομοθέτην, ὅτι οὐκ [ἂν] ἀνθρώπου οἱ νόμοι ἀλλὰ δράκοντος (χαλεποὶ γάρ)*.¹⁴ A similar note is struck by a fragment of Demades, suggesting that Draco wrote laws in blood rather than ink (fr. 23 De Falco): *ἔοικεν, ἄνδρες δικασταί, Δράκων ὁ νομογράφος οὐ μέλανι, δι' αἵματος τοὺς νόμους δὲ χαράξαι* (cf. J. Tzetzes *Chil.* 5.345–49). This same quality of severity is noted in Aristotle's dismissal of Draco in the *Politics*: there is nothing *ἴδιον* in his laws except *ἡ χαλεπότης διὰ τὸ τῆς ζημίας μέγεθος* (1274b15–18). Plutarch offers details after a stock reference to severity (*Solon* 17.1): idleness and minor thefts of food were punishable by death. After citing Demades, he closes with a supposed quote from Draco himself to the effect that even minor crimes warranted execution, with nothing more serious available for graver offenses (*Solon* 17.2–4). The death penalty for theft especially impressed later writers (e.g., Gellius *NA* 11.18.1–5; J. Tzetzes *Chil.* 5.342–51; Alciphron 2.38.3, where Solon is also mentioned).

Given the stature of Solon as a *nomothetēs*, there is naturally a tone of disparagement in most of the citations within this tradition. This is so much the case that in a rare context in which a speaker must approve Dracontian severity, as in Lycurgus *Against Leocrates* 64–66, he is careful to avoid the name of Draco, although the death penalty for minor thefts makes it clear whom he has in mind. In contrast, the unsuperseded homicide code can be lauded for rendering murder *φοβερόν* and *δεινόν* with an explicit reference to Draco (Dem. 20.158); it also draws on the authority of Solon, who left it in place. In Attic courts, one may praise Solon and Draco, or praise currently valid practice supposedly derived from Draco, or disparage Dracontian laws now extinct (sometimes to the advantage of Solon), but no one before an audience drawn from

14. Probably Herodicus of Selymbria, the teacher of Hippokrates (e.g., Plato *Rep.* 406A; *Protag.* 316E), and not Herodikos of Leontinoi, also a doctor and the brother of Gorgias. An old suggestion is to emend to Prodikos: L. Spengel, *ΣΥΝΑΓΩΓΗ ΤΕΧΝΩΝ sive artium scriptores ab initio usque ad editos Aristotelis de rhetorica libros* (Stuttgart 1828) 94, n. 29. Cf. H. Diels & W. Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*⁶ (Berlin 1951–1952) 2.319–20.

ordinary Athenians ever praises superseded legislation of Draco or implies that Draco was a superior legislator to Solon.

A chronological conclusion emerges from this pattern of referentiality. Surviving attestations imply that Draco inspired greater interest among the Athenians after 450 and perhaps in the 430s, as our earliest reference from Cratinus hints.¹⁵ Heightened attention continued during the war (Herodotus) and just afterwards (Xenophon and Lysias). That this pattern is not a trick of accidental survival is, in the first instance, suggested by the absence of Draco in Herodotus, who was so interested in the stories associated with early *sophoi* and, in particular, with the Seven Sages. Indeed only in late authors does Draco find his way into such company.¹⁶ The Sages were paradigmatic figures who encapsulated in their *personae*, accomplishments, and *dicta* conventional attitudes of the archaic period. Their traditions were well established before Herodotus (in oral story-telling, if not in early prose works); witness his notorious difficulties in integrating their legends into his chronological framework (e.g., the meetings of Solon and Kroisos, 1.29.1–33, or of Khilon and Hippokrates, father of Peisistratos, 1.59.1–3). Draco's absence suggests that Solon was the canonical spokesman for archaic Athenian normative traditions and that Herodotus' Athenian informants did not make much of Draco. Little is known directly about the polemics of late archaic and early classical Athens, but some indications exist that constitutional debate occurred in the form of retrojections onto the program of Solon of controversial institutions such as a probouleutic popular council (*Ath. Pol.* 8.4; Plut. *Solon* 19.1–2) or allotment (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 8.1, 22.5). From this perspective, Draco was not seen as a forerunner by polemicists before 450, a set of circumstances matching the surviving attestations.

Draco as a legislator for the Aiginetans does not become much clearer through considering the rest of the evidence, but rather more baffling. In the *Suda*, he does not appear, at least superficially, to be the statesman sharing with Solon the laurels for the Athenian political order, since oligarchic Aigina was so unlike (and opposed to) democratic Athens. And, if he is to be seen as the "man of blood" whose antiquated laws were mostly replaced by Solon, we are left with the question of identifying those who would connect him with Aigina.

DRACONTIAN HOMICIDE LEGISLATION

It is argued that the assignment of the Athenian homicide law to Draco is the one fixed point for orienting the other types of allusion to the statesman's career: the Athenians had always remembered what Draco had legislated on homicide, and any awakened interest in him at the end of the fifth century started from this basis. In this view, a sequence of inscribed laws confirmed the

15. Fr. 274 is probably from the well-attested *Nomoi* (fr. 121–34 K) which P. Geissler, *Chronologie der attischen Komödie* (Berlin 1925) 20, dates to 439–37. Here the laws of Solon and perhaps of Draco, represented as old men, made up the chorus. Note the reference to *thesmoi* in fr. 127.

16. Note the absence of Draco in the lists in DL 1.41–42, esp. in the list of 17 of Hermippos (cf. fr. 8, *FHG* 3.37–38 = fr. 6 Wehrli). See, in general, A.R. Burn, *The Lyric Age of Greece* (London 1960) 207–9.

status of Draco as their legislator. That would allow us to confront a fanciful Draco, smothered on Aigina, with a historical seventh-century statesman. There is a devastating objection to a privileging of the historicity of the homicide laws as Dracontian: the identification of Draco as their framer belongs to the same rediscovery of him attested in the late fifth century. There is more to this than the banal point that all references to the legislation on homicide follow the inscription of the law on unintentional homicide in 409/8. And this law hardly establishes Draco as tradition's harsh legislator (cf. Dem. 21.43).

Let us consider the contents of *IG I³ 104* itself.¹⁷ Its surviving statute was the late fifth-century enactment on unintentional homicide, as its reception from the archon basileus shows (l. 6). There had been at least one revision since the seventh century, as the heading *πρῶτος ἄχσων* (l. 10) indicates that the law's archetype belonged either to Solon's law code or to a later redaction claiming Solonian authority.¹⁸ Retained archaic features (perhaps Dracontian or

17. Note ed. prin. of U. Köhler, "Attische Inschriften," *Hermes* 2 (1867) 16–36, esp. 27–36. For believers in the classical statute as virtually Dracontian: R.S. Stroud, *Drakon's Law on Homicide* (Berkeley 1968) esp. 60–64 (an important contribution to our reading of the text); M. Gagarin, *Drakon and Early Athenian Homicide Law* (New Haven 1981) esp. 21–22, upon both of whom I have depended greatly for their discussion of earlier work. On homicide courts at Athens, see D.M. MacDowell, *Athenian Homicide Law in the Age of the Orators* (Manchester 1963) esp. 117–23; R. Sealey, "The Athenian Courts for Homicide," *CP* 78 (1983) 275–96. See also M.H. Hansen, "The Prosecution of Homicide in Athens: A Reply," *GRBS* 22 (1981) 11–30, esp. 14–17.

18. Scepticism is owed to the thesis that the Dracontian *axones* survived, a view which started as early as C.F. Hermann, *De Dracone legum latore Attico* (Göttingen 1849) 7–9 (see also Stroud *Drakon's Law* 32–34). A conclusion can only be made through considering the related question of the substantive survival down to 400 of the Solonian *axones* and *kyrbeis*. I should counter the learned arguments in favor of survival by noting that both the debate over the *patrios politeia* and the efforts to ideologize the *personae* of Draco, Solon, or Kleisthenes after 450 are incomprehensible, if recourse existed to original documents. We must differentiate substantive survival from other modes of continuity: in archaeological survival, fragments of archaic codes existed as objects of communal reverence; in antiquarian survival, historical data about the assignment of various laws to specific *axones* were preserved; and finally in bureaucratic survival, details about the structure of legislation can have existed without exhaustive or verbatim preservation of the laws themselves. Our sources are strangely reticent about the relationship to the *axones* and *kyrbeis* of the Peisistratids, for whom public representation of the legal heritage of Solon must have been a lively concern. A Peisistratid redaction of Athenian laws (accompanying the projects on the Acropolis) may be a piece of this puzzle not yet explored satisfactorily. In that connection, the costs of sacrificial animals expressed in money from the 16th *axon* are probably significant (Plut. *Solon* 23.4). Limitations of space must force these arbitrary-seeming remarks to suffice now. Cf. A. Andrewes, "The Survival of Solon's *Axones*," in D.W. Bradeen & M.F. McGregor (eds.), *ΦΟΡΟΣ: Tribute to Benjamin Dean Meritt* (Locust Valley NY 1974) 21–28; R. Stroud, *The Axones and Kyrbeis of Drakon and Solon* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1979); H.R. Immerwahr, "The Date of the Construction of Solon's *Axones*," *BASP* 22 (1985) 123–35 (his cautionary remarks are noteworthy); N. Robertson, "Solon's *Axones* and *Kyrbeis*, and the Sixth-Century Background," *Historia* 35 (1986) 147–76; W.R. Connor, "'Sacred' and 'Secular': 'ἱερὰ καὶ ὄσια and the Classical Athenian Concept of the State," *Ancient Society* 19 (1987) 161–88, esp. 185–88. An investigation of the survival of archaic legal documents is intermeshed with interpretative problems involving the *anagrapheis* and other bodies associated with codifying the laws after 411. See, most recently, M. Ostwald, *From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law* (Berkeley &

Solonian) persisted: the role of the *ephetai* as jurors (ll. 13, 17, 29), the *phratores* as possible exculpators (18–19, 23), and the law's representation of itself as a *thesmos* (20).¹⁹

The law, however, cannot have been an entirely seventh-century document.²⁰ The stipulation protecting the murderer (l. 28; cf. Dem. 23.37–40) if he avoided Amphictyonic rites is unlikely to have preceded 600 and the First Sacred War, when the Amphictyony achieved authority for Delphi and Solon initiated closer Athenian contacts.²¹ Moreover, Demosthenes describes a provision that citizens were not to abuse or extort money from a murderer, citing an *axon* (the first *axon* in the restoration) as his authority (23.28–31). Transgressors of this provision are to be tried before the Heliaia. Here, manifestly, was a part of the homicide code which could not derive from Draco, because the Heliaia was a Solonian innovation (Aris. *Pol.* 1274a3–21; *Ath. Pol.* 9.1; Plut. *Solon* 18.3–4).²² The law which the *anagrapheis* inscribed was obtained from the archon basileus, who probably had in his care only the official text of the current homicide law and not some original monument or document.²³

Not only is the surviving law a statute revised since the seventh century, but a review of citations of homicide law in the orators favors a disconcerting conclusion: all homicide law could be cited as Dracontian regardless of anachronism, including the statute on intentional homicide.²⁴ The phenomenon is not limited to oratory. Any provision on murder could be attributed to Draco almost casually, as both derivatives of Attidography²⁵ and the comic playwright, Xenarchus, suggest.²⁶ Yet, *IG* I³ 104 appears to offer us a Dracontian homicide

Los Angeles 1986) 405–11, 414–20, 509–24; N. Robertson, "The Laws of Athens, 410–399 BC: The Evidence for Review and Publication," *JHS* 110 (1990) 43–75; P. J. Rhodes, "The Athenian Code of Laws, 410–399 B.C.," *JHS* 111 (1991) 87–100.

19. Other possible archaisms are (*phylo*) *basileis* in l. 12; the use of *δικάζειν* in 11–12; the phrase *ἀγορὰς ἐφορὰς* 'border market' in 27–28 (cf. Dem. 23.37). See Meiggs-Lewis p. 266; Stroud *Drakon's Law* 45–47, 53, 63–64.

20. See C. Hignett, *A History of the Athenian Constitution to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford 1952) 305–11; E. Ruschenbusch, "ΦΟΝΟΣ: zum Recht Drakons und seiner Bedeutung für das Werden des athenischen Staates," *Historia* 9 (1960) 129–54, esp. 130.

21. Jeffery *Archaic Greece* 73–75.

22. This provision is restored in ll. 30–31. Cf. Stroud *Drakon's Law* 54–56.

23. Cf. Stroud *Axones* 7–10.

24. Most telling are two sequences: Dem. 23.22, 28, 37, 44, 51, summed up with *ὁ μὲν νόμος ἐστὶν οὗτος Δράκοντος, ὃ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δὲ ὅσους ἐκ τῶν φονικῶν νόμων παρεγραψάμην*; Dem. 23.53, 60, 62, 82, 86, closing with *ἔστι μὲν οὐκέτι τῶν φονικῶν ὅδ' ὁ νῦν ἀνεγνωσμένος νόμος* . . . Cf. Aelius Theon *Progym.* 81. Note also Dem. 20.157–58, [Dem.] 47.71; cf. Antiphon. 5.14–15, where the name of the legislator, probably Draco, is unmentioned. The Demosthenic material is patently a restatement of current practice. Anachronism like mentioning the Heliaia was irrelevant: this was not historical reconstruction.

25. Pausanias drew his references to the Dracontian origin of several provisions of the code from such a source (6.11.6; 9.36.8).

26. Draco's laws ruined the pleasure of seducing married women (fr. 4.21–23): *ἄς πῶς ποτ', ὃ δέσποινα ποντία Κύπρι, βινεῖν δύνανται, τῶν Δρακοντείων νόμων ὁπόταν ἀναμνησθῶσι προσκινούμενοι*. Immunity was granted to killers of adulterers taken in *flagrante delicto*.

code beginning with unintentional killing, an order which, in itself, would be odd indeed. If the heading *δεύτερος ἄχσον* is correctly restored in l. 56 of *IG I³ 104*, we are compelled to believe either that intentional homicide did not appear in the Dracontian segment of the revised code of the *anagrapheis* or that intentional homicide was placed not only below unintentional killing but also on an *axon* other than the first.²⁷ Moreover, the unintentional homicide law beginning *IG I³ 104* opens with the word *καί*, the most natural explanation of which was that the law on intentional homicide once preceded it in an earlier version of the code.²⁸ The *καί* was preserved in a spirit of conservatism.²⁹ These considerations prompt the hypothesis that the *anagrapheis* in 409/8 decided against treating intentional homicide procedure as Dracontian. They differed from both the Demosthenic view on Dracontian legislation and the implication of (at least) one Attidographic tradition that Draco's homicide laws were left intact by Solon. So the *anagrapheis* confound our natural expectation that Draco's authorship of the law on intentional homicide ought to have been a precondition for the emergence of his reputation as a legislator on murder.

Nonetheless, there is another sign that the *anagrapheis* may have done this very thing. Plutarch *Solon* 19.3 (citing οἱ πλείστοι) argues for the Solonian establishment of the Areiopagos based on the fact that laws of Draco mention only *ephetai*, not Areiopagites (cf. Poll. 8.125). That his source(s) could maintain such a view at all must mean that an influential understanding of Draco's legislation excluded from it intentional homicide in its contemporary formulation with trials before the Areiopagos (cf., e.g., Dem. 23.22; *Ath. Pol.* 57.3; Poll. 8.117). The law surviving in *IG I³ 104* would provide just such an authoritative witness, one which clearly saw the *ephetai* as Dracontian jurors.

Furthermore, in primitive seventh-century Attica, a first legislator on murder is unlikely *prima facie* to have provided for two bodies of aristocratic jurors. If the Solonian amnesty law, however, forces us to admit the pre-Solonian existence of the *ephetai* (Plut. *Solon* 19.4), the Areiopagos was still most probably an earlier court than those staffed by the *ephetai*,³⁰ as its prestige and

27. See the discussion in Gagarin *Drakon* 72–76, who argues that the provisions for protecting an exiled killer (26–29), self-defence (33–36), and lawful homicide (37–38) entail a previous citation of the intentional homicide law.

28. For the view that the Dracontian law was superseded, see Meiggs-Lewis p. 266; Ruschenbusch *Historia* (1960) 130–32, who goes on to assert, however, that Areiopagite jurisdiction was a secondary development.

29. For other explanations of *καί*, note Stroud *Drakon's Law* 34–40 (esp. useful for earlier views), who construes *καί* with *ἐάν*, 'even if'. Draco emphasized the penalty of exile notwithstanding lack of intention. A.R.W. Harrison, "Drakon's ΠΡΩΤΟΣ ΑΞΩΝ," *CQ* 11 (1961) 3–5, argues that the law on premeditated murder was part of the first *axon*, but the heading *πρῶτος ἄχσον* is merely a reference to a still existing *stelē* containing the law. Not only is such notation unparalleled, but the restoration [*δεύτερος*] *ἄχσον* in l. 55 would render *πρῶτος ἄχσον* a true heading. Gagarin *Drakon* 96–110 holds that *καί* is used elliptically in order to show that the same procedures prevailed for intentional homicide as for unintentional homicide (*Drakon* 112–41); with the death penalty and permanent exile later additions! Cf. G. De Sanctis, *Atthis: Storia della repubblica ateniese dalle origini alla età di Pericle*³ (Florence 1975) 234–36.

30. Hignett *Constitution* 79–82, 309–11; Harrison *CQ* (1961) 5; De Sanctis *Atthis*³ 219–23; cf.

prominence in myth suggests, where mythological Areiopagite jurisdiction sometimes covers jurisdiction later falling to the *ephetai*.³¹ So the *ephetai*, who never formed a deliberative body and were probably drawn from the Areiopagites, were a secondary development. The *ephetai* may have originated in the time between Draco's legislation and the Solonian reforms or else they preceded Draco, who must be considered merely the first legislator to commit to writing an already sophisticated body of oral law on murder (including several courts).³²

The alternative reconstructions are less likely. That Solon transferred ephetic jurisdiction on voluntary homicide to the Areiopagos is unbelievable.³³ Nor does it make much sense to imagine that ephetic jurisdiction over unintentional homicide and Areiopagite authority over premeditated murder mark two stages in the engagement of the state in what had previously been a nearly private settling of murders through feud.³⁴ Draco presumably regularized and codified powers which the archons, basing themselves on oral law, had already been attempting to exercise. It is absurd to suppose that the carefully drawn statute in *IG I³ 104* was the first intervention of the state into a situation where private recourse dominated previously. For one thing, *aidesis* 'pardon' is a familiar concept, in which the state's role needed no special pleading. Nothing suggests that individual aristocrats had the strength to defy communal jurisdiction over murder, and aristocratic celebration of familial vendetta, as opposed to factional loyalty, seems muted in contemporary poetry (if present at all). On the contrary, the archon basileus may have possessed too much discretion before Draco, who consolidated the role of Areiopagite (and ephetic?) jurors in order to promote communal and especially elite compliance. No extra-legal methods of vengeance are attested in the accounts of the controversy over the executions of the Kylonians, where a *political* dispute is alone indicated.

Thus, the *anagrapheis* of the laws seem to have used converse criteria to the ones that seem natural to us in deciding what was Dracontian and what was not. Plutarch's argument on the Areiopagos, combined with the internal evidence from the law itself, helps to show that the affixing of the label *Δράκωντος* (*IG I³ 104.5*) to specific statutes within the homicide code derives from a process of historical reconstruction and not from direct transmission.

U. Kahrstedt, "Untersuchungen zu athenischen Behörden," *Klio* 30 (1937) 10–33, esp. 15–17; R.W. Wallace, *The Areopagos Council, to 307 B.C.* (Baltimore 1989) 8–22, 44–47.

31. Ares: Hellanicus *FGH* 323a F22; Eur. *El.* 1258–63; *IT* 945–46; Apollod. 3.180. Kephalos for the murder of Prokne: Hellanicus F 22. Its sanctity and its standing in myth are explicitly linked by Demosthenes (23.66). Cf. Sealey *CP* (1983) 289–90.

32. The dossier of evidence is well summarized in H.J. Wolff, "The Origin of Judicial Legislation among the Greeks," *Traditio* 4 (1946) 31–87, which ought, however, to be treated with care for its tendentiousness about self-help.

33. Such a shift was inconceivable to fifth-century Athenians, who followed Ephialtes' advice to strip the *epitheta* 'additional powers' (authority outside of hearing such cases) from the council (*Ath. Pol.* 25.2). Cf. Sealey *City States* 99–105; Gagarin *Drakon* 132–36.

34. See Sealey *City States* 99–105; cf. Ruschenbusch *Historia* (1960) 136–42.

Furthermore, the version of the homicide laws of the *anagrapheis*, which was erected in the Stoa Basileios, differed from a version known to have stood on the Areiopagos itself (see Lys. 1.30 for a case before the court in the Delphinion; cf. [Lys.] 6.15). Demosthenes probably also used this version in the *Against Aristocrates*, and the same edition was also cited by the speaker in [Dem.] 47.71. Demosthenes uses a formula, τὸν νόμον τὸν μετὰ ταῦτα (in diverse variants: 23.28, 44, 51, 60, 62), showing him to be working from notes taken from a single edition. He considered these laws to be Dracontian, significantly referring to the law on intentional homicide as the first in his string of citations (23.22). Accordingly, the laws on the Areiopagos did not exhibit the same pattern of "labeling" as the revised code in the Stoa Basileios. Either the Areiopagite laws all bore a note describing them as Dracontian or (more probably) they contained no attribution at all, but were believed to be Dracontian by virtue of tradition. Nevertheless, they were valid law, as the orators' citations illustrate, so that the presence, absence, or variety of this type of labeling did not affect the validity of the statute.

The codifiers of Athenian law employed more restrictive criteria for the attribution of laws to Draco than did other Athenians (including the orators). In the same spirit, the proposal of Teisamenos after the democratic restoration distinguishes between the *thesmoi* of Draco and the *nomoi* of Solon in a legalistic, antiquarian mode of citation (And. 1.83; cf. *Anec. Bekk.* 1.264.12–14). As we have already seen, a consistent denomination of Dracontian laws as *thesmoi* is not a regular feature of traditional citation. What is more, this distinction between Dracontian *thesmos* and Solonian *nomos* is probably not in fact an accurate reflection of the evolution of archaic legal terminology.³⁵ Just how the codifiers proceeded in practical terms can only be subject to speculation. There is little likelihood, however, that the codifiers determined a law to be Dracontian or Solonian (for the purposes of labeling, it may be remembered) by assessing the (virtually unascertainable) degree to which it diverged from its archetype. They probably used a "litmus test(s)" in checking for the presence of something that they held datable. Plutarch or his sources may have unwittingly used circular reasoning insofar as the *anagrapheis* could have actually denied the label Dracontian to the intentional homicide law because they already considered the Areiopagos to have been established by Solon.

To what extent Draco's credit for homicide legislation was genuine recollection or valid rediscovery about archaic lawmaking is uncertain. It is striking that the part of the code seeming most archaic *prima facie* is the very section traced to the earliest legislator, when it is equally possible for us to imagine that

35. The laws of Draco and Solon were probably correctly *thesmoi* in their historical context (see Solon frs. 31.2, 36.18 W; cf. *Ath. Pol.* 35.2; Plut. *Solon* 19.4). Thus *Ath. Pol.* 4.1, 7.1 uses *thesmos* for Dracontian law correctly, but the common application of *nomos* suggests that stricter usage was not universal (cf. Porphyry *De abst.* 4.22; *ΣAesch.* 1.39 D). Note M. Ostwald, *Nomos and the Beginnings of the Athenian Democracy* (Oxford 1969) 55–56, 158–60, where the emergence of *nomos* as law is held to be Cleisthenic. See also I. Zeber, "Quelques idées sur la notion de ΘΕΣΜΟΣ," in *Studi in onore di Arnaldo Biscardi* (Milan 1982) 2.491–98, esp. 497–98.

the homicide laws (as the oldest) should have been the most thoroughly amended since their origin.³⁶ If the codifiers of the homicide laws truly distinguished the law on intentional homicide as non-Dracontian, they were making judgments on attribution virtually as historians. If assignment or denial of a law to Draco is recognized as a product of late fifth-century reconstruction, we are compelled to observe that traditions about early Attica crystallizing in this period were not unaffected by constitutional struggles. When we suggest that the *anagrapheis* were applying simple criteria to assign laws to different Athenian statesmen, we are also authorized to ask whether they too may not have been conditioned by the ideological conflict raging about them when they applied the label Δράκοντος to a particular Athenian law. Against this background, Draco becomes a figure whose peculiarly fifth-century rediscovery was fraught with temptations toward employing him as an embodiment of party-political positions.

THE CONSTITUTION OF DRACO

Once we recognize the biography of Draco as a reconstruction conditioned by ideological controversy, it becomes possible to consider the most controversial piece of evidence on the legislator, the so-called "Constitution of Draco" which appears in *Ath. Pol.* 4.³⁷

ἡ μὲν οὖν πρώτη πολιτεία ταύτην εἶχε τὴν ὑπογραφὴν. μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα χρόνου
τινὸς οὐ πολλοῦ διελθόντος, ἐπ' Ἀρισταίχμου ἄρχοντος, Δράκων τοὺς θεσμοὺς
ἔθηκεν· ἡ δὲ τάξις αὐτοῦ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον εἶχε. ἀπεδέδοτο μὲν ἡ πολιτεία τοῖς
ὄπλα παρεχομένοις· ἡροῦντο δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἐννέα ἄρχοντας καὶ τοὺς ταμίας οὐσίαν
κεκτημένους οὐκ ἐλάττω δέκα μνῶν ἐλευθέραν, τὰς δ' ἄλλας ἀρχὰς τὰς ἐλάττους
ἐκ τῶν ὄπλα παρεχομένων, στρατηγούς δὲ καὶ ἱππάρχους οὐσίαν ἀποφαίνοντας
οὐκ ἐλάττον ἢ ἑκατὸν μνῶν ἐλευθέραν, καὶ παῖδας ἐκ γαμετῆς γυναικὸς γνησίους
ὑπὲρ δέκα ἔτη γεγονότας. τούτους δ' ἔδει διεγγυᾶν τοὺς πρυτάνεις καὶ τοὺς
στρατηγούς καὶ τοὺς ἱππάρχους τοὺς ἔνους μέχρι εὐθυνῶν, ἐγγυητὰς δ' ἐκ τοῦ
αὐτοῦ τέλους δεχομένους, οὐπὲρ οἱ στρατηγοὶ καὶ οἱ ἱππάρχοι. βουλευεῖν δὲ
τετρακοσίους καὶ ἕνα τοὺς λαχόντας ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας. κληροῦσθαι δὲ καὶ ταύτην
καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς τοὺς ὑπὲρ τριάκοντ' ἔτη γεγονότας, καὶ δις τὸν αὐτὸν μὴ
ἄρχειν πρὸ τοῦ πάντας ἐξελεθῆναι· τότε δὲ πάλιν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς κληροῦν. εἰ δέ τις τῶν
βουλευτῶν, ὅταν ἔδρα βουλῆς ἢ ἐκκλησίας ᾗ, ἐκλείποι τὴν σύνοδον, ἀπέτινον ὁ
μὲν πεντακοσιομέδιμνος τρεῖς δραχμάς, ὁ δὲ ἱππεὺς δύο, ζευγίτης δὲ μίαν. ἡ δὲ
βουλὴ ἢ ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου φύλαξ ᾗν τῶν νόμων καὶ διετήρει τὰς ἀρχὰς, ὅπως
κατὰ τοὺς νόμους ἄρχωσιν. ἐξῆν δὲ τῷ ἀδικουμένῳ πρὸς τὴν τῶν Ἀρεοπαγιτῶν

36. One might of course argue that the homicide laws were protected from revision, but such demonstrations are heavily dependent on citing rhetorical echoes of Athenian conservatism like Antiphon 5.14, 6.2. Dem. 23.62 does not exclude legislative modification. Cf. Gagarin *Drakon* 22–26. For a complicated evolution, see Sealey *CP* (1983) 280–81, 284–85.

37. [Plato] *Axioch.* 365D refers independently to a Dracontian *politeia*: ἐπὶ τῆς Δράκοντος ἢ Κλεισθένης πολιτείας, cf. Alciphron 3.41, fr. 2. Cic. *Rep.* 2.1.2 offers *rem publicam* . . . *Atheniensium, quae persaepe commutata esset, tum Theseus tum Draco tum Solo tum Clisthenes tum multi alii, postremo exsanguem iam et iacentem doctus vir Phalereus sustentasset Demetrius* . . . Cf. Athen. 11.508A listing Draco, Solon, and Plato as Athenian lawgivers.

βουλὴν εἰσαγγέλλειν, ἀποφαίνοντι παρ' ὃν ἀδικεῖται νόμον. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς σώμασιν ἦσαν οἱ δανεισμοί, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἡ χώρα δι' ὀλίγων ἦν.

This is also the only testimonium on Draco that parallels the anecdote about his visit to Aigina by presenting details on his legislative activity, and it is a singular witness indeed.

The Constitution cannot be taken seriously as a seventh-century political order.³⁸ Note the many anachronisms: *monetary* requirements for office and fines for failure to attend meetings;³⁹ the use of functional social description, οἱ ὅπλα παρεχόμενοι, instead of census class, to define participation; the prominence of *stratēgoi* and hipparchs; the absence of archaic officials such as the *kōlakretai* and *naukraroi*; the use of sortition for council and minor magistracies; and its timocratic rather than aristocratic undertones.⁴⁰ The need for an age-threshold for holding office indicates wide participation in government in an individualistic social context (rather than one where political activity was shaped by *genos* and family). In recent work, this chapter has found few (and these unconvincing) defenders.⁴¹ This anachronistic polity suggests an interesting conclusion about the general knowledge of Draco at the time of its first appearance. No recognized edition of Draco's laws could have existed, else the attribution to him of such a constitution would have been an absurd gambit.

The Constitution was intended rather as an alternative to Periclean imperial democracy. The military officers are predominant: their property qualifications and provision for their giving security are specified; their *euthunai* recall imperial standards of accountability; and they are to possess larger estates than the archons and *tamiai*. Since there are *prutaneis*, the council operates in *probouleusis* at frequent sittings, like the Cleisthenic *boulē*. The *prutaneis* seem to offer sureties with the military officers, implying that theirs was not a

38. Note the earliest comment: J.W. Headlam, "The Constitution of Draco. 'Αθ. Πολ. ch. iv.," *CR* 5 (1891) 166–68; T. Reinach, "La constitution de Dracon et la constitution de l'an 411, d'après Aristote," *REG* 4 (1891) 82–85; G. Busolt, "Zur Gesetzgebung Drakons," *Philologus* 50 (1891) 393–400; E. Meyer, *Forschungen zur alten Geschichte* (Halle 1892) 236–39; De Sanctis *Atthis*³ 206–14. For early champions of its authenticity, cf. U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, *Aristoteles und Athen* (Berlin 1893) 1.50–51, 57–59, 76–98; O. Seeck, "Quellenstudien zu Aristoteles Verfassungsgeschichte Athens," *Klio* 4 (1904) 270–326, esp. 306–18. See also J. Miller, "Drakon," *RE* 5.2 cols. 1648–62, esp. 1657–61; Busolt-Swoboda *GS* 52–58, esp. n. 2, p. 53; A. Fuks, *The Ancestral Constitution* (London 1953) n. 2, p. 98, which summarize earlier scholarship. See also P.J. Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian ATHENAION POLITEIA* (Oxford 1981) 84–87.

39. The 100 *mnai* for the estates declared (*ἀποφαίνοντας*, another anachronism) by prospective generals and 10 *mnai* for archons and *tamiai* render an impossible result, if we apply the Solonian equation of a *medimnos*, a sheep, and a drachma (Plut. *Solon* 23.3). The Dracontian *stratēgos* has an estate valued twenty times the level for annual output for a *pentekosiomedimnos*, while archons and *tamiai* have only double the output.

40. See F. Jacoby, *Atthis: The Local Chronicles of Ancient Athens* (Oxford 1949) 316–19, n. 140. See also Rhodes *AP* 112–18.

41. Note F.P. Rizzo, "La Costituzione di Draconte nel c. iv dell' ΑΘΗΝΑΙΩΝ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ di Aristotele," *Mem. Ist. Lombardo* 27.4 (1960–1963) 271–308, esp. 282–94, 306–8 (cf. the rev. of N.G.L. Hammond in *CR* 16 [1966] 237); R. Develin, "The Constitution of Drakon," *Athenaeum* 62 (1984) 295–307, esp. 302–7.

sortitive, rotating office, but that these 'presidents' were elected; possibly also chosen from the same class as the *stratēgoi*, those with estates of at least 100 *mnai*. The process of guarantee would be a deliberate timocratic (and anachronistic) touch. The reference to ἄλλας (= minor?) offices implies an administrative mechanism like that of the fifth century, and not of the archaic period.

While Attic tradition invariably contrasted Solon and Draco to Draco's disadvantage, the Constitution implicitly makes Draco the more important legislator, as many of Solon's major accomplishments are assigned to him (or, at least, shown to antedate Solon). In Draco's polity, the Solonian classes, a popular council, sortition, an Areiopagos charged with oversight of the laws, and the right of *eisangelia* already exist. Therefore, the fourth-century convention that Draco could not be praised in detraction of Solon may not yet have prevailed when this *politeia* was composed. That circumstance may suggest a late fifth-century date for its fabrication.

The Dracontian council of 401 is especially helpful in determining the ideological affiliations of this polity. Its complement is arbitrary, lacking any conceivable grounding in Ionian or Cleisthenic tribal order (another point against its historicity). Its strength was meant to differentiate it from the Solonian (populist) council of Four Hundred, while its prytaneis and census requirement are timocratic features. At the same time, the near coincidence of the 401 *boulē* with the council of Four Hundred of 411 suggests two further conclusions: not only did both councils evolve in congruent anti-democratic circles, but the Dracontian polity probably originated in the period before the failure of the Four Hundred had discredited a body of that size.⁴²

While much political power is vested in the zeugites, the functions reserved for the Areiopagos promote the influence of the wealthy. That supervision of the constitution and specifically adjudication of *eisangeliai* fell to the Areiopagos betrays the intention of undoing the democratizing work of Ephialtes (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 35.2). Yet, the elite is not simply trusted to act with political propriety. The *nomothētēs* avoids a naive, archaic fusion of economic or familial status and moral qualities: elite office-holders must hold their estates unencumbered by debt and possess legitimate sons over ten (*Ath. Pol.* 4.2; cf. *Din.* 1.71; Meiggs-Lewis 23.18–22, the anachronistic "Decree of Themistocles"). Elite devotion to civic duty is not assumed, but enforced by the requirement for guarantors for officials and the imposition of fines for absence from public meetings.

These features and the preference for Draco over Solon are aspects of the same moderate oligarchic sensibility, of which the whole polity is redolent. This was not the blueprint of an extremist like Kritias. Points of comparison stand with the moderate intermediate regime of 411 (or the 5000) and the

42. Rizzo, *Mem. Ist. Lomb.* (1960–1963) 298, observes that true Therameneans would not have invoked the Four Hundred consciously after 411, since Theramenes had been so instrumental in their downfall, a fact exploited both by friends and enemies (e.g. *Ath. Pol.* 28.5 with 33.2; *Xen. HG* 2.3.30–31, 45–47, 51; *Lys.* 12.66–67).

"future" constitution of the same year.⁴³ Active political rights were limited to those of hoplite census or above (Thuc. 8.97.1; *Ath. Pol.* 33.1–2). Fines were levied for non-attendance of meetings of *boulē* and assembly (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 30.6). Zeugite participation is encouraged by mandating a drachma fine for non-attendance, which, while such fines are oligarchic in principle, is relatively heavier than the 2 or 3 drachmas levied against upper-class absentees (see *Ath. Pol.* 4.4). Even eligibility for the elite offices is in some cases open to those possessing estates of only 1000 dr., and the favored zeugites fill allotted offices below the top positions (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 30.2).

While there is nothing here that excludes an origin for the polity in a fifth-century political pamphlet, the Dracontian Constitution is sufficiently dissimilar from anything actually proposed or implemented during the Decelean War that it ought not to be seen as a polemic directly on behalf of any of the actual fifth-century oligarchies. After the fall of the Four Hundred, the succeeding moderate regime conducted affairs rather like the full democracy, so that the eventual reversion to democracy remains a most obscure transition. Thereafter, it is doubtful that any practical politician would have framed a moderate oligarchy like the Dracontian Constitution without taking the precaution of introducing an elected directorate of limited size (especially in light of Draco's allotted council). That is what one supposes that Theramenes and other moderates anticipated as the role of the Thirty. The Dracontian polity also contains no sign of the debate over suspension of pay for public service (Thuc. 8.97.1; *Ath. Pol.* 29.5). Thus, it might best be dated before the upsurge of doubts about Periclean democracy after the Sicilian debacle, and possibly even before Athenian finances were strained by the Archidamian War.⁴⁴ To term the polity in *Ath. Pol.* 4 Theramenean (as so many scholars have done) catches its ideological coloration nicely, but that qualification does not necessitate a date in or after 411.⁴⁵

The lack of tight logical causation in chapters 2–4 of the *Athenaion Politeia* is not owed to an interpolator who perhaps introduced a free composition without historical grounding in the late fifth century,⁴⁶ but

43. This judgement was a mainstay of critics of the Constitution's historicity like those cited in n. 38 above. A good discussion is Fuks *Ancestral Constitution* 84–101.

44. While a moderate constitution in 411 might borrow the idea of dividing the citizens into four large councils, rotating in office, from Boiotian constitutional practice (*Ath. Pol.* 30.3; cf. *Hell. Oxy.* XVI[XI].2, 4; Thuc. 5.38.2–4), the Constitution of Draco has no hint of such a mechanism, which may date it before the battle of Delion, the earliest date at which the Boiotian constitution is likely to have had much prestige in Attica.

45. See Wilamowitz *Aristoteles* 76–77; E. Ruschenbusch, "ΠΑΤΡΙΟΣ ΠΟΛΙΤΕΙΑ," *Historia* 7 (1958) 398–424, esp. 421–22. Cf. Fuks *Ancestral Constitution* 92–95, whose arguments suggestive of a fourth-century date are not probative. Note Rhodes *AP* 114 on the stipulation about possessing legitimate children. See also R.W. Wallace, "Aristotelian Politeiai and *Ath. Pol.* 4," in R. Rosen & J. Farrell (eds.), *Nomodeiktes: Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald* (Ann Arbor 1993), for a draft of which I thank the author. See also Jacoby *Atthis* 206.

46. For an interpolation, see (e.g.) Headlam *CR* (1891) 168; U. Wilcken, "Zur Drakontischen Verfassung," *Apophoreton* (Berlin 1903) 85–98; Fuks *Ancestral Constitution* 96–97; Rhodes *AP*

(rather) to the failure of the Atthidography underlying this work to combine the material surrounding Kylon, Draco, and Solon into a synthesis. The moderate Dracontian regime disrupts the account of elite exploitation leading up to Solon (2.2), so that at its end the author must resume his narrative of the crisis rather lamely: ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς σώμασιν ἦσαν οἱ δανεισμοί, καθάπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἡ χώρα δι' ὀλίγων ἦν (4.5). In contrast, the main source(s) of the *Athenaion Politeia* and of Plutarch's *Solon* focused on the decline toward crisis and Solon's intervention at the cost (it seems) of leaving out an extended account of Draco.⁴⁷ The Constitution has been included within the treatise, being introduced with a characteristic term, *τάξις*, used for a stage of institutional evolution (4.2; cf. 3.1, 6; 5.1; 11.2; 41.2). Yet, its incorporation appears to have been problematical—once again, I would argue, by virtue of its content and not because of interpolation—as it is not enumerated but merely noted when the author recapitulates constitutional evolution in chapter 41 (cf. the lack of any reference to the constitution of the 5000).⁴⁸ One detail, however, in the treatment of Solon by the *Athenaion Politeia* is unparalleled in the equally Atthidographic account of Plutarch's *Solon*, namely the preexistence of the census classes (*Ath. Pol.* 7.3: καθάπερ διήρητο καὶ πρότερον; cf. *Plut. Solon* 18.1–2). It is likely that this departure originated in an effort to incorporate the Dracontian *politeia*.

The *Athenaion Politeia* must have had a treatment of Draco—even if one suspects that the prospective reference in 3.1 to ch. 4 is itself an interpolation. It passes belief that a better contextualized version was replaced by chapter 4 without leaving any trace of its existence.⁴⁹ The Dracontian Constitution may derive from someone who drew on fifth-century polemic, like Demetrius of Phaleron in his *Περὶ τῶν Ἀθηνῆσι πολιτειῶν* (in two books),⁵⁰ or perhaps from one of the “conservative” authorities (if these are not in fact once again

n. 21, p. 5; 27; 53–57; 85–86. The supposition of an interpolation by Aristotle himself scarcely furthers analysis, as it cannot be differentiated from the more common structural phenomena as poor integration of source material or shifts in underlying sources.

47. See also F.E. Adcock, “The Source of the Solonian chapters of the *Athenaion Politeia*,” *Klio* 12 (1912) 1–16.

48. Note K. von Fritz, “The Composition of Aristotle's *Constitution of Athens* and the So-called Dracontian Constitution,” *CP* 49 (1954) 73–93, who explains the enumeration in *Ath. Pol.* 41.2 by arguing that [Aristotle] believed that Draco was legislating within an existing constitution rather than prescribing his own *politeia*. It is uncertain whether such an argument is even necessary, since *Aris. Pol.* 1274b15–16 may be discounted because the *Politics* and the *Athenaion Politeia* belong to different genres with varying standards for the acceptability of material (cf., e.g., Rhodes *AP* 60–61). See also Rizzo *Mem. Ist. Lomb.* (1960–1963) 274–81; Develin *Athenaeum* (1984) 297–302; Wallace in *Festschrift Ostwald*. Cf. J.J. Keaney, “Ring Composition in Aristotle's *Athenaion Politeia*,” *AJP* 90 (1969) 406–23, esp. 415–17, but the reservations of Rhodes *AP* 45–46 vitiate much of the force of his argument that ch. 4 is an interpolation on compositional grounds.

49. Cf. Rhodes *AP* 28, 46.

50. Jacoby *Atthis* 385–86, n. 51 (note DL 5.80); also Wilamowitz *Aristoteles* 1.76–77. It is important to note that a derivation through Demetrius is not in itself an argument either for or against interpolation or forgery. Cf. von Fritz *CP* (1954) 76, 85–86.

Demetrius) whom the author read for their criticism of Solon, on the grounds that his legal ambiguities had allowed an aggrandizement by the popular courts (9.2). Cicero offers a list of Athenian *nomothetai* including Draco and ending with a flattering remark about Demetrius himself (*Rep.* 2.1.2; n. 37 above). That series may indicate that his list of Attic lawgivers that contained Draco derived from Demetrius.⁵¹ Whoever may have served as intermediary between fifth-century propaganda and the Peripatetics, the responsibility for including chapter 4 seems to lie with the author of the *Athenaion Politeia*.

Before turning to the *Suda*'s account of the death of Draco, it is appropriate to review what we have learned from the Dracontian Constitution. The strong interest in collecting oral traditions during the second half of the fifth century directed Athenian public attention toward Draco. The *persona* which Draco assumed was greatly affected by the appropriation of Solon as the fount of Athenian populism by proponents of Periclean democracy. A tactic left those disenchanted with the democracy was to find a respectable pedigree for alternatives to the imperial *dēmos*. Unsurprisingly, Draco, the available pre-Solonian legislator, became this other source for constitutional tradition. The high degree of partisanship associated with the name of Draco in that period is shown by the Dracontian *politeia*.⁵²

Yet, the late fifth century also stands as a high water mark for controversy about Draco. In contrast to the Dracontian polity which magnifies his role, the code of the *anagrapheis* gives us a minimizing appraisal, namely Draco as the source of only a part of the homicide code. It was perhaps fabrications like the Constitution which prompted a reaction that rejected any link between Draco and the Areiopagos. Given the suspicions arising from the oligarchic conspiracies, the care shown in assigning a specific, limited role to Draco as a lawgiver is unsurprising. Evaluating the ideological affiliation of the programs of early Athenian lawgivers turned out to have had life and death consequences. Hence, there is a true poignancy in the reference to *thesmoi* in the epigram on behalf of the men who occupied Phyle with Thrasyboulos (Aesch. 3.190; *SEG* 28.45): *τούσδ' ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα στεφάνοις ἐγέραιρε παλαίχθων|δῆμος Ἀθηναίων, οἳ ποτε τοὺς ἀδίκους|θεσμοῖς ἄρξαντας πόλιος πρῶτοι καταπαύειν|ῆρξαν, κίνδυνον σώμασιν ἀράμενοι*.⁵³ Not only is *thesmos* a poetic synonym for *nomos*, but the reference to "unjust *thesmoi*" also rebukes the pretensions of the oligarchs that they governed in accordance with ancient enactments comprising the ancestral constitution like the *thesmoi* of Draco (as they were named in contemporary sources).

51. The 10 *mnai* threshold for office-holding in the Dracontian *politeia* recurs in Demetrius' constitution as defining the minimum estate for active citizenship (DS 18.74.3).

52. Any reticence of the *Ath. Pol.* in assigning credit for constitutional innovation to Draco (cf. Develin *Athenaeum* [1984] 298–300) arises from his need for a single line of constitutional evolution. Following both the pamphleteer and his Atthidographic source closely would have created two irreconcilable ideologically loaded variants.

53. See A.E. Raubitschek, "The Heroes of Phyle," *Hesperia* 10 (1941) 284–95. For another interpretation of the connotation of *θέσμος* here, see Ostwald *Sovereignty* 509.

Even as open advocacy of oligarchy declined after the Thirty, Draco, while still restricted to a subordinate role *vis-à-vis* Solon, could now be associated with *all* homicide law in the orators. That legislation, along with his harshness, became the only well-defined features of his historical image. The fifth century passed on such a variety of judgments on Draco that it seems that Atthidography, as reflected in the *Athenaion Politeia* and Plutarch's *Solon*, could not contextualize Draco's political activity, whether we consider his legislation on homicide or the largely apocryphal constitutional *nomothesia*. Specifically, there is almost no integration of Draco's work in Attic historiography either with the aftermath of Kylon's *coup d'état* or with the agrarian crisis leading up to Solon.⁵⁴ Nor was his harshness, albeit prominent in popular memory, ever reconciled with the actual content of Dracontian homicide law, which is hardly draconian by the standards of the classical period, let alone those of the seventh century. Accordingly, there was no single *persona* for Draco in Attic historiography, but several distinct, discontinuous components of a historical personality. The segmented character of the source material has even led to some radical efforts at redating.⁵⁵

Only one datum stands out with unusual solidity: the *Athenaion Politeia* assigns the legislation of Draco to the archonship of Aristaiikhmos, probably 621/0 (*Ath. Pol.* 4.1).⁵⁶ We lack, however, any clear witness to the office held

54. It may be quite sensible to suppose that Draco legislated in reaction to the turmoil created by the suppression of the Kylonians (note [e.g.] A. Andrewes, "The Growth of the Athenian State," *CAH*² 360–91, esp. 370; Jeffery *Archaic Greece* 88–89). The *Ath. Pol.* could only offer a vague link: *μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα χρόνου τινὸς οὐ πολλοῦ διελθόντος, ἐπ' Ἀρισταίχμου ἄρχοντος, Δράκων τοὺς θεσμοὺς ἔθηκεν*. Perhaps, by defining what constituted homicide, Draco demarcated the area within which the archons could use deadly force against tyrannists, guaranteeing that a future Megakles could also act decisively. M. Ostwald, "The Athenian Legislation against Tyranny and Subversion," *TAPA* 86 (1955) 103–28, esp. 105–11 plausibly suggests Draco as the first proposer of Attic anti-tyranny law (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 16.10). Such speculation, however, establishes a connection which Atthidographic tradition apparently did not. The trial of the anti-Kylonians and their descendants was integrated both with the tyrannical *coup d'état* before and, through the purification of the city afterwards (c. 600), with Solon, but not with Draco (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 1; Plut. *Solon* 12.1–12). And the trial as portrayed in the *Ath. Pol.*, although ostensibly about killing, has no point of contact with Dracontian homicide law (as known to us). The surviving opening of the *Ath. Pol.* confirms the "floating" character of traditions on Draco. Chapter 1 with its description of the final aftermath of the Kylonian affair (c. 600) may indeed have followed directly on an account of Kylon's coup (628 or earlier). The sequence that follows thereafter has the pre-Solonian situation (chap. 2), the pre-Dracontian constitution (3), the Dracontian order (4), and the pre-Solonian situation again (4.5–5.1). The problems here transcend the imperfect coordination of the Dracontian Constitution with the Solonian crisis to involve a confusion over where to fit Draco in at all. See also Stroud *Drakon's Law* 70–74; M. Gagarin, *Early Greek Law* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1986) 112–15.

55. See, most recently, E. Lévy, "Notes sur la chronologie athénienne au VI^e siècle," *Historia* 27 (1978) 513–21, esp. 517–19 with n. 18, p. 518.

56. The *Suda* dates Draco's legislation in the 39th Olympiad, 624–21, and the same date is offered elsewhere in chronographic tradition (Tatian *Adv. Graec.* 41; Clem. *Stromat.* 1.16.80; *Suda s.v.* Δράκων, δ 1495 Adler; in 621 or 620 according to Eusebius *Chron. Arm.* p. 186 [Karst]; Hieron. *Chron.* p. 97b [Helm]). Other variant dates find likely explanation in distortions during transmission: Diodorus dates Draco 47 years before Solon (9.17.1 = ΣDem. 24.211), and ΣAesch. 1.6, on the basis of one manuscript tradition, may have dated him 100 years before Solon. The

by Draco as legislator (a *thesmothetēs*?; Paus. 9.36.8), let alone how his efforts were accommodated with the authority of the archon himself.⁵⁷ A sceptical conclusion thus offers itself, namely that the only solid evidence on Draco was a note on a copy of the archon list that he legislated in the year of Aristaikhmos.⁵⁸ Other themes recoverable from the attestations on Draco were vague traditions, including legal harshness, involvement with homicide law, reputation as the earliest source for Attic written law, and a suggestion of his work's supersession by Solon. From these meager ingredients, the legend of Draco was created and subsequently elaborated in the second half of the fifth century.

THE *SUDA* ON DRACO

The *Suda* reports the death of Draco on Aigina under the rubric: Δράκων, Ἀθηναῖος νομοθέτης (δ 1495 Adler).⁵⁹

οὗτος εἰς Αἴγινα ἐπὶ νομοθεσίαις εὐφημούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰγινητῶν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ ἐπιρριψάντων αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν πετάσους πλείονας καὶ χιτῶνας καὶ ἱμάτια ἀπεπνίγη, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐτάφη τῷ θεάτρῳ. γέγονε δὲ τοῖς χρόνοις κατὰ τοὺς ζ' σοφούς, ἢ μᾶλλον καὶ πρεσβύτερος τῇ γοῦν λθ' Ὀλυμπιάδι τοὺς νόμους ἔθετο γηραιὸς ὢν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις. ἔγραψεν ὑποθήκας εἰς ἑπτατρίσχιλια.

The entries in the *Suda* on Athenian statesmen probably derived from Atthidography, although there is a near certainty that at least one intermediary has intervened. At a guess, I should suggest Hermippos as the specific source for this story. He wrote a work called *Peri nomothetōn*, which is known to have treated the Attic hero Triptolemos.⁶⁰ The supposition of an original derivation in Atthidography is made more likely in this case by the tone of the anecdote. Its hostility to the Aiginetans—apparent in the fecklessness of their greeting—is appropriate to the patriotic spirit that pervades the *Atthides* (regardless of the political inclinations of specific historians). This hypothesis, however, cannot be tested directly, inasmuch as no references to Draco survive among their fragments. If stories as strange as this one existed in Atthidography about Draco,

seven year interval between Draco and Solon attested by another manuscript of ΣAesch. 1.6 and by J. Tzetzes *Chil.* 5.350–51, could conceivably reflect an effort to link Draco with the moves against the suppressors of the Kylonians. On dating, in general, see Stroud *Drakon's Law* 66–70.

57. Pausanias' identification of Draco as a *thesmothetēs* may be ancient speculation, which was based on the fact that his activity was in the archonship of another.

58. See T. J. Figueira, "The Ten Archontes of 579/8 at Athens," *Hesperia* 53 (1984) 447–73, esp. 461–62. Cf. Jacoby *Atthis* 93–94 with notes, 308–9; 186; 347. In what may have been an over-reaction to facile equating of the *Atthides* with Roman pontifical *annales*, Jacoby doubted this mode of transmission for the date.

59. Hesychius Milesius *De viris illustribus* 22 (p. 16, Flach) contains the same notice in abbreviated form: Δράκων ὁ νομοθέτης εἰς Αἴγινα ἐπὶ νομοθεσίαις εὐφημούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν Αἰγινητῶν, ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ, ἐπιρριψόντων αὐτῷ ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν πετάσους πλείονας καὶ χιτῶνας, ἀπεπνίγη.

60. On Triptolemos fr. 3, *FHG* 3.36–37 = 84 W (cf. frs. 80–88 W for fragments of *Peri nomothetōn*). See also F. Wehrli, *Hermippos der Kallimacheer* (Basel 1970), *Die Schule des Aristoteles* Supplbd. 1, 91–95, who suggests a derivation of his information from Theophrastus' *Nomothetōn* (DL 5.45).

the author of the *Athenaion Politeia* may even be excused for his utilization of the Dracontian Constitution.

Draco is also in the *Suda* (uniquely) the author of a considerable body of poetry, the *Hypothekai*, in 3000 verses. This denomination is striking: Isocrates uses this term to denote the archaic didactic poetry of Hesiod, Phocylides, and Theognis (2.43). Again the parallel with Solon—perhaps specifically with his (probably) supposititious hexametric *Nomoi* (fr. 31 W = Plut. *Solon* 3.5)—is significant. An altogether reasonable conjecture that an Attic tradition of didactic poetry might have preceded Solon has been utilized by ancient polemics to render Draco a forerunner of Solon in poetry as well as in *nomothesia*. The *Hypothekai* might well have been an anthology of archaic normative poetry which was apocryphal only in its attribution to Draco. Thus, it would not naturally have contained programmatic material involving the supposed legislative activities of Draco. Rather the aristocratic moralizing of such poetry enhanced the stature of Draco as a genuine conservative spokesman. The pretended “survival” of the corpus may have underwritten a contention by the opponents of imperial democracy that they could also provide real knowledge of Draco’s political program, such as we see in the Dracontian *politeia*.⁶¹

Draco in the gloss of the *Suda* and in the anecdote about his death on Aigina is Draco the *nomothetēs*, most akin to the author of the Dracontian Constitution. The source for the notice chronologically juxtaposes the statesman with the Seven Sages, and the observation about his possible relative priority to the other wise men may, in the original source, have been intended to augment Draco’s prestige still further. If Solon had been the canonical Athenian representative on such lists, an implicit correction in favor of Draco may lie in the background here. Draco’s status as an oligarch is not really doubtful: he was, after all, about to make laws for oligarchic Aigina at the moment of his death. Nonetheless, even though these observations seem to amount to a magnification of the reputation of Draco, we are brought up short before the impact of the denouement of the incident. Neither the lawgiver nor his Aiginetan friends emerge from the episode on Aigina in a positive light. His prospective lawgiving is aborted by a quite ridiculous death.⁶² Death by suffocation with clothes at the hands of his Aiginetan hosts is a nasty imputation about the islanders’ vaunted hospitality (cf., e.g., Pin. *Ol.* 8.21–30; *Nem.* 3.1–3, 5.8–10;

61. Theognis may be a parallel, as the compilation of Megarian aristocratic poetry transmitted under his name was especially interesting to late fifth-century oligarchic or conservative Athenians like Critias (fr. 5 W), Xenophon (*Stob. Flor.* 88.14), and Antisthenes (DL 6.16).

62. The departure of a statesman after his legislation is a *topos* (just as his voluntary seeking of death), as the cases of Lykourgos of Sparta and Solon indicate. That explains why Draco can have been traveling after his Attic lawgiving. For full citations, see A. Szegedy-Maszak, “Legends of Greek Lawgivers,” *GRBS* 19 (1978) 199–209, esp. 207–8, who also notes the tradition of ascribing unusual deaths to ancient poets and philosophers (n. 42, p. 207). For that, consult also J.A. Fairweather, “Fiction in the Biographies of Ancient Writers,” *Ancient Society* 5 (1974) 231–75, esp. 269–70.

Paian 6.123–31).⁶³ In short, we are apparently hearing an Athenian source denigrating the Aiginetans here.

The mode of “death by apparel” in fact makes its second appearance here in the record of Athenian and Aiginetan polemics. The Aiginetans told Herodotus a story in which the single Athenian survivor of an impious attempt to steal from Aigina the statues of the goddesses Damia and Auxesia had been put to death by the womenfolk of his dead comrades when he returned to Attica (5.82–88).⁶⁴ Their weapons of opportunity were the *fibulae* which they wore on their clothes. It was suggested by the Aiginetans that the Athenian adoption of Ionian dress was owed to a punishment of Attic women through excluding their use of similar pins for the future. The story in Herodotus has its context in an explanation how the Aiginetans achieved their independence from Epidaurus and become embroiled militarily for the first time with the Athenians through the dispute over the statues. This confrontation led to the *ἐχθρὴ παλαιή* ‘ancient hatred’ between the two states. Regardless of how they differed over the sequence of events, the juxtaposition of Aiginetan independence with conflict against Athens was common to the Aiginetan, Athenian, and Epidaurian informants of Herodotus (see pp. 51–53, 55–57 above).

Our Draco anecdote is implicitly set at the time of Aiginetan independence, since this is the most appropriate setting for *nomothesia*. Furthermore, it is possible that the differentiation of Draco from Solon which we have noted in the Dracontian Constitution and that I have seen as implicit in the *Suda* had other ramifications. Solon was credited by Attidography with a new system of weights, measures, and coin weights, different from the Pheidonian measures and other standards which were presumably in use on Aigina (*Ath. Pol.* 10.1–2; Androtion *FGH* 324 F 34; Plut. *Solon* 15.3–4; see pp. 76–78 above). Regardless of the anachronism and confusion of this tradition, its existence may indicate that Solon’s legislation was conjoined with an estrangement from Aigina. Thus, Draco could be viewed as a likely legislator for the Aiginetans. The dates for the two statesmen bracket the period when Aigina became independent from Epidaurus (see pp. 28–33 above). It is possible therefore that Aiginetan independence (with its attendant transition from friendship to enmity toward Athens) could parallel the passage from a supposedly Dracontian (oligarchic) Athens to a Solonian (democratic) Athens. The two murders by articles of clothing, one on Aigina and one in Attica, take on a curious—and, one suspects, distinctly polemical—symmetry.

Nevertheless, two aspects of the anecdote make it improbable that we have in the *Suda*’s version the initial story which was told about Draco and the Aiginetans. First of all, it is bizarre that an Athenian storyteller should bring an Attic statesman, who often occupied an honored, albeit secondary, place in patriotic tradition, to Aigina only to kill him off at the hands of the Aiginetans. Second, there is the confirming detail that the tomb of Draco existed in the

63. See Figueira *Aegina* 324–29.

64. See pp. 41–44 above for full discussion.

theater on Aigina. Although ease of verification is not always a true guide to the presence of wholecloth fabrication in ancient stories, a part of the audience would have been able to validate for themselves the factuality of a tomb in the theater on Aigina, if this detail had appeared in an Atthidographic narrative. Moreover, a burial site within a theater is properly a *hērōon*, just the sort of honor which a city would accord its *nomothetēs*.

The possibility then arises that the anecdote as we have it from the *Suda* is reactive mythologizing. By this I mean the tendency to counter an enemy's portrait of the distant past, which does not allow easy corroboration or contradiction, with a restructuring of the account rather than by a bare denial of its historicity. The stories in Herodotus about the *ἔχθρη παλαιή* may betray such a reaction as this (see pp. 36–51 above). An Athenian story telling of the odd death of Draco by suffocation at the hands of fervent Aiginetan admirers may accordingly entail an Aiginetan account describing *nomothesia* by Draco on the island. That story provided an aetiology for a *hērōon* in the theater in the town of Aigina. Naturally, one could object that such an Aiginetan story seems far-fetched. Is it, however, more unlikely than the existence of any connection at all between the statesman and the island, let alone an Attic story that he was *smothered* there?

A parallel for smothering by clothes is offered by an anecdote told with variations by Plutarch and Parthenius. Parthenius (*Narr. Am.* 9) based himself on the fourth-century Naxian historian Andriskos in his *Naxiaka*, book 1 (*FGH* 500 F 1) and on Theophrastus, probably the intermediary source.⁶⁵ Polykrite, a Naxian maiden, was trapped outside the walls of Naxos in the Delion, while her city was besieged by the Milesians, aided by the Erythraians. Through the extraction of an oath, she was able to exploit the infatuation for her of the Erythraian commander, Diognetos, so that he agreed to betray his position to the Naxian leaders, Polykrite's brothers. A Naxian attack against the Milesians, distracted with celebrating a festival, was successfully carried off, but Diognetos was accidentally killed by the attackers. Exuberantly, the women of Naxos greeted Polykrite, who was killed in a manner similar to Draco: τῇ δ' ἐπιούσῃ οἱ Νάξιοι πάντες πολὺν πόθον εἶχον ἰλάσασθαι τὴν κόρην. καὶ οἱ μὲν τινες αὐτὴν μίτραις ἀνέδουν, οἱ δὲ ζώναις αἷς βαρηθεῖσα ἢ παῖς διὰ πλῆθος τῶν ἐπιρριπτουμένων ἀπεπνίγη. It is noteworthy that Polykrite then receives state burial and posthumous honors as a heroine.

Plutarch attributes his version to anonymous Naxian historians (*Mor.* 254B–F with *FGH* F 501 F 2), and he gives a historical context for the war (cf. Polyaeus. 8.36, a derivative account).⁶⁶ Plutarch's main account differs in that Diognetos is not an accomplice in the communications between Polykrite and

65. Fr. 626 from *Pros tous kairous*, for which see W.W. Fortenbaugh, P.M. Huby, R.W. Sharples, & D. Gutas, *Theophrastus of Eresus* (Leiden 1992) 2.471–73; for analysis D.M. Mirhady, *The Political Thought of Theophrastus* (Diss., Rutgers University-New Brunswick 1991) 33–37, 77–81.

66. P.A. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods: An Analysis of the Mulierum Virtutes* (Cambridge, MA 1965) 93–97.

her brothers, but must be saved by Polykrite from execution by the Naxians. Plutarch's conclusion also differed: *μετὰ χαρᾶς καὶ στεφάνων ὑποδεχομένους καὶ θαυμάζοντας, οὐκ ἦνεγκε τὸ μέγεθος τῆς χαρᾶς, ἀλλ' ἀπέθανεν αὐτοῦ πεσοῦσα παρὰ τὴν πύλην* . . . He does add, however, that Polykrite's tomb was called *βασκάνου τάφος* 'Tomb of Slander (or Envy)'. Plutarch briefly adds another variant, attributing it to Aristotle (fr. 559 R, probably from the "Constitution of the Naxians" [fr. 558 R]), which is similar but not identical with Parthenius' Theophrastean version, but which is silent on the fate of Polykrite (cf. *FGH* 501 F 2.4). The brief notice in Gellius, citing Aristotle, may indicate that Aristotle also traced Polykrite's death to sudden, great joy (*NA* 3.15).

Polykrite's misadventure is helpful in understanding the ramifications of the account of the death of Draco. First of all, we may note the similar aetiological intent in explaining a *hērōon*. The story of Polykrite appears to have been an unusually important one for Naxian historiography, and it may well be that it was treated by three different Naxian historians: Andriskos (Parthenius' source), the Naxian *sungrapheis* (Plutarch's main source), and Aristotle's source (if his account is not merely a conflation of the other two). The motif of the death by smothering under clothing could be varied, suggesting that it was a *topos* for the sudden conversion of a joyous occasion to tragedy. It is therefore an example of the very narrative element that could be deployed by an Athenian to transform the mood of an Aiginetan story. Perhaps this was done by an Attidographer who could be expected to have known the Naxian narrative on Polykrite. In the case of Polykrite, the other treatments internalize the existential crisis—it is exaltation/exultation itself which kills the hero and that is a divinely-promoted redress for her earlier success.

For Draco, any state of exaltation/exultation (whether his own or that of his Aiginetan admirers) must be owed to the completion of his legislation at Athens. Clearly, to an Athenian that accomplishment could not be outdone: regardless of the reputable standing of Draco in Attic constitutional tradition, the gods must sanction misfortune following joy.

At several junctures above, I have outlined the ample evidence, starting with Herodotus, that fifth-century Athenians believed the Aiginetan oligarchy to be an illegitimate suppression of the local *dēmos*. Here let me note briefly that the Athenians championed in 489–88 Nikodromos and his followers, whom Herodotus, basing himself on Attic informants, styles as the *dēmos*, in their struggle against the government of the *pakhees* 'bloated ones', a derogatory term for the Aiginetan elite. Those rebels who escaped were incorporated into Athenian society. Herodotus retails the sacrilegious brutality with which the oligarchs slaughtered their rebel prisoners, creating a miasma not expiated until the Aiginetans were expelled from their island by the Athenians in 431 (see pp. 277–78 below).

After the subjugation of Aigina by Athens in c. 457–56, just when Herodotus was collecting the evidence, some Athenians and even some residents on Aigina were agitating against the Aiginetan oligarchy. A cult of Athena Polias was inaugurated on Aigina, symbolizing that Aigina belonged to Athena of

Athens (*IG* IV 29–32). The Aiginetans defended their political traditions through their *xenos*, Pindar. *Olympian* 8 in honor of Alkimedon of Aigina belongs to this period.⁶⁷ In vv. 21–32, alongside characteristic praise of Aiginetan hospitality and justice, Pindar upholds aristocratic judgment. The scholia read him as warning against entrusting decision-making to the *dēmos* and noted the servile roots of the Aiginetan *dēmos* (*ΣOl.* 8.30c, d, i, l).

In the same ode Pindar celebrates the connection of the honorand with the Athenian aristocrat Melesias, a patron of Aiginetan aristocratic youth. As I have argued (pp. 205–8 above), some elite Aiginetans cultivated the faction of Melesias and his son Thoukydides in order to counter the influence of the anti-Aiginetan Perikles. The Aiginetans needed influential Athenian friends not only to forestall further Athenian hegemonism, but also to intercede with the Athenians over their burden of tribute. The suggestions, hidden in the biographical tradition about the historian Thucydides, that Thoukydides Melesiou practiced usury on Aigina hint at such intercession. Thoukydides' intervention was adapted to form part of a causation for the Peloponnesian War blaming conservative Athenians: usury leading to Aiginetan hardship, stimulating protestations to the Spartans, causing Spartan ultimata to Athens, hostilities, and the expulsion of the Aiginetans in retaliation. While these charges are not to be trusted, they do indicate that the ties between Thoukydides and groups within the Aiginetan aristocracy both were sensitive politically and were subjected to ideologically grounded readings by contemporaries.

It is against this background of patronage of the Aiginetan elite by right-wing Athenians that the "discovery" of Draco's role as a legislator on Aigina and the attribution of a *hērōon* to him in the theater on Aigina may be understood. That lost Aiginetan account, to which the Athenian anecdote in the *Suda* reacted, was another gambit in Aiginetan attempts to solidify their status as clients of aristocratic Athenian politicians. If an influential segment of the Athenian leadership could be convinced that Draco truly legislated on Aigina, then the Aiginetan government was not an oligarchic usurpation, but a version of the *patrios politeia* of the Athenians themselves. Indeed it turned out that Aigina was Athenian, but not in the sense supposed by Athenian imperialists, who aspired to elevate the Aiginetan *dāmos* to power and eventually won their point when the island became an Athenian colony (see Thuc. 2.27.1). Rather, Aigina preserved the fundamental, primitive polity of the Athenians, a moderate oligarchy as the Dracontian Constitution portrayed it.

The hypothetical Aiginetan story which brought Draco to Aigina as a *nomothetēs* must belong to the period between the subjugation of Aigina and the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. That is the only period when these necessary preconditions prevailed: both the existence of conservative Athenians and of Aiginetans seeking rapprochement and the countervailing influence of Athenians determinedly hostile to the prevailing regime on Aigina. That date is not irreconcilable with my suggested date for the Dracontian Constitution,

67. See Figueira *Colonization* 83–86, 104–28 for further discussion; also pp. 205–10 above.

which, in any case, is quite likely to be fifth-century. The congruence of the anecdote about Draco's death and the Constitution indicates that it was during the pre-war period that Athenian traditions about Draco began to be exploited for constructing alternatives to imperial democracy. The moderation of the Dracontian *politeia* is appropriate to a period when resistance to democracy was still largely theoretical, namely before the brutality of the war had embittered partisanship and before modest reforms had been tested and failed (or had been rejected) in the regime of the 5000.

CONCLUSION

Draco does not seem to have been an important figure in Athenian institutional traditions before the second half of the fifth century. After that time he became the subject of considerable historical reconstruction. That is not to say that some of this reconstituted picture does not depend on sound recollection, e.g., his date in the archonship of Aristai khmos, his severity, his place at the beginning of Athenian *nomothesia*, and his connection with legislation on homicide. Even in the matter of homicide law, however, there can be no guarantee that Draco was not associated with it because it was perceived as the most archaic segment of the code and thus suitable for the first legislator.

It is striking that the first appearance of Draco in Cratinus is in a context where the desuetude of his law-making is accented: the Athenians are roasting barley on the *kurbeis* which bore Solonian and Dracontian laws (fr. 274 K). Another fragment from the likely source for the citation, a comedy called the *Nomoi*, has an illiterate claiming sound knowledge of the past, perhaps Athens' true legal tradition, by oral transmission (fr. 122). Thus Cratinus' allusion suggests that the reconstruction of Draco's contributions to Athenian life may have been controversial from the start. A document such as the Dracontian Constitution reflects this controversy, with its proposal for a counter-Solonian, non-democratic political order.

Because the associations surrounding Draco resonated contrapuntally to imperial democracy, the Aiginetans could choose him to symbolize their affinities with Athenians who were sympathetic to Aiginetan political practices. An old tradition which associated Solon with an alienation of the Athenians from the Aiginetans may have helped in lending credibility to the notion of Draco as a friend of Aigina. Other Athenians, however, turned the link between Draco and Aigina into a sinister story in which the *dusdaimonia* of the Aiginetans is foremost. With such partisan treatments of Draco current, it is not surprising that a segment of Athenian opinion, reflected in the codification of the laws, reacted against the pretensions of an oligarchic Draco. *IG I³ 104* suggests that Draco was assigned only those homicide laws that mentioned the *ephetai* and other jurors, officials with no wider constitutional significance. Draco's position *vis-à-vis* the Areiopagos was too controversial to admit in that publication of the laws.

Autonomoi kata tas spondas (Thucydides 1.67.2)

IN 432, on the eve of the Peloponnesian War, the Aiginetans sent envoys secretly to Sparta in order to support charges made against the Athenians by Spartan allies.¹ According to Thucydides, the Aiginetans claimed that the Athenians were not allowing them to be *αὐτόνομοι κατὰ τὰς σπονδὰς* 'autonomous in accordance with the treaty' (Thuc. 1.67.2; cf. Plut. *Per.* 29.5; DS 12.44.2).² The arguments and veiled threats of the Corinthians, seconded by the Megarians, who were damaged by the Megarian Decree, induced the Spartans to convey an ultimatum to Athens. The Athenians were to rescind the Megarian Decree, to withdraw from Poteidaia, and to allow the Aiginetans to be autonomous, or war would follow (1.139.1). Here I am concerned with the nature of this autonomy sought by the Aiginetans and its basis in international law. Elucidation of these two matters will entail identifying the *spondai* 'truces', to which Thucydides alludes so tantalizingly. In trying to determine the ancient (and particularly Thucydidean) valence of the concept of *autonomia*, at least regarding the Aiginetans, it will also be necessary to make an effort at establishing how Aiginetan independence was seen from an Athenian perspective. The reference to Aiginetan autonomy in Thucydides stands as an essential piece of evidence for the prevailing interpretations of autonomy in the fifth century. A critique of the validity of the Aiginetan claim to autonomy substantially changes our appreciation of ancient understandings of *autonomia*.³

I. THE CONCEPT OF AUTONOMY

It is attractive to begin with examples of the use of *αὐτόνομος* and related terms in Thucydides, both where less highly charged situations (than that prevailing on the eve of the war) are described and where the interrelations of the states involved were relatively simple. In Sicily, for example, the Sicels not under Syracusan control (or *ὑπήκοοι*) could be described as *αὐτόνομοι* 'autonomous' (6.88.4). Note also the autonomous Thracians, that is, those not

1. The following studies will be cited by author: E.S. Bickerman, "Autonomia: sur un passage de Thucydide (I, 144, 2)," *RIDA* 5 (1958) 313-44; M. Ostwald, *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History* (*American Classical Studies* 11, 1982); K.A. Raaflaub, *Die Entdeckung der Freiheit* (Munich 1985); B. Smarczyk, *Bünderautonomie und athenische Seebundspolitik im Dekeleischen Krieg* (Frankfurt am Main 1986).

2. Plutarch's biographies are cited after the Budé edition of R. Flacelière and E. Chambry.

3. The internal logic of the questions which I am posing establishes its own order for the presentation of ancient evidence on autonomy. It should, however, be noted that all the relevant fifth-century attestations of *αὐτόνομος* and related terms are discussed below.

under the control of the Odrysian kings but on occasion allied with them.⁴ Outside Thucydides, this meaning ‘independent’ for *αὐτόνομος* is attested in Herodotus and in the Hippocratic corpus.⁵ Clearly, *αὐτόνομος* in these examples has the meaning of ‘independent’ pure and simple. Naturally, the concept of independence often emerges in contrast to those who are not independent or in juxtaposition to descriptions of powers that might infringe on liberty. Yet, that does not make autonomy freedom granted by a stronger power or even freedom as seen externally. ‘Independent’ is also an obvious definition on the basis of composition, a conclusion that is seconded by lexicographical glosses in the same sense for the verb *αὐτονομέομαι* (*Anec. Bekk.* 1.466; *Suda* α 4512 Adler; Photius 3248 Theodoridis; all *s.v.* *αὐτονομουμένη πόλις*: [e.g.] *ἡ τοῖς αὐτῆς νόμοις χρωμένη καὶ οὐχ ὑπακούουσα ἑτέροις*; cf. *ΣThuc.* 2.29). Even when we exclude the controversial connotations derived from both Spartan and Athenian rhetoric about their own and each other’s alliances (discussed just below), the meaning ‘independent’ for *αὐτόνομος* is attested in Thucydides for Greek *poleis* as in its application to the Greek cities (like Gela) aligned with Syracuse (7.58.3). This same connotation appears in diplomatic language, as indicated in the description of Delphi and the Delphians in the Peace of Nikias as *αὐτονόμους*, *αὐτοτελείς* ‘fiscally discrete’, and *αὐτοδίκους* ‘self-adjudging’ (5.18.2; on the status of the Chalcidians in the same treaty: see III below).⁶ Nonetheless, these comparisons do not take us very far, because *αὐτόνομος* is also used of *poleis* which seem to external appearances to have accepted the hegemony of others and to have been thereby constrained in their foreign policy, if not in their internal political life.

4. In *Thuc.* 2.29.2, the kingdom of Teres and Sitalkes is contrasted explicitly with the autonomous part of Thrace. In 2.96.2, the autonomous Thracians are mercenaries or volunteers in the service of Sitalkes, and not his subjects (cf. 2.98.4), while 2.96.3–4 describes autonomous Paionians and Triballians beyond the borders of his realm. Finally, the forces of Sitalkes are so impressive in 429/8 that the autonomous Thracians outside his kingdom to the north become terrified (2.101.3).

5. Herodotus’ description of the status of the Medes after the fall of Assyria: they were *autonomoi* until they fell under the control of Deïokes, who was enamored of *τυραννίδος* (1.96.1). J.E. Powell, *A Lexicon to Herodotus* (Cambridge 1938) 53, glosses ‘independently governed’. Hippocrates (*On Airs, Waters, Places* 16 *ter*) offers an anthropological argument in order to explain the unwarlike character of the Asians; they avoided the risks of war, since the benefits of war accrued to their masters. The autonomous inhabitants of Asia were, on the contrary, quite warlike. Ostwald’s observation (p. 12) that these *autonomoi* “though they live in the shadow of a superior power which potentially threatens their existence, still enjoy a degree of self-determination and independence” suggests that the *autonomoi* were the Greek cities of Asia under Persian control. Yet the subject cities would scarcely make war. Hippocrates is thinking, rather, of totally independent Greeks and barbarians (*μὴ δεσπόζονται*).

6. It was perhaps necessary to add terms like *αὐτοδίκος* and *αὐτοτελής* to *αὐτόνομος* because the treaty was sworn by two states with different connotations of autonomy. For the Athenians, to declare Delphi autonomous would not necessarily preclude the exercise of fiscal influence and judicial authority over it by the Phokians. See below I.B. The addition of two compounds based on *αὐτο-* is intended not only to specify but also to imply that *αὐτοδίκος* and *αὐτοτελής* are aspects of *αὐτόνομος*.

A. Autonomy According to the Spartans

The Spartan definition of autonomy appears to be close to the sense of 'independence' just noted. Autonomy, however, does not preclude acknowledgement of Sparta as *hēgemōn*.⁷ The best sources for this Spartan understanding (at least during the fifth century) are Spartan diplomacy and self-justifications as reported by Thucydides. Let us exclude from the discussion, for the moment, both the initial Spartan call for the autonomy of Aigina and their subsequent demand for the autonomy of all Athenian allies (1.139.1, 3). Elsewhere, in no passage is *autonomia* distinguished from *eleutheria* 'freedom'.

In 429, Arkhidamos rebuked the Plataians, who reminded him of a Spartan guarantee of their own autonomy, by speaking of the need for the Plataians to refrain from helping Athens enslave Greece, if they were to be autonomous (see VI below; 2.72.1: αὐτοί τε αὐτονομεῖσθε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνελευθεροῦτε . . . παρασκευή τε τοσσήδε καὶ πόλεμος γέγνηται αὐτῶν ἔνεκα | καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐλευθερώσεως). Consequently, for him, the goal of the war was *eleutheria* or *autonomia*, terms utilized interchangeably.⁸ The same attitude is exhibited by Brasidas at Akanthos.⁹ Hermokrates is probably echoing Spartan polemics when he emphasizes that the Athenians will not encounter slavish Ionians, Hellespontians, and islanders in Sicily, but free (ἐλεύθεροι) Dorians from the autonomous (αὐτονόμου) Peloponnesus (Thuc. 6.77.1). So central is this theme to Spartan self-justification that, after the Athenian/Spartan alliance, the Corinthians could turn their own rhetoric against the Spartans in claiming to the Argives that the alliance with Athens was intended to enslave the Peloponnese (5.27.2). So every autonomous city ought to assist Argos in resisting. That independence is at issue is affirmed by the phrase qualifying such adherents (καὶ δίκας ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας δίδωσι), since the ability to arrange procedures for adjudicating disputes is a quality of the independent.

The Athenians were sceptical of this autonomy under Spartan hegemony, as is shown both by the Athenian ambassadors at Sparta and by Perikles in his answer to the final Spartan ultimatum (1.76.1–2, 1.144.2). Similarly, Thucydides himself could observe that the Spartans imposed oligarchy on their allies (1.19; cf. 5.81.2).¹⁰ Spartan moves to break up regional hegemonies in the

7. My analysis hence will diverge from Bickerman, Ostwald, and Raaflaub (esp. 189–207), who see a single (rather amorphous to my mind) definition of *autonomia* (shared by both Athenians and Spartans), a meaning in which it was usually distinguished from *eleutheria*.

8. Cf. Raaflaub 193–94.

9. 4.86.1: ἐπ' ἐλευθερώσει δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων παρελήλυθα . . . οὓς ἂν ἔγωγε προσαγάγωμαι ξυμμάχους ἔσεσθαι αὐτονόμους; 4.87.5: ἐλευθεροῦν; αὐτονομίαν; cf. 88.1. For further references to *eleutheria*, see 4.85.5, 6; 86.4; 87.2–4. It is probable, however, that Thucydides intended his readers to exercise scepticism regarding Brasidas' account of Spartan aims in the war (cf. 4.108.5). See W.R. Connor (*Thucydides* [Princeton 1984] 132–34), who compares 4.86.1, 88.1 with 3.59.2, and notes 4.108.2–6.

10. That such a view was all too credible is demonstrated by Brasidas' disclaimer of any Spartan desire to impose an oligarchy on the Akanthians (4.86.4–5). There is, however, no reason to attribute anachronism to Thucydides and to think that the critical perspective on the constitutional latitude given to Sparta's allies was a product of the war years. Cf. Raaflaub 156–60.

Peloponnesus like those of Elis or Mantinea could be described from the Spartan perspective as recognizing the autonomy of Lepreon (5.31.4; cf. Xen. *HG* 3.2.23), or making the Parrhasioi autonomous (5.33.3; cf. 5.81.1). But, from a Mantineian perspective, the struggle for supremacy in their own district is a battle both for *arkhē* and against *douleia* (5.69.1). Such doubts about Sparta's true policies toward autonomous cities do not, however, affect the conclusion that *eleutheria* and autonomy were equated by the Spartans. Rather they exploit that equation.

Furthermore, it is, in fact, just possible to glimpse a fundamental justification for Spartan hegemony over autonomous cities that has been overlooked. In the Spartan resolution offering peace terms to Argos of 418–17, it is stipulated that all Peloponnesian cities (καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας) are to be autonomous κατὰ πάτρια (5.77.5). The same formula for the status of the Peloponnesian cities appears in the *spondai* and *summakhia* between the same two states which followed shortly afterward: αὐτόνομοι καὶ αὐτοπόλεις, τὰν αὐτῶν ἔχοντες κατὰ πάτρια, δίκας δίδοντες τὰς ἴσας καὶ ὁμοίας (5.79.1). The phrase κατὰ πάτρια should go with the preceding clause, as is customary, as Bickerman observes: it qualifies the territorial *status quo*, not arbitration or adjudicatory procedures as it does just above this clause.¹¹ The expression αὐτοπόλεις and the earlier reference to the rest (ἄλλαι) of the cities help to reformulate the point made in the resolution (5.79.1 with 78.2, 5).¹² The autonomy clause is limited to cities, so that various sub-political entities were excluded. Those controlled by Argos and Sparta were to remain under their domination, as parts of the *khōra* of the cities—they had no recourse to the treaty. Claims on other districts made by other signatories were excluded as non-traditional.¹³ The territorial *status quo* was to remain in existence, and, significantly, that dispensation may be qualified with κατὰ πάτρια just like autonomy in the resolution. In both contexts, the phrase ought to mean 'in accordance with tradition', and not 'because of tradition'. In other words, κατὰ πάτρια does not provide in and of itself a justification for autonomy or territorial integrity, but reminds the signatories in an abbreviated notation that traditional patterns are to prevail.¹⁴

11. Bickerman n. 59, p. 333. Compare note 14 below.

12. Note the Akanthian ambassador at Sparta in his speech urging action against Olynthos, Xen. *HG* 5.2.14: ἡμεῖς δὲ, ὦ ἄνδρες Λακεδαιμόνιοι, βουλόμεθα μὲν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρῆσθαι καὶ αὐτοπολίται εἶναι. That Akanthos ought not to be federated with Olynthos is a matter of tradition.

13. Note *HCT* 4.141 and Ostwald 5.

14. In the same spirit, the phrase elsewhere in Thucydides describes the practice of allowing enemies a truce to pick up their dead (4.98.8), and characterizes the autonomous status of Delphi and the Delphians in the Peace of Nikias (5.18.2). Ostwald 3–9 argues that here and in the Spartan resolution autonomy is guaranteed by the πάτρια and that autonomy was contingent upon the willingness to resort to arbitration. The same πάτρια, however, in the preceding clause of the Peace of Nikias conditions the manner in which all Greeks were to have access to panhellenic sanctuaries, qualifying infinitives like θύειν and θεωρεῖν, and obviously does not establish the access in itself. In 4.118.1, κατὰ πατρίους νόμους 'in accordance with ancestral customs/laws', serves as an equivalent expression referring to Delphi in the Spartan/Athenian truce of 423. This

This interpretation is supported when we consider the appearances of *κατὰ πάτρια* in diplomatic contexts where arbitration is mentioned. In the treaty with Argos, the phrase *κατὰ πάτρια* qualifies the recourse to arbitration by Spartans and Argives (5.79.1: ἐπὶ τοῖς ἴσοις καὶ ὁμοίοις δίκας διδόντας *κατὰ πάτρια*). A similar qualification of arbitration with *κατὰ πάτρια* stands in the truce of 423 between Athens and Sparta (4.118.8). A specification for arbitration on equitable terms also appears after the territory clause in the Argive/Spartan treaty. We have already encountered it in the Corinthian proposal to Argos. It is a formulation asserting the freedom to establish mechanisms for adjudicating disputes and recognizing a similar ability in others. So its juxtaposition with autonomy is unsurprising. The meaning of *κατὰ πάτρια* when connected to arbitration is elucidated by its appearance in the final clause of the Argive/Spartan treaty to describe how individual citizens of signatory cities are to have their disputes litigated (5.79.4: τῶς δὲ ἕτας *κατὰ πάτρια* δικάζεσθαι ‘private citizens are to litigate in accordance with tradition’). Here the prepositional phrase is clearly modal, and not a citation of the authority for such a clause.¹⁵ In all three treaties, the phrase *κατὰ πάτρια* does not establish arbitration or litigation as valid any more than it necessitates interstate agreements to these ends (cf. also 2.2.4). In fact, the treaties themselves mandate prescriptions such as recourse to arbitration and autonomy.

Elsewhere in Thucydides, the phrase *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια*, with the meaning ‘in accordance with traditional rights and duties’, is conspicuous in justification of Theban hegemony over Plataia (2.2.4; 3.66.1; cf. τὰ [κοινὰ] πάτρια: 3.61.2, 65.2). These Boiotian *patria* entailed the subordination of Plataia, not its autonomy. The Thebans could even imply that the *eleutheria* or autonomy of the Boiotians (equalling independence in 1.113.4) meant Theban hegemony (1.113.4; 3.62.5; cf. 3.67.3).¹⁶ Therefore, it is not autonomy that is traditional.¹⁷ It is rather the division of the Peloponnesus into zones of influence between Sparta and Argos which prevails despite the general grant of autonomy. Spartan hegemony over the Peloponnesus (grounded in the Dorian conquest of the region) was a part of these *patria* in accordance with which autonomy was to be exercised.

One could conclude from the valence given to autonomy-language by the Spartans that they were asking for Aiginetan independence before the war. There is, in addition, a specific indication that this was actually the case, in that the Spartans seem to have demanded Aiginetan independence again after the beginning of the Peloponnesian War. The reception of this demand at Athens

patently stands as shorthand for Amphictyonic practice and enactment alongside the prescriptive qualification τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις χρώμενοι (4.118.3 *bis*).

15. See HCT 4.144–45.

16. The dropping of the phrase *κατὰ τὰ πάτρια* from the Peace of Antalkidas and the subsequent common peaces was significant (Xen. HG 5.1.31: τὰς δὲ ἄλλας Ἑλληνίδας πόλεις καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας αὐτονόμους ἀφείναι). The traditional leadership over the Boiotians exercised by the Thebans was thereby unprotected in fourth-century provisions for general autonomy.

17. Cf. Ostwald 7.

shows its congruence with the aforesaid Spartan characterizations of autonomy. In the *Acharnians* (652–54) of 426/5, Aristophanes refers to a Spartan demand for control of Aigina in joking that their purpose was to procure the services of the poet, who was affiliated with the island. Either this demand was made in the course of the abortive attempt by the Athenians to get satisfactory terms for peace in 430 (Thuc. 2.59.2; DS 12.45.5), or was disseminated amid hopes of Spartan overtures for peace in 426 (cf. Thuc. 3.89.1; 5.16.2–3).¹⁸ Liberation of Aigina from Athenian control was consonant with the Spartan understanding of the term autonomy to denote independence.¹⁹ If we are to believe that the Spartans were calling for Aiginetan independence on the eve of the war, we are left with a mystery concerning the identity of the *spondai* in question: can Athens at any time have conceded Aigina independence?

B. The Athenians on Autonomy

In the terminology of Thucydides on the Athenian Empire, autonomy denotes the status of allied cities maintaining an independent military establishment, who were thereby exempt from the mechanism for exaction of tribute. Euphemos, the Athenian ambassador at the conference at Kamarina (6.85.2), distinguishes between autonomous allies like Chios and the Methymnians of Lesbos (Χίους μὲν καὶ Μηθυμναίους νεῶν παροκωχῇ αὐτονόμους), the subject allies (τοὺς δὲ πολλοὺς χρημάτων βιαιότερον φορᾶ ... ξυμμάχουντας), and completely independent allies like the islands in the Ionian Sea such as Zakynthos and Kephallenia (ἄλλους δὲ καὶ πάνυ ἐλευθέρως ξυμμαχοῦντας). Yet the same allies from the Ionian Sea in the third category here are on another occasion called autonomous by Thucydides (7.57.7). The vicissitudes of war affected assignment to the *eleutheroi* or the *autonomoi*. Euphemos follows his denomination of the Ionian Sea islands as independent by noting their importance for the war because of their position relative to the Peloponnese (6.85.2).²⁰ If a cessation, however, of threats to Athenian hegemony in the northwest took place, the independent Ionian Sea islands might have less latitude in external policy and come to be considered autonomous.²¹ The important criterion for recognizing allies as independent rather than autonomous is the contingency of their alliance on the present war, as Thucydides notes in his account of the Argives at Syracuse (7.57.9). Such ties were perforce impermanent. Accordingly, the Argives would be the best example of an independent ally, for they are distinguished from but juxtaposed with the autonomous in 6.69.3.

18. See Figueira *Colonization* 82–83.

19. Cf. *HCT* 1.451–52, where it is suggested that Perikles anticipated a demand for the surrender of Aigina, if the Athenians rescinded the Megarian Decree (cf. Thuc. 1.139.4–5).

20. Even an independent ally like Corcyra, whose connection with Athens was contingent upon the war, could still be deemed to be in the process of enslavement to Athens in the rhetoric of pro-Peloponnesians, when it considered moving from an *epimakhia* to a *summakhia* (Thuc. 3.70.3: καταδουλοῦν; 3.71.1: δουλωθεῖν).

21. In his discussion of their service in Sicily, Thucydides describes them as constrained (κατειργόμενοι) because the Athenians controlled the sea (7.57.7).

While the *eleutheroi* could be merged with the autonomous when an emphasis was placed on their following Athenian leadership, the distinction between autonomy and subject status is sharper and specifically marked by the provision of military forces to the Athenian alliance and freedom from the assessment of tribute. Numerous passages illustrate these criteria: Thuc. 3.10.5 (military service), cf. 3.11.1; 3.39.2 (possession of warships); 6.85.2, 7.57.4 (provision of warships), note 8.91.3; cf. 1.19; 3.11.1; 6.84.3.²² Note the phrase οὐχ' ὑποτελεῖς . . . φόρου (7.57.4; cf. οὐ φόρῳ ὑπήκοοι: 7.57.5). The association of the provision of ships and autonomy is so close that Euphemos describes the Chians and Methymnians as autonomous by the virtue of provision (παροκωχῆ) of ships.²³ Another token of autonomy was the possession of walls (3.39.2; 8.91.3; cf. 3.50.1–2) so that their demolition and the surrender of ships were interpreted together as a demotion in status (Thuc. 3.3.3 for Mytilene). A particularly valuable passage is Thucydides' account of the surrender of the Samian rebels: demolition of walls, tendering of hostages, surrender of ships, and responsibility to make payments (1.117.3). That this all amounts to subject status is indicated by the brief reference to the Byzantine surrender that follows: ξυνέβησαν δὲ καὶ Βυζάντιοι ὥσπερ καὶ πρότερον ὑπήκοοι εἶναι. The possession of ships and fortifications amount to the military capability which was an essential aspect of autonomy as emphasized by Euphemos at Kamarina. He attempts to account for the incongruity of fighting for the freedom of the Sicilian Chalcidians of Leontinoi while the Chalcidians of Euboea are subjects of Athens (6.84.3): ξύμφορος ἡμῖν ἀπαράσκευος ὦν καὶ χρήματα μόνον φέρων, τὰ δ' ἐνθάδε καὶ Λεοντῖνοι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι φίλοι ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτονομούμενοι; '(the Euboian Chalcidian) being unprepared militarily and only contributing tribute is helpful to us, but, in the situation here,

22. It has been argued that these classifications were not clear-cut, on the basis of the catalogue of Athenian forces at Syracuse (Thuc. 7.57.1–11), which has been held to treat the Chians and Methymnians as *hupēkooi*. The Chians, however, are not to be considered *hupēkooi* in 7.57.4. In the first place, the classification of the three groups of non-Athenian allies in 7.57.3 (*hupēkooi*, *autonomoi*, and mercenaries) is not programmatic, but gives way to a list with a mixed ethnic and geographical organization. Although the partitive genitive phrase καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑπηκόων καὶ φόρου ὑποτελῶν heads the sub-list of which the last item is the Chians, its syntactical role is forgotten as the sentence proceeds under the influence of the prepositional phrases ἀπὸ δὲ νήσων and ἐκ δ' Ἰωνίας, so that Thucydides can finally observe in the next sentence without glaring inconsistency: τούτων Χῖοι οὐχ ὑποτελεῖς ὄντες φόρου. Cf. HCT 4.433–35; T.J. Quinn, *Athens and Samos, Lesbos and Chios: 478–404 B.C.* (Manchester 1981) 97–98. Those believing (like HCT 4.434; Ostwald 28–30) that the payment of tribute was consistent with autonomous status also cite 7.57.5 (cf. 6.85.2): πρὸς δ' αὐτοῖς Αἰολῆς, Μηθυμναῖοι μὲν ναυσὶ καὶ οὐ φόρῳ ὑπήκοοι, Τενέδιοι δὲ καὶ Αἰνιοὶ ὑποτελεῖς. If this is not to be taken as an especially broad definition of *hupēkooi*, the following hypothesis may be offered. The word ὑπήκοοι goes only with φόρῳ, and is thereby negated by οὐ. As the sentence has no verb, a word like ξυνεστράτευον (7.57.3) or ξυνείποντο (7.57.4) may be understood with ναυσί. The result is a reading which is not very neat, but perhaps that is not an insurmountable objection in this very compressed catalogue. Translate: "in addition to these, [there were] Aiolians: Methymnians [served] with ships, and not subjects by virtue of tribute, and Tenedians and Ainians [were] tributaries". Cf. also G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, "The Character of the Athenian Empire," *Historia* 3 (1954–1955) 1–41, esp. 16–21; Raaflaub 197–99.

23. Cf. Quinn *Athens and Samos* 98–99.

both the Leontinians and the other allies [are helpful], being autonomous as much as possible.²⁴

Some Athenians even visualized the acceptance of Spartan hegemony in terms of their own definition of autonomy. Members of the Four Hundred were willing to make peace with Sparta disadvantageously in order to preserve an oligarchic constitution: ... τὰς τε ναῦς καὶ τὰ τεῖχη ἔχοντες αὐτονομείσθαι: 8.91.3. Barring this result, rather than being at risk at the hands of a restored *dēmos*, the oligarchs preferred to reach an agreement with the Spartans ἄνευ τειχῶν καὶ νεῶν (cf. Xen. *HG* 2.2.20; DS 13.107.4). That this particularly Athenian sense of autonomy is not confined to the fifth century is shown by Andocides 3.14, where autonomous status is connected with the possession of walls and ships.²⁵ |

Thus, the language of autonomy provides a terminology appropriate for characterizing globally a political status which is less constrained than that of a *hypēkoos* 'subject' (and its relatives), a word with which the terminology of autonomy is directly contrasted (for non-Athenian examples: 5.33.1–3; 6.88.4), and also used for describing the tribute-paying allies of Athens.²⁶ The Athenian understanding of autonomy could even be extended by Thucydides to rural Attica itself, because the Athenians, although they formed a single people previously, had an autonomous *oikēsis* before their synoecism by Theseus (2.16.1).²⁷ Here, autonomy as interdependency precedes unification or consolidation (rather than subjection succeeding autonomy), and "interdependent independence" may be quite close to the Athenian appreciation of the status of their ship-contributing allies.

Moreover, actual Athenian diplomatic practice suggests that grants of autonomy were meant to establish a recognizable status and were thereby not merely symbolic acts. So the grants help us move our discussion beyond rhetoric. In the 420s, Mytilene had its autonomy restored, as attested by an Athenian decree.²⁸ The grant was made amid provisions for the withdrawal of cleruchs, an important amelioration of the previous, punitive situation there, and for the restoration of previously existing *symbolai*.²⁹ The reestablishment

24. See Ostwald 29 with n. 158, p. 62 on *aparaskeuos*. The term often has a disparaging sense (1.69.5, 80.3, 82.5, 84.1; 2.11.4; 3.4.2; 5.9.6; cf. 1.125.2; 2.87.5; 3.13.2; 6.49.1). Its use in 1.99.3 to describe how the Athenian allies shifted to the payment of tribute by reason of their inertia suggests the term had a place in Athenian apologetics.

25. Other would-be imperial powers adopted the same language; note the grant of autonomy by the Gortynians to the Rhittinians from the late fifth century at the earliest (*IC* 4.80, cf. 4.184). See R.F. Willetts, *Aristocratic Society in Ancient Crete* (London 1955) 110–14.

26. 1.77.2, 5; 1.117.3; 2.41.3; 3.50.3; 3.91.2; 3.102.2; 4.56.2; 4.61.5; 4.108.3; 5.84.2; 5.91.1; 6.21.2, 22; 6.43; 6.82.2, 84.2; 7.20.2; 7.28.4; 7.57.3–5; 7.63.3; 8.2.2; 8.64.2, 5; cf. 2.63.3.

27. I should not compare Hdt. 1.96.1 on the autonomy of the Medes before Deioke, where collective independence from a despot is foremost. Cf. Ostwald 13.

28. Tod *GHI* #63.11 = *IG* I³ 66; cf. Thuc. 3.50.1–3 for the loss of autonomy.

29. See A.W. Gomme, "*IG* I² 60 and Thucydides III 50.2," *Studies Presented to David Moore Robinson* (St. Louis 1951–1953) 2.334–39, dating to 425/4; also B.D. Meritt, "Athenian Covenant with Mytilene," *AJP* 75 (1954) 359–68, esp. 362–68, dating 427/6; P.A. Brunt, "Athenian

of autonomy set the stage for a rearming by Mytilene.³⁰ Samos was granted autonomy in 412 because of the loyalty to Athens of the Samian *dēmos*, newly established in power (Thuc. 8.21).³¹ The Samians had been non-autonomous previously (7.57.4). The grant of autonomy to Samos leads not surprisingly to a revival of independent Samian military activity at the side of the Athenians, as the 10 Samian ships assisting at Arginousai indicate (Xen. *HG* 1.6.29; cf. a single ship deployed in 412 before autonomy: Thuc. 8.16.1). Samos was also eventually refortified in 411 (Thuc. 8.50.5–51.2).³² After Aigospotamoi, the Athenians granted to the Samians the triremes left at Samos (DS 13.104.2; *IG* I³ 127.32 = Meiggs-Lewis 94).

The decree granting citizenship to the Samians in 405 probably restates many of the provisions of the grant of autonomy of 412/1 (*IG* I³ 127 = Meiggs-Lewis 94.15–16). Here, the stipulation of autonomy (15) is joined to provision for an independent choice of constitution (lines 12–13). It is combined with a clause describing how the Samians were to exercise political responsibility over their own affairs: *τοῖς δὲ νόμοις χρῆσθαι τοῖς σφετέροις αὐτῶν αὐτονόμος ὄντας* ‘to use their own laws being autonomous’ (15–16). Autonomy is specifically coupled with being governed by one’s own enactments, as though the infinitive phrase were an etymological gloss on the term *αὐτόνομος* itself.³³ Next a reaffirmation of previously existing *symbolai* strikes the dominant note of reciprocity (ll. 17–18): the Athenians do not impose on the Samians a pattern of interaction with themselves, but uphold the continuance of earlier agreements presumably made by the two states on a basis of equality. Still another clause clarifies the expected military role of the autonomous Samians: *ἐὰν δὲ πολεμῇν*

Settlements Abroad in the Fifth Century B.C.,” in E. Badian (ed.), *Ancient Society and Institutions* (Festschrift V. Ehrenberg, Oxford 1966) 71–92, esp. 82–84, dates to before 424. See, in general, Figueira *Colonization* 251–53.

30. The two Lesbian ships in Thuc. 5.84.1 (cf. 8.100.5) could be Mytilenean as well as Methymnian, and the allied force helping against the Mytilenean fugitives at Antandros might well have included Mytileneans (4.75.1). Moreover, if *IG* I³ 67 is correctly associated with Mytilene (as suggested by Meritt *AJP* [1954] 359–68), a rearming of the Mytileneans is likely. Lines 6–10 bear a prohibition against raiding or campaigning against the Athenians, which is significant not only in itself, but which is found elsewhere in the treaty with the independent ally Halieis (424/3): *IG* I³ 75.8–9. Cf. de Ste. Croix *Historia* (1954–1955) n. 4, p. 18 for the supposition that this grant was devoid of meaning. The Mytileneans may have had difficulties in taking full military advantage of their autonomy. The execution of 1000 members of the elite (3.50.1) would have left the city without many experienced officers and marines.

31. A fragmentary inscription praising the Samians derives from this round of diplomacy, *IG* I² 101 = I³ 96, for which see D.M. Lewis, “Notes on Attic Inscriptions,” *BSA* 49 (1954) 17–50, esp. 29–31. If lines 6–7 truly authorize the Samian *dēmos* to punish with death and exile, that power is presumably an aspect of their recovered autonomy. See also Smarczyk 17–22 for the political exploitation of the new autonomy.

32. See R. Legon, “Samos in the Delian League,” *Historia* 21 (1972) 145–58, esp. 156; Smarczyk 19; cf. Quinn *Athens and Samos* 74–75, esp. n. 55.

33. Hence I am uncertain whether the *nomoi* in question here concerned only judicial matters instead of including executive and legislative functions too. Cf. Ostwald 45. In general, note Smarczyk 22–31.

δέηι, παρασκ[ε]υάζεσθαι αὐτὸς ὥς ἂν δύνωνται ἄριστα πράττοντας μετὰ τῶν στρατηγῶν (22–23).

The existence of clauses on the constitution, *nomoi*, fidelity to agreements, and recourse to *sumbolai* suggests a desire to leave as little room for misreading as possible. Therefore it is not justifiable to conclude, for example, from the existence of a clause guaranteeing freedom of constitution that the concept of autonomy at Athens did not usually imply constitutional autonomy. The juxtaposition with the idea of autonomy implies that a series of stipulations of the opposite spirit would have been out of place alongside autonomy. During the Ionian War, the scant data in our possession suggest that the Athenians used grants of autonomy to encourage the return of rebels and dissidents to the Athenian camp.³⁴

The military valence of autonomy (so prominent in Thucydides) suggests that indicators of autonomy like walls, fleet, and freedom from tribute are not merely the outward signs but also the actual guarantors both of independence in external *and* internal affairs and of the necessity for a certain style of diplomacy in dealings with the *polis* considered autonomous.³⁵ The reaffirmation of *sumbolai*, many of which originated when independent states first allied themselves with Athens, in grants of autonomy (Mytilene, Samos, and perhaps Selymbria) shows that reciprocity was the keystone of such interaction. There can be no pretense of autonomy in a context of total dependence on another for one's security. Reciprocity depended on shared exertions and risks. Thus, the recovery of autonomy by Samos and Mytilene is accompanied by their cooperation in Athenian operations. Consequently, it is possible to understand why Athens was inclined to encourage the autonomy of its larger allies on expedient grounds. If cities were large enough, local governments were more efficient at utilizing their military potential than Athens could ever have been (compare the remarks of Euphemos at Kamarina).

The misadventures of the oligarchs of the Four Hundred in their management of Athens' subjects clarifies the military aspect of *autonomia*. If the reading of the majority of the manuscripts in 8.64.5 is correct, Thucydides, assuming the perspective of the elites of subject cities, contrasts an *ἄντικρυς*

34. The decree granting autonomy to the *koinon* of the Eteocarpaians belongs to this period (Tod *GHI* (2) #110.15); for the date: *HCT* 5.48, citing unpublished work of M.H. Jameson. For a possible grant of autonomy to Selymbria: Meiggs-Lewis 87.10–11 = *IG* I³ 118 with Smarczyk 5–10; cf. Plut. *Alcib.* 30.3–10; DS 13.66.4; Xen. *HG* 1.3.10. The decree refers to previous *sumbolai* (lines 22–26). Smarczyk suggests Byzantion, Klazomenai, and Neapolis in Thrace as other possibilities (10–17, 31–34, cf. 35–47).

35. Indications of this autonomous-style diplomacy are associated particularly with Chios as in Aristophanes' *Birds* (878–80, with scholia; cf. Hypereides fr. 194 Jensen; Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 104; Thrasymachus fr. B3 D/K), where the inclusion of the Chians in Athenian prayers is mentioned. The language of such diplomacy may also be judged from Eupolis fr. 232 K, where Chios is *καλὴ πόλις* or *καλὸν καλῶν πόλισμα* (Edmonds) 'noble city of noble men', which *πειθαρχεῖ καλῶς* 'obeys legitimate authority nobly'. Regarding Mytilene, Quinn (*Athens and Samos* 31–32) cites the use of the verbs *τιμάω* and *θεραπεύω* (also *θεραπεία*) to qualify Athenian diplomacy with that state before its revolt (Thuc. 3.9.3, 11.7, 12.1, 39.2, 5).

'direct' ἐλευθερία with a ὑπόυλος 'fallacious' or 'unsound' | αὐτονομία.³⁶ Under the leadership of Peisander, the Athenian oligarchs encouraged the establishment of oligarchies in the subject cities (8.64.1–2), presumably because such regimes had a greater legitimacy (!) or their creation would appease potential rebels.³⁷ Thus, to these Athenian oligarchs, autonomy meant the "freedom" to choose one's own constitution, even an oligarchic one, which is exactly the same privilege accorded the autonomous Samians. In the case of Thasos, highlighted by Thucydides, however, the new oligarchy fortified the city and defected to Sparta, achieving the direct *eleutheria* already noted (8.64.3–5). Consequently, for anti-Athenians, autonomy under Athenian control is insufficient, even though it contains the right of establishing a different constitution. Constitutional liberty did indeed entail the existence of a military establishment. Elevated status and military power tempted allied aristocrats to opt for the Spartan offer of αὐτονομία or ἐλευθερία, probably because autonomy *within* the Athenian alliance did not offer immunity for carrying out factional programs of aggression and for settling grudges between social groups.

While the Spartan idea of autonomy as an independence which could be reconciled with an unequal alliance and the Athenian notion of autonomy as a superior status, held by allies who made military contributions, are not entirely dissimilar, the two definitions cannot be taken to coincide. The clash between Spartan and Athenian conceptions of *autonomia* can be seen in the remarks of the Mytileneans at Olympia in the presence of the Spartans. At times, the Mytileneans recognize their favored status (reflecting the Athenian perspective on autonomy) among the members of the Delian League (3.10.5–6, 11.1; cf. 3.39.2), but at other times they adopt a position equating their status with subjection and the Spartan cause with a liberation movement (3.13.1). The rhetoric of the Mytilenean envoys is driven by a powerful urgency to exculpate themselves from Athenian imperialism in which they had collaborated. Their difficulty in dramatizing their powerlessness in traditional political terminology helps explain why a new vocabulary of hegemony was invented to account for the relations of the Athenians with their subjects and allies.

An Athenian like Diodotos, arguing the case for sparing the same Mytileneans, makes his language reflect their dilemma: Athenian subjects are paradoxically both ἐλεύθερος 'free' and ἀρχόμενος βία 'ruled by force' and they

36. All the manuscripts read αὐτονομίας except B (the Vatican manuscript 126), which has εὐνομίας with αὐτονομίας as a marginal correction. DH *Amm.* 2.11 reads εὐνομίας, which is not telling in light of the freedom of other of his citations. HCT 5.160–61 defends εὐνομίας on the grounds that εὐνομία under Athens was spurious and because no grant of autonomy had been made. M. Ostwald, *Nomos and the Beginnings of Athenian Democracy* (Oxford 1969) 176–77, upholds αὐτονομίας among other reasons because ὑπόυλος makes best sense connected with a political slogan known to have been used in the war, and that αὐτονομία would be a reasonable denomination for the status being offered allied cities by the oligarchs. See also Ostwald 46.

37. Phrynikhos, a major figure in the oligarchic councils, argued against such a view in 8.48.5–6, once again employing what was probably the rhetoric of Athens' enemies: οὐ γὰρ βουλήσασθαι αὐτοὺς μετ' ὀλιγαρχίας ἢ δημοκρατίας δουλεύειν μᾶλλον ἢ μεθ' ὁποτέρου ἂν τύχωσι τούτων ἐλευθέρους εἶναι. See C.H. Grayson, "Two Passages in Thucydides," *CQ* 22 (1972) 62–73.

revolt for the sake of autonomy *εἰκότως* ‘appropriately’ (3.46.5–6). Here, uniquely, autonomy for an Athenian denotes a higher status than *eleutheria*. Kleon, however, provides us with a formulation more in tune with Athenian political vocabulary: the Mytileneans were *αὐτόνομοι* (3.39.2), but the break from Athenian hegemony is liberation (*ἐλευθέρωσις*: 3.39.7).

The understanding of *αὐτονόμος* as ‘independent’, which is exemplified in Thucydides by the Spartans, is probably the prior one (although the Athenians were justified in adducing how it ignored Spartan interference in allied affairs). The Athenian definition of autonomy as the highest status within the Delian League is then a secondary development, which makes distinctions about the League members which were not acknowledged by hostile observers like the Spartans. The appearance of autonomy-language in Athenian official phraseology reinforces my contention that at Athens the conceptual break between *αὐτονόμος* and *ὑπήκοος* was sharp. Hence the vocabulary of autonomy is not likely to have originated among the opponents of that authority over the allies.³⁸ The complexity of interrelations within the Athenian *arkhē*, along with a growing economic interdependence ([Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 2.11–13), was challenging an earlier and simpler political terminology that defined status in polarities such as “free” and “subject”. The latitude of most *poleis* in foreign policy was decreasing. In politics of small size, constraints on external policy necessarily restricted the scope of constitutional and social legislation.

II. AIGINETAN AUTONOMY IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ADVENT OF WAR

It is against the background of these differing understandings of autonomy that we must assess Thucydides’ introduction of Aiginetan autonomy into his account of the causation of the Peloponnesian War. The historian gives no details about any rights to autonomy for the Aiginetans by treaty, or about the circumstances under which a putative autonomy might have been infringed. Rather, the confrontations over Corcyra and Poteidaia are emphasized in his portrayal of the pressure brought by Sparta’s allies. By his very reticence, Thucydides seems to be indicating that events involving Aigina did not have a substantial impact on the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. Yet the guilt of the Aiginetans in the minds of ordinary Athenians was quite a different matter. When the Athenians made their decision to remove the Aiginetans from their island in 431, they justified this harsh act by charging that the Aiginetans were quite responsible for the war (2.27.1). Hence, Thucydides was correcting—in this case through his silence—a popular appreciation of the causation of the war.³⁹ His glancing attention toward the Aiginetan demand for

38. Cf. Ostwald 38–41.

39. Cf. E. Schwartz, *Das Geschichtswerk des Thukydides*² (Bonn 1929) 92–101, 117–28, who thought that Thucydides intended to include a complete treatment on the subject of Aiginetan autonomy (on the scale of the Corcyra or Poteidaia incidents) in his causation of the war, but changed his views. Yet, we lack even the outline of such a treatment, and its importance would be quite out of keeping with the Periclean interpretation of the autonomy issue (see directly below). See *HCT* 1.465–67.

autonomy sufficed for him, probably because the issue was a notorious one, immediately recognizable. Unfortunately, his context is not immediately apparent to us who depend, for a start, almost exclusively on his incidental remarks. Nonetheless, one must insist that both Thucydidean disinterest in Aiginetan autonomy as a cause for the war and Athenian indignation about Aiginetan instigation alike suggest that the Aiginetan charge of unfair deprivation of autonomy was not well founded.

Furthermore, Spartan diplomacy seems to imply that the case for Aiginetan autonomy was not strong enough to venture arbitration, the procedure for the adjudication of disputes under the Thirty Years Peace, to which the Athenians were prepared to submit (Thuc. 1.140.2). If the Spartans were sincere in their avowal of gratitude for Aiginetan help during the Helot Revolt (cf. 2.27.1–2, 4.56.2), arbitration might have been advantageous to the Aiginetans, but only if their claim had merit. Even if we believe that they were not—the result of their advocacy was after all the exile of the Aiginetans—there was also the prospect of a military advantage in depriving the Athenians of the use of a naval base, conveniently situated for operations against the Peloponnese, Attica, and the Aegean (Thuc. 2.27.1–2; cf., e.g., *Hell. Oxy.* VIII(III).1–2; Xen. *HG* 5.1.1–13, 18–24, 29; 5.4.61; see pp. 326–35 below). Even without achieving an Athenian surrender of the island, their purpose would have been better served had they made a trial of arbitration. At the least, submission to arbitration would have encouraged those Athenians reluctant to second the Periclean policy of fighting rather than making concessions, as Arkhidamos advised them before hostilities (Thuc. 1.85.2). Moreover, the Spartans themselves came eventually to recognize the impropriety of their decision to begin the Archidamian War, because they refused to submit to arbitration and the Thebans had attacked Plataia. Thus, they sought a better *casus belli* in 414/3 (Thuc. 7.18.2).

That grounds existed to support the autonomy claim is further underlined by the elaboration of demands for autonomy in Sparta's final embassy. They then called for autonomy (independence to them) for all of the Greeks, including Athens' allies (1.139.3). This was a request for nothing less than the dissolution of the Delian League and of the Athenian *arkhē*, and can have had no basis in any interstate agreements accepted by Athens.⁴⁰ Such a demand stigmatizes Athens as a general threat to Greek freedom, and attempts to delegitimize Athenian authority over the allies. It can only have been made when war was inevitable. The addition of unconditional calls for autonomy suggests that the Spartans had already recognized a profitable area for propagandizing (explicit in Thuc. 2.8.4–5), later so well represented in the public statements attributed to them by Thucydides. Was the previous call for Aiginetan autonomy necessarily any better grounded than its successor, the demand for autonomy for all the Greeks?

40. G. Grote, *A History of Greece*² (London 1888) 5.31; *HCT* 1.451–55; cf. Bickerman 343–44; H. Nesselhauf, "Die diplomatischen Verhandlungen vor dem peloponnesischen Kriege (Thukydides 1, 139ff.)," *Hermes* 69 (1934) 286–99, esp. 291–93.

The Thucydidean minimization of the significance of Aiginetan autonomy adopts a stance that is consciously Periclean. According to Thucydides, Perikles addressed the Athenian *ekklēsia* on the answer to be made to the Spartan specific and general demands for autonomy. First of all, starting from the refusal of arbitration he advised the Athenians that the precise Spartan terms did not convey a true reading of the Spartan determination for war. Acquiescing in the terms of the ultimatum would merely elicit more ultimatums (1.140.5), because it showed that Athenian fear would render more concessions (1.141.1).⁴¹ It is significant that the peremptory character of the Spartan demands—forms of *ἐπιτάσσω* and *κελεύω* appear (1.140.2, 5; 141.1)—is specifically coupled with the Spartan refusal to resort to arbitration as established by the Thirty Years Peace (1.140.2–5, 141.1). Next, the long central portion of Perikles' speech was devoted to an appraisal of the relative military potential of the Peloponnesians (1.141.2–143.5), which led to a cautious optimism about Athenian prospects. In his conclusion, however, Perikles returned from general concerns to the answer specifically to be made to Spartan conditions for peace. Seeking to reestablish diplomatic equality, he provided a list of counter-conditions in return for Athenian compliance with the Spartan ultimatum. Here, Perikles offers to grant autonomy to cities if they were autonomous at the time of the Thirty Years Peace, and to make a general grant of autonomy if Sparta would grant autonomy to its allies under conditions chosen by the allies themselves (1.144.2; see the Chronological Table, pp. 409–18 below, for further references to the Spartan demand and Athenian answer; none add anything of historical value). There is a tendency to see the counter-conditions as merely ironic:⁴² Perikles was scoring rhetorical points concerning the very vagueness of the concept of *autonomia*.⁴³ |

41. That Thucydides believed this assessment to be correct can be seen from the manner in which he presents the decisions of the Spartan assembly (1.88) and of the Peloponnesian League (1.125.1–2). See *HCT* 1.466–67.

42. E.g., *HCT* 1.463; Nesselhauf *Hermes* (1934) 298–99; J. Classen (rev. J. Steup), *Thukydides*⁵ (Berlin 1914–1922) 1.375. Perikles' other counter-condition was for Sparta to deny itself *xenēlasia* in return for the rescinding of the Megarian Decree. The scholiast to this passage (1.144.2) calls this condition impossible, leading Gomme (*HCT* 1.462) to doubt its applicability. In fact, this counter-proposal was well designed, because it offered a trade-off on two internal matters vexatious to either side for their economic consequences. See Bickerman 320. [See also E. Badian, "Thucydides and the Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War. A Historian's Brief," in J. Allison (ed.), *Conflict, Antithesis, and the Ancient Historian* (Columbus 1990) 46–91, 169–81, esp. 81–87 attempts to find in the Spartan focus on the rescinding of the Megarian Decree in the penultimate approaches a legitimate attempt at peace by upholding Sparta's right to protect its allies. Unfortunately, he fails to countenance the idea that the Spartans were interfering in Athenian internal policies in such a unilateral fashion as to reinforce Periclean suspicions that their true goal was merely intimidation.]

43. Ostwald 42–43: *αὐτονομία* was a "political football"; Perikles' counter-conditions are an example of "cynicism". [More recently, Badian *Conflict* 83–84 finds here an effort by a Perikles, intent on provoking war, to sabotage a legitimate Spartan proposal to recognize the integrity of the Athenian Empire by rescinding a general autonomy clause of the Thirty Years Peace (see pp. 270–71, 286–87 below)].

Perikles, however, was offering two separate conditions for grants of autonomy in its two connotations, Athenian and Spartan.⁴⁴ If the Spartans could enumerate cities not presently autonomous, but which were autonomous at the time of the Thirty Years Peace, Perikles was prepared to advise the Athenians to make them autonomous. In this case, he envisages a form of autonomy within the *arkhē*, probably autonomy in its Athenian connotation of non-tributary status. On the other hand, if the Spartans preferred to grant autonomy to their own allies, the Athenians were prepared to match any of their concessions. Here, Perikles accepts the Spartan equation of autonomy with independence, but objects to a characterization of Spartan allies as autonomous because of Spartan interference in their internal affairs: *μὴ σφίσι ἐπιτηδείως αὐτονομεῖσθαι, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς ἐκάστοις ὡς βούλονται*.

But if these are truly two different terms for two different autonomies (and not two equally binding pre-conditions), why does not Thucydides say "or" instead of "and" in joining them? He does not because the two conditions are not entirely true alternatives. The two Periclean conditions for Athenian grants of autonomy must also be connected with the two stages in the Spartan demands for autonomy. The case of Aigina, perhaps with Poteidaia, seems to be envisaged in the offer to grant autonomy to any state autonomous at the time of the Thirty Years Peace. Naturally, the second demand has superseded the first ultimatum so that merely declaring Aigina or Poteidaia autonomous was no longer a valid route of escape from the crisis. Yet, Perikles had to cope with his opponents' wishful thinking on this issue without surrendering political will to the same fantasy.⁴⁵ His emphasis remains on the Spartans' piling on of contradictory demands.

Perikles seems confident that Aigina could not be described as autonomous under the provisions of the Thirty Years Peace.⁴⁶ So the *spondai*

44. Bickerman (n. 26, p. 321) puts a comma after *εἰ*, thus coordinating the *καὶ* introducing the phrase referring to the Thirty Years Peace and the *καὶ* introducing the general grant of autonomy. We should rather read *εἰ καὶ* 'if indeed', 'if really', or 'I should be surprised if it were so': cf. J.D. Denniston, *Greek Particles*² (Oxford 1954) 303. For this interpretation, compare J. De Romilly & R. Weil, *Thucydide: La guerre du Péloponnèse* (Paris 1953–1972) 1.98; H.S. Jones, *Thucydidis Historiae*² (Oxford 1942) at 1.144.2; Classen-Steup 1.375. Cf. C.G. Cobet (*Variae Lectiones*² [Leiden 1873] 436), who removes the problem of two conditions by expunging the *καὶ* before *ἔταν* in order to make a single condition and by treating *εἰ . . . ἐσπεισάμεθα* as parenthetical.

45. His opponents probably shrank from the implication that the final demand for a general grant of autonomy meant war, and preferred to think that it was merely propaganda, appended to earlier serious proposals. Concessions regarding Megara (and Aigina, for that matter) could still defuse the crisis. Perikles needed to prepare the Athenians for a war which was inevitable, in his judgment, because of the manner in which the Spartans were conducting diplomacy. At the same time, he had to show his adversaries that concessions on the earlier demands not only undercut the legality of Athens' position but also jeopardized the city's best interests. Compare Nesselhauf *Hermes* (1934); G. Pasquali, "L'ultimatum" Spartano ad Atene nell'inverno 431–30," *SFIC* 5 (1927) 299–315.

46. My interpretation of *εἰ καὶ* renders the sentence rhetorically counter-factual, and arguments from the overall context and sequence of arguments point in the same direction. The case would be even stronger if it could be shown that the protasis mentioning the autonomy of states under the

mentioned by the Aiginetans at Sparta do not in fact refer to that treaty. This conclusion is supported by the final stipulation of Perikles in his speech that the Athenians were ready to submit to arbitration, but that Spartan unwillingness to invoke arbitration suggested determination to make war (1.144.2). Perikles' remarks at the beginning of his speech about the nature of Spartan plotting against Athens suggests that he thought that the Spartans were unlikely to take him up on his counter-conditions. The acceptance of his latter provision would have entailed a (rather unlikely) Spartan rethinking of the nature of autonomy and of their own relationship to their allies. From the Periclean perspective, "jaw-jaw", however, was better than "war-war". Even far-reaching changes to the way in which Athens conducted its affairs with its subjects might have been conceivable in the abstract, if equitable negotiations were initiated. In summation, the notion(s) of *autonomia* that is implicit in both his counter-conditions is not a trivial one, but one in which enormous changes could be wrought in Athenian and Spartan foreign affairs. The irony in Perikles' speech does not derive from a lack of seriousness in his counter-offer, but from his realization that the Peloponnesians were set on war.

Under the foregoing interpretation of the place of Aiginetan autonomy in the Thucydidean causation for the war, one can understand the references to *spondai* in 1.67. In 1.67.1, the Corinthians charge the Athenians with having broken *σπονδὰς* (*n.b.*, without the article) and harming the Peloponnesus. In 1.67.2, the Aiginetans lack autonomy in accordance with *τὰς σπονδὰς*. Finally, in 1.67.3, the Megarian Decree is *παρὰ τὰς σπονδὰς* 'contrary to the treaty'. The argument that the *spondai* represent in all three cases (or in perhaps any of them) the literal terms of the Thirty Years Peace is invalidated by the remainder of Thucydides' narrative. The Corinthian justification for their dissatisfaction with Athens has already been undermined by the historian through the thoroughly mendacious speech which he attributes to their attempt to dissuade the alliance with Corcyra (1.37–44).⁴⁷ The Corinthian explication of Athenian responsibilities under the (*spondai*) Thirty Years Peace is particularly unconvincing (1.39.2–4). Thucydides reports Perikles as explicitly denying that the Megarian Decree was forbidden in the Thirty Years

Thirty Years Peace (*εἰ... ἐσπεισάμεθα*) was contrary to fact (cf. Bickerman n. 27, pp. 321–22, who objects strongly). The outstanding question is whether the sequence of tenses/moods: protasis, aor. ind.; apodosis, fut. ind. can possibly signify what it seems to, namely a factual supposition. The two conditions surrounding this one are both future: *έάσομεν... μὴ ποιῶσι* and *ἀφήσομεν... ὅταν... ἀποδώσι*. The protasis with *ὅταν* shares an apodosis with *εἰ... ἐσπεισάμεθα*. The clause having *ὅταν* with the aor. subj. has as usual a future in the apodosis. Does that future also stand for an imperfect or aorist with *ἄν* of the apodosis of a contrary to fact condition for the sake of emphasis? Note the gloss of Classen-Steup 1.375: "wie er doch nicht der Fall." See also F. Müller, "Disposition der ersten Perikleischen Rede bei Thukydides," *NJPhP* 31 (1885) 550–57, esp. 556, who makes a similar comment.

47. Note A.E. Raubitschek, "Corinth and Athens before the Peloponnesian War," in K. Kinzl (ed.), *Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory: Studies Presented to Fritz Schachermeyr* (Berlin 1977) 266–69.

Peace (1.144.2).⁴⁸ In chapter 67 Thucydides is again reporting (not subscribing to) Corinthian, Aiginetan, and then Megarian charges in the three appearances of the word *spondai*. If I am correct, the very vagueness and contradiction of the term *spondai* here has polemical point in emphasizing the lack of diplomatic grounds for the Peloponnesian grievances: they were forever adducing *spondai* with little attention to what the Athenians had actually agreed on in the Thirty Years Peace and elsewhere. Concomitantly, the Corinthian speech which directly follows (1.68–71), with its invocation of the theme of the Spartans as liberators, the Athenians as enslavers (1.69.1), is also remarkably devoid of any specific breaches of the Thirty Years Peace by Athens.

My working hypothesis will be that the Thucydidean/Periclean position on Aiginetan autonomy is correct. It is not only borne out by the foregoing historiographical analysis of the language of autonomy, but can be supported by the historical interpretation of Aigina's status to be presented below. The mere statement by the Aiginetans of their right to autonomy is not in itself a guarantee that their claim was a good one or that the abridgment of such a right played an important role in the causation of the war. To imagine otherwise would attribute a grave failing to Thucydides, one serious enough to justify extreme theories about the appearance of alternative and inconsistent causations for the war in Book 1. Yet it is doubtful whether going so far as to posit a change in Thucydidean perspective on the start of the war could absolve him satisfactorily of a charge of suppression of evidence on Aiginetan autonomy or of repeating (or even fabricating) Periclean misrepresentations. To take the Aiginetan claim to autonomy as fully valid inevitably leads to a position near to the extreme anti-Thucydidean stance just outlined. Nonetheless, any inclination to proceed along these lines is brought up short by the failure of the Spartans to accept arbitration.^{48a}

III. THE AIGINETANS UNDER ATHENIAN CONTROL

It is appropriate now to consider the political situation of Aigina in the years leading up to the Peloponnesian War. Let us look first for signs of the status of autonomy as understood in its Athenian connotation, marking the militarily active class of Athenian ally. Such a procedure will allow us to assess the likelihood that Aigina was granted autonomy either in a peace treaty with Athens⁴⁹ or by the Thirty Years Peace.⁵⁰ Thucydides describes the terms of the Aiginetan surrender to Athens. Aiginetan walls were to be demolished; the

48. G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London 1972) 279, 294–95.

48a. Badian in Allison *Conflict* has offered just such a perspective on Thucydides which finds an extraordinarily tendentious treatment of the causation of the war by a manipulative historian who employed "disinformation".

49. *HCT* 1.225–26.

50. See Ostwald 23; Raaflaub 192, n. 242, p. 206; M. Amit, *Great and Small Poleis* (Brussels 1973) 38–42; *Athenian Empire* 183–84; Bengtson *SVA* 2.75; and the authorities cited in ns. 59, 62–64 below.

fleet given up; and the island forced to pay tribute (1.108.4). Archaeology confirms the first and second of these provisions, because the walls and the military harbor of the city of Aigina were rendered inoperative in what appears a single demolition project.⁵¹ The defenselessness of Aigina continued down to 431, for the Athenians were able to expel the inhabitants from the island without experiencing any resistance (2.27.1). One might infer from this fact the existence of an Athenian garrison on the island, which some have found in a fragmentary inscription (*IG* I³ 38 = *IG* I² 18; but see below). Aigina paid the high tribute of 30 talents for most of this period, as attested by the Tribute Lists (e.g., *IG* I³ 270.V.37 [442/1]). The evidence has already been presented that the provision of ships and the possession of walls accompany autonomous status, at least in the minds of the Athenians, and that the requirement to pay tribute is associated with its absence. By his account of the Aiginetan capitulation, Thucydides seems to be establishing the island's loss of autonomy.

In order to counter this impression, one approach is to posit a definition for autonomy that is sufficiently elastic as to encompass Aiginetan political disabilities. Yet, the criteria for autonomy seem to be elastic only insofar as independent allies were classed with the autonomous as in the case of the Ionian Sea islands (Thuc. 7.57.7; cf. my views above (n. 22) on the status of Chios and Methymna in 7.57.4, 5). The remaining possible exceptions to the determinative character of the Aiginetan disabilities (no walls, no fleet, tribute-paying) need to be addressed in order to discern how they differ from Aigina's situation.

For instance, the Chalcidian cities (with Argilos) were conceded autonomy in the Peace of Nikias, but were at the same time liable to the payment of tribute to Athens.⁵² The Spartans were to surrender these cities (*παρέδοσαν*) to Athens (Thuc. 5.18.5). Inasmuch as Sparta lacked the military power to coerce these cities to rejoin Athens after the cessation of hostilities, its commitment was merely a withdrawal of active support. Olynthos, Spartolos, and their dependencies had defected before general hostilities, so that Athens could hardly expect to recover them from Sparta in the Peace of Nikias, which, after all, was restoring the *status quo ante bellum*. At the most, this "surrender" was meant to create a framework for a settlement worked out between all the rebels and the Athenians (envisaged in the Peace: 5.18.5). Meanwhile, the Spartans conceded that tribute payments based on the assessment of Aristides were to be levied on all the rebels, presumably on the principle that Spartan aid to them during the war ought not to weaken Athenian strength without some reparation. The autonomous Chalcidians were virtually independent of Athens except for the Aristeidian tribute, a sort of permanent indemnity, so that their situation is in no way comparable to that of the Aiginetans.⁵³

51. G. Welter, "Aeginetica XIII–XXIV," *AA* (1938) 480–540, esp. 484–85; P. Knoblauch, "Die Hafenanlagen der Stadt Ägina," *AD* 27.1 (1972) 50–85, esp. 83–84.

52. Ostwald 28; Nesselhauf *Hermes* (1934) 291.

53. The practical independence of these cities makes it possible that the participial phrase *φερούσας τὸν φόρον*... has a concessive force, 'although they pay the tribute', although a conditional sense is a strong possibility. Cf. Ostwald n. 34, p. 53. That immunity from Athenian attack

Viewed solely from an Athenian standpoint, the combination of tribute and autonomy was anomalous. The Spartans, however, would have been anxious to maintain the illusion that they had been fighting to liberate the Greeks. In one important regard the Peace of Nikias gave support to the view that the cities in the north had been liberated: it did not violate the principle of possessing military forces instead of paying tribute as a feature of autonomy. In terms of the treaty, the Chalcidian cities were to be allies of neither the Peloponnesians nor the Athenians, which demonstrates that they possessed their own military establishments despite a concession by Sparta of their liability to pay some tribute. An agreement between Athens and Sparta concerning Aigina would scarcely have been parallel to the status accorded the Chalcidians, for they were not (and could not be) left in Athenian hands. While the Chalcidians were to possess an independent military capability, even a defensive capacity was forbidden the Aiginetans.

Similarly, the Athenian injunction to Chios in 425 to demolish a defensive wall under construction does not demonstrate that demolition of fortifications was consistent with autonomy even though Chios remained autonomous until 412 (4.51).⁵⁴ In 425, Chios possessed fortifications adequate to protect it from the Peloponnesians and Persians before the new construction (witness its siege during the Ionian War: Thuc. 8.38.2–5, 40.1–3, 55.2–56.1).⁵⁵ The new wall seemed to the Athenians only a preparation for a defense by rebels against Athens. Hence the Athenians considered themselves justified in treating it as provocative. The Chians, however, may have considered an addition to their defenses a reasonable precaution, in light of the foray into the Aegean of the Peloponnesian fleet.⁵⁶ Furthermore, the request for its demolition did not affect the overall defensive posture of Chios. The Aiginetans, on the other hand, possessed no defenses, and something much more damaging than a symbolic breach had been done to their walls and to their autonomy. Contrast also the Athenian order to Mytilene (3.3.3) after an embassy failed to halt preparations for revolt. The Athenians demanded that the Mytileneans surrender their fleet and disable their fortifications, and the demand was accompanied not by ambassadors, as in the case of Chios, but by a fleet. In further contrast, the Chians received guarantees (*πίστεις*) from the Athenians that no changes would be made in their status before tearing down the wall.⁵⁷ It is surely this difference between an ultimatum backed by naked

was conditional on payment is stipulated in the next sentence, and may be a slight indication that immunity (part of a concession of autonomy) had not already been specified.

54. Contrast Ostwald 27–28.

55. Note that Kleon juxtaposes the ability of Mytilene before its defection to protect itself from the Peloponnesians with its autonomy and its honors granted by Athens (Thuc. 3.39.2).

56. Quinn *Athens and Samos* 41–43.

57. Gomme *HCT* 3.499–500; cf. Quinn *Athens and Samos* 42, with n. 13, p. 86, citing a proxeny decree, perhaps for a Chian (now *IG* I³ 70), that mentions *πίστεις* juxtaposed with strong sanctions (l. 7), which B.D. Meritt ("Attic Inscriptions of the Fifth Century," *Hesperia* 14 [1945] 61–133, esp. 115–19) would equate with those of Thuc. 4.51. Cf. Meiggs *Empire* 359.

force and even an importunate diplomatic mission that helps us to understand why Chios continued to be autonomous after 425.

Therefore, the terms of the Aiginetan surrender make it unlikely that their surrender agreement with Athens, any subsequent agreement, or the Thirty Years Peace contained any guarantee of autonomy. A grant of autonomy in the Thirty Years Peace could not have been accompanied by any change concerning fortifications, fleet, and tribute, because, as we have noted, these conditions remained the same down to 431. But for the Aiginetan stipulation of the right to autonomy at Sparta, no one, ancient or modern, would have described the island as autonomous, any more than states forced into the Delian League like Karystos or a subjugated rebel such as Naxos. To conclude that Aigina was autonomous in the Thirty Years Peace is to drain the concept of autonomy of its substance.⁵⁸

IV. A NOMINAL GRANT OF AUTONOMY

Various attempts have been made to explain a grant of autonomy to Aigina in the Thirty Years Peace as factual but merely nominal, one which did not alter the Aiginetan situation significantly (i.e., so that it approximated that of Chios, Samos, and Lesbos). The impact of the absence of the (just-outlined) conditions associated with autonomy would thereby be vitiated. Meiggs suggests that Aigina was allowed to resume coining as a demonstration of the autonomy granted by the Thirty Years Peace; this new series was represented by the "tortoises".⁵⁹ The Aiginetans had received a dispensation from the force of the Attic Coinage Decree, and that concession constituted their special autonomous status. As it turns out, a careful consideration of the Coinage Decree and the monetary conditions of the Pentekontaeteia shows that the Aiginetans received no special treatment.⁶⁰ Furthermore, the numismatic evidence suggests that Aigina continued minting or resumed minting shortly after its surrender to Athens.⁶¹ Therefore, the resumption of coining is at the wrong juncture to have any significance at all for Aiginetan autonomy after the Thirty Years Peace.

Another approach is to assume that the Aiginetans were required to pay tribute at a fixed rate, rather like the Chalcidian cities in the Peace of Nikias (5.18.5).⁶² Aigina, however, is not a true parallel to the Chalcidians, because the Chalcidians preserved their military apparatus *and* paid tribute; Aigina

58. Note Ostwald 42: "However, what both parties seem to agree on is that *αὐτονομία* has no specific substantive meaning, that, in other words, it is merely useful as a political football in the game of fixing the blame for the war that is sure to break out onto the other side."

59. Meiggs *Empire* 183–84.

60. Inasmuch as the history of Aiginetan coining during this period can aid us in rethinking the nature of Athenian monetary policy *vis-à-vis* autonomy, I have included a treatment of Aiginetan coinage under the Attic Coinage Decree in an Endnote (pp. 288–92 below).

61. See the Endnote for a dating of the tortoises before 431, and for the argument from output and from hoards for their initiation in the 450s.

62. *ATL* 3.303, 320, followed by D. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca 1969) 258–59.

was disarmed. Moreover, it is one thing to pay a fixed amount, one set at a relatively low rate and agreed upon long ago by the payer, and quite another to pay the onerous sum of 30 talents per year, a levy, the amount of which, to the best of our knowledge, lay entirely at the discretion of the Athenians.^{62a} The hypothesis of the *ATL* requires that the Athenians took some action (ignored by Thucydides) shortly before 432 to trespass on Aiginetan autonomy (a puppet government or garrison?). This was prompted, rather paradoxically, by what the editors of the *ATL* consider to be a partial payment of tribute in 432. In fact, it is an increased payment of tribute that would give better support to the *ATL* scenario, as it would show Athenian contempt for the diplomatically-fixed level of tribute. A simpler explanation is that the high payments had exhausted the Aiginetan capacity to pay. A tradition survives that the Aiginetans were heavily in debt to Thucydides Melesiou (Marcell. *Vit. Thuc.* 24; *Vit. Anon. Thuc.* 7), whose father's friendship with the island's elite is attested in Pindar (*Ol.* 8.54; *Nem.* 4.93–96, 6.64–66). If the Aiginetan payment of tribute in the last year before the war stood at 9 or 14 T (*IG I³* 279.I.88), a more likely hypothesis would assume that the amount of tribute owed had been adjusted downward by Athens.⁶³ Since the records of Aiginetan payments between 439 and 432 are lacking, there is no way of even dating when the payment of tribute decreased. Just as one group of Aiginetans looked to Sparta to threaten Athens into an alleviation of their homeland's plight, the Aiginetan government may have sought relief from the Athenians through the normal mechanism of re-evaluation of tribute. In any event, since the Aiginetans were careful to conduct their diplomacy at Sparta in secret, they would scarcely have provoked Athens by a resistance to the levying of the tribute.

De Ste. Croix admits the bare possibility of a special clause on Aigina, but prefers to suggest the possibility of a guarantee of autonomy to all Delian and Peloponnesian League members through the Thirty Years Peace.⁶⁴ A general autonomy clause, however, would have been an act of colossal imprudence on the part of the Athenians. A blanket guarantee could only provide ammunition for calling into question in the future the conduct of Athenian affairs with their allies, when it is clear that the Athenians intended no

62a. See *Colonization* 114–15; pp. 221–22 above.

63. Compare the criticisms of the *ATL* in P.A. Brunt, "The Megarian Decree," *AJP* 72 (1951) 268–82, esp. 280–82. Brunt himself believes that only a vague provision existed in the Thirty Years Peace on behalf of Aiginetan autonomy; the Aiginetans were not, in fact, made autonomous. The Athenians held that Aigina owed the tribute, but the Aiginetans protested that they were autonomous, so that tribute was exacted irregularly by the Athenians. The Spartans presumably acquiesced in this exaction until it became advantageous for them to heed Aiginetan complaints. That the Aiginetans were afraid of complaining openly to Sparta in 432 when they had been protesting their non-liability for the whole period of the Thirty Years Peace seems absurd—the Spartans would scarcely have been receptive to such agitation. Would the Athenians not have taken some early action in retaliation?

64. De Ste. Croix *Origins* 293–94. [Badian *Conflict* 61–67 argues for the existence of a general autonomy clause, but adds to earlier arguments (based on Aigina and Poteidaia) only the dubious parallel of the Peace of Kallias and the suspect Spartan willingness to come to the aid of the Samian rebels (for which see pp. 131–33 above; n. 92, p. 285 below).]

reorganization of their alliance pursuant to the Thirty Years Peace. The extent to which autonomy was an ambiguous concept, as de Ste. Croix makes it, would only increase the danger of making such an indiscriminate engagement.⁶⁵ In the statements attributed to Perikles by Thucydides, there is not a hint that a Spartan demand for autonomy had any standing in the Thirty Years Peace. That Perikles did not mention the Thirty Years Peace when he noted the lack of autonomy of Spartan allies further indicates that no general autonomy provision existed. Such a provision is more appropriate to the *koinai eirēnai* of the fourth century, but it looks terribly out of place in *spondai* deliberately of limited duration.⁶⁶

A preconception which underlies the idea that Sparta demanded a clause on Aiginetan autonomy in the Thirty Years Peace and that Athens was willing to grant one is that Aigina had belonged to the Peloponnesian League.⁶⁷ A grant of autonomy was a sop to Spartan pride, offended by the surrender of a loyal ally. This is not the place to repeat at length the arguments against Aiginetan participation in the Peloponnesian League.⁶⁸ There are no signs of Spartan concern for Aigina during the First Peloponnesian War; all Peloponnesian attempts on behalf of the Aiginetans were made by the Corinthians and Epidaurians (Thuc. 1.105.3, 6). Sparta (or at least Pleistoanax and his followers) was ready to accept the reconquest of Euboia by Perikles, a place where Sparta had a much greater ability to intervene than Aigina (1.114.2–3). Thus, it is doubtful whether Sparta could have extracted such a concessionary clause from Athens, given the modest scale of concessions made on other matters by either side in the Thirty Years Peace.

V. ATHENIAN PERSPECTIVES ON AIGINETAN INDEPENDENCE

The investigation of the source for the Aiginetan claim that Athens had infringed upon its autonomy can now be advanced by a consideration of those

65. This supposition suggests that the Athenians had ignored the payment of tribute and similar criteria for a distinction between the autonomous and other subjects. Consequently, de Ste. Croix (*Historia* [1954–1955] 16–21) doubts that there was ever a real division of allies into *autonomoi* and *hupēkooti*.

66. Still another approach to demonstrating how Aigina lost its autonomy, supposedly guaranteed in the Thirty Years Peace, concerns a possible garrison on the island (in *IG I³* 38: originally dated by Hondius to the early 450s): A.S. Nease, "Garrisons in the Athenian Empire," *Phoenix* 3 (1949) 102–11, esp. 104–5. Lewis (*BSA* [1954] 21–25), who doubts that *IG I³* mentions a garrison (rather than *phulakē* 'watch'), offers a date c. 445. In connection with his general downdating of Attic inscriptions, H.B. Mattingly ("Athens and Aegina," *Historia* 16 [1967] 1–5) dated the inscription to the eve of the Peloponnesian War, and found it to contain intimidation leading up to a breach of autonomy. He is followed by W. Schuller, *Die Herrschaft der Athener im ersten attischen Seebund* (Berlin 1974) 34. Mattingly ("Athens and Aegina: a Palinode," *Historia* 26 [1977] 370–73) now doubts that the inscription even mentions the Aiginetans. In my discussion in *Colonization* 120–26, I date the inscription to the early 440s and connect it with precautions (with Aiginetan cooperation) to protect Attica from hostile action mounted from Aigina or conducted by Aiginetans.

67. De Ste. Croix *Origins* 293–94; *HCT* 1.225–26.

68. See pp. 108–10 above.

facets of Aigina's relationship with Athens that bear on Athenian views about the legitimacy of the Aiginetan government. The first class of evidence concerns the sixth century. This material, mainly from Herodotus, is also informative about fifth-century polemics, since Herodotus interrogated Aiginetan and Athenian politicians about the past history of their states' conflicts.

A1. Fifth-century Athenians believed that the cult statues of the Aiginetan goddesses Damia and Auxesia derived from Attica, in return for which yearly dues were owed to Athena Polias and Erekhtheus (Hdt. 5.82.2–84.2). This datum is reported by Herodotus in a narrative filled with a balancing of Athenian and Aiginetan variants about an early war, along with Argive and perhaps Epidaurian corroboration. The derivation of the statues and the liability for dues, however, were not controversial.⁶⁹

A2. Athenian local history related a tale in which the legislator Draco went to Aigina to create a law code for the Aiginetans (*Suda s.v. Δράκων*, δ 1495 Adler; pp. 250–52 above). The Athenians maliciously said that Draco was killed by a warm greeting from masses of over-exuberant Aiginetans. Yet, the Atthidographic account seems to imply that some Aiginetans claimed possession of the tomb of Draco, perhaps a *hērōon*. Thus, a conservative Athenian law-giver could be accepted as the *nomothetēs* of oligarchic Aigina.

A3. In the late sixth century, the Athenians, who had been raided by the Aiginetans, established their own cult of the Aiginetan hero Aiakos (Hdt. 5.89.2). Just as the cult of the Salaminian hero Eurysakes established and substantiated an Athenian claim to the ownership of Salamis, the cult of Aiakos ought to have claimed control over Aigina.^{69a} An oracular response reported by Herodotus promised Athenian supremacy over Aigina if the proper interval after the appeal to Delphi was observed (Hdt. 5.89.2).

A second class of data concerns the period of hostilities between Athens and Aigina in the 490s and 480s. Herodotus is again our source, but in this case he was on firmer ground because he seems to have interrogated prominent participants in these hostilities.

B1. At one stage in the fighting, the Athenians promoted an insurgency by one Nikodromos and his followers against the Aiginetan oligarchy (Hdt. 6.88). That Herodotus' informants described the rebels as the *dēmos* suggests that the Athenians believed that the rebels spoke for the majority of Aiginetans (6.91.1). In the eyes of the Athenians, the brutal and impious suppression of this revolt by the Aiginetan elite justified and, on a supernatural plane, necessitated the expulsion of the Aiginetans from their island in 431 (6.91.1–2).|

B2. After the suppression of this rebellion, fugitives were settled at Cape Sounion and received Athenian citizenship as suppliants (6.90). They continued their struggle against the oligarchs by a series of raids in which they may have tried to appropriate Aiginetan cult equipment (6.90).⁷⁰ Thus the

69. See pp. 50–51, 55–57 above.

69a. Cf. F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques: Supplément* (Paris 1962) #19, pp. 49–54 with *IG II²* 1232.

70. See p. 39 above with references.

Athenians believed that they had incorporated the legitimate authority within the Aiginetan polity into their body of citizens.

A third body of material concerns the subjugation of Aigina and its situation thereafter.

C1. Diodorus describes Athenian subjugation of Aigina as the suppression of a revolt in one version of the island's defeat (11.70.1–3). In a doublet, he describes the conquest of the island as a war, a characterization in which he is more likely correct, as the account of Thucydides demonstrates (Thuc. 1.105.2; cf. DS 11.78.3–4). The two Diodoran accounts are similar enough to demonstrate that they derived from a single original, probably in Ephorus.⁷¹ This observation suggests that the idea of a rebellion was somehow worked into the account of Ephorus, possibly in connection with an Athenian claim that Athens was the legitimate master of Aigina, and that the Aiginetan oligarchy had usurped power.

C2. After Aigina's surrender, cults of Athena Polias and of Apollo and Poseidon existed on the island (*IG* IV 29–38).⁷² I might have discussed these cults as an example of Aigina's lack of autonomy. However, by their surviving *horoi* the cults appear too modest for instruments of imperial policy. Their sponsors were perhaps private individuals. That several inscriptions on the *horoi* are in Ionic at a date c. 450 suggests the participation in the cults by Ionian (non-citizen) residents of the island. As to the identity of the native promoters of the cults, refugees of the 480s and their descendants, who were now free to resume their connection with their homeland, are a possibility. They may have combined Apollo of the Aiginetan acropolis with Poseidon of their refuge at Sounion. The presence of a cult of a naturalized Athena Polias of Athens on Aigina suggests a deliberate effort to obscure the identity of Aigina as a separate community.⁷³

C3. When the Corinthians were not exploiting Spartan sympathy toward the Aiginetans, they were themselves able to describe quite accurately the situation of the Aiginetans under Athenian control. In their attempt to get the Athenian assembly to reject the Corcyrean proposal for alliance, the Corinthians list their services to Athens. Among these is the loan of ships to supplement Athenian forces during the intervention in the coup of Nikodromos on Aigina which led to an Athenian *ἐπικράτησις* over the Aiginetans (1.41.2; cf. Hdt. 6.89). It is less important here for us to correct Corinthian exaggeration than note that *ἐπικράτησις* should mean subjugation or decisive victory.⁷⁴

A final class of data on Aigina covers the Athenian settlement on the island established after the expulsion of the Aiginetans.

71. Meiggs *Empire* 51–52, 455–56; see pp. 46–48 with n. 31, 107–9 above; also Figueira *Colonization* 106–11.

72. See J.P. Barron, "The Fifth-Century *Horoi* of Aigina," *JHS* 103 (1983) 1–12, esp. on the dating.

73. See Figueira *Colonization* 115–20.

74. See pp. 129–34, 141–48 above.

D1. The settlers are called colonists by Thucydides (2.27.1; 8.69.3) and not cleruchs, which suggests a refoundation of Aigina under Athenian auspices (cf. 5.74.3; 7.57.2).⁷⁵ Aiginetan cults continued to exist, a conclusion which is warranted by the inscriptions containing the cult inventories of Aphaia (IG IV 39) and of the goddesses Damia and Auxesia (IG IV 1588). The inventories were made as the colonists took over the operation of the cults. There may have been other traces of continuity.⁷⁶

D2. Aristophanes joked that the Spartans wished to recover Aigina so as to acquire the playwright himself (*Acharnians* 652–55). The scholia to this passage present two hypotheses: that Aristophanes had property on Aigina (654b [ii] Wilson); that the poet was a cleruch on the island (654b [i]). Commentators argue that Aristophanes had some prior, more integral, connection than settlement in 431 on the grounds that this made the joke stronger (cf. the doubts of the scholiast in 654b [i]).⁷⁷ The Aiginetan local historian Theogenes presents the poet as involved in the foundation of the Athenian colony there (FGH 300 F 2). That an Aiginetan celebrated even a famous Athenian usurper or dispossessor is unlikely. Theogenes' statement may be connected to a broader claim that the poet was Aiginetan.⁷⁸ Aristophanes may have been both descended from the refugees of the 480s and a settler on Aigina in 431.⁷⁹

On the basis of the material just presented, there is a reasonable doubt that fifth-century Athenians considered Aigina to be legitimately an independent *polis*. With the Aiakeion the Athenians had raised a strong claim to ownership through cult, a claim which they believed to have had antecedents in the sixth century. They strengthened this claim by assimilating the champions of the Aiginetan *dāmos*, in a manner similar to their absorption (or creation) of the Salaminioi to embody a claim to Salamis when that island was in Megarian hands. On their subjugation of Aigina, the Athenians may have encouraged the repatriation or at least a resumption of involvement with the island for Athenians of Aiginetan descent, and certainly permitted the establishment of cults with Athenian affinities. They believed themselves to be exacting divine retribution in their expulsion of the Aiginetans in 431. The colony that replaced independent Aigina was a reconstitution of a now legitimized Aiginetan polity.

75. ATL 3.284–89; Figueira *Colonization* 24–31; cf. V. Ehrenberg, "Thucydides on Athenian Colonization," CP 47 (1952) 143–49, esp. 145–46; A.J. Graham, *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece*² (Chicago 1983) 172–74, 182–83.

76. See Figueira *Colonization* 31–39.

77. E.g., J. van Leeuwen, *Acharnenses* (Leiden 1901) 113–14; B.B. Rodgers, *The Acharnians of Aristophanes* (London 1910) ix, 100–101; W.J.M. Starkie, *The Acharnians of Aristophanes* (London 1909) 139–40.

78. Note R. Cassel & C. Austin, *Poetae Comici Graecae II, 2 Aristophanes* (Berlin 1984) #1.21–23.

79. See Figueira *Colonization* 79–93.

VI. AIGINETAN AUTONOMY AND THE HELLENIC LEAGUE

Our search for a context in which Athens might have guaranteed the autonomy of Aigina can be advanced by a consideration of the discussion of Plataian autonomy in Thucydides. The Plataians at the time of the Peloponnesian attack on their city in 429 attempted to deter the Spartans by citing engagements made by Pausanias after the Battle of Plataia. Pausanias is described as freeing Greece (*ἐλευθερώσας*) and inaugurating a sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherios, after which he proclaimed that the Plataians as *autonomoi* were to possess their homeland free from attack (2.71.2; cf. 2.71.4, where the same language is repeated). Arkhidamos, in answer, accepted the validity of this proclamation: *αὐτοὶ τε αὐτονομείσθε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ξυνελευθεροῦτε* 'be autonomous yourselves, and help free others' (2.72.1). Strikingly, both the Plataians and the Spartans equate autonomy and freedom.⁸⁰ Arkhidamos also states that he cannot cease hostilities because Plataia is allied with Athens against Sparta in its war of *eleutherōsis*. The king thus reiterates the dominant theme of Spartan self-justification during the war, i.e., Athens is the tyrant-city of Greece, equivalent to Xerxes as a threat to freedom. The original proclamation of Pausanias served to protect Plataia from Thebes, at a time when that Medizing state was not yet subdued.⁸¹ The care for legality which the Spartans exhibit about their pledge is demonstrated both by Spartan patience while Athens was consulted (2.73.1) and by the willingness of Arkhidamos to allow the Plataians neutrality and immunity in the Peloponnesian War, even though such a concession would have enraged the Thebans, intent on forcing Plataia into the Boiotian League (2.72.1, 3). There is no reason to think that the terminology of the Plataian and Spartan citations of Pausanias' pledge, about which both had every reason to take care, was anachronistic or even inaccurate.⁸²

80. Cf. Ostwald 21–22.

81. The Oath of Plataia (Tod *GHI* #204, pp. 2.303–7; cf. DS 11.29.3; Lyc. *Leoc.* 81) dramatizes a similar situation, one before the battle, and contains provisions for decimating Thebes, for not uprooting or displacing Spartans, Athenians, Plataians, and other allies from their cities (ll. 34–37), and for not using famine or interdiction of water supplies in besieging Greek cities (ll. 37–39). The authenticity of the oath was questioned even in antiquity (Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 153). Despite its possible preservation of fifth-century material, the oath is a fourth-century elaboration (*n.b.* the restrictions on sieges). See C. Habicht, "Falsche Urkunden zur Geschichte Athens im Zeitalter der Perserkriege," *Hermes* 89 (1961) 1–35, esp. 11–19; L. Robert, *Études épigraphiques et philologiques* (Paris 1938) 307–16. Cf. P. Siewert, *Der Eid von Plataiai* (Munich 1972) esp. 81–83, 109–10; A.E. Raubitschek, "Inschriften als Hilfsmittel der Geschichtsforschung," *RSA* 1 (1971) 177–95, esp. 190–92. The apocryphal character of the oath bolsters our confidence in the Thucydidean account of Pausanias' guarantee of autonomy. The terminology of autonomy in Thucydides was later replaced in the oath by more striking language borrowed from the Amphictyonic Oath at a time when Spartan misuse of autonomy in the early fourth century may have partially vitiated the earlier language of autonomy (cf. Aesch. 2.115).

82. Such anachronistic language has already been seen in the oath, and it also appears in the so-called Covenant of Plataia, another dramatization of the solidarity of the Greeks at the time of the battle and of the reassurances given the Plataians. Note Plut. *Arist.* 21.1–2: *Πλαταιαῖς δ'ασύλους καὶ ἱερούς*. That there could have been an Oath of Plataia before the battle, a proclamation of

Next the comments of the Thebans and Plataians, arguing their cases before Spartan judges after the fall of Plataia to Peloponnesian forces, can advance an understanding of the circumstances surrounding Plataian autonomy.⁸³ Faced with the question of what they had done to further the Spartan cause (3.52.4, 54.2), and in light of Arkhidamos' previous rebuff regarding Pausanias' autonomy pledge, the Plataians naturally advanced their claims to Spartan good will mainly on the basis of their services against Persia (for *eleutheria*: 3.54.3, 58.5, cf. 3.59.4), at a time when Thebes Medized (3.54.3, 56.4, 57.1–4, 58.4–5, 59.2), rather than because of the continuing validity of a grant of autonomy. The pledge is noted obliquely through references to Plataian honors for the Spartan dead, to be connected with the festival of Zeus Eleutheros (3.58.4–5, 59.2).

In their turn, the Thebans call into question Plataian motives for loyalty during the Persian War (3.62.1–2, 64.1; cf. 3.63.1). Their first priority is to excuse their own Medism, while indicting Plataian Hellenism. So the Theban people, as opposed to a small circle of oligarchs, were not really Medizers (3.63.3–4). Accordingly, when they became their own masters again, they fought against Athenian enslavement of Greece, unlike the Plataians (3.62.5). The latter fought Persia, the enemy of Greek freedom, for the same reason that they now fight on behalf of Athens, another enemy of freedom, namely loyalty to the Athenians. The emphasis of the Thebans must not fall on the pledge of autonomy by Pausanias to the Plataians, but they should rather stress the present status of the Plataians as defectors from their *hēgemōn* in the Hellenic League (3.63.2, 64.2; note the repeated use of the terms "Greeks" or "Greece": 3.62.1, 2, 5; 63.1, 3; 64.1, 4). The Plataians could even have maintained a defensive alliance with Athens (3.63.2) or remained neutral (3.64.3). The Thebans insist that the Plataians have forfeited their rights in the Greek alliance (*ξυνομοσίαν*) on account of their collaboration in enslavement (*ξυγκατεδουλοῦσθε*: cf. 3.63.2: *ξυνεπιέναι*) of the Aiginetans and other allies, who had been Plataian allies in the Hellenic League (*ξυνομοσάντων*: 3.64.2–3).⁸⁴ The specific outrage against Aiginetan autonomy which the Plataians had committed was a betrayal of their oath to their allies in the Hellenic League rather than some subsequent agreement.

The Thebans are echoing themes of Spartan anti-Athenian propaganda not only in general but also specifically Arkhidamos' first interchange with the Plataians (cf. 3.59.4). Arkhidamos said that the war was being fought on

Pausanias afterward, and finally a Covenant of Plataia seems incredible. Care must be exercised in distinguishing moralizing extrapolations in Thucydides like Plataian neutrality or their duty to help free other Greeks from the proclamation of Pausanias itself, but that scarcely affects the historicity of the autonomy pledge. Cf. Ostwald 18–21; Siewert *Eid* 89–93.

83. On the organization of these two speeches, see, most recently, C.W. MacLeod, "Thucydides' Plataean Debate," *GRBS* 18 (1977) 227–46 = *Collected Essays* (Oxford 1983) 103–22.

84. The speech closes with a discussion of the brutal behavior of the Plataians after the Theban attempt on their city (3.65.1–66.4), and a general recapitulation and exhortation to the Spartans to condemn the Plataians (3.67.1–7).

behalf of the freedom of those who had sworn with Plataia (ὕμῶν τε ξυνώ-
μοσαν), i.e., members of the Hellenic League like Aigina, who were now ὑπ’
Ἀθηναίοις (2.72.1). The Plataians had forsaken their alliance with Sparta in
the Hellenic League (2.74.3). This theme was so well established in anti-
Athenian polemics that it appears in Aris. *Rhet.* 1396a17–20: as a topos, along
with the charge of enslaving the Greeks: οἶον ὅτι τοὺς Ἕλληνας κατεδου-
λώσαντο, καὶ τοὺς πρὸς τὸν βάρβαρον συμμαχεσαμένους καὶ ἀριστεύσαν-
τας ἡνδραποδίσαντο, Αἰγινήτας καὶ Ποτιδαίοντας. Thus, it is reasonable to
conclude that the continuing subjection of the Aiginetans to Athens, their dep-
rivation of autonomy trumpeted by the Spartans before the war, was offensive
because it transgressed oaths connected with the Hellenic League. The *spon-
dai* cited by the Aiginetans are an abbreviated reference, which should be ex-
panded on the model of καὶ τὰς παλαιὰς Πανσανίου μετὰ τὸν Μῆδον σπον-
δάς, the words used by Thucydides to describe the engagement in favor of
Plataian autonomy made by Pausanias (3.68.1). The same charge that is lev-
eled against the Plataians in detail is concealed within Thucydides’ brief notice
on the Athenian “violation” of Aiginetan autonomy.

Strikingly, the word *spondai* could be used by Thucydides for a
guarantee of autonomy at the time of the Persian Wars, which permits a
similar identification for the *spondai* mentioned by the Aiginetans at Sparta.
Nonetheless, there is no hint that the Spartans propagandized in the same way
about the subjugation of the Aegean islanders who had joined the Hellenic
League in 479. This suggests that it may have been the oaths of reconciliation
between Athens and Aigina that most dramatically or memorably guaranteed
autonomy. The mediation between former enemies which accompanied the es-
tablishment of the League may have involved a recognition by them of each
others’ autonomy (cf. Hdt. 7.145.1).⁸⁵

A validation of Aiginetan autonomy by Athens makes good sense only at
this time, since the Athenians could not afford to jeopardize their very survival
by risking that the Aiginetans, with their strong fleet, Medize. When freed
from their commitment by the renunciation of the alliance with Sparta in
462/1 (Thuc. 1.102–3), the Athenians undertook the subjugation of Aigina
shortly thereafter.⁸⁶ Thus, they returned to their long-standing position that
they had a better claim to rule Aigina than an illegitimate Aiginetan oligarchy.
In contrast, the Plataians got a special guarantee of autonomy because of their
unique situation in the League: they were the only city whose chief *Greek*
adversary lay outside the League, among the Medizers. Thus, they sought a
Spartan guarantee of their autonomy (in place of an infeasible reconciliation
with Thebes) before the attack on Thebes, as a protection lest the Thebans
seek vengeance against them in the future.⁸⁷ |

85. There is no reason why the *πίστις*, mentioned by Herodotus as given by the Greeks to each
other at the founding of the Hellenic League, cannot have included affirmations of autonomy,
inasmuch as the Athenian *πίστις* later given to Chios reaffirmed its autonomy (Thuc. 4.51).

86. Figueira *Colonization* 112–13.

87. That the Plataians based their claim to autonomy on Pausanias’ declaration, not on their

There is no evidence that would exclude the word *αὐτόνομος* from being used for guarantees of independence in 481. The earliest attested appearance of the term is Sophocles' *Antigone* 821–22 (probably in the late 440s), where it characterizes Antigone's arrogation of the status of the source of law for herself.⁸⁸ A similar usage can perhaps be paralleled for Perikles as reported by Thucydides.⁸⁹ Such transference from the sphere of the state to private life suggests that the language of autonomy was well established in political life.

There also exists an indication that would help bring the concept of autonomy back to the period of the Persian War. Mardonios, commanding the Persian forces left by Xerxes in central Greece, offered the Athenians the maintenance of their present territorial holdings (he was probably thinking of territory claimed by the Thebans, already Persian allies), the cession of additional territory, and reparations for the rebuilding of burnt temples, all under the status of *autonomoi* (Hdt. 8.140a.2). Mardonios equates this autonomous alliance with Persia with freedom (8.140a.4). The Athenians, in answer, express their determination to achieve freedom by fighting (8.143.1). It cannot be ruled out that the account as it stands endeavors to contrast autonomy with complete independence.⁹⁰ Such rhetoric would scarcely be surprising around

membership in a reorganized Hellenic League, condemns the authenticity of a reorganization in association with the Covenant of Plataia. On the basis of Plut. *Arist.* 21.1–2, its existence was proposed by Grote *History*² 4.282–83; and defended by J.A.O. Larsen, (e.g.) "The Constitution and Original Purpose of the Delian League," *HSCP* 51 (1940) 175–213, esp. 176–80; by A.E. Raubitschek, "The Covenant of Plataea," *TAPA* 91 (1960) 178–83; and by Meiggs *Empire* 507–8. The existence of such a new order is condemned by the silence of Herodotus (cf. 9.85–88) and of Ephorus (represented by DS 11.29.1, 33.1), as well as that of Thucydides. Idomeneus is a probable and an untrustworthy source. That the Greeks would reorganize themselves in the midst of a war is hard to understand, and the absence of the provision for any *hēgemōn* is inexplicable. The specificity of the military forces is suspect, and their size and composition ill-suited for the military operations to come. The anachronistic character of the guarantee of *asulia* to the Plataians has already been noted (see n. 82 above). The Covenant is based on the sacrifice to Zeus Eleutherios attested by Thucydides, which eventually was included in a penteteric festival (cf. Isoc. 14.60–61; DS 11.29.1; Poseidippos fr. 29 K; Paus. 9.2.6; *SIG*³ 1064; see Plut. *Arist.* 19.8–9; *IG* VII 2509; *SIG*³ 835A for a later syndedrion of the Greeks). See *ATL* 3.101–5; P.A. Brunt, "The Hellenic League Against Persia," *Historia* 2 (1953–1954) 135–63, esp. 153–56; F. Frost, "Some Documents in Plutarch's Lives," *C&M* 22 (1961) 182–94, esp. 186–89.

88. See Ostwald 10–11 following B.M.W. Knox, *The Heroic Temper* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1964) 66 with n. 9, who correctly detect a note of disparagement. A rationale for such disparagement, suggested by Ostwald (n. 41, p. 54), based on the restiveness of Athenian subjects, seems forced. The bare citation of *αὐτόνομοι* in Cratinus fr. 15 (*Supp. Com.* [Demianczuk]) advances the argument no further.

89. In 2.63.3, the state formed by the *apragmones* will perish even if it could achieve a separate political existence: καὶ εἴ ποὺ ἐπὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν αὐτόνομοι οἰκήσειαν. Similarly, if Passow's (unlikely) emendation of ἐπ' αὐτονομίας προφάσει 'on pretext of desertion' with ἐπ' αὐτονομίας προφάσει 'on pretext of autonomy' in 7.13.2, the autonomy in question may be personal rather than communal.

90. Ostwald 15–16. Cf. Raaflaub 192, with 199–200, where it is noted that the term *ὁμαιχμία* (8.140a.4) emphasizes the equality of partners to the alliance, another indication that independence was offered the Athenians. Cf. 7.145.2.

mid-century, when Herodotus was collecting this self-laudatory material from his Athenian sources. At that time, *autonomos* had perhaps already taken on its Athenian connotation in describing the status of an ally that did not pay tribute. Nonetheless, it cannot be doubted that Mardonios, at least in Herodotus' narrative, intended to equate autonomy with independence. One might hypothesize that Mardonios offered to the Athenians the same condition of autonomy which was guaranteed to them, at least by the Aiginetans, in the Hellenic League, a status which did not conflict with a military alliance with Sparta, or, by extension, with Persia. Later, as the evolution of *autonomos* led to its denoting a favored status in the Delian League, Mardonios' offer was reconceptualized in order to suggest that he held out something less than independence. A final extrapolation is that the meaning "independent" for *autonomos*, a sense in which the word continued in use outside Athens, was prior to the sense of non-tributary ally.

On this interpretation, Aiginetan behavior after the defeat of Xerxes is also comprehensible.⁹¹ The only hostile act of the Aiginetans toward Athens was to complain about the rebuilding of Athens' walls (Plut. *Them.* 19.2). This complaint was directed toward Sparta as *hēgemōn* of the Hellenic League, in the councils of which the question of refortifying places outside the Isthmus was still to be resolved. The Aiginetans also sent help, as did Plataia and Athens, to suppress the Helot Revolt (Thuc. 1.102.1; 2.27.2; 3.54.5; 4.56.2). If the alliance between Athens and Sparta after the Peace of Nikias was consciously conservative, the fact that it contains a clause calling for aid in the event of a Helot revolt is significant (5.23.3). The only common characteristic among Athens, Plataia, and Aigina was their participation in the Hellenic League. Accordingly, it is noteworthy that Athens refrained from hostilities against Aigina until the Athenians had renounced their alliance with Sparta and their membership in the League. Thereafter, they went to war with Aigina at their earliest opportunity (1.105.2).

VII. CONCLUSIONS

1) Although the moment of its coining is unknown, *αὐτόνομος* originally meant 'independent' and in this connotation a recognition of autonomy appears at the foundation of the Hellenic League. It is uncertain whether all League members pledged each other's autonomy; it is possible that former enemies like Athens and Aigina chiefly did so (with Plataia a special case). Hence, in terms of what autonomy meant in 478, Thucydides could describe the Athenians as leading autonomous allies at the foundation of the Delian League (1.97.1), even though some were tributary from the start. Similarly, the Mytileneans could speculate about what their situation would be if all the allies were still autonomous (Thuc. 3.11.1). Many Greeks (prominently the Spartans) continued to define *αὐτόνομος* as 'independent', so that the new authority of imperial Athens was irreconcilable with their autonomy-language.

91. See pp. 104–7 above.

a) Autonomy as independence was nonetheless reconcilable with alliance with a military *hēgemōn*, which encouraged the development of the Athenian view of autonomy during the Pentekontaeteia. Allies who collaborated in their own defense and did not pay tribute were held to be autonomous by the Athenians. Thus, the Mytileneans at Olympia can update their perspective on autonomy when referring to the Chians and themselves as the only remaining non-tributary, *αὐτόνομοι* and *ἐλεύθεροι* allies (Thuc. 3.10.5; cf. 3.11.3; note *ἐρημότεροι* in 3.11.1).⁹²

b) During the Peloponnesian War, Athens combined autonomy with other provisions for self-government in grants made to its allies. By the Ionian War, both oligarchs and democrats were more ready to make grants of autonomy, probably because of the shift from tribute to the 5% tax (Thuc. 7.28.4).⁹³ Since that tax was levied even in an Athenian colony (Arist. *Ranae* 363), it was probably raised among the autonomous allies. Therefore, non-liability to tribute ceased to be a criterion for distinguishing the autonomous. Grants of autonomy no longer diminished the revenues supporting the fleet, and the re-established military forces of autonomous allies could serve as auxiliaries. In the fourth century, the Athenian treaty of 384 with Chios revived this practice: it established an alliance with an autonomous Chios, which preserved an independent defensive capacity (Tod *GHI* #118.19–24, 2.26–29). The Second Confederacy extended this approach to autonomy by providing that every member of the alliance was to be autonomous and free (*IG* II² 43.9–11, 19–20; cf. *DS* 15.28.3–4). Autonomy was coupled with freedom for members to choose any constitution (a feature already noted in the reaffirmation of Samian autonomy) and immunity from garrison, governor (*arkhōn*), and tribute (II. 20–25). The latter provisions went along with the maintenance of independent military establishments (cf. II. 46–51). Thereafter, the same provisions appear in an Athenian treaty with Chalcis (Tod *GHI* #124.20–27, 2.70–72).

c) In comparison, the Spartans continued to conceive of autonomy as freedom under hegemony. In the terms negotiated by various Spartan commanders and Persian satraps in the fourth century, the autonomy of the cities in Asia is guaranteed (Xen. *HG* 3.2.20, 3.4.25; cf. 3.1.20, 3.2.12, 3.4.5). That Tithraustes once tries to make autonomy contingent upon paying the traditional tribute to the Great King reminds us of the delimited autonomy of the Chalcidian cities in the Peace of Nikias (3.4.25). The King's Peace highlights this Spartan notion of autonomy, with its precedent in the Hellenic League,

92. That this semantic shift could operate makes it unlikely that there was ever an autonomy clause in the treaty establishing the Delian League; cf. N.G.L. Hammond, "The Origins and Nature of the Athenian Alliance of 478/7 B.C.," *JHS* 87 (1967) 41–61 = *Studies in Greek History* (Oxford 1973) 311–45, esp. 330, 336–37. Compare Ostwald 23–26. Consequently, a fifth-century peace with Persia, a "Peace of Kallias" is also suspect for its stipulation of the autonomy of the Asian Greeks (rather like a *koinē eirēnē*). Cf. *DS* 12.4.5; Lyc. *Leoc.* 73; *Suda s.v.* *Κίμων*, κ 1620 Adler.

93. Cf. Smarczyk 61–83.

namely mutual non-interference under Spartan hegemony (Xen. *HG* 5.1.31, 36; cf. 4.8.14).

d) While autonomy-language often appears in connection with the recognition of the autonomy of a weaker state by a stronger power, it is not concessive freedom or freedom in spite of an external influence.⁹⁴ It could be used in reciprocal recognitions of autonomy such as has been postulated for the Hellenic League and can also be seen in the Spartan resolution of 418. There the phrase *καὶ μικρὰς καὶ μεγάλας* underlines this very point, as the great cities probably included Argos and Sparta (Thuc. 5.77.5). Note that the “cities great and small” in the autonomy clause of the King’s Peace include all Greek cities outside Asia (*HG* 5.1.31). In Xenophon’s description of the common peace of 371, once again the same phrasing is used (*HG* 6.5.3; cf. 6.3.18). In Diodorus’ description of the foundation of the Second Confederacy, among the cities guaranteed autonomy is Thebes (15.28.4: *πόλιν δὲ ἐπ’ ἴσης καὶ μεγάλην καὶ μικρὰν μιᾷ ψήφῳ κυρίαν εἶναι*).

2) The autonomy about which the Aiginetans complained at Sparta had no basis in valid international agreement, since the Athenians had renounced their membership in the Hellenic League in 462/1. In their subsequent dealings with Aigina, the Athenians had reverted to a position of doubting the legitimacy of the Aiginetan government. Hence, the Spartans could not resort to arbitration in this matter in the face of a Periclean insistence on legality. Yet Sparta still had a good issue for propagandizing, because the difficult situation of the Dorian Aiginetans under Athenian rule stimulated compassion, when it could be juxtaposed with the Aiginetan *aristeia* at Salamis. The Athenians were blind to this sympathy, because to them, the Aiginetans were piratical, hubristic, and sacrilegious miscreants.⁹⁵ But this specific failure of insight was hardly unique in imperial Athens. At the same time, one can only marvel at the audacity of the Spartan ultimatum. It tried to undo the previous thirty years of history, all that had happened since the dismissal of the Athenians from Ithome and the fall from power of Kimon. In a frame of mind dominated by the commitments to the Hellenic League, the next step was to wish away the Delian League by extending the notion of Aiginetan autonomy to all Athenian subjects. Not surprisingly, this ultimatum was accompanied by hegemonic language, scarcely appropriate for Athens of the 480s, let alone for the imperial state of the 430s. The Archidamian War was a painful lesson for Sparta, and the Peace of Nikias and the Athenian-Spartan alliance that followed it represented a two-stage reascent toward a sort of cohegemonic Hellenic League.

3) The idea that Aigina had been guaranteed autonomy in the Thirty Years Peace has been an important supposition in the reconstruction of the evolution of autonomy by, for instance, Bickerman and Ostwald. If it is

94. Cf. Raaflaub 200–201.

95. See pp. 53–55 above.

removed from consideration, the following views on autonomy should be re-considered. i) Declarations and stipulations of autonomy were not casually inserted into interstate documents. They were not meant for show. ii) There is no evidence that the concept of autonomy was taken less seriously around mid-century, and used with renewed significance in the 420s.⁹⁶ iii) While the Athenians and Spartans defined autonomy differently, there is no indication that they used ambiguity regarding the language of autonomy to achieve an advantage over each other in treaties like the Thirty Years Peace. The Peace of Nikias shows the care with which they defined Delphic and Chalcidian autonomy for the purposes of that agreement.

4) Autonomy may have begun by meaning the independence of a city's internal decision-making process. The usage of the term in its Athenian connotation, however, focuses on liability or non-liability to pay tribute, on the possession of a fleet, and on the existence of fortifications. Nonetheless, it is mistaken to see in these characteristics only the outward trappings of an internal autonomy, for they are essential aspects of autonomy itself.⁹⁷ Clearly, the idea that one could have total internal independence without a military apparatus was inconceivable. The absence of a capability for war necessitated paying tribute. The fact of paying tribute would have induced even the most generous and relaxed of *hēgemones* (which the Athenians were not) to become involved in the internal affairs of tribute-payers, because the nature and incidence of the taxes supporting tribute involved the *hēgemōn* in most aspects of the lives of the subjects. There is no evidence at all to suggest that any Athenian after 450 ever maintained that persons who did not undertake their own defense by risking their lives could have been considered *autonomoi*.^{97a} On this principle turned much of the Athenian justification of their imperial policy,

96. Cf. Ostwald 47–48.

97. Hence attempts to justify the etymological sense of *autonomia* as legislative or judicial independence find very few passages to cite, as Ostwald observes (29, with n. 155, p. 62).

97a. See pp. 218–19 above. The argument of N.D. Robertson, "The True Nature of the 'Delian League' 478–461 BC," *AJAH* 5 (1980) 64–96, 110–33, is at variance with much of the appreciation of the Athenian concern for autonomy as presented above. Yet, his approach to the nature of the synod of the Delian League is helpful on the linkage of military service and autonomy (119–20, with n. 125, 127 [pp. 130–31]). He notes (as I was tempted to do in an earlier draft of this article) the transition from a situation where the allies were unable to resist Athens owing to their number (Thuc. 3.10.5: ἀδύνατοι δὲ ὄντες καθ' ἐν γενόμενοι διὰ πολυψηφίαν ἀμύνεσθαι οἱ ξύμμαχοι ἐδουλώθησαν πλὴν ἡμῶν καὶ Χίων) to one where the complicity in campaigning against other allies by states with equal input to decision-making could be used as an Athenian argument for the propriety of their actions (Thuc. 3.11.4: ἅμα μὲν γὰρ μαρτυρίῳ ἐχρῶντο μὴ ἂν τοὺς γε ἰσοψηφούς ἀκούσας, εἰ μὴ τι ἡδίκουν οἷς ἐπῆσαν, ξυστρατεύειν). He then argues (correctly in my view) for seeing the league synod as a council of war of ship-contributing states. The mystery of its disappearance is owed to the decline in number of such states (which is not, however, a reference to changes from an "imaginary time"). In terms of the foregoing discussion, the deliberations of the league became confined to bilateral discussions between the Athenians and the ambassadors of the handful of remaining autonomous cities.

which is well illustrated by Perikles' crushing riposte to criticism of the building program by Thoukydides Melesiou and his faction. The allies contribute οὐχ ἵππον, οὐ ναῦν, οὐχ ὀπλίτην, ἀλλὰ χρήματα μόνον (Plut. *Per.* 12.3).⁹⁸

ENDNOTE

The monetary history of Aigina during the Pentekontaeteia is consonant with the reconstruction of the history of autonomy proposed above. There is little likelihood either on legal or on practical grounds that the sequence of Aiginetan minting in the period of their subjection to Athens reflects shifts in their status or has a bearing on the general question of the nature of autonomy. In the comments to follow, I draw heavily on the analyses contained in a monograph in progress on the Attic Coinage Decree (IG I³ 1453).

I. We may approach first the issue of whether the right to mint was directly considered to be an aspect of autonomy by the Athenians and other Greeks.

A) As the presentation of the material above seems to indicate, there are no collocations of coinage or minting and autonomy language. In the current state of our knowledge, the Athenians never granted the right to coin silver in the course of decrees which declared allies autonomous. Determinations of those who were to be considered autonomous revolved around the possession of a military apparatus and the capacity to contribute in their own persons to allied operations. It is hard to see how a state's possession of its own currency necessarily solidified or subverted such an ability.

B) Furthermore, outside of Athenian practice, there is also little corroborative material that speaks for a crucial importance for coining in achieving a recognition of a city's autonomy. There is no suggestion, for instance, that the ability to mint had in the classical period a strong symbolic impact, analogous to that exercised by admission to the United Nations today. How would we rate the autonomy of the many independent cities that never coin, most using the coinage of their larger neighbors? Those without mints are the numerical majority of all Greek *poleis* during the fifth century. In the early fourth century Mytilene and Phokaia made arrangements for coordinating minting activities without a hint of precautions to protect their autonomy (Tod *GHI* #112). Naturally, cities could declare their own coinage sole legal tender locally, but there is no warrant to think that they acted in order to strengthen a claim to autonomy rather than for reasons of facilitating administrative supervision and taxation (cf. Eretria: IG XII.9 1273 [550–25]; Olbia: SIG³ 218 [fourth century]). The conclusion of T.R. Martin, *Sovereignty and Coinage in Classical Greece* (Princeton 1985) esp. 196–218, that there was no close connection between sovereignty and coinage is unobjectionable on the basis of the evidence from the Pentekontaeteia.

II. The Athenian Coinage Decree and other hegemonic dispositions about monetary matters (insofar as they can be assessed indirectly) do not indicate that the Athenians would have wished to forbid Aiginetan minting.

A) In the first place, Athenian monetary legislation must have focused on the essential issue of the administration of the collection of tribute. Expenses for building and equipping ships were mainly incurred at Athens and hence underwritten in

98. The evolution of the term *αὐτόνομος* was not, however, only a reflection of the general process of Athenian aggrandizement. No one (including the Athenians) may have anticipated how an initially popular system of tribute would necessarily embroil the Athenians so deeply in the internal politics of the tributaries.

Athenian money. Rowers and specialist naval personnel will also have been paid in Attic coins. Hence, for the sake of convenience (if not hegemonal primacy), assessments of tribute—starting, I believe, from the Aristeidian first assessment—were denominated in terms of Attic money. Thus, those cities that coined themselves held their receipts from taxes in the form of their own money, but a major outlay (often the largest) had to be made in foreign (Attic) coinage. This created a potential for exchange problems for those allied cities which might experience difficulties in acquiring Attic coinage in sufficient amounts and at a good price. Most payments of tribute as reported on the Tribute Lists were made in Attic tetradrachms. Before 446, however, we find odd amounts which indicate that Athens was sometimes prepared to accept foreign money. See S.K. Eddy, "Some Irregular Amounts of Athenian Tribute," *AJP* 94 (1973) 47–70; D.M. Lewis, "The Athenian Coinage Decree," in I. Carradice (ed.), *Coinage and Administration in the Athenian and Persian Empires* (Oxford 1987) 53–63. The postscript on List I also seems to show that payments were received in electrum (*IG* I³ 259.VI.6–12). Some presumably were the aforesaid odd amounts; others perhaps lie hidden in round numbers. This dispensation probably reflects a sensitivity toward financial stresses that were being felt through the general state of war prevailing in the Aegean. Even this remediation—which was not without its costs to the Athenians—could not help the other aspect of exchange difficulties, the relative disadvantage suffered by those who maintained non-Athenian currencies in recapturing some of the money paid to their citizens who served in the league fleet and were paid in Attic money.

B) The actual history of coining during the *arkhē* reflects these economic forces militating in favor of an acceptance of Athenian money as legal tender and a corresponding attenuation of the activity of local mints. Many states ceased to coin, lowered their rate of minting (perhaps reserving local money for particularly significant disbursements by the government), or coined only in weights below the stater. This last phenomenon is especially demonstrative of the usage of local money to supplement Attic tetradrachms circulating locally. Nonetheless, independent mints did not become extinct and were not terminated by imperial enactment. Too many mints can be shown to have continued minting after the supposed prohibition of coining by the Coinage Decree (at any likely date for it) to be explained away as mistakes of our numismatics or as special dispensations of the Athenians. See (e.g.) M.J. Price, "The Coinages of the Northern Aegean," in Carradice *Coinage and Administration* 43–51; H.B. Mattingly, "The Second Athenian Coinage Decree," *Klio* 59 (1977) 83–100, esp. 89–100. We must conclude that there existed specific market conditions involving Greeks outside the *arkhē* and non-Greek trading partners (e.g. in the Black Sea and in Thrace) that would have been set at risk if particular allied mints were closed (like those specializing in electrum issues or the mints of the Thracian littoral). Where trade brought in sufficient owls for exchange and where a relatively larger proportion of transactions took place between citizens, the larger civic economies were less vulnerable to a local predominance of Attic coins. Valuable new evidence on the circulation of coins in the Aegean is offered by the "Decadrachm Hoard". See S. Fried, "The Decadrachm Hoard: Introduction," in Carradice *Coinage and Administration* 1–19. When we have filtered out the local influences of its origin in southwest Asia Minor, the hoard seems to suggest that the *arkhē* and its quasi-Hellenized hinterland were a relatively self-contained monetary region, where Attic coinage had an expectedly large role in the money supply, but other coinages were common, because convertible, if only through intermediary. Aiginetan and Aiginetan-weight coinage played a minor role in the money circulating on a local level in the *arkhē*.

C) The Coinage Decree, as shown by the copy from Kos in Attic, was (most likely) originally promulgated in the early 440s. The Ionian copies suggest a continuing validity down into the 420s and the joking reference to the law in the *Birds* of Aristophanes (vv. 1040–41) may bring its currency down into the mid-410s. The Decree seems to have involved a one time exchange of foreign monies into Athenian coinage. Fragmentary clauses report an order to coin silver available in the mint (section v), establish a minting fee (v), and create a sheltered fund (vi–viii; perhaps to ameliorate future difficulties of monetary exchange). The tribute system appears intimately involved in the procedure, as the prominent role of the Hellenotamiai marks (ii.1). Two clauses in the Decree are thought to demonstrate that a ban on allied minting in silver was at issue. One prop for this conclusion was removed by Lewis' explanation that the clause threatening capital punishment did not constrain allied monetary activity, but protected a fund established herein from tampering by Athenian politicians (viii). See D.M. Lewis, "Entrenchment-Clauses in Attic Decrees," in D.W. Bradeen & M.F. McGregor (eds.), *ΦΟΡΟΣ: Tribute to Benjamin Dean Meritt* (Locust Valley, NY 1974) 81–89. The other clause has been held to add to the oath of the *bouleutai* a commitment to act against those minting silver in the cities (xii). I shall argue in my monograph that it does nothing more than affirm the local validity throughout the *arkhē* of Attic coins, weights, and measures alongside local coins, weights, and measures. The traditional restoration may well permit my interpretation, but several equally or more plausible restorations can also be offered.

D) No one has ever suggested a believable rationale for any other objective for the Coinage Decree than the purpose just suggested, namely to establish the general validity of Attic coinage alongside local issues. That result obviated any exchange problems that might have troubled the flow of tribute payments. Other theories that have proposed economic rationales seem to founder on their inability to prove any differential advantage for the Athenians in forbidding the operation of other mints. Any significant profit from the conversion of foreign coins into Attic coins is hard to find on the scale of conversion or at the likely rate to make prohibition worthwhile. The final alternative, that the Athenians acted merely to exult in their own hegemony and in the abasement of their allies not only fails before the absence of any linkage of coining and autonomy, but also in the face of the non-appearance of the least protest in contemporary evidence on the intrusiveness of such Athenian monetary legislation.

III. The continuation of Aiginetan minting is unsurprising against this background.

A) The Coinage Decree will not have forbidden it, so long as the Aiginetans accepted Attic money as legal tender on Aigina. The Aiginetan internal economy was relatively large and trade made up a significant portion of income. The Aiginetans had far-flung commercial connections outside the *arkhē* and in many cities, especially where minting was conducted on the Aiginetan standard, Aiginetan coins may conveniently have circulated much like local coins. As has been noted, the "Decadrachm Hoard" suggests that Aiginetan coins had a different pattern of local circulation from Attic owls. Aigina therefore fits the pattern of those states that continue to mint even after the Coinage Decree. See also J.H. Kagan, "The Decadrachm Hoard: Chronology and Consequences," in Carradice *Coinage and Administration* 21–28.

B) Accordingly, there is no reason to believe that Aigina was forced to cease minting and to change type after its subjection to Athens. The tortoise type (eventually supplanting the turtles) is attested earlier in a few series of the coins of independent Aigina, which seems to refute the suggestion that the Athenians demanded its introduction to

impress on the Aiginetans their loss of naval power. Nor is there reason to think that the Athenians found some objectionable, thalassocratic symbolism in the sea turtle type itself; they were quite prepared to use it on their own weights in order to facilitate exchange between the Attic and Aiginetan weight systems (p. 68 above). Cf. P. Rago, "Il cambio di tartaruga ad Egina," *RIN* 65 (1963) 7–15, esp. 13–15. However much one may be prepared to condemn Athenian imperialism, does anyone really care to argue that the Athenians and specifically Perikles would have bothered with such a petty, gratuitous, and unproductive gesture as this? It is more likely that the change of type was owed to a shift in minting authority, as I argued in *Aegina* 115–21. The minting officials responsible for coining the archaic Aiginetan staters or turtles may have been associated with the subsidization and supervision of the Aiginetan fleet in a manner similar to the *naukraroi* and their treasury in archaic Athens (pp. 163–68 above). With the termination of the fleet, their minting was ended. The other mint, only fitfully active in the archaic period, assumed complete responsibility for coining. Its tortoise type originated long before as a punning reference to the terrestrial duties of its supervisors, when compared with the maritime interests of the officials of the mint then dominant. The Aiginetans may even have exploited the changeover with a demonetization of the earlier turtles that was intended to raise revenue. See also O. Picard, "La tortue de terre sur les monnaies d'Egine," *BSFN* 33 (1978) 330–33; cf. L.H. Beer, *The Coinage of Aegina: A Chronological Reappraisal Based on Hoards and Technical Studies* (Diss., Oxford University 1980) 195–96.

B) The tortoises are clearly coins that began in the fifth century, as the overstrike of a coin by the fifth-century Cypriote king Azbaal of Kition indicates. See S.P. Noe, "Countermarked and Overstruck Greek Coins at the American Numismatic Society," *ANSMN* 6 (1954) 85–93, esp. 89–90; E.S.G. Robinson, "A Hoard of Archaic Greek Coins from Anatolia," *NC* 1 (1961) 107–17, esp. 111–12. Rago perceived stylistic similarities between the latest "T-back" turtles and the first tortoises (*RIN* [1963] 10; Beer *Coinage* 195–98). Their low percentage of gold and proportion of copper link them to the last turtles. Note C.M. Kraay & V.M. Emeleus, *The Composition of Greek Coins: Analysis by Neutron Activation* (Oxford 1962) 14. It becomes increasingly clear that the fifth-century tortoises were issued in considerable numbers so that a date before the Thirty Years Peace is probably necessary to accommodate them. The hypothesis of a short hiatus between turtles and tortoises c. 457–56 appears most probable. See Rago *RIN* (1963) 13–14; E. Erxleben, "Das Münzgesetz des delisch-attischen Seebundes: II. Die Münzen," *AfP* 20 (1970) 66–132, esp. 68; R.R. Holloway, "An Archaic Hoard from Crete and The Early Aeginetan Coinage," *ANSMN* 17 (1971) 1–21, esp. 20–21; Beer *Coinage* 79–83, 112–13, 192–95. There are also signs in hoard evidence that tortoises were already in circulation before 450. See M. Thompson, O. Mørkholm, C.M. Kraay (eds.), *An Inventory of Greek Coin Hoards* (New York 1973) #21 (Koumares), #1647 (Naucratis); cf. #28 (Chavari), #1483 (Massyaf); see also *Coin Hoards* 3.12, for which see M. Caramessini-Oeconomides, "The 1970 Myrina Hoard of Aeginetan Staters," *Greek Numismatics and Archaeology: Essays in Honor of Margaret Thompson* (Wetteren 1979) 231–39; *Coin Hoards* 3.10, for which see H. Nicolet-Pierre, "Remarques sur le monnayage d'Egine au VI^e et au V^e siècle d'après la trouvaille de Mégapolis de 1936," in V. Kondić (ed.), *Frappe et Ateliers monétaires dans l'antiquité et Moyen Age* (Belgrade 1976) 5–12; the "Wells Hoard" (*Coin Hoards* 1.12) for which see Beer *Coinage* 146–50. Cf. H.B. Mattingly, "Coins and Amphoras—Chios, Samos and Thasos in the Fifth Century B.C.," *JHS* 101

(1981) 78–86, esp. 83. Hence the suggestion of Robinson, followed by Meiggs and Kraay, that Aigina was allowed to resume coining as a demonstration of an autonomy granted by the Thirty Years Peace fails to explain what we now know numismatically, even if one were prepared to reject the paradigm for monetary legislation that I have proposed above. Cf. Robinson *NC* (1961) 111–12; Meiggs *Empire* 183–184; C.M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1976) 47.

Four Notes on the Aiginetans in Exile

FIFTH-CENTURY political history is, first and foremost, the history of *poleis* rather than a record of the vicissitudes of sub-political groups. Accordingly, it cannot be with the highest expectations that one approaches the literary evidence for information about the Aiginetans after their expulsion from their homeland by the Athenians in 431.¹ By this displacement, the Aiginetans were sundered from the institutions of the *polis*, the modality through which they might act collectively. Therefore, the full story of the Aiginetan *diaspora* is irrecoverable: we can only perceive several episodes in their travails and are able to recover only some of the policies and of the attitudes with which they faced their difficult situation. Yet, what can be discerned contributes significantly to our understanding of international politics in the late fifth century. The dogged pursuit by the Aiginetan exiles of a recovery of their homeland is in itself a noteworthy testimony to the bonding between citizens and their *polis*.

I. THE CHARACTER OF THE AIGINETAN SETTLEMENT IN EXILE

When the Aiginetans were expelled from their island by the Athenians in 431, it was in large part for their complicity in the Peloponnesian declaration of war on Athens (Thuc. 2.27.1).² The Aiginetans had complained in secret to the Spartans that they were being deprived of their autonomy (1.67.2; cf. Plut. *Per.* 29.5). Accordingly, a Spartan demand for Aiginetan autonomy, which the Spartans averred was guaranteed *kata tas spondas* 'according to the treaty', was included in the Spartan ultimatum to Athens (1.139.1).³ Perikles dismissed this claim by offering to grant autonomy to any state which was autonomous when the Thirty Years Peace was signed (1.144.2). Nonetheless, because of the heroism of the Aiginetans against Xerxes (they had won the *aristeia* at Salamis: Hdt. 8.93.1), Aiginetan autonomy made an excellent subject for anti-Athenian propagandizing (3.64.3; cf. Aris. *Rhet.* 1396a17–20): the Spartans had remained faithful to the ties created by service against Persia in contrast to the Athenians who were prepared to victimize former comrades.

1. I should like to thank W.K. Pritchett, Emeritus Professor of Classics at the University of California at Berkeley, who generously shared his latest thoughts on the topography of the Thyrreatis with me by letter. Pritchett will include a treatment of the major points of controversy in his forthcoming *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography: Part VI* [now, Berkeley & Los Angeles 1989]. See ns. 35, 44–45 below. Some of the material treated in this article has previously been discussed by E. Mikrogiannakis, "Ἡ τύχη τῶν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἐξοικισθέντων Αἰγινήτων," *Kretika Chronika* (= *KChron*) 23 (1971) 395–424; see ns. 10, 27, 32, 53, 54, and 58 below.

2. All references are to Thucydides unless otherwise specified.

3. A complete discussion of Aiginetan autonomy and the elusive *spondai* guaranteeing them is presented above, pp. 255, 266–84.

On their expulsion, the Aiginetans split into two sections (2.27.1–2).⁴ Some were scattered around the Greek world (for the causes for this division, see pp. 323–24 below). Other Aiginetans found refuge with the Spartans, who gave them the region of the Thyreatis to inhabit.⁵ Thucydides cites two reasons for Spartan willingness to receive them: *κατὰ τε τὸ Ἀθηναίων διάφορον καὶ ὅτι σφῶν εὐεργέται ἦσαν ὑπὸ τὸν σεισμόν καὶ τῶν Εἰλώτων τὴν ἐπανάστασιν* (2.27.2). Gratitude for help during the crisis of c. 465 is also noted by Thucydides in his narrative on the Athenian attack on the Thyreatis in 424 (4.56.2; see also pp. 106–7 above). There is no reason to doubt that there was some sincerity in this motivation, especially among ordinary Spartiates, but one should also observe that it served the campaign of propaganda about Aiginetan autonomy. By grounding their welcome of the Aiginetans in gratitude for help c. 465, the Spartans heightened awareness of their responsibility to Aigina as *hēgemōn* of the Hellenic League and *de facto* leader of all the Greeks: just like the Spartan-Athenian alliance of 421, the *spondai* establishing the Hellenic League may have contained a clause stipulating military aid to Sparta in the event of a Helot Revolt (cf. Thuc. 5.23.3; see p. 107 above).

The *diaphoron* ‘hostility’ at issue is presumably that separating the Athenians and Aiginetans, rather than that between the Spartans and Athenians.⁶ In his second notice on the reasons for the Spartan reception of the Aiginetans, Thucydides seems to repeat this motive in the following terms: *ὅτι Ἀθηναίων ὑπακούοντες ὁμῶς πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων γνώμην αἰεὶ ἔστασαν* (4.56.2). The emphasis in the first explanation is on alienation from the Athenians, while, in the second explanation, stress (conversely) falls on Aiginetan identification with the Spartan cause. Further speculations on practical reasons for harboring the Aiginetans in the manner in which the Spartans did must wait on a determination of the character of the settlement in the Thyreatis.

The Thyreatis lay on the border with Argive territory, and had been annexed from Argos by Sparta c. 546, when the Argives had been defeated in the Battle of the Champions (Hdt. 1.82.2–8). The exact use to which the arable land of Thyreatis had been put by Sparta before the emplacement of the Aiginetans is unclear. No evidence indicates occupation by Perioeci, of whom, in any case, one would be hard pressed to supply a context for the removal. Originally, some of the land was probably used to provide *klēroi* for Spartiates, because Pausanias states that [the Spartans, after the battle] *αὐτοὶ τε παραντίκα ἐκαρποῦντο καὶ ὕστερον Αἰγινήταις ἔδωσαν ἐκπεσοῦσιν ὑπὸ Ἀθηναίων ἐκ τῆς νήσου* (2.38.5). Yet, if one judges from the site of the town of Thyrea and from Pritchett’s site for Anthene, described as once having been occupied by the Aiginetans (see pp. 306–7 below), the Aiginetans occupied the

4. Other references to the expulsion: Thuc. 4.56.2; DS 12.44.2; Plut. *Per.* 34.2; Paus 2.29.5, 38.5; Strabo 8.6.16 C375.

5. See also DS 12.44.2–3; Paus. 2.29.5, 38.5.

6. *HCT* 2.87 against J. Classen (rev. J. Steup), *Thukydides*⁵ (Berlin 1914–1922) 2.70, who cites Thuc. 1.103.3 on the Messenians at Naupaktos. See below for Ephorus’ suggestion that the reception of the Aiginetans balanced the establishment of the Messenians at Naupaktos.

northern Thyreatis. As any *klēroi* in this area would have lain close to Argive territory, so near as to make Argive interference with the Helots practicable, these borderlands may have been underutilized, if not unoccupied. Since the size of the class of *Homoioi* had fallen through the losses suffered in the Great Earthquake of c. 465 and the ensuing insurrection of the Helots, perhaps some potential *klēros*-land could be spared in 431.⁷ After the region had reverted to Argive control after the Theban invasion of Lakonia in 369 (with possession reconfirmed by Philip II in 338; cf. Paus. 2.20.1, 38.7; DS 15.64.1), there were three towns in the area according to Pausanias. Besides Anthene, the two other communities, Neris and Eua, are nowhere described as having been perioecic or Aiginetan. The graves at Eua yield material the closest affinities of which lie with the Argolid rather than Lakonia. Only one burial can be firmly dated before 370.⁸ The land of these two towns may originally have been allotted to *klēroi*.

There are no data which indicate that *communities* of free men existed in *Lakonikē* save for the perioecic towns. Clearly, there had been no change of sovereignty on the arrival of the Aiginetans, inasmuch as Thucydides describes the Thyreatis in 420, with its two towns Thyrea and Anthene, as occupied by Lakedaimonians (5.41.2: [Kynouria] ἔχει δὲ ἐν αὐτῇ Θυρέαν καὶ Ἀνθήνην πόλιν, νέμονται δ' αὐτὴν Λακεδαιμόνιοι). That the Thyreatis had long been Spartan territory in 431 may be combined with the phraseology of the Thucydidean references to the grant to suggest that the Aiginetans were given the rights of Perioeci:⁹ 2.27.2: ἐκπεσοῦσι δὲ τοῖς Αἰγινήταις οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἔδωσαν Θυρέαν οἰκεῖν καὶ τὴν γῆν νέμεσθαι; 4.56.2: νεμόμενοι δὲ αὐτὴν ἔδωσαν Λακεδαιμόνιοι Αἰγινήταις ἐκπεσοῦσιν ἐνοικεῖν. In the account of the original grant, the combination of ἔδωσαν and οἰκεῖν with the verb νέμω in the middle (with γῆν) implies a permanent settlement, if not a division of the land into individual holdings.¹⁰ The same verb νέμω is again used to describe the ownership of Kynouria in 420, but, as we have noted, the inhabitants are there said to be Lakedaimonians, not Aiginetans. Moreover, in the notice on an Argive raid of 414, the land is again simply implied to be Spartan: καὶ Ἀργεῖοι μετὰ ταῦτα

7. T. J. Figueira, "Population Patterns in Late Archaic and Classical Sparta," *TAPA* 116 (1986) 165–213, esp. 181–84.

8. C. Abadie & T. Spyropoulos, "Fouilles à Helleniko (Eua de Thyreatide)," *BCH* 109 (1985) 385–454, where only the first of two burials in Cemetery B, Sector B, Tomb B might date as early as the 5th century (404–7).

9. If Tantalos was a harmost such as those who were assigned to perioecic towns, this conclusion would be further supported. See n. 27 below.

10. All the comparable formulae in Thucydides entail the permanent grant of land with all pertinent rights. Nearest to 2.27.2 is 2.30.1: (Athenians) παραδιδόασιν Παλαιεῦσιν Ἀκαρνάνων μόνοις τὴν γῆν καὶ πόλιν νέμεσθαι. Approximating 2.27.1–2 somewhat less closely is 5.32.1: τὴν γῆν (Skione) Πλαταιεῦσιν ἔδωσαν νέμεσθαι. For 4.56.2, compare 3.68.3: (Thebans) τὴν δὲ πόλιν (Plataia) . . . ἔδωσαν ἐνοικεῖν (Megarian exiles and pro-Theban Plataians); Hdt. 2.178.1: (Amasis) καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖσι ἀπικνευμένοις ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἔδωκε Ναύκρατι πόλιν ἐνοικῆσαι; Hdt. 9.106.3: τῶν μηδισάντων ἐθνέων τῶν Ἑλληνικῶν τὰ ἐμπόρια (Hude) ἐξαναστήσαντας (the Peloponnesian leadership) δοῦναι τὴν χώραν Ἰωσι ἐνοικῆσαι Cf. Mikrogianakis *KChron* (1971) 402.

ἐσβαλόντες ἐς τὴν Θυρέατιν ὄμορον οὖσαν λείαν τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων πολλὰν ἔλαβον (6.95.1). Thucydides' terminology throughout seems to certify the conclusion that the Aiginetans had become Spartan, one assumes by the normal route of assimilation, i.e. a grant of perioecic status.¹¹

Why the Spartans should have made the Aiginetans Perioeci may be viewed in terms both of Spartan tradition and of the exigencies of the war with Athens. In the Spartan struggles with Argos for hegemony over the archaic Peloponnesus, the Spartans had provided refuge for the inhabitants of Asine and Nauplia in new Perioecic settlements (Asine: Paus. 4.14.3, cf. 2.36.4–5; 3.7.4; Nauplia: Paus. 4.35.2; cf. 4.24.4; 27.8). These two towns of the Argolid had been natural targets for the Argives, who considered them to fall within the Temenid Lot, the segment of the Peloponnesus primordially Argive.¹² In the ebb and flow of Argive dominance in the Argolid, the Asineans and Nauplians had countered by aligning themselves with Sparta. Asine was destroyed by Argos c. 715, and Nauplia had suffered the same fate in the late seventh century.¹³ The analogy between these two peoples and the Aiginetans is a close one. The Aiginetans lay within the penumbra of a power hostile to Sparta—Athens—and were accused by that power of Laconism. Receiving such fugitives was patently of practical advantage, as it gained for Sparta followers committed against its chief adversary.

Yet, to the best of our knowledge, this line of policy had not been revived since the harboring of the Nauplians. Its revival can be understood, if we consider the forms taken at the same time by Athenian imperialism. Ephorus states directly that the Spartan reception of the fugitives was motivated by the Athenian welcome of Messenian fugitives at Naupaktos (DS 12.44.2–3). The establishment of the Aiginetans in the strategically significant Thyreatis demonstrated that Sparta could play the same game of international power politics. Nonetheless, just as the incorporation of the Aiginetans had an offensive facet, so too can it be seen as defensive, aimed at protecting an Aiginetan and Peloponnesian claim to Aigina.

As early as c. 506, Athens laid claim to the rightful ownership of Aigina through the establishment of a cult in honor of the Aiginetan hero Aiakos (Hdt. 5.89.2). A Delphic response had assured the Athenians that the proper consecration of the Aiakeion would guarantee Athenian subjugation of Aigina (witness the parallel of the Eurysakeion in their incorporation of Salamis).^{13a}

11. For a similar conclusion, compare J. Christien & T. Spyropoulos, "Eua et la Thyreatide—Topographie et Histoire," *BCH* 109 (1985) 455–66, esp. 461, 466. Note also that the liberated and enfranchised Helots called Neodamodeis were probably Perioeci: Hesych. s.v. δαμώδεις, 214 Latte; *ΣThuc.* 5.34.1; Xen. *HG* 3.3.6; cf. Dio Chrys. 19(36).38.

12. Temenid Inheritance and cult of Apollo Pythaeus: Thuc. 5.53; Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 115 with Strabo 8.6.10 C372; Paus. 2.26.1–2; cf. 2.28.3–7, 2.38.1–2. See, e.g., K.O. Müller, *Die Dorier* (Breslau 1844) 1.80–81, 154–55; Jeffery *Archaic Greece* 133–37, with ns., p. 143.

13. Asine: J.N. Coldstream, *Geometric Greece* (London 1977) 145, 152–54; Nauplia: R.M. Cook, *Southern Greece: An Archaeological Guide* (London 1968) 127; see pp. 15–19 above.

13a. F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques: Supplément* (Paris 1962) #19, pp. 49–54 with *IG* II² 1232.

When conditions were propitious for an intervention in the internal affairs of the Aiginetans c. 490, the Athenians supported a coup staged by the Aiginetan *dāmos* (Hdt. 6.88; 91.1–2). After the uprising was put down, fugitives fleeing governmental retaliation were received into Attica and allowed to settle Sou-nion as citizens (Hdt. 6.90).^{13b} By this gesture, the Athenians incorporated into their citizen-body representatives of the Aiginetan *dāmos*, who were, in terms of Athenian political values, the source of legitimate authority in Aiginetan society. Later, the tributary Aigina of the 450s experienced a reaffirmation of the island's ties to Athens by the establishment of Attic cults on the island (*IG* IV 29–38).¹⁴ Finally, the Athenian settlement planted on Aigina after the expulsion of the Aiginetans in 431—technically an *apoikia* 'colony' (7.57.2; cf. 5.74.3) and its settlers being *epoikoi* 'secondary settlers' or 'reinforcing colonists' (2.27.1; 8.69.3)—functioned as a reconstituted, legitimized Aiginetan polity.¹⁵ The new community inventoried the cults of Aphaia and of Damia and Auxesia preparatory to carrying on their ritual on its own behalf (*IG* IV 39, 1588). In this way, it claimed continuity with pre-expulsion Aigina.

By their assimilation of the Aiginetans, the Spartans forwarded a countervailing claim to Aigina. They set the stage for a reiteration of the demand for an autonomous Aigina should the Athenians try to negotiate peace; an effort made, as it turned out, either when the Athenians rejected for a time the leadership of Perikles in 430 or during a flurry of rumors about peace in 426.¹⁶ Spartan policy covered every eventuality: they had the practical help of the Aiginetans during the hostilities; they used Aiginetan autonomy in representing the war as a struggle against the tyrant-city of Greece; and, finally, if the Athenians were imprudent enough to relinquish Aigina, the Spartans acquired a base conveniently situated for naval operations. Its usefulness as a staging point for expeditions into the Aegean and for *ληστεία* 'pillaging' against Attica was to be proven during the Corinthian War (see pp. 342–50 below). All these aspects of Spartan motivation for an establishment of the Aiginetans on Spartan territory are encapsulated within the succinct reference by Thucydides to the *diaphoron* between Aigina and Athens.

The specific choice of the Thyreatis as the new home for the Aiginetans may have a simple explanation in the fact that this territory was the last accession to Spartan holdings, and, especially where it adjoined the Argive border, had been underutilized. It may, therefore, have become an obvious candidate for a project in resettlement. But the Aiginetans could also have been accommodated elsewhere in Spartan territory. Given their interest in the sea,

13b. See Figueira *Colonization* n. 4, p. 105.

14. See J.P. Barron, "The Fifth-Century *Horoi* of Aigina," *JHS* 103 (1983) 1–12. [See *Colonization* 115–20.]

15. *ATL* 3.284–89; cf. V. Ehrenberg, "Thucydides on Athenian Colonization," *CP* 47 (1952) 143–49, esp. 145–46; A.J. Graham, *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece*² (Chicago 1983) 172–74, 182–83. [See *Colonization* 7–15, 53–66.]

16. Thuc. 2.59.2; Arist. *Ach.* 652–58 with scholia; see D. Kagan, *The Archidamian War* (Ithaca 1974) 82–83. [See *Colonization* 82–83 with n. 12, p. 83.]

southern Lakonia near the Spartan naval base at Gytheion, for example, would have been appropriate. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that the Spartans also saw the Aiginetans established in the Thyreatis as useful auxiliaries in Sparta's relations with its arch-rival in the Peloponnesus, Argos. Settled there, the Aiginetans helped to create a *cordon sanitaire* along the border with Argos. Like other Perioeci, the Aiginetans guarded the frontier from hostile incursion and stood in the way of Helot flight across into foreign territory, in this case, the Argolid.¹⁷

The settlement of the Aiginetans, however, transcended the customary, perioecic role of buffer state. Aigina and Argos had had a long tradition of political cooperation. One myth on the foundation of Aigina portrayed it as a colony of Argos (Paus. 2.29.5; ΣPin. *Ol.* 8.39a–b; *Nem.* 3.1b; Strabo 8.6.16 C375; J. Tzetzes, ΣLyc. *Alex.* 176; cf. ΣPin. *Pyth.* 8.29a). Not surprisingly, Aigina belonged to the Argive share of the Peloponnesus, the Temenid Lot, and may have participated in the cult organization paying honors to Apollo Pythaieus of Argos, a ritual expression of Argive hegemony (see n. 12 above). Aigina was also held to have been subject to Argos in the time of Pheidon, who was credited with coining the first Greek silver on the island (Orion *s.v.* ὀβολός [col. 118 Sturz], cf. Heraclid. Pont. fr. 152 [Wehrli], *EM s.v.* ὀβελί-σκος, 613.12–15 Gaisford; Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 176; Pollux 9.83; cf. Ael. *VH* 12.10; Hdt. 6.127.3). Aiginetan and Argive traditions stated that Argos had reinforced Aigina against Athens in the early archaic period (Hdt. 5.86.4), and, as late as c. 490, Argive volunteers were sent to Aigina in order to oppose an Athenian landing (Hdt. 6.92.2–3). Even in the fifth century the Argives held themselves justified in fining Aigina for complicity in Spartan aggression against themselves (Hdt. 6.92.1–2; cf. Thuc. 5.53).

Argos had never surrendered its claim to the Thyreatis, and it is striking that Thucydides characterizes this region as a border land in his three notices on the Aiginetan relocation there (2.27.2: μεθορία τῆς Ἀργείας καὶ Λακωνικῆς; 4.56.2: ἐπὶ Θυρέαν, ἣ ἐστὶ μὲν τῆς Κυνουρίας γῆς καλουμένης, μεθορία δὲ τῆς Ἀργείας καὶ Λακωνικῆς; 5.41.2: περὶ τῆς Κυνουρίας γῆς, ἥς αἰεὶ πέρι διαφέρονται μεθορίας οὔσης; cf. 6.95.1: ἐς τὴν Θυρεάτιν ὁμορον οὔσαν . . .). In 420, sensing Sparta's relative weakness, the Argives offered to submit the question of ownership of the Thyreatis to state or individual arbitration, an option which was rejected by the Spartans (5.41.2). The Argives then proposed a battle by *corps d'élite* limited to the border itself, to be fought when both states were otherwise at peace and free from epidemic. It is significant that the Spartans, who found the latter alternative *μωρία* 'foolish', were ready to accede because of their desire to procure a fifty-year truce with Argos (5.41.3).

While nothing demonstrates that Sparta ever contemplated relinquishing the Thyreatis, Spartan delicacy in the face of the Argive claim to the area suggests that the earlier settlement of the Aiginetans there might also have been

17. See, e.g., A.J. Toynbee, *Some Problems of Greek History* (London 1969) 183–84 with Annex 3, pp. 204–12.

made with Argos in mind. Perhaps the Spartans thought that the ancient friendship of the Aiginetans with the Argives helped to desensitize the issue of the ownership of the Thyreatis, since they were now no longer profiting directly from it in the same way as previously. At the same time, Argos would have to attack the Aiginetans in order to recover the land it claimed. If the Thyreatis is approached by skirting the coast, an invader would turn directly toward Thyrea to avoid the coastal marshes. In Pausanias' description of the region, the Aiginetan settlement at Anthene comes immediately after the *polyandria* for the Argive and Spartan champions who fought in c. 546, which presumably stood right at the border (Paus. 2.38.5–6). In Pritchett's hypothesis (see p. 306 below), Anthene lay virtually at the feet of the watchtowers demarcating the frontier, directly on the main road from the Argolid. If any residual sympathy existed among the Argive leadership for the Aiginetan oligarchs, Sparta had placed the Argives in a difficult position for vindicating their claim to the Thyreatis. Later, in retaliation for an attack upon Kleonai, the Argives did indeed raid the Thyreatis in 415/4 and took booty sold for 25T (6.95.1; cf. Paus. 10.9.12; *FdD* 3.1.573), but this occurred so long after 431 as to make the incident valueless for judging Spartan motivations and possible Argive inhibitions early in the war.

II. THE ATHENIAN ATTACK ON THE THYREATIS

One of our difficulties in tracing the subsequent history of the expelled Aiginetans is that the experiences of such groups of exiles are seldom documented in Thucydides for their own sake.¹⁸ A major Athenian attack, however, made on the Thyreatis in 424 was perforce treated by Thucydides (4.56.2–57.3; cf. *DS* 12.65.8–9; *Plut. Nic.* 6.7; also *DH Th.* 14). This incursion formed a part of the raiding of Spartan territory undertaken after the capture of Kythera (4.53–54). The Athenian force sent against Kythera (and later Lakonia), commanded by Nikias Nikeratou, Nikostratos Dieitrophous, and Autokles Tolmaiou, was an impressive one with 60 triremes, 2000 Athenian hoplites, and a strong force of allies (cf. *DS* 12.65.8).¹⁹ From Kythera the

18. Note the relatively rare introduction of contingents of exiles: 3.31.1; 4.1.3; 5.115.1; 6.7.3, 43.1, 64.1; 7.57.8, many of which references appear in enumerations of military contingents.

19. The strength of the allied force is disputed: *Thuc.* 4.54.1 notes the detachment of 10 ships and 2000 Milesian hoplites against Skandeia, one of the towns on Kythera, while the main force went against the inland town. Commentators have found the coupling of 2000 hoplites and 10 ships incongruous and have further noted that the Milesians could only field 800 hoplites in defense of Miletos itself later in the war (8.25.2). The general tendency has been to emend the figure, with 500 a popular correction. See E.F. Poppo (rev. J.M. Stahl), *Thucydides: De bello Peloponnesiaco, Libri Octo*²⁻³ (Leipzig 1875–1888) 2.2.94; Classen-Steup⁵ 4.108; *HCT* 3.509; J. De Romilly, *Thucydide: La guerre du Péloponnèse. Livres IV et V* (Paris 1967) xx, 37. Yet, the 2000 hoplites with 10 ships is not a problem, as other ships could have discharged a landing force when the 10 ships were left behind. The simplest assumption is that words like καὶ ἄλλων ξυμμάχων have fallen from the text so that the 2000 Athenian hoplites were matched by an equal number of allies, of whom the Milesians were the largest civic contingent (e.g., 800). For similarly sized expeditions, note 1.61.4 (with 1.57.6): 70 ships/3600 Ath. + many allied soldiers; 3.91.1:

Athenians assaulted Helos, Asine, and other points in the Lakonian Gulf (4.54.4). In the meantime the Spartans had divided (unproductively, but perhaps unavoidably) their forces among small garrisons posted in the coast-lands of their territory (4.55.1). Hence, although most of the Spartan detachments did not stand battle, as the Athenians coasted down the west coast of Cape Malea they had to deal with a Spartan *phroura* around Kotyrta and Aphroditia which did offer resistance (4.56.1; cf. Paus. 3.22.11; *SGDI* #4544 = *IG* V.1 961).²⁰ After this incident the expedition withdrew to Kythera, only to emerge once more against the eastern shore of *Lakonikē* to attack Epidaurus Limera and then the Thyreatis (4.56.2). The Athenians moved up the coast from the south and after striking at Thyrea their flotilla returned to Attica.

The attack on the Thyreatis belonged to a style of warfare against perioecic towns which Athens had employed since the outbreak of the war (in retaliation for the Peloponnesian invasions of Attica).²¹ The Perioeci were targets of opportunity for the enemies of Sparta, since land cultivated by the Helots on behalf of the Spartiates was insulated from naval attack by the coastal settlements of the Perioeci—the Pylos region was an exception. The Athenians tended to strike at the Perioeci with flotillas of ships, bearing sufficiently large landing forces that they could threaten their towns with assaults and successfully engage any local troops marching in relief.²² In contrast, *klēros*-land, cultivated by the Helots, lacked the concentrations of inhabitants that made such tactics effective. So it was only after the establishment of an Athenian (and Naupaktian/Messenian rebel) presence at Pylos that it became feasible for the Athenians to direct the necessarily small-scale raiding against land supporting the Spartiates themselves (Thuc. 4.41.2–4; cf. 4.9.1, 53.3, 55.1–2).

When the Athenians landed near Thyrea, the Aiginetans had been building (with the aid of a Spartan contingent) a *teikhos* 'fortified position' along the shore (4.57.1). Had the town of Thyrea itself (lying only 10 stades or c. 1.8 km. inland) not been fortified, one might be content in seeing this fortification as solely defensive. It would be connected with the other precautions undertaken around this time by Sparta, like the dispatch of garrisons or the enrollment of cavalry and archers (4.55.1–2). Accordingly, this second fort in a vulnerable position along the shore and situated so near the town probably had an offensive purpose. It provided a protected base for

60/2000 hoplites; 4.31.1, 32.2: 70/2800 in all; 4.129.2: 50/2000 hop. + 600 cav. + peltasts; 7.42.1 (cf. 7.20.2; *DS* 13.9.2): 73/5000 hop. + many light armed; 8.25.1: 48/3500 hop. + peltasts; Xen. *HG* 1.1.33: 50/1000 hop., 100 cav. + allies; *HG* 1.4.21: 100/1500 hop. + 150 cav. Cf. 2.56.2: 100/4000 hop. + 300 cav.

20. For the geography of the campaign: P. Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia: A Regional History 1300–362 BC* (London 1979) 190–91, 243–45.

21. For a classification of naval warfare during the Peloponnesian War, see pp. 331–33 below. On the geopolitical situation of Sparta during the Peloponnesian War, see Figueira *TAPA* (1986) 192–99. For the placement and identification of perioecic settlements: B. Niese, "Neue Beiträge zur Geschichte und Landskunde Lakedämons," *NGG* (1906) 101–42, esp. 112–14; Toynbee *Some Problems* 494–96.

22. Cf. Thuc. 2.25.1–2; 2.56.6; 3.3.2; 3.7.1–2; 3.16.1–3, cf. 3.17.1–2; 3.91.1; 4.2.1–5; cf. 2.80.1.

ληστεία 'pillaging' against the Athenian *arkhē* at a time when Athenian counterattacks would seek to disrupt or preempt such initiatives.²³

Thucydides does not feature ληστεία very prominently in his narrative, and he makes little terminological distinction between the attacks of freelancing raiders or privateers and the raiding done by squadrons (such as the Athenian efforts under discussion). For the Peloponnesians, confronted by the predominance of Athenian seapower, ληστεία was as a rule confined to the former manifestation. References to the activity of individual raiders working under Sparta's aegis appear in Thucydides only when they impinge on large-scale operations or evoked an Athenian reaction (e.g., 2.32, cf. 5.18.7; 2.69.1; 2.93.4–94.3; 3.51.2; 4.67.3; 6.104.3).²⁴ The Spartan desire to wage a war of attrition against Athens dovetailed nicely with the Aiginetan propensity for ληστεία, which had been manifested in their attacks on Attica in the late sixth century (Hdt. 5.81.3, 89.2). Later, in 416/5, when the Spartans felt compelled to retaliate for Athenian raids from Pylos, but were reluctant to begin hostilities, they proclaimed that any of their allies could practice ληστεία against the Athenians with impunity (5.115.2). The unfinished and inopportune Aiginetan *teikhos* stood as a surrogate for lost Aigina, whence campaigns of ληστεία would be conducted regularly in the fourth century on behalf of Spartan interests.²⁵

While some scholars have questioned Thucydides on the proximity of Thyrea to the coast, the investigations of Pritchett have borne out earlier opinions in support of his account.²⁶ There are ample indications that Thyrea was situated at the hill of Kastraki near the modern town of Astros. Lying within the requisite 10 stades of Kastraki there are only two candidates for the location of the littoral fortification (rocky promontories standing out along a low, swampy coastline): Paralion Astrous and Khersonisi. Pritchett notes the presence of Classical sherds only at Paralion Astrous and the remains of a fortification that probably represents the project under construction by the Aiginetans and the Spartans.

When the Aiginetans and the Spartan garrison assisting them abandoned the half-built fortification, the Aiginetans fell back on Thyrea, but the

23. See Busolt *GG*² 3.2.1128.

24. That Thucydides might have changed his perspective on ληστεία, had he lived to finish (and revise?) his history, can perhaps be surmised from the treatment in excursus by the Oxyrhynchus historian of a foray by the Corinthian Timolaos during the Ionian War (*Hell.Oxy.* VII(II).3–4 [Bartoletti]).

25. Xen. *HG* 5.1.1–2, 13, 18–24, 29; 5.4.61; 6.2.1.

26. W.K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography: Part IV (Passes)*, Univ. of Calif. Pubs.: Classical Studies 28 (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1982) 64–74. Note *BCH* 103 (1979) 561. Cf. W.M. Leake, *Travels in the Morea* (London 1880) 2.492–93; *HCT* 3.512; most recently, P.B. Phaklares, *Ἀρχαία Κυνουρία* (Thessalonika 1985) 94–98 who would identify it as Helleniko (more probably Eua). Earlier views locating Thyrea near Kastraki: C. Bursian, *Geographie von Griechenland* (Leipzig 1862–1872) 2.69–71; J.G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece* (London 1898) 3.307–9; H. Kiepert (rev. R. Kiepert), *Formae Orbis Antiqui* 13, *Peloponnesus cum Attica* (Berlin 1906) 1. Paralion Astrous as the Aiginetan *teikhos*: Bursian *Griechenland* 2.70–71; Leake *Morea* 2.485; Frazer *Description* 3.307. See also Christien & Spyropoulos *BCH* (1985) 457–58; Phaklares *Κυνουρία* 60–81; [Pritchett *Topography VI* 94–95].

Spartan detachment deserted them in fear of being shut in the town. Moreover, the Spartans did not participate in the ensuing battle because they did not believe themselves *axiomakhoi* 'battle-worthy' (4.57.2). Their behavior exemplified Thucydides' generality on the reluctance of the garrisons to offer battle because of their inferior numbers (4.56.1). The whole Athenian force followed up and took Thyrea by storm (4.57.3). Those Aiginetans not killed were carried off to Athens. Taken along with them was Tantalos, either the harmost (or magistrate) of Thyrea or the commander of the Spartan detachment, who chose (as the only Spartiate present?) to fight alongside the Aiginetans.²⁷ Thereupon, the Athenians decided to kill the Aiginetans *διὰ τὴν προτέραν αἰεὶ ποτε ἔχθραν* (4.57.4). It is, of course, true that the hatred of the Athenians and Aiginetans for each other had become virtually proverbial (cf. Hdt. 5.81.2, 82.1, 89.1). It is also correct, as commentators have observed, that the treatment of enemies on both sides was becoming more brutal.²⁸ There are, however, several considerations which appear to indicate that special aggravating factors were at work in these executions.

Rather than being regarded as an act of violence of a now usual (and so excusable) type, mistreatment of the Aiginetans had its place among the charges of atrocity leveled against the Athenians by the Peloponnesians. Plutarch treats the "hunting down" of the Aiginetans as an act of petty vindictiveness (*Comp. Nic. et Crass.* 4.3). Aristotle's *Rhetoric* cites an Athenian *andrapodismos* of the Aiginetans among standard anti-Athenian accusations (1396a19–20). Although sheer exaggeration cannot be ruled out—Poteidaia is also mentioned—the term *andrapodismos*, implying wholesale enslavement, if not execution of adult males, can only have been justified from the treatment of the captured at Thyrea. The Athenians are also described after Aigospotamoi as dreading the same treatment as they meted out to Hestiaia, Melos, Skione, Torone, and Aigina, perhaps on the basis of their knowledge of Spartan propaganda (Xen. *HG* 2.2.3). Aelius Aristides in his *ὑπὲρ τῆς πρὸς Ἀθηναίους εἰρήνης* (32) imagines himself as having to mitigate such accusations in an

27. For Tantalos as the garrison commander, see Poppo-Stahl 2.2.101, which is supported by Diodorus' denomination of him as a *φρούραρχον* (12.65.9). The implication that only the Spartan commander (who was wounded) behaved like a true Spartan, while his men shirked, would underline Thucydides' observations on Spartan morale (4.55.1–4). Classen-Steup⁵ (4.116) and Gomme (*HCT* 3.512) object that the garrison's commander will have stayed with his men, aloof from the struggle. Was Tantalos then a Spartiate sent to supervise Thyrea, just as the *Kythērodi-kēs(ai)* was sent out to supervise Kythera (Thuc. 4.53.2)? For harmosts in perioecic communities, note ΣPin. *Ol.* 6.154f and *IG* V.1 937 (probably from Kythera and dated to the late fifth or early fourth century), which mentions a *Μένανδρος ἀρμοστής*. See U. Kahrstedt, *Griechische Staatsrecht* (Göttingen 1922) 1.73–74; cf. F. Hampl, "Die Lakedaemonischen Perioeken," *Hermes* 72 (1937) 1–49, esp. 43–45. It can be taken for granted that sufficient survivors would have remained to reconstitute a community from those avoiding or escaping battle; from those away in the *khōra*, elsewhere in Lakonia, or abroad; and finally from ransomed males, sold as slaves because they were too young to have been killed. Athenians can never have expected in this way to preclude a Peloponnesian demand for the return of Aigina. Cf. Mikrogianakis *KChron* (1971) 405–7, 421.

28. G. Grote, *A History of Greece*² (London 1888) 5.283; Gomme *HCT* 3.513, noted with approval by Kagan *Archidamian War* 264.

attempt to plead Athens' case before its enemies (1.404, cf. 402, 406 [Dindorf]). Such references (linking Aigina with Melos, for example) seem to imply that the initial expulsion and the subsequent attack on the Thyreatis had become conflated in one image of Athenian brutality. Apparently, the Athenians defended themselves through a selective recollection of their actions. Diodorus Siculus (12.65.9), reflecting Ephorus, and Plutarch in the *Nicias* (6.7), merely note the conveyance of the Aiginetans to Athens as prisoners.²⁹ Atthidography, from which both Ephorus and Plutarch probably derived their information, may well have passed over the executions of the Aiginetans.³⁰ Such a suppression should be taken as a sign of troubled consciences at Athens, or, at least, a defensive reaction to anti-Athenian propagandizing.

The treatment of the captured Aiginetans also contrasts strongly with Athenian behavior toward their Kytherean prisoners.³¹ The Kytherean surrender had been on the condition that the Athenian judgment on them could not involve execution (4.54.2, 57.4). Thus some of their leaders were held as hostages, and Kythera had already been made tributary (4.57.4; cf. 4.54.3). Apparently, in the struggle at Thyrea such a contingency was out of the question. So Athenian brutality could be selective even at this stage of the war. Thucydides is undoubtedly reflecting popular feeling at Athens in assessing inveterate animosity between the two peoples as the reason for the executions. Contrast, however, the Athenian treatment of the Aiginetans at the beginning of the war, when they were merely expelled from their homes, despite an Athenian belief in their responsibility for the very outbreak of hostilities. Not even the Aiginetan ringleaders who had gone to Sparta to agitate for an intervention appear to have been punished.

Given the ascendancy of Perikles over other aspects of policy at the beginning of the war, it is virtually certain that the decision to expel the Aiginetans represented an action of which he approved. The anti-Aiginetan credentials of the man who called the island the "eyesore" of the Peiraeus are not in doubt (Plut. *Per.* 8.7; *Dem.* 1.2; *Mor.* 186C, 803A; Aris. *Rhet.*

29. Gomme (*HCT* 4.513) attempts to resolve the conflict by adding the term ἀπέκτειναν to the end of DS 12.65.9, although he admits that *Nic.* 6.7 seems to agree with Diodorus. Plutarch's emphasis in *Comparatio* 4.3 on the unjust attack on Thyrea rather than on the executions also suggests that he did not carelessly abbreviate an account ending with wholesale executions.

30. Alternatively, one might opt with Busolt *GG*² 3.2.1128 n. 5 for Ephorus as the source of the distortion. In any case, the closeness of Diodorus and Plutarch to Thucydides argues that either Ephorus or the Atthidographer worked with Thucydides' text before him. And Ephorus himself may have supplemented Thucydides with an *Atthis*. Conceivably, he was attempting to have it both ways, since Diodorus uses ἐξηνδραποδίσατο for the Athenian action at Thyrea before he speaks of the conveyance of the prisoners to Athens.

31. Gomme (*HCT* 3.512) ascribes the Athenian decision to the status of the Aiginetans as rebels. Yet Salaithos, the Spartan commander who aided the rebel Mytileneans, was executed (3.36.1), while Tantalos, serving with the Aiginetans, was not. Although hypocrisy cannot be ruled out, executing as rebels people whom the Athenians themselves had expelled from their *arkhē* does seem rather bad public relations. In that case, why was not some action taken against these "rebels" at the time of their rebellion in 431? See A. Panagopoulos, *Captives and Hostages in the Peloponnesian War* (Athens 1978) 87–89.

1411a15–16). Nikias was the leading spirit of the expedition against Kythera and the Thyreatis: he alone is mentioned in the parallel accounts of Diodorus and Plutarch; he conducted negotiations with some of the Kythereans even before the expedition (4.54.3); and the formula Nikias and his *xunarkhontes* appears both in Thucydides (4.54.2) and in the accounts of the *logistai* (Meiggs-Lewis 72.20–21 = *IG* I³ 369). A continuity between policies of Perikles and those of Nikias, who served as his colleague in the *stratēgia* (Plut. *Nic.* 2.2; cf. 3.1), is also likely. Indeed this campaign fits the plan for invasions of the Peloponnesus formulated by Perikles on the eve of the war (1.142.4, 143.4–5). While we may freely admit that Nikias had a lesser capacity to resist popular passions than had Perikles (cf. 2.65.8–9), the disparity in the treatment of the Aiginetans in 431 and 424 remains striking.

In light of these considerations, it becomes probable that these Aiginetans were not only preparing to practice *ληστεία* against Athenian interests, but had also already contributed to the Spartan war effort (see pp. 308–10 below).³² Hence the Athenian determination to see them tracked down in the Thyreatis and to ensure that as few of them as possible survive their attack is explicable.³³ The flight of these Aiginetans to Spartan territory—and their acceptance of perioecic rank, if that conclusion is correct—had been an aggravating factor, since they could have scattered like so many of their compatriots.

I have offered a key toward interpreting the Athenian attack on the Thyreatis in the half-built Aiginetan coastal fort and in its connection with *ληστεία*. That this hypothesis about the activities of the Aiginetan exiles during the Peloponnesian War is, in fact, correct is indicated by a proverb applied to *dusphrastoi* ‘mysteries’ and *dusnoētoi* ‘incomprehensibilities’, which appears in the collections of Zenobius and Apostolius, the paroemiographers.³⁴

The expression *ἄκρον λαβέ, καὶ μέσον ἔξεις* is explained by recourse to the following anecdote. When the Aiginetans had been expelled from their island, they consulted the Delphic oracle and were given this cryptic response. Eventually, they carried out the advice of Apollo by occupying the middle of an *akron* to found a new settlement. As the ancient explanations admit, this is a most obscure pronouncement. The term *akron* can denote either a ‘height’ or a

32. Cf. Mikrogianakis *KChron* (1971) 404 and n. 41.

33. Aiginetan fourth-century legislation mandating the execution of any Athenian landing on the island (DL 3.19; Ael. Arist. 46, 2.233 [Dindorf]) takes its inspiration from the executions in 424. The Athenian provision for the mutilation of the hands of any Aiginetan taken prisoner, belonging to the Peloponnesian War or, better, to the fourth century, is another parallel reaction to the continuing participation of the Aiginetans in hostilities against Athens (Cic. *Off.* 3.11.46; Ael. *VH* 2.9; Val. Max. 9.2 ext. 8).

34. Zenobius 1.57, *CPG* 1.22–23; Apostolius 1.97, *CPG* 2.264; cf. Diogenianus 1.27, *CPG* 2.5; *Suda* s.v. *ἄκρον λάβε καὶ μέσον ἔξεις*, a 1011 Adler. Jacoby *FGH* 404, 3b, 1.218, 2.142, believes that the reference to the Aiginetans is corrupt on the basis of *FGH* 404 F 1 = *Prov. Bod.* 207 (see pp. 307–8 below). He does not explain why this very differently worded gloss led to the explanations cited above nor why the Bodleian manuscript should be considered to transmit a purer tradition. Cf. also O. Crusius, *Analecta Critica ad Paroemiographicos Graecos* (Leipzig 1883) 113–14, 223.

'headland', but the explanation by the paroemiographers validates the latter alternative by glossing the term as *akroterion*. There was also presumably some promise of good fortune alluded to by the term *meson*, since it stands in the outcome clause (not the injunctive clause) of the oracle. Whether *meson* (= *to meson*?) connotes a wholesome political moderation, means something approximating 'difference', hence 'advantage', or signifies central position, thus place of importance, is indiscernible.³⁵

The historical context for the story is the period after 431. Like other founders of new settlements, the Aiginetans are imagined to have consulted the Delphic oracle.³⁶ Although the explanation of the proverb does not say so explicitly, enigmatic oracles of foundation take for granted that the new settlement(s) will be unsuccessful until the oracle is deciphered.³⁷ Given its thorough sack by the Athenians, Thyrea belongs appropriately to such a period of failure.

The prophesied occupation of a headland by the Aiginetans reminds us of their abortive effort at fortification in 424, and presumably had the same purpose. A claim of successful prediction of the future is usually a signal that the oracular response in question is *post eventum*.³⁸ In this case, it is only the strained decipherment that need necessarily be *post eventum*, inasmuch as the advice as it now stands is so cryptic as to be immune to future falsification. In either case, such an explanation was probably fabricated or applied for the first time to the Aiginetans, only after some Aiginetan good fortune, associated with the acquisition of a new base, had already occurred (one contributing to a restoration to Aigina?). It is in *λῆστέα* (or in some other contribution to the Peloponnesian cause) that one must assume that such successes were achieved.

On the location of the peninsula accommodating the new Aiginetan base or settlement, there can be only speculation. Any answer must confront the difficulties in establishing the locations of the settlements of the Thyreatis. Pausanias does not mention Thyrea in his treatment of the Thyreatis, although elsewhere he does refer to a road from Tegea to Thyrea and the villages of the Thyreatis (8.54.4). Either there is a lacuna where Pausanias' description of Thyrea and the rest of coastal Kynouria to the south once stood (as

35. By letter (8/1/87), Professor Pritchett offers an interesting alternative topographical interpretation: "The promontory is in the middle of the Astros plain—like a stage in a vast amphitheater. You occupy the promontory and you will have a central position in the entire plain."

36. See A.S. Pease, "Notes on the Delphic Oracle and Greek Colonization," *CP* 12 (1917) 1–20; H.W. Parke, *A History of the Delphic Oracle* (Oxford 1939) 47–87; Parke & D.E.W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle* (Oxford 1956) 1.49–81, 2.12–13 (on oracle #325, referring to the Pelleneans); J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1978) 137–44, who lists our oracle as Q80.

37. Ephesians: Kreophylos *FGH* 417 F 1; Taras: Paus. 10.10.6–8; Kyrene (less cryptic than misunderstood): Hdt. 4.156.3–157.3; Plut. *Mor.* 408A. Compare the case of the Spartan Dorieus, where the role of disobedience of the oracle is replaced by an improper refusal to consult Delphi at the outset (Hdt. 5.42.2–43).

38. Müller *AL* 185 translates *akron* as 'hill' and connects it with Thyrea. Thus he implies that the oracle is historical, since a *post eventum* invention would hardly associate Delphi with the disaster experienced by Thyrea.

Pritchett argues), or Thyrea was not rebuilt, or it was moved after 424—Pliny calls Thyrea a *locus* uniquely in a series of “towns”.³⁹ In that case, Pausanias or his source (presumably dating after 424) had no reason to mention it.

Pausanias does mention Athene along with Eua and Neris (2.38.6; cf. Steph. Byz. s.v. *Εὔα* = Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 60). According to him, it was once inhabited by the Aiginetans. Its name was properly Anthene, for a *polis* (= town, one assumes here) of that name is noted by Thucydides in his account of the Spartan and Argive negotiations of 416 (5.41.2), and Lysias referred to the same town in a lost speech (fr. 15 [Thalheim]; cf. Steph. Byz. s.v. *Ἀνθεῖα*; Pliny 4.5.16, where it also is *Anthea*). The site of Anthene, however, is also disputed. Kalitses and Pritchett, working from his persuasive discussion of Pausanias (especially concerning the Anigraia road), locate the town inland near the Spartan-Argive border on the slopes of Mt. Zavitsa, where there is a town-site with a heavy concentration of fifth-century sherds.⁴⁰ Some corroboration for Aiginetan occupation of this site may be found in a fifth-century inscription found nearby which contains provision against damage to a *κενέριον* (= *κενήριον* ‘cenotaph’: *SEG* 13.266). It has been taken to allude to the monuments for the fallen in the Battle of Champions which are mentioned by Pausanias (2.38.6). Kritzas suggests that the letter-forms of this inscription resemble those in use on Aigina rather than at Argos or Sparta.⁴¹ Bursian and Kahrstedt suggest that destroyed Thyrea gave way to Anthene as the center of population for the Aiginetans.⁴² Once the Aiginetans were repatriated, other sites (like Eua, the most populous *kōmē* according to Pausanias) possibly came to prominence. Yet, if one believes that Eua was founded in the fifth century (on the basis of the burial cited in n. 8 above), Eua itself could have become a successor to Thyrea.⁴³ In either case, the Aiginetans would have moved their main settlement inland to a site difficult of access from the sea after the savage Athenian attack on Thyrea. Yet, as will be seen shortly the hypothesis of movement inland is not the most likely Aiginetan reaction to Athenian attack.

[Scylax] 46 mentions a Methana in Kynouria, which is described as a *limēn* (*GGM* 1.40–41). This anchorage is to be located near the chapel of

39. *NH* 4.5.16. For a lacuna, see W.K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography: Part III (Roads)*, Univ. of Calif. Pubs.: Classical Studies 22 (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1980) 135–42 (with refs. to earlier scholarship; e.g., R.A. Tomlinson, *Argos and the Argolid* [London 1972] 46). [See also Pritchett *Topography VI* 97–101.] For the non-appearance of Thyrea, note U. Kahrstedt, “Zwei Geographia im Peloponnes,” *RhM* 93 (1950) 227–42, esp. 227–32.

40. K.I. Kalitses, “Τὰ Ἀνιγρᾶια τοῦ Πανσανίου καὶ ἡ θέσις τῶν Θυραϊτικῶν κωμῶν,” *AE B* (1965) 10–18 (less specific); Pritchett *Topography III* 102–34, esp. 116–21; *Topography IV* 75–79; [*Topography VI* 92]. See also Christien & Spyropoulos *BCH* (1985) 457.

41. The first publication of *SEG* 13.266 was K. Rhomaïos, “Ἐρευνητικὴ περιοδεία εἰς Κυνοῦριαν,” *Praktika* (1950) 234–41, esp. 237–38. C. Kritzas, “Remarques sur trois inscriptions de Cynourie,” *BCH* 109 (1985) 709–16, esp. 711–13, who, however, doubts that *κενέριον* means ‘cenotaph’. [See now Pritchett *Topography VI* 79–83 in answer.] See *LSAG* p. 171 for the inscription’s date.

42. Bursian *Griechenland* 2.69–70; Kahrstedt *RhM* (1950) 227–32.

43. See Christien & Spyropoulos *BCH* (1985) 462, who suggest the comparison between Thyrea and the *teikhos* at Paralioi Astrous, on the one hand, and Eua and Methana, on the other.

Ay. Andreas. There stood a town laid on a grid plan where the earliest sherds are late fifth century.⁴⁴ Christien and Spyropoulos visualize this town as the port of Eua, which replaced Thyrea as the chief place of the region, and Pritchett identifies it with Pausanias' Thyrea, a refoundation of the town sacked by the Athenians.⁴⁵ Also, it is not out of the question to see in [Scylax]'s Methana another reference to the oft-corrupted name Anthene, which would then have had a coastal location. Accordingly, Bursian and others have placed Anthene at Ay. Andreas.⁴⁶ Methana, however, is mentioned only this one time in ancient literature, and it is not to be ruled out that Messenian Methana has been misplaced in [Scylax], as Pritchett believes. Nevertheless, it is most likely that, whatever the succession of settlements in the Thyreatis, a settlement guarding the northern border, probably Anthene, was contemporary with a town nearer to the coast (Thyrea and its possible successor) during the main period of Aiginetan occupation.

Thus the possible locations for the *akroterion* mentioned in the oracle are two. One choice is Paralion Astrous, the site of the earlier Aiginetan *teikhos*, since nothing that had happened in 424 excluded its further use. How the Aiginetans would have fared had their fort been finished is unknown. The substantial remains observable on the site could as easily be ruins of a fortification finished after 424 as the unfinished remnants of building preempted by Nikias. From the map provided by Pritchett, the traces of fortification occupy the *meson* 'middle' of an *akron* 'cape'. Another possibility would be near Ay. Andreas, where an outlier of Parnon comes down to the sea in a rocky cape. This might be Anthene (improbable), Methana (less likely), or simply refounded Thyrea (under whatever name). In this interpretation, the *meson* of the oracle could allude to the way in which this position stands between the Thyreatis and the rest of Kynouria, lying to the south, with the cities of Tyros and Prasiai.

The explanation of the proverb exploits the happenstance of the successful acquisition of a coastal base by the Aiginetans. The proverb had had an original context in a new settlement by the Pelleneans (?; mss. have *Pellaioi* or *Apellaioi*) defeated by Kleisthenes, sixth-century tyrant of Sikyon (*Prov. Bod.* 207 *apud* Zenobius 1.57, *CPG* 1.22–23 = Anaxandridas *FGH* 404 F 1; cf. *FGH* 105 F 2 = *POxy* 11.1365, possibly Ephorus). Nonetheless, the recovery of their homeland by the Aiginetans in 405 represented a remarkable reversal of fortune. Sometime thereafter, under this influence, the historical context for

44. On the layout on a grid: e.g., Frazer *Description* 3.307–8. On the date of the site, see *BCH* 110 (1986) 691 for references to the thesis of Phaklares *Κυνουρία* (esp. 48–59), who identifies the site as Anthene. These points were called to my attention by Pritchett through correspondence (8/1/87).

45. See Christien & Spyropoulos *BCH* (1985) 462. Pritchett will argue for a refoundation of Thyrea at Ay. Andreas in his forthcoming *Topography*, VI (letter, 8/1/87 [now pp. 95–96]).

46. E.g., Bursian *Griechenland* 71 with n. 5; Kiepert *Formae* 2. [Cf. Pritchett *Topography* VI 96–97.]

this proverb was adapted to take advantage of the vicissitudes of the Aiginetans during the Peloponnesian War.

[A new fragment of *IG V.1 1* (= Meiggs-Lewis 67), the so-called "Spartan War Fund", allows an amplification of the points made in this section of my presentation.^{46a} The new fragment reports a contribution of the Aiginetans in Front II. 3–4: *ἔδον τοὶ Αἰγινᾶται τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ποττὸν* | *π* | *όλεμον* | *τέτορε* | *ς* καὶ δέκα μνᾶς καὶ δέκα στατῆρες. I follow the text of Loomis, in which underlining marks letters previously attested of which he could find no surviving trace.

Readers of my earlier remarks will not be surprised to find that the expelled community of the Aiginetans is referred to as simply *τοὶ Αἰγινᾶται*. While Loomis is correct to remind us that it is those exiled by their own people for whom *φεύγω* and related terms is considered most appropriate, the fact that the Spartans treated the Aiginetans under their protection as the legitimate Aiginetan state ought also to be remembered. The Athenians were illegally in occupation of Aigina in violation of an earlier recognition of *αὐτονομία* held valid by Sparta. The *stēlē* advertizes this political "fact".

It is the corporate character of this Aiginetan entity which indicates that it is the Aiginetans of the Thyreatis who are the donors. While it might be superficially attractive to explore the hypothesis that Alkidas' fleet stopped at Kydonia, on either the outward or returning legs of its foray, the bare attribution "the Aiginetans" will not do for the Aiginetans at Kydonia. If they joined the Kydoniates, it was presumably through some form of *sumpoliteia* afforded citizens of the *mētropolis*. A more exact descriptive formula would be needed for the Kydoniates and/or the Aiginetans at Kydonia.

If the discussion of chronology is restricted to the Aiginetans for the sake of argument, then any date 431–405 would be satisfactory. From my discussion above, it can be seen that the modest donation of 14 *mnai*, 10 staters would have been within the financial capacity of the Aiginetans, even after the Athenian attack in 424—I have noted the likelihood of their continued presence in the Thyreatis in any case.^{46b} My discussion of the more complex interaction of the Spartan fleet and the Aiginetans in the fourth century (providing a base and manpower or sharing booty; see pp. 333–34, 345–47 below) may be taken to exclude that the inscription touches on the subsidization of naval operations on fourth-century Aigina. Nor do I think it likely that the Aiginetans would have contributed at all until their recall of the harmost Eteonikos in 391/0 (see pp. 338–42 below), and that seems to exclude 396/5, when Agesilaos was operating from Ephesos (Xen. *HG* 3.4.4). The modesty of the Aiginetan contribution directs us to the same conclusion. Clearly, the presence of pro-Spartan Chian exiles, the Ephesians (however surprising, given their continued

46a. For discussion, see A.P. Matthaiou & G.A. Pikoulas, "Ἐδον τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ποττὸν πόλεμον," *Horos* 7 (1989) 77–124 (ed. *princeps* for the new fragment); Meiggs-Lewis² 312; W.T. Loomis, *The Spartan War Fund: IG V 1,1 and a New Fragment* (Stuttgart 1991), for generous access to which I thank the author; cf. *Horos* 6 (1988) 117; *SEG* 36.357.

46b. Cf. Matthaiou & Pikoulas *Horos* 100–1.

membership in the *arkhē*), and the Melians point us toward Alkidas' expedition of 427, or, at least, its chronological context.^{46c}

I suspect that Loomis' suggestion that this was a document meant to proclaim conspicuously the existence of warm and significant support for the Peloponnesian war effort is correct. If my hypothesis of Aiginetan service in Peloponnesian naval forces is also correct, we may imagine the arrival of a contingent of Aiginetan naval personnel (with ship or ships?) in order to participate in Alkidas' campaign. They brought with them a sum of money to subsidize operations, and appeared at the top of the surviving inscription. Thus the Aiginetan gift becomes another witness to their continuing activism in the Spartan cause.

The Aiginetans could be treated as part of a group of initial donors, contributing before the expedition sailed, but the organization of the inscription is quite problematical. The Ephesians seem to appear as donors collectively in Front ll. 24–25, a troubling occurrence in 427, when they were still loyal tributaries to the best of our knowledge. The hypothesis that the list has shifted into a sequential mode and that a payment was made under the influence of the presence of the Peloponnesian fleet in Ionia is one explanation. Yet it is unlikely that these contributions covered any significant duration.^{46d} In that case, another difficulty becomes the appearance of two entries on the Side relating gifts of the Melians which are separated by a single, affluent Lokrian donor, giving a talent (Side ll. 8–14, 20–25). Why were the two gifts not aggregated? If the two Melian donations were separated in time (outward and inward phases of the trip?), why does a individual? donor by himself appear in between. The Melians may be factions rather than the Melian state who made separate donations before Alkidas sailed.

If one accepts that the inscription is a poorly organized and propagandistic representation of donations to the Spartan fleet, its organization ought to be appreciated as a part of the document's political program. There was in fact little support for the Spartan war effort during the Archidamian War outside of Sparta's immediate allies. The inscription collects what evidence of support did exist (I believe, at a crucial moment such as the sailing of Alkidas' expedition), lumping together foreign and Spartan individuals, exiles, and what are purportedly non-allied and neutral governments in such a way as to lengthen the list as much as possible. For instance, the one detail on an individual, the (specifying) double ethnic of the Achaian from Olenos (Front ll. 7–8) probably validates significant support (worth making something out of)—a trireme is somehow involved—in a way in which the help from other individuals, less well identified, does not (Front ll. 13–14, Side ll. 15–19). If the Achaian is an allied trierarch, the other individuals may also be Spartan and allied trierarchs of Alkidas' fleet. In any event, that the purpose of the inscription was to magnify

46c. Cf. Matthaïou & Pikoulas *Horos* 110–11, who will accept a date down to 415/4 for these entries.

46d. The supplements *Τέτοιοι* (*sic*) of Matthaïou/Pikoulas in Front 1 and *Θάσιοι* in l. 5 complicate interpretation even further (*Horos* [1989] 80–83, 92–93).

support for the war effort makes it unlikely that a list of (mostly) small donations straggling over years would have been inscribed (the hypothesis of Matthaïou and Pikoulas). A more likely hypothesis is that the inscription contains only the donations of 427/6, and perhaps only those associated with Alkidas' foray. In a polity, which lacked sophistication in the preservation and display of records, the confusion of the inscription may betray a verbatim copy of the list of donations.

Moreover, we cannot be certain that the nature of the support has been accurately represented. It is improbable that the Spartans could make much out of the Chian support; Chios was an autonomous state which seems to have been genuinely committed to the Athenian cause (see pp. 273–74 above). Even the ordinary Spartiate probably had faced determined Chian adversaries and would have no illusions about the status of Chian friends from a place where having even a few friends was no embarrassment. Indeed, we need not follow earlier commentators in seeing a causal link between these pro-Spartan Chians and Athenian diplomacy on Chios in 425/4. Yet, the Athenian subject allies, Ephesians, and the Teians and Thasians, suggested by the editors of the new fragment, may be factions rather than governments in power.^{46e} This interpretation is probably preferable to the hypothesis of a portrayal of forced exactions as contributions.^{46f}

In an inscription meant primarily for Spartan viewers (and secondarily for Peloponnesian visitors?), very few would have had the requisite knowledge to correct the record about the nature of the *authorization* of foreign gifts from tributary allies of the Athenians. The abject failure of Alkidas' expedition must have been a sobering experience to Sparta's political leadership; the crusade against the tyrant-city of Greece had evoked virtually no response in the Aegean and the behavior of Alkidas had earned Sparta few new friends. The impression of a grand alliance coalescing against Athens which this inscription is meant to create was putting the best face possible on a military debacle. After all, the Spartans were not yet ready to rethink their commitment to the war itself.]

III. THE ATHENIAN ATTACK ON KYDONIA

Since it has been established that the fugitives from Aigina contributed to the Peloponnesian war effort against Athens, that conclusion can be used to bring another obscure incident in the war into its proper focus. In 429, after Phormio had defeated the Spartan navarch Knemos, he sent urgently to Attica for more ships to be dispatched to him quickly, as further fighting was anticipated (Thuc. 2.85.4). The reinforcement of twenty ships, however, was ordered to make an attack on Crete before sailing for the Gulf of Corinth and

46e. We need not follow the editors in dating their contributions to times when they had rebelled from Athenian suzerainty (cf. Horos [1989] 103–7).

46f. The restoration of the Thasians would be decisive, as they lay away from the actual and possible paths of Alkidas' squadron.

was thereby delayed (2.85.5–86.1). Unfavorable sailing conditions increased the delay and compounded the damage.

οἱ δὲ ἀποπέμπουσιν εἴκοσι ναῦς αὐτῷ, τῷ δὲ κομίζονται αὐτὰς προσεπέστειλαν ἐς Κρήτην πρῶτον ἀφικέσθαι. Νικίας γὰρ Κρής Γορτύνιος πρόξενος ὦν πείθει αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ Κυδωνίαν πλεῦσαι, φάσκων προσποιήσιν αὐτὴν οὔσαν πολεμίαν· ἐπῆγε δὲ Πολιχνίταις χαριζόμενος ὁμόροις τῶν Κυδωνιατῶν. καὶ ὁ μὲν λαβὼν τὰς ναῦς ὤχετο ἐς Κρήτην, καὶ μετὰ τῶν Πολιχνιτῶν ἐδήου τὴν γῆν τῶν Κυδωνιατῶν, καὶ ὑπ' ἀνέμων καὶ ἀπλοίας ἐνδιέτριψεν οὐκ ὀλίγον χρόνον· οἱ δ' ἐν τῇ Κυλλήνῃ Πελοποννήσιοι, ἐν τούτῳ ἐν ᾧ οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι περὶ Κρήτην κατείχοντο, παρεσκευασμένοι ὥς ἐπὶ ναυμαχίαν παρέπλευσαν ἐς Πάνορμον τὸν Ἀχαικόν, οὐπὲρ αὐτοῖς ὁ κατὰ γῆν στρατὸς τῶν Πελοποννησίων προσεβεβόη-
θήκει. (2.85.5–86.1)

Commentators have almost universally condemned the shortsightedness of this diversion, attributing it to unrealistic expectations of Phormio or blaming it on a volatility of strategy as determined by the assembly.⁴⁷ Interpretation is further complicated by several stylistic peculiarities of the passage. The antecedents of the participles *κομίζονται* and *λαβὼν* are not specified (unless the absurdity of the Cretan Nikias as commander of an Athenian force is countenanced).⁴⁸ The doubling of the ethnic of Nikias (Κρής Γορτύνιος) seems unnecessary. Connor has suggested that the text is corrupt where it specifies the proposer of the expedition.⁴⁹ The phrase *Νικίας γὰρ Κρής Γορτύνιος πρόξενος ὦν* should be emended (Γορτυνίων) so as to contain a reference to Nikias Nikeratou, who was *proxenos* of the Gortynians at Athens (with Κρής as an intrusive gloss).⁵⁰ Before this emendation is evaluated, however, let us examine the historical situation.

The strong association between Kydonia and the Aiginetans deserves to be introduced into our investigation. The Aiginetans captured Kydonia from the Samians in 519 and refounded it as an Aiginetan colony (Hdt. 3.44.1; 59.1–3; Strabo 8.6.16 C376). The Aiginetans had presumably been interested in the town because of their trade with Crete and with Egypt. Ships sailing from the Peloponnesus to Naukratis circled the western end of Crete where Kydonia lay (cf. Thuc. 4.53.3).⁵¹ Pindar's sixth Nemean ode (probably from

47. HCT 2.221: "over-confident . . . or still oppressed by the effects of the pestilence", "this particular folly"; Grote *History of Greece*² 5.123: "ill-advised"; B.W. Henderson, *The Great War between Athens and Sparta* (London 1927) 102–4: "imbecility of this order", "crass strategical stupidity". [There has been a boomlet of articles on this passage in Thucydides since I wrote: A. Gerolymatos, "Nicias of Gortyn," *Chiron* 17 (1987) 81–85; G. Herman, "Nikias, Epimenides and the Question of Omissions in Thucydides," *CQ* 39 (1989) 83–93; P. Karavites, "Thuc. 2.85.5: Some Implications," *AHB* 3 (1989) 25–28. I had missed P. Karavites, "The Enduring Mystery of Nicias (Thuc. 2.85.5)," *Klio* 62 (1980) 307–10.]

48. Classen-Steup⁵ 2.226.

49. W.R. Connor, "Nicias the Cretan? (Thucydides 2.85.4–6)," *AJAH* 1 (1976) 61–64.

50. C.G. Cobet, *Variae Lectiones*² (Leiden 1873) 441; cf. G. Daux, "Thucydide et l'événement (à propos de l'intermède crétois, II 85, 4–6)," *CRAI* (1979) 89–103, esp. 94–95. [Gerolymatos *Chiron* (1987) 83 has compiled the examples of Κρής: they are enough to remove any remaining incongruity in Thucydides' phraseology.]

51. See H. van Effenterre, *La Crète et le monde grec de Platon à Polybe* (Paris 1948) 36–39.

the 460s) is in honor of the Aiginetan Alkimidas, a boy wrestler of the high aristocratic family of the Bassidai. The scholia to the poem identify Alkimidas as also Cretan (inscr.), citing an Asklepiades (of Myrlea?). Alkimidas may have emigrated to Kydonia after the fall of Aigina to Athens in 457–56. [The dates of the Kydoniate sculptor Kresilas may also mark him as an Aiginetan refugee to Crete of circa 450.]^{51a} It is a reasonable assumption that Kydonia also provided a haven for Aiginetans expelled from their city in 431, as the city began to become important only in the fourth century, which suggests an augmentation of strength in the fifth century (cf. Strabo 10.4.11 C478).⁵² This connection between Aigina and Kydonia makes it unsurprising that the purpose of the expedition diverted to Crete is described as subduing an enemy city.⁵³

The creation of a state of hostility between Kydonia and Athens may well be owed to some form of *ληστεία* (as Gomme suggested).⁵⁴ As I have already observed, *ληστεία* does not often draw the exclusive attention of Thucydides.⁵⁵ Hence, the absence of allusions to Kydoniate *λησταί* does not provide an accurate gauge for the existence of this phenomenon. The later use of Crete as way-station by Peloponnesian fleets may be taken as an indication that a pro-Spartan base (or bases) like Kydonia (unspecified in Thucydides) had come into existence on the island. Alkidas' fleet wintered in Crete in 427 on its return from the abortive Peloponnesian attempt to relieve Mytilene (Thuc. 3.69.1).⁵⁶

51a. Note AG 13.13; Pliny NH 34.19.53, 74; E. Loewy, *Inschriften Griechischer Bildhauer* (Leipzig 1885) #45–47, pp. 36–38; Raubitschek DAA #132, #133.

52. Cf. van Effenterre *Crète* 117–20, 243–47. [In the course of a discussion of the familial connections of Alkimedon of Aigina, victor of *Ol.* 8, C. Carey, "Prosopographica Pindarica," *CQ* 39 (1989) 1–8, esp. 2, treats the identification of Alkimidas as a Cretan, which he holds to be a mistake derived from the bad information of the Nemean victor list. Clearly, critics like Carey and H. Maehler, "Bemerkungen zu Pindar," *Hermes* 113 (1985) 392–403, esp. 401 on *Nem.* 6.16 (on whom Carey partially depends), have correctly undermined outlandish earlier suggestions, like Alkimidas being adopted by a Cretan metic on Aigina or that he was merely a colonist from Kydonia. Pindar knows nothing of any dual ethnicity, so that one must opt (as I have) for a subsequent emigration of Alkimidas. Nonetheless, there is nothing in the ode from which Asklepiades could have extrapolated, and the weak historical tradition on competition at Nemea makes it improbable that anyone would have annotated the list of victories in contradiction to the indications provided by a Pindaric *epinicion*. We ought not forget that Alkimidas may not have ended his career with his Nemean victory as a boy so that in some later athletic contest he could have been described as Cretan. As for the sources of Asklepiades, the Aiginetan local historians, Pythainetos and Theogenes, may be suggested (see pp. 215–16 above; *Colonization* 87–88), since they were used also by Didymus. The Bassid Alkimidas, a member of the island's highest elite, may have been a significant figure in Aiginetan history in ways irrecoverable to us.]

53. Müller *AL* 113. Cf. Mikrogiannakis *KChron* (1971) 407–24.

54. *HCT* 2.221. Cf. Mikrogiannakis *KChron* (1971) 421–23, who believes that the Athenian hatred toward the Aiginetans was sufficient reason. The expedition, however, is not portrayed by Thucydides as primarily punitive.

55. See pp. 300–1 above with ns. 21, 24.

56. Meigg-Lewis 67 seems to contain contributions to Spartan naval operations conducted by Alkidas. Lines 6–7 have been emended to record the gift of a man from Oleros in Crete (Ὀλέ[ριος]; the alternative is Olenos in Akhaia). See F.E. Adcock, "Alcidas ἀργυρολόγος," *Mélanges Gustave Glotz* (Paris 1932) 1.1–6; [the new fragment invalidates the suggestion of a Cretan (see p. 309 above).]

The Melians will later suggest to the Athenians that Spartan help could reach them undetected through the Cretan Sea (5.110.1). A squadron traveling in 412/1 from the southern Peloponnesus to Ionia diverted to Crete to avoid Athenian interception (8.39.3). The possibility of squadrons using Crete and Kydonia in particular in this fashion may have been suggested to the Spartans by the success of *λησταιί* operating from Crete in the first years of the war.⁵⁷

Our hypothetical reinforcement of Kydonia by those expelled from Aigina may have had an impact on the balance of power in Crete. The proposer of the Athenian intervention hoped to gratify the enemies of the Kydoniates in neighboring Polikhne, although, as the text stands, he is Gortynian. Since Gortyn lies far to the east of Kydonia, about half the length of Crete (Strabo 10.4.13 C479), Nikias of Gortyn possibly feared an expansion of Kydoniate power, initiated by aggression against its immediate neighbors. At Athens, he may have also won credibility for his plan by citing disruptions caused by Kydoniate depredations in Crete itself. For Athens, however, the immediate attraction in the expedition was the possibility of seizing Kydonia itself.⁵⁸ The Kydoniate attacks and interceptions of Athenian and allied ships must have been damaging enough to warrant taking a chance that the twenty ships would not reach Phormio before the next engagement—a dangerous risk in the event, for they were too late and Phormio very nearly lost his fight disastrously (2.90–92.6).

Yet, the risk may well have seemed worth taking. Despite suggestions that there was something amiss in the failure to equip two expeditions, which would have been of modest size and ordered out when no major fleets were mobilized elsewhere,⁵⁹ the size of this force and its method of attack were grounded in the nature of the expedition. By the attachment of the Cretan mission to the task of reinforcing Phormio, the squadron could leave Athens without arousing suspicion about a landfall in Crete.⁶⁰ Twenty ships could not

57. [Gerolymatos *Chiron* (1987) 84–85 offers an inverted version of this hypothesis in which the Athenians want to base ships at Kydonia (for which intention there is no evidence) in order to intercept merchant ships sailing between Egypt and the Peloponnesus.] Note the Kydoniate Eurylokchos who ransomed Athenian captives in *IG II²* 399 of c. 320/19. See E. Ziebarth, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Seeraubs und Seehandels im alten Griechenland* (Hamburg 1929) 18, 104 (#48); cf. 26, 108 (#77) on *IG II²* 844 (the honorific decree for Eumaridas of Kydonia).

58. Kagan, *Archidamian War* 112–13, reflecting the criticisms noted in n. 47 above, exaggerates both the closeness of the links between the Cretans and Sparta and the prospects for a major revolt there which would distract the Peloponnesians from their plans in the northwest. All the Thucydidean references to Cretan support for the Peloponnesians have already been noted, and they could be explained by the pro-Spartan attitude of Kydonia by itself. They are balanced by the aid to the Athenians offered by Cretan mercenaries (6.25.2; 6.43.1; 7.57.9). Diodorus Siculus, Xenophon, and Plutarch (*Pericles*, *Nicias*, *Alcibiades*, and *Lysander*) do not mention Crete in connection with the war. Second, 20 triremes were too few to set off large changes in the balance of power on Crete (of which we know, in any case, virtually nothing; cf. van Effenterre *Crète* 28–38), even if they could have lingered there. Cf. Mikrogiannakis *KChron* (1971) 421–23.

59. See *HCT* 2.221; cf. Kagan, *Archidamian War* 112, who opts for the effects of the plague or of fiscal exigencies.

60. In this case, it would be necessary to assume that the phrase *πείθει αὐτοὺς ἐπὶ Κυδωνίαν πλεῖσται* need not necessarily denote a decision of the *ekklēsia*, but could describe a decision of the

hope to besiege and take even a small city, especially on what amounted to a stop-over. Twenty were, however, an appropriate reinforcement for Naupaktos, which may have had a limited ability to support a larger force out of its small hinterland (cf. Thuc. 3.94.3–98.5; 3.100.1–102.5). Nevertheless, such a fleet could surprise Kydonia, especially with the collaboration of traitors within its walls (subversion or defection rather than main force is implied by the verb *προσποιέω* in the active voice: 1.55.1; 2.2.2; 3.70.1; 3.94.3; cf. 4.47.2).^{60a} The expectation of taking Kydonia was not fulfilled, and the Athenians merely conducted a devastation of Kydoniate territory with the help of the forces of Polikhne.

If Connor's emendation is accepted, the attack on Kydonia could be viewed as a precursor to the attack on the Thyreatis from the standpoint of its command. Nikias would have assumed the anti-Aiginetan mantle of Perikles right around the time of Perikles' death by urging a strong counteraction for Aiginetan/Kydoniate aid to Sparta. Yet, the foregoing interpretation makes best sense if the received text is essentially maintained. The excision of the word *Κρής* as a gloss does not affect this conclusion, although we may keep it, if we choose, on the grounds of the existence of two near homonyms.^{60b} But can the surviving text be upheld in the face of Connor's criticisms? For the identity of the proposer of the expedition a Gortynian makes better sense as the individual who acted to win favor with the Polikhnitai, whose small, inland city hardly loomed large in Athenian imperial designs. Nor does it make as much sense for Thucydides to have noted the role of Nikias as Gortynian *proxenos* in Athens as to have introduced the proxy of a Cretan at Gortyn on behalf of the Athenians. Nikias the Cretan both had access to Athenian decision-making through his proxy, a detail important for explaining the acceptance of his plan, and as a Gortynian might well have had a special awareness (and thereby credibility) about Kydoniate activities. In contrast, it is hard to envisage why a proxy at Athens for the Gortynians by Nikias Nikeratou was so significant (as a motivation?) to warrant mention. As far as we know, Gortyn was not an ally of Athens so that a collective appeal by the Gortynians to their *proxenos* at Athens is probably not at issue. That Nikias Nikeratou would have involved himself in an intrigue over Kydonia would cry out for comment, if his name really appeared here. Finally, there is the mystery why the Athenians would have sent Nikias to serve, probably counterproductively, alongside Phormio in what was clearly a "one man show" in the Corinthian Gulf.

In the text as it stands, the burden of blame falls on Nikias of Gortyn, who misled the Athenians on his motivations (*φάσκων προσποιήσσειν αὐτὴν οὖσαν πολεμίαν· ἐπῆγε δὲ Πολιχνίταις χαριζόμενος . . .*), with *φάσκω* suggesting contention rather than truthful telling. That emphasis is aided by the

stratēgoi, possibly affirmed under some guise by the *boulē*. Compare 3.18.1, with 3.47.3 for ambiguity about Mytilenean decision-making; 3.70.5 (on Corcyra); 5.84.3 (on Melos).

60a. Note also Gerolymatos *Chiron* (1987) 85.

60b. Cf. Daux *CRAI* (1979) 95; Karavites *Klio* (1980) 310.

anonymity of the Athenian commander, who is, in effect, exonerated by Thucydides' failure to name him.⁶¹ In support of this view, note that the commander of this squadron is also unnamed in 2.92.7, where the arrival at Naupaktos of the reinforcements is recounted. If the supervision of reinforcements to Phormio had been the first appearance of Nikias in Thucydides, it is probable that his name would have been repeated in 2.92.7.⁶² It is, in any case, unlikely that Nikias' name can have appeared without its patronymic.⁶³ Finally, Walbank suggests that the proxeny of Nikias of Gortyn ought to be retained.⁶⁴ He identifies Polybos (or Polypos), known from an honorific decree of 405/4 (*IG* I² 125 = I³ 126), as a *proxenos* of Gortyn (rather than of Kortys in Arkadia)—*n.b.* the ethnic is a restoration—and a relative of our Nikias. Although the tradition that Epimenides the Cretan seer was escorted to Athens by a Nikias Nikeratou suggests a genuine link between the general Nikias and Crete, that tie is most likely to have been a more general mode of patronage than a proxeny for Gortyn (as reflected in the naming of Nikias of Gortyn?); nothing in Thucydides demonstrates or even implies that Nikias had a role in this botched initiative.⁶⁵ |

61. Cf. Busolt *GG*² 3.2.978; Daux, *CRAI* (1979) 102–3, believes Thucydides' reticence on the commander keeps the emphasis on the city's mistaken policy. [Karavites *AHB* (1989) offers another explanation for the suppression of the names of Athenians (the proposer and the commander of the expedition): Thucydides was more concerned with this episode as a first diverging from Perikles' conservative, defensive military strategy.]

62. Classen-Steup⁵ 2.226, 249. There is no indication of any textual problem in the latter passage. Such recapitulatory passages sometimes repeat the name of the commanding officer, when Thucydides intended the repetition to be significant: 1.64.2 with 2.58.2; 3.80.2 with 3.81.4, 3.85.1.

63. Cf. Connor *AJAH* (1976) n. 10, p. 64 for exceptions. Yet, it must be remembered that it is the absence of the patronymic on the *first* appearance of the name that is significant here. The aiming of Thucydides' work at a panhellenic audience explains the stress on Ἀθηναίος rather than the patronymic in 1.1.1. Titles specify the non-Athenian leaders Arkhidamos (1.79.2: ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτῶν), Alkidas (3.16.3: ναύαρχον), and Athenagoras (6.35.2: δῆμον . . . προστάτης). Left as exceptions are only the famous Themistokles (1.14.3) and Hagnon, mentioned with colleagues during the Samian War also lacking patronymics (1.117.2). Some might consider them parenthetical. [Karavites *Klio* (1980) explored the issue of absence of Nikias' patronymic and dismisses Hagnon as a parallel (as I do). He goes on to make the point that Thucydides' is particularly circumspect about the patronymic of Nikias. His further suggestion that Νικηράτου be added in emendation dispenses with γὰρ too casually.]

64. M.B. Walbank, *Athenian Proxeny of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Toronto 1978) 174–76, cf. 469–74 on *IG* I³ 126 (his #91), who also rejects Connor's emendation for its necessitation of two levels of corruption. He would add Thraix, a *Kortunios*, who made an early fifth-century dedication on the Acropolis (*IG* I² 488) as possibly another member of the family. It makes better sense, however, to posit that Thraix came from Gortunia in the valley of the Axios River (cf. Thuc. 2.100.3). [Gerolymatos *Chiron* (1987) 84 notes that a Gortynian proxeny for Nikias would make his second—if the one for Syracuse (not mentioned by Plutarch) can be trusted (*DS* 13.27.3)—and points out that such doubling of responsibility is unparalleled in the fifth century. Can Athens, however, with its farflung connections have had unique *proxenoi* for so many *poleis*, especially allies?]

65. Connor (*AJAH* [1976] 62) notes the escort of Epimenides by Nikias Nikeratou in the 46th Olympiad (*DL* 1.110–11). The story might have been created in the early 420s, when the pious Nikias may have proposed religious remedies for the Great Plague, and, to follow Connor, stimulated more Athenian interest in Crete. See also Jacoby, *FGH* 3b, 1.313 (opting for a fabrication

IV. THE AIGINETAN PROXENOS OF RHODES AT NAUKRATIS

In 411, the cities of Rhodes defected from the Athenian alliance to the Peloponnesian camp at the instigation of pro-Spartan oligarchs, *dunatōtatoi andres* (Thuc. 8.44.1–2). The island thereupon became a key point for the remaining hostilities of the Ionian War (Thuc. 8.44.3–4, 55.1; DS 13.38.5, 45.1; Xen. *HG* 1.1.2; DS 13.69.5, 70.2; Xen. *HG* 1.5.1; 2.1.15, 17).⁶⁶ The three Rhodian cities, Lindos, Ialysos, and Kameiros, united to form a single state in 408/7 (DS 13.75.1).⁶⁷ A Rhodian decree, found at Lindos on the acropolis, belongs to this period (SIG³ 110).

during the Peloponnesian War); G. Huxley, "Nikias, Crete and the Plague," *GRBS* 10 (1969) 235–39. Epimenides, however, was a familiar personage in Attic tradition so that it is unlikely that an outright fabrication could be concocted as late as the Peloponnesian War. While our surviving reference is late fifth-century, the conjunction between a Nikias and Epimenides may have had a respectable pedigree, so that pro-Athenian Gortynians named their Nikias (the future *proxenos*) after the associate of Epimenides. Epimenides is usually a Knossian in Athenian historical tradition (DL 1.109 = Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 67a, 68b–c; *Suda* s.v. 'Επιμενίδης, ε 2471 Adler; Pliny *NH* 7.52.175)—the localization at Phaistos in Plut. *Solon* 12.7–12 is a confusion based on one name for his father—and in Diogenes his visit leads to an alliance between Athens and Knossos, a city which was usually a rival of Gortyn (cf. *IC* IV 64?). The connections between Nikias, various Cretan cities, and the expedition against Kydonia are not sufficiently well attested for us to reach significant conclusions on the state of the text of Thuc. 2.85.5–6. [Herman *CQ* (1989) 87–93 finds here an example of hereditary proxy and *xenia* between the family of Nikias and that of a Gortynian (*n.b.*) Epimenides, citing Nikias Epimenidou, an Athenian *proxenos* at Oropos (*IG* VII 274: third century). He also notes *IG* II² 6220 with Epimenides Nikiou and 8463 (both Roman) with the Gortynian Nikias Nikiou. Although we might perhaps admit the historicity of Epimenides, it will never do to have him an ordinary Cretan aristocrat whose family related to that of Nikias through a conventional *xenia* over 75 or 175 years (Herman skirts the earlier chronology for the sage) that continued through a branch (!) relocated to Gortyn. The mythologized figure whom we see in the sources has no points of congruence with such a family, and Herman's effort to bring in Nikias of Gortyn as a *mantis* in Nikias' service is another unlikely complication. The later individuals isolated by Herman were named under the influence of the tradition about the first Nikias Nikeratou and Epimenides. This tradition and the name of the Gortynian Nikias are probably owed to the patronage of a fifth-century member of Nikias' family on Crete. Yet, we could admit Herman's other contentions and still draw up short before his final conclusion that upper-class solidarity induced Thucydides to cover up the machinations of Nikias Nikeratou, the commander of the expedition. Even if we ignore the exaggeration of calling the unfortunate officer's activity "dangerously close to treachery" (a massive elaboration on the text), it is still unlikely that Nikias would be sent to reinforce Phormio. If Thucydides needed to suppress the role of Nikias Nikeratou, would he not also have suppressed the name of the Gortynian Nikias, since, in Herman's reconstruction, that name would recall not only the Nikias of Epimenides' escort, the ancestor of Nikias Nikeratou, but also the fact that the *mantis* himself had served with Nikias Nikeratou? Finally, if Nikias Nikeratou had attacked Aiginetans in Thyrea and on Crete, I suspect that that circumstance might have been recalled.]

66. For Rhodian history in general in this period, see H. van Gelder, *Geschichte der alten Rhodier* (The Hague 1900) esp. 80–87 and, most recently, R.M. Berthold, "Fourth Century Rhodes," *Historia* 29 (1980) 32–49.

67. See also Strabo 14.2.9–10 C654; Ael. Arist. 43, 1.816–17 [Dindorf]; Conon *FGH* 26 F 1 (47). On the Rhodian defection: E. David, "The Diagoreans and the Defection of Rhodes from Athens in 411 B.C.," *Eranos* 84 (1986) 157–64.

- 1 [ἔδοξε τῇ β]ολαῖ· ἐπὶ πρ-
[υτανίων τ]ῶν ἀμφὶ Δει(ν-
ίαν· -----)αν Πυθέω Αἰγ-
[-----τ]ὸν ἐγ Ναυκράτ-
5 [ιος] ἔρ[μα]νέα πρόξενον
[ῆ]μεν Ῥοδίων πάντων κα-
ὶ αὐτὸν καὶ ἐκγόνους κ-
αὶ ἡμεν αὐτῶι καὶ ἔσπλ-
[ο]ν καὶ ἔκπλον καὶ αὐτῶ-
10 ι καὶ ἐκγόνοις ἀσυλὶ κ-
[αὶ ἀσ]πονδὶ καὶ πολέμο
[καὶ εἰ]ρήνης. *vac.*

Editors have generally restored the lacuna opening line 4 so as to read Αἰγινάταν|τὸν.⁶⁸ An inscription of all the Rhodians ought to belong to the years after the defection from Athens just as the Mytilenean attempt to synoecize Lesbos was an aspect of their revolt from Athens (Thuc. 3.2.3). The attribution of this grant to the council and the *prytanies* without the *dāmos* seems to indicate an oligarchic political context for the decree.⁶⁹ Hence, the decree was promulgated under the oligarchic regime which most scholars have accepted was established when the Rhodian *dāmos* found itself unable to resist the Peloponnesian fleet (and its local partisans) because of the Rhodian cities' lack of fortifications (8.44.2).⁷⁰ Since the inscription was found at Lindos rather than at Rhodes itself (although a collective decision of the Rhodians), its inscription cannot long have followed (if at all) the synoecism of 408/7.⁷¹ Therefore a narrow chronological frame can be established for this proxeny decree: 411–407.

Along with a likely date for the inscription early in the history of oligarchic (and perhaps even synoecized) Rhodes, several other considerations argue that this was an act of some political significance. The phrase *πρόξενον [ῆ]μεν*

68. *Editio princeps*: C. Blinkenberg & K.F. Kinch, "Exploration archéologique de Rhodes (Fondation Carlsberg): III^e Rapport," *Bull. Acad. Denmark* (1905, #2) 1–125, esp. 34–48. See also Dittenberger *SIG³*, p. 147; C. Blinkenberg, *Lindos: Fouilles de l'acropole 1902–1914*, II *Inscriptions* (Berlin/Copenhagen 1941) #16, 1.210–14. Cf. M.M. Austin, *Greece and Egypt in the Archaic Age*, *PCPS Suppl.* 2 (1970) 26 with n. 2, p. 63; 29 and n.3, pp. 65–66; *HCT* 5.92.

69. See Blinkenberg & Kinch *Bull. Acad. Den.* (1905) 42–46; F. Hiller von Gaertringen, "Rhodos," *RE Supplbd.* 5 (Stuttgart 1931) cols. 731–840, esp. 767, who notes that the *prytanies* are not the 'presidents' of the council.

70. Hiller von Gaertringen (*RE Supplbd.* 5.772–73, citing *Aris. Pol.* 1302b21–24) suggested that the democracy outlasted the defection by some years, but his hypothesis has received little support. See, e.g., E. Ruschenbusch, "Stasis und politischer Umsturz in Rhodos," *Hermes* 110 (1982) 495–98; David *Eranos* (1986) 162–63, who sensibly notes that our inscription provides strong evidence against Hiller von Gaertringen's thesis.

71. See Blinkenberg & Kinch *Bull. Acad. Den.* (1905) 38–41, who also note the hurried appearance of the inscription. See also Hiller von Gaertringen (*RE Supplbd.* 5.763) arguing that the decree belonged to the *ethnos* of the Rhodians rather than the *polis* of Rhodes. Note also the authorities cited in n. 68 above, to whom Berthold *Historia* (1980) n. 12, p. 34 may be added on the expression Ῥοδίων πάντων.

‘*Ροδίων πάντων*’ ‘to be *proxenos* of all Rhodians’ is emphatic, and one might reasonably assume that at this date this Rhodian *proxenos* was truly meant to exercise his functions. In other words, the decree was not merely honorific. Significant honors are decreed to the *proxenos*. The grant is to descend in the line of the honorand. The *proxenos* and his posterity receive rights of *εἰσπλο(ο)ς* ‘harbor entry’ and *ἐκπλο(ο)ς* ‘exit from harbor’ under *asulia* and *aspondia* in peacetime and war (ll. 7–12).⁷² |

Moreover, the timing of the grant takes on added point from the existence of another inscription (purchased at Cairo), recording a decree of the *polis* of Lindos which appointed one Damoxenos the *proxenos* of the Lindians in Naukratis.⁷³ This inscription precedes the synoecism, since the *boulē* is associated with the *dāmos* in the decision (cf. *LSCG Suppl.* #85), a situation not obtaining afterwards when the introductory formula becomes *μάστροις καὶ Λινδίοις* (and its variants: e.g., *IG XII.1* 761, 762, 839, 861; *SGDI* #4156). Epigraphically, the inscription can be associated with *LSCG Suppl.* #85 which establishes regulations for the dedication of sixtieths to Enyalios by Rhodian soldiers, both those serving under Rhodian officers and mercenaries, who were presumably in Athenian service.⁷⁴ From the representation of the word *βουλή* (*βωλα* instead of the *βολα* of *SIG*³ 110) and the treatment of *ν* (*SIG*³ 110: regular, no inclination to right) and *σ* (*SIG*³ 110: less open), both these inscriptions can be seen to antedate *SIG*³ 110 (as already suggested from constitutional formulae). *LSCG Suppl.* #85 is the older of the two (note *ψάπιγμα* instead of *ψάφισμα*) and is dated by Accame (and Robert) to 440–20. Because of its content, its most likely date is during the Archidamian War. Accordingly, the proxeny decree on behalf of Damoxenos belongs to the period 420–11, or 430–11 at the outside.

Damoxenos and his descendants received honors in a manner similar to those later granted the honorand of *SIG*³ 110: along with an enrollment as an *euergetēs* ‘benefactor’, *ateleia* ‘immunity from taxes’ for *esagōga* ‘importation’ and *exagōga* ‘exportation’ in ‘war and peace’ (10–15: a very common east Greek legal formula: cf., e.g., *I Magnesia* #4; *I Ephesus* #1389; *I Kyme* #4). In contrast, however, to the rights extended to the *proxenos* of *SIG*³ 110 (cf. n. 72), which assume a form not attested at Athens, these formulae specify designation as *euergetēs* as well as *proxenos* and grant *ateleia* in a manner

72. These rights are well attested; note esp. *SGDI* #5687, a proxeny decree of Erythrai for Mausollos: καὶ ἔσπλουν καὶ ἐκπλουν[καὶ] πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης ἀσυλεῖ[ι] καὶ ἀσπονδεῖ, καὶ ἀτέλειαν καὶ[ι] πρὸς ἐδρίην (= *I Erythrai* #8.7–10, cf. #11, #12). Cf., e.g., *IG XII.7* 8.10–14 (Arkesine); *I Kyme* #4; *I Lampsakos* #3. Were the rights accorded to the *proxenos* of *SIG*³ 110 accompanied by *ateleia*?

73. See *SIG*³ 110, n. 4, p. 147; S. Accame, “Un nuovo decreto di Lindo del V sec. A.C.,” *CIRh* 9 (1938–1946) 209–29, esp. 220–21; Blinkenberg *Lindos* #16 App., cols. 212–14; all reporting E. Pridek, “Inscriptions grecques de la collection de V.S. Golenistchev,” *Journal du Ministère de l’instruction publique* n.s. 13 (1908) #12, p. 19 (in Russian).

74. I follow the discussion of Accame *CIRh* (1938) 221–22, who also notes the single instance of the diphthong *ov* in *ἐκγόνους* in *SIG*³ 110. Note that this inscription is assigned mistakenly to Tymnos in *SEG* 4.171. See also L. Robert *BE* (1946/47) #159; *BE* (1958) #5.

more like Athenian grants.⁷⁵ The nationality of Damoxenos is not specified, for he is described only as ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ οἰκέοντα 'living in Egypt' (4–6). We cannot determine how significant is the absence of the ethnic, but it may indicate that Damoxenos was a permanent resident of Naukratis. The account of Herodotus on the organization of the town under the sponsorship of Amasis seems to establish a distinction between such settlers and those unwilling to settle in Naukratis, but wishing to conduct trade there:⁷⁶ καὶ δὴ καὶ τοῖσι ἀπικνευμένοισι ἐς Αἴγυπτον ἔδωκε Ναύκρατιν πόλιν ἐνοικῆσαι τοῖσι δὲ μὴ βουλομένοισι αὐτῶν ἐνοικεῖν, αὐτοῦ δὲ ναυτιλλομένοισι ἔδωκε χώρους ἐνιδρύσασθαι βωμοὺς καὶ τεμένεια θεοῖσι. (2.178.1 Hude)

But the stele in his honor is to be erected in the Hellenion, a sanctuary which Herodotus seems to associate firmly with Naukratis' commercial and transient population. In contrast with the decree in honor of Damoxenos, SIG³ 110 stresses the nationality and even the status (*hermeneus* 'interpreter') of its honorand, and is silent about the Hellenion. The Hellenion was a common sanctuary administered by 9 communities including the Rhodians. These cities also appointed the *prostatai* 'supervisors' who oversaw the *emporion* at Naukratis (Hdt. 2.178.2–3). It is a reasonable conclusion that Damoxenos also had some connection with the Hellenion (as an intermediary between residents and transients?), where the stele honoring him was to be dedicated, and perhaps, thereby, with the administration of the market. The decree orders Polykles son of Halipolis to see to its inscribing. Polykles was a Lindian, inasmuch as he could receive such an instruction from the Lindian state. His family is attested in a late fifth-century dedication made by the offspring of Thallis and Halipolis (with the very rare name of his father guaranteeing the connection).⁷⁷ A Lindian with the ability to see to the erection of a decree in the Hellenion at Naukratis was in all likelihood a Rhodian *prostatēs* at that city, for how else could such authority be explained. With his connection with the Hellenion, perhaps Damoxenos was ideally situated to discharge the duties of a *proxenos* inasmuch as he could both intercede with the *prostatai* and their subordinates and deal with the Egyptians supervising the resident Greek community.

Consequently, the proxeny grant of all the Rhodians recorded in SIG³ 110 seems to belong to an emphatic reorientation of the foreign policy of the island, coming, as it did, not long after the grant to Damoxenos. SIG³ 110 may represent (with the emendation Αἰγινάταν) the choosing of a *proxenos* outside the Hellenion, since the Aiginetans had their own sanctuary (dedicated to Zeus) and had no share in the supervision of the *emporion* (Hdt. 2.178.2–3). Such a decision must have had strong political motivations, since it cannot

75. See HCT 5.92; cf. Walbank *Proxenies* 5–7.

76. A. Bresson, "Rhodes, L'Hellénion et le statut de Naukratis (VI^e–IV^e siècle a.C.)," *DHA* 6 (1980) 291–349, esp. 295–96, 307.

77. For the inscription, see Blinkenberg *Lindos* #582, 2.2.912–13; cf. Bresson *DHA* (1980) 312–13.

have been without practical effects on the conduct of Rhodian commerce in Egypt. Yet, before proceeding to further analysis of the historical context for the grant of proxeny to the honorand of *SIG*³ 110, it is necessary to consider first the rectitude of the emendation identifying the son of Pytheas as an Aiginetan.⁷⁷

An attack has been directed on this restoration by Bresson, who chooses to revive the emendation *Αἰγύπτιον*, which had been offered only to be rejected by earlier editors.⁷⁸ He argues that the Rhodian *proxenos* was an interpreter carrying on a hereditary occupation handed down from an ancestor whom Psammetikhos I had assigned to his Greek mercenaries (cf. Hdt. 2.154.2). The descendant of this interpreter, who had assumed a Greek name and moved to Naukratis, was available for an appointment as a *proxenos*. This suggestion does seem to raise several problems in addition to the number of gratuitous assumptions which it seems to require. Why should a native Egyptian, in this case an ancestor or the father of the *proxenos*, assume a Greek name in order to practice a recognized (even honored) traditional profession (Hdt. 2.164.1), at a time when Egyptians were most protective of their own ethnicity? The Egyptian government had to communicate with the mercenaries in its employ in order to direct their actions. Hence the provision for interpreters was a priority of Psammetikhos I. That situation is inherently different from the position of the merchants, and Naukratis was nothing if not a commercial community. To communicate with their customers in order to conduct business was a responsibility that probably lay with the traders themselves. And how would someone who identified himself as an Egyptian have acquired the influence and knowledge to have acted as *proxenos* for a Greek city as important and commercially active as Rhodes?⁷⁹ An Egyptian may not have had any special qualifications, since it is unlikely that a Greek *proxenos* at Naukratis (acting on behalf of transients) would deal directly with Egyptian officials in commercial matters on a regular basis. Rather he would intercede with the Greek *prostatai tou emporiou*, who, in turn, acted as intermediaries with the authorities in affairs outside their own competence.⁸⁰

78. Bresson *DHA* (1980) 300–7 (cf. Blinkenberg & Kinch *Bull. Acad. Den.* [1905] 37–38). The general thesis of Bresson, that Naukratis only became a true *polis* late, perhaps after Alexander's conquest of Egypt, is itself unobjectionable and essentially independent of a determination on this emendation. Cf. Austin *Greece* 29–33. Compare C. Roebuck, "The Organization of Naukratis," *CP* 46 (1951) 212–20, esp. n. 26, pp. 219–20, who believes *Aiguptios* could denominate a Greek resident in Egypt in this context.

79. For a brief survey of the literary and epigraphical evidence: E. Ziebarth, "Zur Handelsgeschichte der Insel Rhodos," *Mélanges Glotz* 2.909–24. One might reasonably extrapolate without gross distortion from the intensity of Rhodian trade with Hellenistic Alexandria to gauge the place of Naukratis among the trading partners of fifth-century Rhodes, albeit within a much lower level of commerce for both Rhodes and Egypt. Cf. M. Rostovtzeff, *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 1941) 1.169–73, 226–30; R.M. Berthold, *Rhodes in the Hellenistic Age* (Ithaca 1984) 47–53, 99–101.

80. On the degree of Egyptian control: Austin *Greece* 27–29; T.J. Figueira, "Karl Polanyi and Ancient Greek Trade: The Port of Trade," *Ancient World* 10 (1984) 15–30, esp. 23–29.

The description of the Rhodian *proxenos* as an *hermaneus* is also problematical. The specification of the profession of a *proxenos* in an official document would be unique (to the best of my knowledge) among archaic and fifth-century documentary references to *proxenoi*.⁸¹ The denomination *hermaneus* makes best sense as an official title, one which deserved inclusion in an inscription publicizing honors, because the title was itself honorific by its very nature. Hence the phrase "from Naukratis" appears between the article τὸν and the noun ἑρμανεύς. These considerations seem to have force against Bresson's hypothesis that the Rhodian *proxenos* was an native Egyptian rather than an Aiginetan. Although, as with any emendation, a conclusive result cannot be reached, there is no necessity to question the opinion of the majority of the commentators on this matter. Our unknown Aiginetan held the position of "interpreter" for his fellow citizens active at Naukratis. This Hermaneus (not in his role as a *proxenos*) expedited commercial dealings between Aiginetans and Egyptians. He was a prominent man in an Aiginetan community which had once been (and might still have been) of sufficient economic influence as to possess an independent cult center (a distinction shared only with the Samians and Milesians).

The attachment of the ethnic and of the phrase "from Naukratis" seems to identify the Aiginetan as a transient, i.e., a person coming to Naukratis for trade and not a permanent resident who had severed all chief ties with his *polis* of origin.⁸² Pytheas, the name of the father of our *proxenos*, is well attested in Aiginetan elite circles. In the aristocratic *patra* 'clan' of the Psalykheidai, Pytheas, son of Lampon, honorand of Pindar's Fifth *Nemean* and of Bacchylides *Epinicion* 13 may be noted (cf. *Isth.* 5.19, 59; 6.58, poems in honor of his brother). A Pytheas was the father of Lampon, who was a leader of the Aiginetans at Plataia (Hdt. 9.78.1: perhaps the grandfather of the victorious athlete). Another Pytheas, son of Iskhenos, fought with distinction against the Persians (Hdt. 7.181.1; 8.92.1).

The party which seized power on Rhodes after 411 was called the Diagoreioi after the aristocratic family of that name (*Hell. Oxy.* XV(X).2 [Bartolletti]). The most prominent member of the Diagoreioi was Dorieus of Ialysos, who along with his family had once been forced into exile at Thourioi by his democratic opponents (Paus. 6.7.4: with Athenian connivance?). Dorieus and perhaps the Diagoreioi were subsequently condemned to death *in absentia* by the Athenians (Xen. *HG* 1.5.19; Paus. 6.7.4–5; cf. Androtion *FGH* 324 F 46). Much as I have suggested for the Aiginetan exiles, this elite Rhodian family participated in the Peloponnesian war effort while exiled from their homeland. After the Rhodian coup, Dorieus intervened on the island with

81. Note the material discussed in M.B. Wallace, "Early Greek *Proxenoi*," *Phoenix* 24 (1970) 189–208; F. Gschnitzer, "Proxenos," *RE Supplbd.* 13 (Munich 1973) 629–730, esp. 638, 647–50; Walbank *Proxenes (passim)*. Official acts of state perforce differ from the funerary inscriptions of Egyptians living and dying in Attica (*IG* II² 7967, 7968) cited as parallel by Bresson *DHA* (1980) 305. Cf. *IG* II² 9984–86.

82. See Austin *Greeks* 31. Cf. *IG* II² 206.

Peloponnesian forces during 411 against pro-Athenian conspirators (DS 13.38.5, 45.1; cf. the Diagoras serving with Lysander: Paus. 10.9.9). The family excelled in athletics, including Dorieus in the pankration with 3 Olympic, 4 Pythian, 8 Isthmian, and 7 Nemean victories (SIG³ #82; note also Pin. *Ol.* 7 with scholia, esp. Inscr. a–c, for his father Diagoras; Paus. 6.7.1–3; Thuc. 3.8). Dorieus and his faction may have been sympathetic to the oligarchic Aiginetans and the son of Pytheas (the *proxenos* of SIG³ 110), if the latter was, in fact, an upper-class Aiginetan, through his contact with Aiginetans during international athletic competition. Aigina was numbered among the many sites of the triumphs of Diagoras, the father of Dorieus. He won six times there either at the Aiakeia or at the Oinoneia (*Ol.* 7.86 with scholia, 156b–c), and would have been well acquainted with the local aristocracy.

The Rhodian choice of a prominent Aiginetan as *proxenos* signaled their desire to establish a political rapport with known partisans of the Peloponnesian cause. The newly established *polis* with its oligarchic constitution and its pro-Spartan stance gave priority toward creating an official representation abroad reflective of its ideology and foreign policy. Hence, the early appointment of an Aiginetan *proxenos* at Naukratis. The Aiginetans resident in Naukratis had the same anti-Athenian stance as their former fellow citizens in the Thyreatis and (probably) at Kydonia. The Aiginetan community at Naukratis was still of economic prominence locally, a situation owed primarily to its expertise about commerce with Egypt, but perhaps secondarily to its continuing relations with Aiginetans in the *diaspora* and on Spartan territory. When the Rhodians named an Aiginetan *proxenos*, they chose outside the citizens of those cities which like their own had previously shared in the Hellenion and administered the market (contrast the Lindian *proxenos* Damoxenos). The fact that many of these states still belonged to the Athenian *arkhē* (unlike the fugitive Aiginetans) may have been a factor in their decision.

CONCLUSION

Each of the four preceding notes throws a concentrated beam of light on a separate area of the history of the Aiginetans after their expulsion from their island in 431. While they do not give a complete picture of the experiences of the Aiginetans during the war, the conclusions drawn from them are coherent. By their agitation at Sparta before the outbreak of the war, the Aiginetans, or shall we say those Aiginetans conducting this necessarily secret diplomacy, committed their people to a confrontation with Athens. After the dissolution of the Aiginetan *polis*, the lives of the Aiginetans were dominated by an *ekhthrē palaiē* 'ancient hatred' toward the Athenians. Only if Athens could be defeated would the Aiginetans have had the chance of a restoration to their island. The exiles have been traced to the Thyreatis, Kydonia, and Naukratis, and in each refuge they can be connected with anti-Athenian forces and activities. If there were still any pro-Athenian Aiginetans like the aristocrats who had friendly relations with the Athenian/aristocratic leaders Melesias and Thoukydides

Melesiou (Pin. *Ol.* 8.54; *Nem.* 4.93, 6.65; see also pp. 205–10 above), they are indetectable: the only Aiginetans in the *diaspora* impinging on the historical record are discovered in anti-Athenian operations.^{82a}

The Aiginetans used the maritime skills acquired during their independence against Athens, as indicated by their coastal base(s) in the Thyreatis and by the Athenian hostility to Kydonia. The Aiginetan community in Naukratis may have given its aid to rebels against the Athenian *arkhē* like the Diagoreioi of Rhodes. The end result of this anti-Athenian activism was subjection to the heavy casualties attendant on Peloponnesian naval operations during the war and the evocation of at least one deadly Athenian reprisal, the attack on the Thyreatis. So when Lysander restored Aigina to the Aiginetans, Xenophon implies that the restored were not all that numerous (2.2.9): (Lysander) ἀπέδωκε τὴν πόλιν Αἰγινήταις, ὅσους ἐδύνατο πλείστους αὐτῶν ἀθροίσας. The island unquestionably did not achieve again its pre-Peloponnesian War prosperity or power (note Paus. 2.29.5: πλούτου δὲ ἡ δυνάμεως οὐκέτι ἐξεγένετο ἐς ἴσον προελθεῖν σφισιν).⁸³

The actions of the Aiginetans in exile indicate that the division between Aiginetans welcoming a Spartan invitation to settle in the Thyreatis and those scattering throughout Greece was not primarily grounded in the presence or the lack of hostility towards Athens. Nor was the division of the refugees into those resident in the Thyreatis and in *diaspora* indicative of the differential experience of the two groups with seafaring. My reconstruction suggests that all attested Aiginetan exiles practiced maritime activities. While it is possible to speculate about gradations of involvement in commerce—for example, between investors in the commercial ventures of others, who settled in Thyrea, and those actively escorting cargoes, who sought new homes in suitable, neutral entrepôts—we lack the direct information on individuals necessary for conclusions. Indeed one could argue that the fugitive population in the Thyreatis itself was split into more agrarian and more maritime centered components, a division expressed by the decision to take up residence in border-guarding Anthene, on the one hand, or in coastal Thyrea (and its adjoining harbor), on the other.

It does not necessarily follow, however, that those Aiginetans willing to settle in the Thyreatis and those unwilling shared the same intensity of identification with or admiration for Sparta. After the Aiginetans were reunited on Aigina following Aigospotamoi, the restored *polis* kept its distance from Sparta in the early years of the Corinthian War (Xen. *HG* 5.1.1: see pp. 338–42 below). While the Spartans wanted and needed a campaign of *ληστεία* against Attica, the Aiginetans waited to gauge Spartan commitment to a naval war, and they may even have dismissed their harmost Eteonikos in order to maintain their neutrality. Did Aiginetans in 431 then disagree and divide over the sincerity or the viability of Spartan gestures on their behalf?

82a. See now *Colonization* esp. 30–39, 126–28 for Aiginetans who may have remained on Aigina.

83. Note also DL 3.3; Plut. *Lys.* 14.4.

[Moreover, the Thyreatis continued to be inhabited, with some of the likely sites for Aiginetan settlement appearing to show no clear break in habitation c. 400. That situation could indicate some Aiginetans may have remained as Spartan Perioeci even after an independent Aiginetan state was restored. Although details for a sure reconstruction are lacking, it is possible that a spectrum of responses had emerged to the ideologizing and internationalizing of the Aiginetan confrontation with Athens. At the poles of Aiginetan political behavior, pro-Spartans were absorbed into the perioecic population of Lakonia and pro-Athenians may have been incorporated into an Athenian refoundation of the *polis* on the island of Aigina. To other Aiginetans, settlement abroad was a temporary expedient pending the reestablishment of an independent, Dorian Aigina. To still others, the trauma of exile at Athenian hands broke their ties with Aigina itself. For some of them Aiginetan settlement abroad provided havens of cultural and social continuity. The rest may have disappeared into the metic population of the Aegean, an international milieu of the deracinated.]

In 431, the Spartans anticipated a short war against Athens, expecting the Athenians to give way after devastation of Attica. Accordingly, their purpose in harboring the Aiginetans was to set the stage for a vindication of Aiginetan autonomy which would establish the island, resettled by pro-Peloponnesians, as a strongpoint against the Athenians. Hence, the *ληστεία* (necessarily slow-acting) against the Athenians may have been an Aiginetan initiative. Yet, there may also lie invisible behind it the contributions to the Spartan cause by individual Aiginetans. We are not well informed about the ethnic composition of the crews of Peloponnesian fleets during the war, but it would be reasonable to assume that Aiginetan exiles, especially those in the Thyreatis, served as crewmen on Peloponnesian warships. This conclusion is supported by the evidence surviving from the Corinthian War. In the course of 387/6 the Athenian general Khabrias made an attempt on Aigina during which he lured a force out of the town into an ambush (Xen. *HG* 5.1.10–13). Besides a force of Aiginetan and Peloponnesian hoplites, the sortie was made by light-armed Aiginetans, Spartan sailors, *xenoi*, and metics. The non-hoplites were the crews of the Peloponnesian ships on Aigina at this time, because their defeat gave Athens a respite from raids. The existence during the Corinthian War of a pool of trained Aiginetan sailors and *epibatai* was owed to service with the Spartans during the Peloponnesian War. Thus, when Teleutias, exhorting his sailors before his raid on the Peiraieus, adverts to Sparta as “our polis” (Xen. *HG* 5.1.16), his remarks may have taken added relevance from the presence among his troops of Spartan Perioeci of Aiginetan descent and Aiginetans who had once been Perioeci themselves. There is little direct trace of their activity, however, inasmuch as Thucydides and his emulators/continuator emphasized the explication of the behavior of *poleis* and their forces.

Aigina and the Naval Strategy of the Late Fifth and Fourth Centuries

THE FOLLOWING investigation examines the role which the island of Aigina played in the struggle for naval hegemony between Athens and Sparta, and offers insights both into techniques of warfare and into the balance of power at sea in the western Aegean. One important result of such an examination is the application to the classical period of a classification of Mediterranean naval warfare conducted by rowed ships into two discrete patterns, fleet operations and *ληστεία* by small groups of ships. The general military situation of Athens and Sparta and the political techniques available to either city for making use of their resources and for exploiting the weaknesses of their adversary affected the viability of fleet operations and raiding, the two modes of aggression.

A predominance of fleet operations during the Peloponnesian War is a correlate of the Athenian *ἀρχή* and "thalassocracy". This realization, along with our very ability to isolate this category of warfare, starting from the fifth century, is owed to Thucydides. His emphasis was on Athenian amphibious expeditions, the most characteristic form assumed by fleet operations, which, although justifiable in his context, somewhat obscures a "background" phenomenon, the continuous activity of raiders. Hence raiding activity is not always explicitly differentiated according to its scale, but one term for it, *ληστεία*, usually does connote for Thucydides pillaging by small forces, used opportunistically and without elaborate planning, rather than larger expeditions conducting coordinated attacks. The latter involved forces with a capacity for attacking fortified positions and for fighting engagements on land, although their primary activity was still devastating enemy territory. For the sake of clarity, I shall use the expression "flotilla raids/raiding" to refer to this military pattern, and reserve *ληστεία* and "raiding" for the activity of small forces. In this distinction, I am exploiting a shading of meaning introduced by Thucydides into his discussion of the Athenian attacks on Spartan territory, when he observes that the Spartans had no experience of *ληστεία* before the Athenian occupation of Pylos: οἱ δὲ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες ἐν τῷ πρὶν χρόνῳ ληστείας καὶ τοῦ τοιούτου πολέμου (4.41.3). Clearly, Lakonian territory had been ravaged quite significantly by flotilla forces earlier in the war.

Furthermore, in our analysis of the place of Aigina in naval strategy, it will be important to make this distinction, since flotilla raids and individual raids do not necessarily coexist within a single military repertoire. Moreover, privateering also deserves separate consideration as a sub-genre or variety of raiding, by which is meant the use of a privately owned or officered vessel,

undertaking hostile acts with a governmental sanction. For Aigina as a naval base, the relative prominence of fleet operations or *ληστεία* varied as the geopolitical situation of the island and its preparedness for war changed.

AIGINA DURING THE PELOPONNESIAN WAR

Thucydides attributes the Athenian decision in 431 to expel the Aiginetans from their island to two causes: a belief in Aiginetan guilt in fomenting the Peloponnesian War, and, more relevant for us, a judgment that it would be less dangerous for them to hold Aigina (which was) *ἐπικειμένην* 'lying off' or 'situated adjoining to' the Peloponnesus (2.27.1). Commentators have suspected Thucydides' text because it cites only the location of Aigina relative to the Peloponnesus rather than noting the danger of Aigina to Attica by virtue of its position off the Attic coast. Classen would remove the phrase *τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ* or emend to *<τῇ τε Αττικῇ καὶ> τῇ Πελοποννήσῳ*.¹ Gomme agrees and compares 4.53.2 (cf. 4.54.3–4), where Kythera, later to be used as a base for Athenian (flotilla) raids against Lakonia, *ἐπικείται* 'lies off' Lakonia.² Even De Romilly, who declines to emend, still insists that it is Aigina's position *vis-à-vis* Athenian territory that made the danger of a Spartan attempt on Aigina more serious.³ To support this understanding of the text, these and other commentators adduce Perikles' remark on the need to remove Aigina, the "eyesore of the Peiraeus" (Plut. *Per.* 8.7, *Mor.* 186C, 803A; Aris. *Rhet.* 1411a15–16; cf. Cic. *Off.* 3.11.46). That comment, however, is more likely to have been made earlier, in connection with a Periclean proposal to attack Aigina after the battle of Kekryphaleia.⁴ Lycurgus refers to a subjugation of Aigina by Perikles, which, even discounted for exaggeration, ought to mean that Perikles had some overall responsibility for the conquest of the island. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, however, saw *τῇ Πελοποννησίων ἐπικειμένην*, a reading which, while not preferable to our manuscripts, has the same sense as the received text (*Thuc.* 15). Therefore, I shall try to argue that Thucydides' reference to the Peloponnesus and not to Attica is deliberate and that even in its compression his statement contains the essential point about Aigina in the Peloponnesian War: it was important as a fleet base.^{4a}

First, we must consider the actual use of the island. Aigina could be used as a way-station for expeditions against and around the Peloponnesus, as a safe place for marshalling military forces. The first stop for the Sicilian expedition was Aigina (*Thuc.* 6.32.2). Similarly, when Demosthenes brought out the second expedition to Syracuse, he waited at Aigina for any units of his command

1. J. Classen (rev. J. Steup), *Thukydides*⁵ (Berlin 1914–1922) 2.70.

2. Gomme *HCT* 2.86–87.

3. J. De Romilly, *Thucydide: La guerre du Péloponnèse, Livre II* (Paris 1953) 21, 93.

4. De Romilly, *Thucydide* 2.93–94; *HCT* 2.86; E.F. Poppo (rev. J.M. Stahl) *Thucydides: De bello Peloponnesiaco, Libri Octo*^{2–3} (Leipzig 1875–1888) 1.2.58.

4a. Geographical opinion does not provide an unequivocal testimony: to be sure Aigina was positioned with reference to the Epidauria (Strabo 8.6.4 C369; Eustath. *Il.* 1.288; Pomp. Mela *Chorogr.* 2.7.109; cf. Strabo 2.5.21 C124, 8.6.1 C365), and that was the predominant description, but also to Attica (Eustath. *Il.* 1.121, 282; cf. Arr. *Anab.* 6.11.6).

that were delayed, presumably the *νησιῶται* and subject allies that made up a large part of his strength (7.20.2–3). Demosthenes timed his departure from the island so as to rendezvous with Kharikles, directed to take on Argive hoplites (7.20.1): with Kharikles, Demosthenes was to make a *περίπλους* of the Peloponnesus (7.20.2). The two Athenian commanders were to ravage Lakonia before parting company (7.20.2). The stop at the island of the first Sicilian expedition is noted because of a race there from the Peiraieus. Demosthenes' stop was noteworthy for the delay to meet reinforcements, and the need for the rendezvous. Therefore, other similar expeditions may have used Aigina as a staging point, especially for linking up with allied contingents.⁵ There were, however, no special, extraneous reasons in these cases for mentioning calls at the island. This conclusion is borne out by the Athenian campaign against Epidauros in 419. Seizure of that city would have shortened lines of communication between Argos and Aigina, from where Thucydides assumes any aid to Argos would be mounted (5.53: *ἐκ τῆς Αἰγίνης . . . τὴν βοήθειαν*).⁶ The Athenians also used the island as a convenient point of detention for hostages such as suspect, oligarchic ambassadors from Corcyra (Thuc. 3.72.1).

The participle *ἐπικειμένη* with reference to the Peloponnesus takes on additional point from the narrative order in Thucydides. The first *περίπλους* of the War, an expedition of 431 which attacked Methone, could have demonstrated to the Athenians the usefulness of Aigina as a base (2.23.2, 25).⁷ This expedition, begun before the expulsion of the Aiginetans, is narrated directly before the reference to the expulsion. Newly colonized Aigina was used immediately, for the force returning from Lakonia stopped there, and was promptly redirected to support Athenian forces then attacking the Megarid (2.31.1). Although the Athenians could have maintained a station and garrison on Aigina regardless of the presence of the Aiginetans, their disaffection would have been a permanent distraction; better to have Athenian colonists who could eagerly provide the ancillary services useful for a base.

Yet, the Thucydidean formulation on the significance of Aigina subsumes not only its positive utility for the Athenians, but also the advantage in

5. The following expeditions may be noted: Perikles' expedition of 430 against the Argolic Akte and Prasiai (with Lesbians and Chians) (2.56); Asopios' ravaging of the Lakonian coast in 428 (3.7.1–2); a punitive attack on the Isthmus and Peloponnesus in 428 (3.16.1–3); an expedition around the Peloponnesus in 426 (3.91.1); the expedition of 425 to Sicily which fortified Pylos (4.2–15); Nikias' expedition of 425 against Corinth and the Akte (with Milesian, Andrian, and Karystian allies) (4.42–45); the expedition against Kythera and Kynouria of 424 (with allied help) (4.53–57); an expedition of 414 against Kynouria (6.105.2; cf. 7.18.3).

6. The Spartans acknowledged the significance of Aigina as a base in their ravaging of the island in 411 (8.92.3). It was more important for them to ravage Aigina than to occupy it, at least in comparison to Euboia, their eventual target (8.95.2–7). Compare a possible raid of Lysander before Aigospotamoi: Plut. *Lys.* 9.2–3, for which see J.-F. Bommelaer, *Lysandre de Sparte* (Paris 1981) 101–2, who accepts its historicity. The notice may well be a doublet of the intervention there after Aigospotamoi at virtually the same time as a *raid* on Salamis (Xen. *HG* 2.2.9).

7. Note B.X. de Wet, "The So-Called Defensive Policy of Pericles," *Acta Classica* 12 (1969) 103–19, esp. 111.

denying the island to the Spartans. As has been observed, he did not, however, anticipate its use as a base for raids against Attica (similar to those so prominent in the fourth century). Rather, there was a precedent for its use as a fleet base by Sparta: Leotykidas' fleet assembled at Aigina in 479 before venturing out into the Cyclades (Hdt. 8.131.1, 132.1–2; DS 11.34.2). Similarly, it would have been possible for the Spartans to concentrate smaller squadrons, based at Nisaia, Kenkhreai, the ports of the Argolic Akte, and bases in Lakonia like Las (Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 117; cf. Paus. 3.24.6), for attacks on the Athenian ἀρχή. Some problems that Spartan fleets experienced during the Peloponnesian War are traceable to their lack of such a central/forward base.⁸ A bold stroke, the surprise attack on the Peiraeus, made do with ships stored at the Megarian dockyards at Nisaia (Thuc. 2.93–94). The seaworthiness of ships sent to sea in this manner was not of the highest quality, and the Peloponnesians got no further than Salamis. In contrast, a Spartan attack on the Peiraeus, mounted from Aigina during the Corinthian War, achieved great success. In 427, Alkidas' expedition in support of the rebel Mytileneans lingered in its voyage around the Peloponnesus and returned piecemeal to Lakonia after wintering in Crete (Thuc. 3.29.1, 69.1), which insured that it would be out of contact for the greater part of its round trip. During the Corinthian War, Spartan squadrons regularly departed for Ionia from Aigina (see p. 360 below).

Even during the Ionian War, when the balance at sea had shifted in favor of the Peloponnesians, operations still showed Sparta's disadvantage from lacking a base in the Saronic Gulf. The most vivid example concerns a Spartan squadron that left Kenkhreai in 412 for Ionia. The Athenians intercepted these ships, which were forced to shelter at Speiraion, a deserted harbor where they were blockaded (8.10–11). With difficulty, the Peloponnesian ships escaped, only to withdraw again to Kenkhreai (Thuc. 8.20.1). As far as can be determined, most Spartan forces bound for Ionia in 412/11 avoided sailing from northern Peloponnesian ports.⁹ Although the Athenians were distracted by στάσις concerning the Four Hundred, when Agesandridas sailed into the Saronic Gulf in 411, the Spartans started from a base in Lakonia. Once in the Gulf, they moved from base to base in a manner that seems ill-at-ease rather than purposive (however much their movements may have had the effect of arousing Athenian suspicions about the intentions of the Four Hundred).¹⁰ |

8. This disability would be amplified, if the number of Peloponnesian ships available at the beginning of the war has been underestimated. Concentrating squadrons rather than a shortage of triremes would have been their main problem. See T. Kelly, "Peloponnesian Naval Strength and Sparta's Plans for Waging War against Athens in 431 B.C.," in M.A. Powell & R.H. Sack (eds.), *Studies in Honor of Tom B. Jones* (Neukirchen-Vluyn 1979) 245–55.

9. Khalkideus brought 5 ships to Chios from Lakonia (Thuc. 8.8.2, 12.3); 4 and later 6 of the ships that returned to Kenkhreai sailed to Chios (8.23.1, 5–6); Hippokrates brought 12 ships, apparently directly from Lakonia, for they next appeared at Knidos (8.35.1); Antisthenes sailed with 37 vessels from Cape Malea (8.39.1, 3).

10. From Las in southern Lakonia (Thuc. 8.91.2, 92.3), they advanced to Epidauros, raided Aigina, returned to Epidauros, and then withdrew to Megara before leaving the Gulf to attack

Just as Athenian anxiety over the existence on Aigina of a population friendly to the Peloponnesian cause helped to motivate a decision to expel the Aiginetans, the Spartans also appreciated the value of an Aiginetan base even before the War. Before the outbreak of hostilities, Spartan embassies demanded that the Athenians, along with withdrawing from Poteidaia and rescinding the Megarian Decree, leave Aigina autonomous (Thuc. 1.139.1). In answer, Perikles exposed the frailty of the Aiginetan claim to autonomy. The Aiginetans were not autonomous at the time of the Thirty Years Peace and the Spartans would not risk putting their case to arbitration (140–44). The vagueness of this claim to autonomy, mysteriously grounded in the *σπονδαί* (1.67.2), suggests that this cause was indeed *ben trovato* for the Spartans.¹¹ They had evinced not the slightest solicitude for Aigina in the so-called First Peloponnesian War, making no efforts to save the island from Athenian conquest. They had left Aigina in Athenian hands under disadvantageous terms: tributary, without fleet, and without fortifications, that is, without all the customary tokens of autonomy (Thuc. 1.108.4; cf. 6.84.3; 6.85.2; 7.57.4).¹² The Spartans recognized the plight of the Dorian Aiginetans, winners of the *ἀριστεία* at Salamis, as good raw material for propaganda. Yet they also had practical ends in mind with all their demands (see pp. 259–60, 293–99 above).

A retraction of the Megarian Decree would strengthen the resolve of the Megarians, whose defection had been so disadvantageous to the Peloponnesian cause at the start of the First Peloponnesian War (Thuc. 1.103.4; DS 11.79.1–2). Similarly, an Athenian withdrawal from Poteidaia would strengthen other allies, the rebellious Chalcidians (Thuc. 1.58.1–2), and hearten the Corinthians. So too would Aiginetan autonomy deprive the Athenians of Aigina as a base and render possible an Aiginetan defection to the Spartan camp. The Aiginetans, formerly formidable adversaries of the Athenian navy, could then have been rearmed and their island used as a base against the Athenians.¹³ That the Spartans did indeed have such considerations in mind is shown by the reiteration of their demand during the first part of the Archidamian War, perhaps either when Athens explored peace terms in 430 (Thuc. 2.59.2; DS 12.45.5; cf. Thuc. 2.65.2) or during a flurry of peace

Euboia (8.92.3–4, 94–95). Theramenes, however, successfully interpreted these moves as collusion with the extremists among the Four Hundred (8.92.3).

11. Compare, for a reference to a general autonomy clause in the Thirty Years Peace, G.E.M. de Ste. Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London 1972) 293–94; for a possible reference to the treaty by which Aigina joined the Delian League: *HCT* 1.225–26. See n. 12 below and pp. 274–76 above.

12. See pp. 109–11 above; for various special formulations of autonomy, cf. P.A. Brunt, "The Megarian Decree," *AJP* 72 (1951) 269–82, esp. 272, 280–82; D. Kagan, *The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* (Ithaca 1969) 258–59; M. Ostwald, *Autonomia: Its Genesis and Early History* (*American Classical Studies* 11, 1982) 23, 42.

13. Spartan military interest in Aigina suggests an intention to conduct an active naval war from the outset. See T. Kelly, "Thucydides and Spartan Strategy in the Archidamian War," *AHR* 87 (1982) 25–54, esp. 33, 38–39.

rumors in 427–26.¹⁴ In the *Acharnians* (652–54) of 426/5, Aristophanes speaks of a Spartan demand for Aigina, understood in comic terms as an attempt to procure his services as an advisor (on his affiliation with the island: *ΣAch.* 654b; *Vita Aristoph.* #1.21–23, Kassel-Austin, *PCG* 3.2; Theogenes *FGH* 300 F 2).^{14a} By that time, the Spartans are unlikely to have preferred scoring propaganda points to getting a peace on their own terms. When they secondarily disseminated their demand for Aiginetan autonomy, they presumably had substantive reasons for wanting to separate that island from Athenian control.^{14b}

My discussion so far has supported the received text of Thuc. 2.27.1. As an actual Athenian base for operations against the Peloponnesus, and as a potential Spartan base against the Empire (unrealizable because of the Athenian colonization), Thucydides could justifiably stress Aigina's position relative to the Peloponnesus, not Attica. Why, however, did Thucydides and (to believe him) his Athenian contemporaries not cite in 431 the danger of raids from Aigina against Attica? Such a campaign of raids had been mounted from Aigina in the late sixth century, after an initial attack that had struck Phaleron (*Hdt.* 5.81.3, 89.2). During the fourth century, intense harassment was worked from Aigina (see pp. 340–50 below). An answer is to be sought in two aspects of the military situation during the Peloponnesian War, which were unique to the second half of the fifth century.

Let us consider first some military prerequisites for a campaign of *ληστεία*. Aigina possessed neither defensible walls nor a fortified harbor in 431. Still, it might have been possible for a Spartan fleet to sail to Aigina and, from there, to operate against the Empire. While the fleet stopped at the island, the Aiginetans (before their expulsion), could have provided manpower, supplies, and even some protection for beached ships. Hence, prudently, the Athenians expelled them. Yet, a campaign of raids necessitated a piecemeal commitment of ships, a policy of engagement which must have a protected (e.g., by a defensive squadron), fortified base. Once, from the 480s to the 450s, Aigina was surrounded by walls and possessed a military harbor, the *κρυπτὸς λιμήν* (Paus. 2.29.11), which was a state-of-the-art naval facility.¹⁵ The possession of this harbor, along with a powerful fleet, made Aigina a dangerous adversary for Athens. By 431, the harbor facilities had been thoroughly devastated; one assumes during or after the conquest of the island. Although commentators have introduced Perikles' calling of Aigina the *λήμη* of the Peiraieus into the

14. D. Kagan, *The Archidamian War* (Ithaca 1974) 80–84; cf. J.H. Finley, *Thucydides* (Cambridge, MA 1942) 193; [now *Colonization* n. 12, p. 83].

14a. See *Colonization* 79–93.

14b. If the discussion of *IG* I³ 38 in *Colonization* 120–26 is well grounded, the Athenians may already have understood the risk in the Peloponnesian use of Aigina as a staging point c. 450, and have taken diplomatic steps to counter. Hence, they will have been unresponsive toward trading the island in return for peace (possibly short-lived).

15. G. Welter, "Aeginetica XIII–XXIV," *AA* (1938) 480–540, esp. 484–85; P. Knoblauch, "Neuere Untersuchungen an den Hafen von Ägina," *BJ* 169 (1969) 104–16; *id.*, "Die Hafenanlagen der Stadt Ägina," *AD* 27.1 (1972) 50–85, esp. 83–84.

issue of the island's military significance (in 431) for Thucydides (Plut. *Per.* 8.7; Aris. *Rhet.* 1411a15–16; Plut. *Mor.* 186C, 803A; cf. Cic. *Off.* 3.11.46), that call for action was inappropriate at that juncture. The subject Aigina of the 430s was no longer a threat to Athens' port, since there was no Aiginetan fleet and no facilities from which to mount raids similar both to those mounted in the fighting of the late sixth and early fifth centuries and to those launched later in the fourth century. Perikles probably used the vivid metaphor of the *λήμνη* to urge a more crucial decision, namely whether to subjugate the island, at a time when the Athenians were already at war with the Peloponnesians (Thuc. 1.105.1–2).¹⁶

Second, let us examine the place of *ληστεία* in the Thucydidean appreciation of naval warfare. My account will go into somewhat more detail than might perhaps be justified by the need to explain the silence of Thucydides on Aigina as a base for raiding, but the usefulness of the paradigm established here for understanding fourth-century fighting at sea provides ample reason for a fuller treatment. Unlike the Aiginetans, the Athenians do not appear to have had a tradition of maritime raiding or, in archaic terms, shall we say, piracy.¹⁷ Nothing suggests that the Athenians, unlike the Spartans, employed individual privateers against their Peloponnesian enemies. Rather, they ravaged enemy territory with large, coordinated flotillas.¹⁸ Raiding Spartan territory (to a large extent, by land), however, was carried on by surrogates, Nau-paktian or Messenian allies, and those hostilities approximated a guerrilla insurrection or a peasant revolt.¹⁹

16. [See now *Colonization* 104–13.] Likewise, Cicero does not necessarily refer to the decision to expel the Aiginetans in 431 when he speaks of Aigina as a threat to the Peiraeus because of its propinquity (*Off.* 3.11.46): ... *nimis enim imminabat propter propinquitatem Aegina Piraeo*. His context is vague, for this is both when the Aiginetans still possessed naval power: ... *qui classe valebant*, and when the Athenians ordered that the thumbs of Aiginetan captives be cut off: ... *ut Aeginetis ... pollices praeciderentur*. The former suggests a period before the subjugation of Aigina in 459–56. See n. 33, p. 304 above, where the last condition is held to indicate a fourth-century context. Cf. D. Proctor, *The Experience of Thucydides* (Warminster 1980) 113–14, and the scholars cited in n. 4 above.

17. Figueira *Aegina* 202–8.

18. Against the Peloponnesus: see n. 5 above; cf. e.g., 2.26.2; 2.85.6; 3.91.1–6; 4.130.1–2; 5.84.2; 8.35.4, 40.1. Both Perikles and Arkhidamos refer to such attacks at the beginning of the War: 1.143.4–5; 2.11.8. Note again 4.41.3 for an implied distinction between flotilla raids and *ληστεία*. In general, see also P.A. Brunt, "Spartan Policy and Strategy in the Archidamian War," *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 255–80, esp. 270–72. Compare H.D. Westlake, "Seaborne Raids in Periclean Strategy," *CQ* 39 (1945) 75–84 = *Essays on the Greek Historians and Greek History* (Manchester 1969) 84–100. He upholds the value of the sea raids (cf., for support, DS 12.42.7–8, 45.3; Just. 3.7.5–6; Polyæn. 1.36.1). I would compare the flotilla raids to the Archidamian invasions of Attica, as both were restricted by defensive counteraction. By the same token, devastation from Pylos and Dekeleia could be compared as an intensification of destructiveness.

19. Mainly from Pylos, but also from Cape Malea and perhaps from Kephallenia: Thuc. 4.9.1, 41.2–4; 5.14.3, 56.2–3; 6.105.2; 7.26.2; cf. Xen. *HG* 1.2.18; DS 13.64.7; 14.34.2–8. After their success with Pylos, the Athenians also fortified Methana for use as a base for raids against the Argolic Akte (4.45.2), and they envisaged a similar use of Delion against Boiotia (4.76.5). Yet, even had the Athenians held their position at Delion, it is doubtful whether the political and

The Athenian emphasis on flotilla attacks follows a traditional distinction in styles of naval warfare inherent in operations by oared warships in the Mediterranean.²⁰ Because of their hull-shape, crew size, and motive power, such warships, including the trireme, had a short range and a low endurance. Depending on close-in tactics like boarding and ramming, large oared ships were inadequate vessels for sea-lane control and blockades where warships stood offshore.²¹ Fleets operated within constraints created by the need to mobilize so many rowers and by the difficulty of keeping them supplied. Warfare by fleets of oared ships centered on amphibious expeditions aimed at hostile maritime strongpoints.²² Opposed to this grand warfare was a smaller-scale style of fighting by raids and privateering, an entrepreneurial, opportunistic, and low-risk mode of warfare, which existed commonly as a background to fleet operations, because its scale freed it from the logistical constraints experienced by fleets. A corollary of this classification is that amphibious, expeditionary warfare primarily endangered the military and political assets of the enemy, but a strategy of raids and privateering struck at an adversary's economic assets.²³

In company with his Athenian contemporaries, Thucydides associates effective power at sea with fleet operations. In large part he saw the history of naval warfare as an opposition of thalassocracy to *ληστεία*. It was characteristic of primitive Greece, with its limited resources, that *ληστεία* was universal (Thuc. 1.5.1–3, 7–8.2). Both Minos, the first of the Greeks to possess an empire held together by a fleet (1.4, 8.2), and those pioneers in seafaring, the Corinthians (1.13.5), cleared the seas of *λησται*. Thus Thucydides, who is Athenocentric to this extent, keeps his narrational emphasis on large-scale

economic topography of Boiotia, so different from Messenia, would have offered the right opportunities. The Boiotians, however, took the threat so seriously that they called up a strong allied force to attack Delion (4.100.1). For the raids of escaped Chian slaves from the Athenian fort at Delphinion, see 8.38.1–2, 40.2–3.

20. I refer the reader particularly to the treatment of J.F. Guilmartin, *Gunpowder and Galleys* (Cambridge 1974) 68–84, 95–122, who emphasizes the indispensable role of “fortresses” and the episodic character of the mobilization of great fleets.

21. A.W. Gomme, “A Forgotten Factor of Greek Naval Strategy,” *JHS* 53 (1933) 16–24 = *Essays in Greek History and Literature* (Oxford 1937) 190–203; cf. G.B. Grundy, *Thucydides and the History of His Age*² (Oxford 1948) 1.354–59, on a putative blockade of the Peloponnesus, for which compare Westlake *CQ* (1945) 77–79 = *Essays* 88–91.

22. A topographical exception like the partial ability of the Athenians to interdict the entrance to the Corinthian Gulf from Naupaktos highlights rather than undercuts the usual role of blockades and interceptions (Thuc. 2.69.1; cf. 2.80.1), but note the inherent difficulties: Thuc. 2.81.1; 6.104.1; 7.17.3–4, 19.4–5, 34.1–8; Polyæn. 5.13.1.

23. Similarly, Thucydides portrays the impact of land raiders from Pylos on Spartan morale (4.41.2–3; 5.14.3), but there is no close analysis of the raids in general, or even an account of a characteristic foray. Accepting Spartan fear as the motivation for war, one might argue in defence of Thucydides that his lack of emphasis on the Pylian raids is excusable. Such raids might induce Sparta to seek peace, but they could not deter a reopening of hostilities as soon as Spartan confidence returned (cf. Thuc. 1.23.6). Note the effect of the victory at Mantinea toward restoring Spartan morale (Thuc. 5.75.3; see *HCT* 4.128).

expeditions, especially those directed against the cities and strongpoints of enemies. *Λησταιί* are mentioned only when the Athenians undertake expeditions to fortify positions from which they can be intercepted (Atalante against the Lokrians: 2.32; Minoa for the Megarians: 3.51) or because their existence had an impact on larger operations. Supposititious Megarian raiders collaborated in the seizure of Nisaia (4.67.3), and the guardpost against *λησταιί* at Boudoron on Salamis figured into an abortive Peloponnesian attack on the Peiraeus (2.93.4–94.3). Consequently, nothing prepares us for the possibility of Peloponnesian raiders in Magna Graecia before Nikias' mistake in seeing Gylippos as acting *ληστικώτερον* 'piratically' (6.104.3). One doubts that we would even know that the Spartans anticipated doing considerable damage with free-lance pillagers or privateers, except that Thucydides has noted the *carte blanche* granted them in 416/5 in order to illustrate the gradual movement of Sparta toward full scale hostilities with Athens (5.115.2). Thucydides does not mention the existence of a similar Spartan proclamation at the beginning of the Archidamian War, although one undoubtedly existed (on the Corinthian War, see p. 340 below).

Yet it is a peculiarity of the period from the defeat of the Corinthians at Kekryphaleia and the subjugation of Aigina down to the debacle at Syracuse that Athenian fleet operations could dominate war at sea to such an extent. Meanwhile, the Peloponnesians were so inferior in fleet capacity that they, quite reasonably, depended heavily on privateering, which the Athenians had learned to eschew. Peloponnesian sea-raids were the maritime counterpart to the war of attrition which the Spartans adopted in their invasions of Attica.²⁴

Privateers operated from Lokris (Thuc. 2.32; cf. 5.18.7), Karia (2.69.1), Megara (3.51.2; 4.67.3), and perhaps from Herakleia in Trakhis (3.92.4).²⁵ One of Nikias' gravest errors during the Sicilian campaign was his decision not to intercept Gylippos and his forces before they arrived in Sicily, because he believed that they were merely a raiding squadron (*ληστικώτερον ἔδοξε παρεσκευασμένους πλεῖν*: 6.104.3). In retaliation for raids from Pylos, the Spartans made the aforesaid proclamation that any of their allies could pillage the Athenians (5.115.2). One raid, perhaps typical, was the foray of Timolaos, a Corinthian, who, during the Dekeleian War, went on a pillaging expedition to the islands with 5 ships (*Hell. Oxy.* VII[II].3–4 [Bartoletti]).²⁶ Later, with

24. Brunt *Phoenix* (1965) 264–70.

25. The usefulness of Herakleia lay partly in its fine position for operations against Euboia (3.92.4, 93.1; cf. Philochorus *FGH* 328 F 130), but no great damage was done (3.93.2). *IG* I³ 41.38–39, which seems to exempt from the *εἰσφορά* settlers at Hestiaia who capture *λησταιί*, is associated with piracy on the Euboian coast during the war by H.B. Mattingly, "Athenian Finance in the Peloponnesian War," *BCH* 92 (1968) 450–85, esp. 476–77. The more likely date, however, is in the 440s; cf. M. Cary, "Athens and Hestiaea: Notes on Two Attic Inscriptions," *JHS* 45 (1925) 243–50, esp. 245–46. Compare R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 519–20; M.F. McGregor, "Athens and Hestiaia," *Hesperia* Suppl. 19 (1982) 101–11. [*Colonization* 192–93.]

26. Not all of Timolaos' ships were triremes, for it is with only 2 triremes that he subsequently sailed to Amphipolis (*Hell. Oxy.* VII[II].4).

the establishment of the fortified camp at Dekeleia, the Spartans adapted this “franchise” system of warfare to raiding by land. Not only did the Spartans conduct military operations of their own|from there (Thuc. 8.71.1–2; DS 13.72.3–73.2; Xen. *HG* 1.1.33–34), but free-lancing raids also took place (Thuc. 7.27.4) in which the Boiotians were particularly active (*Hell. Oxy.* XVII[XII].4). A Spartan harmost at Dekeleia supervised the raiders, since he was responsible for exacting a δέκατη ‘tithe’ from them (Dem. 24.128).²⁷ The harmost was also responsible for selling booty—the Boiotians were the best-situated buyers (*Hell. Oxy.* XVII[XII].4)—along with the λαφυροπωλᾶι ‘booty-sellers’, in order to subsidize operations in course (cf. Xen. *RL* 13.11; *HG* 4.1.26; *Ages.* 1.18).²⁸

Athenian countermeasures included the interceptions, already mentioned, and the inclusion of anti-λησται clauses in treaties made during the Archidamian War.²⁹ The treaty with Halieis stipulates that λησται (clearly, privateers, individual operatives) are not to be received and that the citizens of Halieis themselves are not to undertake privateering (*IG* I³ 75.7–9).³⁰ A similar clause has been restored in an Athenian treaty with a state whose name is not extant, but which may have been Mytilene (*IG* I³ 67.7–8).³¹ The threat of ληστεία was taken more seriously by the Athenians than Thucydides’ narrative, silent on such clauses, suggests.

Nonetheless, the selectivity of subject-matter in Thucydides is justified by the military factors dominating the fortunes of war. For the period covered by his narrative, Peloponnesian-sponsored raids did not weaken Athens significantly. It is improbable that|they damaged Aegean commerce to the degree that the ability of the subjects to pay their tribute was affected. In any case taxes on commerce were only one resource from which tribute was raised. Allied revolt was a far more significant threat to the flow of tribute, and the Athenians met that challenge by mounting amphibious expeditions to subdue

27. The Thebans and Spartans quarreled over the tithe to Apollo from Dekeleia: Xen. *HG* 3.5.5; cf. Just. 5.10.12–13; see H.W. Parke, “The Tithe of Apollo and the Harmost at Decelea, 413 to 404 B.C.,” *JHS* 52 (1932) 42–46.

28. See W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War* (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1971–1985) 1.90–92.

29. See B.R. MacDonald, “ΛΗΙΣΤΕΙΑ and ΛΗΙΖΟΜΑΙ in Thucydides and in *IG* I³ 41, 67, and 75,” *AJP* 105 (1984) 77–84.

30. For a date c. 423, see B.D. Meritt & G.R. Davidson, “The Treaty between Athens and Haliai,” *AJP* 56 (1935) 65–71, esp. 65–68; Meritt, “Attic Inscriptions of the Fifth Century,” *Hesperia* 14 (1945) 61–133, esp. 98–105; MacDonald *AJP* (1984) 80. For a date after the Peace of Nikias: W.E. Thompson, “The Athenian Treaties with Haliai and Dareios the Bastard,” *Klio* 53 (1971) 119–24.

31. B.D. Meritt, “Athenian Covenant with Mytilene,” *AJP* 75 (1954) 354–73, esp. 360–61; cf. *id.*, “An Athenian Treaty with an Unknown State,” *AJP* 68 (1947) 312–15. For other identifications, see, for Philip brother of Perdikkas II, W. Bauer, “Epigraphisches aus dem Athener Nationalmuseum,” *Klio* 15 (1918) 188–95, esp. 193–95; G.A. Papantoniou, “Athenians and Macedonians (*IG*, I², 53 and Thuc. 1, 57, 2–3),” *Acta of the Fifth International Congress of Greek and Latin Epigraphy, Cambridge, 1967* (Oxford 1971) 43–45; for king Artas of the Messapians, see L. Braccisi, “Ancora su *IG* I² 53 (un trattato fra gli ateniesi e il re Artas?),” *ArchCl* 25–26 (1973–1974) 68–73.

rebels. Sparta vanquished Athens only when it had created a duplicate of the Athenian fleet, one momentarily better subsidized and led. A siege, the characteristic outcome for fleet warfare, ended the war. As Peloponnesian *ληστεία* does not stand in the forefront of Thucydides' attention and its impact on the war was, for him, limited, he did not state explicitly that Aigina as a base for *λησται* was not in the minds of the Athenians when they expelled the island's inhabitants. Nonetheless, the commentators who are urging emendation should be resisted.

It is more noteworthy that he neglected to note the singularity and the temporal delimitation of this predominance of fleet operations over *ληστεία*. Nevertheless, the institutions of *ληστεία* established in the Peloponnesian War become more important for Sparta and Aigina in the fourth century, especially the combination of raids with regular operations, the proclamation of immunity for privateers, and the use of raids to subsidize fleet operations.

During the Peloponnesian War, however, as I have argued above, Aigina was used as a fleet base by the Athenians, whose recognition of its importance in this guise helped to motivate their expulsion of the Aiginetans. The potential value of the island to the Peloponnesians was appreciated by the Spartans, who demanded Aiginetan autonomy both before and during the war, and by the Athenians, who were determined to retain the island.

ON THE EVE OF THE CORINTHIAN WAR

After the defeat of the Athenians, the Spartans restored an independent Aigina, a home for as many of the Aiginetans as Lysander was able to gather and restore (Xen. *HG* 2.2.9; Plut. *Lys.* 14.3; DL 3.3). By this restoration, not only did the Spartans show their good faith concerning their demand for Aiginetan autonomy on the eve of the war, but also expected to acquire an anti-Athenian population experienced in seafaring and a base conveniently near to Attica. A Spartan harmost was in residence on Aigina between the Peloponnesian and Corinthian Wars (*Hell. Oxy.* VI[I].3, VIII[III].1; Dem. 18.96).³² Although there had been a general reaction against the imperialistic policies of Lysander, with their decarchies, exaction of tribute, and network of harmosts, this reaction did not extend to withdrawing the harmost from Aigina.³³ Aigina was apparently a place which all Spartan factions held to be indispensable and legitimately within Sparta's sphere of influence.

Why the Spartans wanted a presence on Aigina can be determined from the following episode. In 397/6, there was considerable sympathy in Athens

32. In general, see G. Bockisch, "Ἀρμοσται (431–387)," *Klio* 46 (1965) 129–239, esp. 235 with 183, 220; also H.W. Parke, "The Development of the Second Spartan Empire (405–371 B.C.)," *JHS* 50 (1930) 37–79, esp. 57–65.

33. On the reaction to Lysander, see A. Andrewes, "Two Notes on Lysander," *Phoenix* 25 (1971) 206–26; C.D. Hamilton, "Spartan Politics and Policy, 405–401 B.C.," *AJP* 91 (1970) 294–314; R.E. Smith, "Lysander and the Spartan Empire," *CP* 43 (1948) 145–56. A dramatic and controversial stage was the dismantling of the decarchies (Xen. *HG* 3.4.2, 7), dated to 403/2 or 397; Smith *CP* (1948) 150–55; Andrewes *Phoenix* (1971) 206–16.

for the Persian opposition to Sparta, personified by Konon, who was acting as commander of the Greek forces under Pharnabazos (Xen. *HG* 4.3.11).³⁴ Equipment and men had been sent secretly to Konon, and an embassy, intercepted by the Spartan navarch Pharak, had been dispatched to Persia (*Hell. Oxy.* VII[II].1; Isoc. *Paneg.* [4] 142). Demainetos, presumably an Athenian trierarch, in collusion with the *boulē*, collected a crew, launched a ship from the dockyards, and sailed to join Konon (*Hell. Oxy.* VI[I].1). Thereupon, both those wishing to avoid confrontation with Sparta and even anti-Spartans like Thrasyboulos were afraid of an untimely alienation of Sparta, so that a mission disclaiming responsibility was sent to Milon, the Spartan harmost at Aigina (*Hell. Oxy.* VI[I].2–3).³⁵ Milon manned a trireme, and set out to intercept Demainetos, who was encountered at Thorikos (*Hell. Oxy.* VIII[III].1). As Thorikos is on the east coast of Attica and not on the route to join Konon at Kaunos, perhaps Demainetos was trying to throw the Spartans off his trail. He decided to turn Cape Sounion as soon as he learned, while he lingered along the Attic coast, that the majority of Athenians would not second his actions and that the Spartans would receive news of his departure.³⁶ |

Unfortunately, the London papyrus becomes fragmentary from this point. Aeschines' reference to the same incident ought, however, to serve as a guide in a restoration of the text (see immediately below). While Aeschines may be exaggerating in maintaining that Kleoboulos, his maternal uncle, had helped Demainetos in defeating (*συγκατεναυμάχησε*) the Spartan *navarch* Kheilon (2.78), instead of the harmost Milon,³⁷ a hostile encounter must have taken place. So it is hard to agree with Grenfell & Hunt (followed by Bruce and Bartoletti) that Demainetos merely stole a ship from Thorikos (or some other place in east Attica) and escaped Milon.³⁸ First of all, why should an unguarded, unmanned trireme have been on hand to be taken in east

34. For spring 396, see P.B. Grenfell & A.S. Hunt, *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* 5 (London 1908) 113–15; I.A.F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the 'Hellenica Oxyrhynchia'* (Cambridge 1967) 50, 66–72; [P.R. McKechnie & S.J. Kern, *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Warminster 1988) 137–38.] For autumn 396: G. Bonamente, *Studio sulle Elleniche di Ossirinco* (Perugia 1973) 91–95; [B. Strauss, *Athens after the Peloponnesian War: Class, Faction and Policy 403–386 BC* (Ithaca 1986) n. 73, p. 119]. See also and most recently, for the view that the *ἔρος ὀγδοον* of IX(IV).1 is 395/4, G.A. Lehman, "Sparta's ἀρχή und die Vorphase des Korinthischen Krieges," *ZPE* 28 (1978) 109–26.

35. On Athenian politics, see I.A.F. Bruce, "Athenian Foreign Policy in 396–395 B.C.," *CJ* 58 (1963) 289–95; S. Perlman, "Athenian Democracy and the Revival of Imperialistic Expansion at the Beginning of the Fourth Century B.C.," *CP* 63 (1968) 257–67; [also Strauss *Athens* 107–11 on the Demainetos incident.]

36. That the events of *Hell. Oxy.* VI[I].2–3, including a meeting of the *boulē*, an assembly, and the delegation to Milon, did not take so long that Demainetos got clean away, suggests that he waited to hear news of Athenian reactions to his act. His purpose was then to provoke a groundswell of anti-Spartan sentiment; his addition of a single boat to Konon's force was in itself inconsequential. [Note McKechnie & Kern *Hellenica* 137.]

37. Kheilon was so famous a Spartan name that it could have usurped the name Milon or, possibly, Kheilon was another Spartan commander involved in the episode.

38. Grenfell & Hunt *POxy* 5.206–7.

Attica?³⁹ After all, by the terms of their capitulation to Sparta, the Athenians had the right to possess only 12 ships (Xen. *HG* 2.2.20). Second, the explanation that the hull of Demainetos' original ship was inferior to the hull of the second ship (col. III, 3) is meant to explain why Demainetos used the second ship: he had only one crew, enough for one ship. What is missing is an explanation how the second ship was taken. Nor is it clear in the scenario of a flight by Demainetos why his specially chosen first ship suddenly became unseaworthy. An appropriate answer to both questions is that the second ship was taken in combat. Thirdly, we need not be troubled by the objection of Grenfell & Hunt that Milon would have been captured with his ship. There is no certainty that the name ending in -ων in col. III, 6 is Milon. There are, after all, at least 24 missing letters before -ων, ample space to finish the previous sentence (e.g., [Κόνωνος]) and to introduce another Spartan officer (Kheilon?), who arrived only to withdraw to Aigina on missing Demainetos.⁴⁰ If Milon did not survive the encounter, the manner in which Aeschines refers to the episode would be far more understandable.⁴¹

A reconstruction of the lacunose text might follow along these lines:

Col. II, 40 ... ἐ[πει]δὴ δὲ προσπλεύσας ἐκεῖν[ο]ς πρὸς

Col. III Fr. 1 Fr. 2

- 1 [τὴν ναῦν], ἐπεχείρη[σεν] ἐμβαλεῖν, ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ πολὺ
- 2 ... εἰν' κρατήσ[ας δὲ τῆς ν]εὼς αὐτῶν τὴν μὲν ὑ-
- 3 [φ' αὐτῷ] ναῦν, ὅτι χεῖρον ἦν τὸ σκ[ά]φος, αὐτοῦ κατέλιπε
- 4 [εἰς δὲ] τὴν ἐκεῖν[ων μεταβιβ]άσας τοὺς αὐτοῦ ναύ-
- 5 [τας προ]έπλ[ε]υσεν [ἐπὶ τὸ στράτ]ευμα τὸ μετὰ τοῦ
- 6 [Κόνωνος] ων εἰς Αἴγινα με-
- 7 [τὰ τῶν ἄλλων νεῶν ἐπλευσε]...

Remember first of all that the number of spaces to the left and right of fr. 1 are unknown. Grenfell & Hunt estimate 5–6 spaces at the left, and 8–9 at the right, but concede that there might be slightly more or less space available. In col. III, 1 on the left, read (e.g.) τὴν ναῦν or τούτους as the object of πρὸς to denote action against Demainetos and the Athenians rather than movement toward a place. To the right in III, 1, continue to read ἐμβαλεῖν 'ram' (after

39. Bruce *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 65, following J.H. Lipsius, *Cratippi Hellenicorum Fragmenta Oxyrhynchia* (Bonn 1916) 9, reads κρατήσ[ας μ]ᾶς νεὼς αὐτῶν in col. III, 2, which suggests more than one trireme present on the spot, intensifying this difficulty. Cf. *POxy* 5.207, where τῆς is preferred; V. Bartoletti, *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Leipzig 1959) 9.

40. We might then return to M. Gigante's (*Le Elleniche di Ossirinco* [Rome 1949] 18, 56–57) suggestion for III, 7: με[τὰ τῶν ἄλλων νεῶν ἐπλευσε rather than something like με[τὰ τῆς αὐτοῦ νεὼς (or τριήρους) ἐπληρώκε (L. Castiglioni, rev. Lipsius, *BFC* 27 [1920–1921] 146–47; Bartoletti *Hellenica* 9; Bruce *Hellenica* 65; cf. Grenfell & Hunt *POxy* 5.207). The latter suggestion, explaining that Milon left with his own ship, provides what would be self-evident in the "run-away" interpretation of Demainetos' actions, because only one Spartan ship would need accounting for. This restoration serves paradoxically only to justify retrospectively a restoration for the earlier lacuna in III, 2, allowing it to describe Demainetos' theft of the ship. It does not carry ahead or conclude the narrative.

41. Gigante *Elleniche* 56–57.

Grenfell & Hunt), and then after ἐπὶ an adjective (πολύ: Grenfell & Hunt, or πλέον), with an infinitive describing a counteraction at the beginning of III, 2. Understand Demainetos as the subject of ὥρμησεν.⁴² Then construe αὐτῶν as the Spartans.⁴³ Thus, we have an attempt by Milon to disable Demainetos' trireme which was countered by the Athenians, who then captured the Spartan trireme. Demainetos, with the captured ship, left the scene of the battle before the arrival of Spartan reinforcements.

The import of this episode in our understanding of the Spartan use of Aigina can now be considered. First, one notes that Milon is able to react quickly to the news of hostile activities in Attica. The compressed time-frame for the whole incident suggests that he had a trireme ready for action, which he was able to man speedily. Milon would have brought more ships, had he the time to wait. A one-to-one fight against an Athenian warship was always a chancy business (correctly, in our interpretation of the affair). Those who guided Milon (Aiginetans perhaps) were well acquainted with the coastal waters of Attica. His vessel was able to sail directly to one or more of the likely stages of Demainetos' journey in order to find him at Thorikos. The Spartan ship seems to have started the fighting. But no matter how one restores the papyrus, Milon did not simply miss Demainetos or Aeschines' allusion to the episode would be absurd. Thus, even before the Corinthian War, the Spartan harmost on Aigina was assigned the task of patrol and intervention along the Attic coast. In this case, he acted to insure that the Athenians did not break their alliance with Sparta. The Athenians were aware of this function, since they would never have reported the affair to Milon, unless they anticipated his inclination to take preemptive action. An embassy to Sparta would have been the appropriate act, if their intention had been merely to disavow Demainetos.

THE CORINTHIAN WAR

In the Corinthian War, interpretation of the place of Aigina in naval affairs is hampered by the inadequacies of Xenophon's account.⁴⁴ His selective, sketchy discussion of the fighting at sea follows a fuller treatment of the combat on land. His chronology is vague. A base line, however, is the eclipse of August 14, 394, which helps to date the contemporaneous battles of Knidos and Koroneia (HG 4.3.10; cf. Lys. 19.28). Accordingly, Konon's rebuilding of the Athenian walls is usually fixed in spring or summer 393 (cf. IG II² 1656–57 = Tod GHI #107; Xen. HG 4.8.9–10; DS 14.85.2–3). One principle of organization for a chronology thereupon (most prominently applied by

42. On the absence of a subject for ὥρμησεν: Jacoby FGH 66, 2, 10. Some see a place after ἐπὶ (Bruce *Hellenica* 64), but such a conjecture makes the encounter occur over too great an area.

43. In opposition to Grenfell & Hunt (POxy 5.207) I find the use of αὐτῶν for the inhabitants of the place of the incident unlikely, despite VII(II).4: εἰς Ἀμφίπολιν καὶ παρ' ἐκείνων ἐτέρας τέτ[τα]ρας συμπληρωσάμενος . . . Moreover, the object of πρὸς in III, 1 could have been a place, but hardly an ethnic. Cf. Gigante *Elleniche* 56.

44. A recourse is to supplement Xenophon with Diodorus, whose account is by no means unproblematical, but with whom we cannot dispense for this period. See G.L. Cawkwell, "The Foundation of the Second Athenian Confederacy," CQ 23 (1973) 47–60.

Beloch) is to associate the various Spartan fleet commanders in Xenophon with Spartans holding the navarchy for a year.⁴⁵ Unfortunately, Xenophon's terminology in referring to these officers is confusing, and several errors and irregularities must be posited. Moreover, there is the problem of determining precisely at which point in the year a navarch assumed his duties; Beloch's suggestion, convincing to me, of late summer, coinciding with the Spartan official year is the strongest, but only one, possibility.⁴⁶

Xenophon first refers to Aigina at a time when the Aiginetans had already been at war with Athens for a time (5.1.1). Still earlier, the Aiginetans had been at peace with the Athenians (literally, enjoying social intercourse: *ἐπιμειξία χρωμένων*) for a previous time (*τὸν πρόσθεν χρόνον*). Konon's route across the Aegean in the spring after Knidos illustrates how Aigina was not yet a military factor early in the war. From the Hellespont, Konon sailed through the islands to Melos, and then attacked Pharai, other places in Ky-nouria, and Kythera, before sailing into the Saronic Gulf for the Isthmus (Xen. *HG* 4.8.7–8; *DS* 14.84.3–5; 85.2). He therefore reversed the course taken to Ionia by some Spartan squadrons during the Ionian War, which suggests that Konon anticipated Spartan forces to be reorganizing in Lakonian ports and not at Aigina. The island had not yet begun its role as a staging point for Spartan forces well attested later in the Corinthian War. With the rebuilding of the walls of Athens and the resurgence of Athenian naval power under Konon, the Aiginetans may well have anticipated renewed Athenian expansionism. Yet with Spartan naval power in the Aegean in eclipse after Knidos and the Spartans considering a negotiated peace, the Aiginetans may still have thought it prudent to refrain from hostilities (Xen. *HG* 4.8.12–17).

During this period, Aigina became a haven for pro-Spartans dislodged by Konon's sweep through the Cyclades and the fall of oligarchic governments that ensued, as demonstrated by the *Aegineticus* (19) of Isocrates. The aristocratic Siphnian speaker and his relatives (19.36) had been driven from their homes as the islands were attacked by democratic exiles (19.18–19), whereupon they travelled to Melos, Troizen, and finally Aigina (19.21–24). Even though the Siphnian exiles had already made one attempt to recover their island, Aigina was still at peace and an Aiginetan metic could commission a speech from an Athenian. An appreciable time, several years, since the outbreak of the Corinthian War must have elapsed for the events of the speech to have occurred,⁴⁷ which corroborates Xenophon on the initial non-involvement

45. J. Beloch, *Die attische Politik seit Perikles* (Leipzig 1884) 346–59; *id.*, *GG*² 3.2.217–25; followed (e.g.) by V. Puntoni, *Senofonte: Le storie elleniche*² (Turin 1929) 2.xix.

46. J. Beloch, "Die Nauarchie in Sparta," *RhM* 34 (1879) 117–30; *GG*² 2.2.269–89; L. Pareti, "Ricerche sulla potenza marittima degli Spartani e sulla cronologia dei navarchi," *Studi minori di storia antica* (Rome 1958–1969) 2.1–131, esp. 23–26. For an assumption of office in the spring, at the beginning of the campaigning season, compare L. Breitenbach, *Xenophon's Hellenika*² (Berlin 1873–1876) 2.lxxviii–lxxxvi; see also R. Sealey, "Die spartanische Nauarchie," *Klio* 58 (1976) 335–58, esp. 352–55 on the Corinthian War.

47. G. Mathieu & E. Bremond, *Isocrate: Discours*² (Paris 1956–1962) 1.92, dating the speech to 391 or 390. See also F. Brindesi, *Isocrate: Eginetico* (Florence 1963) 4.

of the Aiginetans in the hostilities. As a sanctuary for pro-Spartans, the island played only a passive role in the struggle for control of the Aegean.

Xenophon tells us that Eteonikos was harmost on Aigina for the second time when the Aiginetans decided to respond to the appeal of the harmost that anyone, so wishing, might take booty from Attica (*HG* 5.1.1). They did this, according to Xenophon, when it was clear that the war would be fought at sea. Eteonikos was acting under the authorization of the ephors (συνδόξαν καὶ τοῖς ἐφόροις ἐφίησι . . .). The language of his appeal was formulaic: λήζεσθαι τὸν βουλόμενον ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς (cf. Thuc. 5.115.2 on the proclamation of 416/5: εἴ τις βούλεται παρὰ σφῶν Ἀθηναίων λήζεσθαι). Therefore, this exhortation was not limited to the Aiginetans, but applied to Spartan allies and pro-Spartans in general. Eteonikos had simply reiterated Spartan policy, probably of long standing, because the proclamation of 416 came at the beginning of hostilities.

To determine the lower terminus of the period of Aiginetan inactivity, consider the actions of the Spartan admiral Teleutias, brother of Agesilaus. The Aiginetan raids eventually provoked an Athenian reaction, a siege at length broken by Teleutias (*HG* 5.1.2). Sometime earlier, he had superseded the previous Spartan commander in the Aegean, Ekdikos (*HG* 4.8.20, 22–23). To follow Beloch, Ekdikos was navarch for Spartan year (SY) 391/0 and Teleutias succeeded as navarch for 390/89.⁴⁸ Underhill objects to Ekdikos' being so long inactive before supersession by Teleutias; so Teleutias succeeds Ekdikos early in SY 391/0 and continues as navarch for 390/89.⁴⁹ He, therefore, spent at least 18 months as navarch, even though multiple holding of that office was irregular (cf. *HG* 2.1.7). It is maladroit, however, to reconstruct the rhythm of military activity as coinciding with official terms. Ekdikos may well have been sent out during the course of SY 391/0, as Diodorus suggests,⁵⁰ in reaction to the Athenians. His dispatch was probably in the campaigning season of 390, since the Spartans would hardly have reacted to his inactivity by sending out Teleutias if it had been winter. We should accept Beloch's theory of Ekdikos as navarch of SY 391/0 (cf. *HG* 4.8.20), but modify it by placing only the later part of his term in Ionia. Teleutias, navarch for 390/89, then succeeded Ekdikos in command of the fleet near the end of SY 391/0. [This reconstruction also has the advantage of obviating a Spartan over-reaction to

48. Beloch *Politik* 350–52.

49. G.E. Underhill, "The Chronology of the Corinthian War," *JPh* 22 (1894) 129–43, esp. 138–39; *id.*, *A Commentary on the Hellenica of Xenophon* (Oxford 1900) li–lv; G.L. Cawkwell, "The Imperialism of Thrasybulus," *CQ* 26 (1976) 270–77, esp. 273, places Teleutias' assumption of command at the end of 391. Cf. Pareti *Studi minori* 2.100 who would also deny the navarchy of 390/89 to Teleutias.

50. DS 14.97.3–4 reports for Attic Year (AY) 391/0 the dispatch of three commanders to Rhodes: Eudokimos (= Ekdikos), Diphilas (= Diphridas), and Philodokos. If this date is correct, Diodorus' date of AY 390/89 for the death of Thibron must be wrong (14.99.3), since Xenophon has Diphridas, as colleague of Ekdikos, sent out to replace the dead Thibron (*HG* 4.8.21, cf. 4.8.19). Cf. Pareti *Studi minori* 2.99–100. On Thrasybulos' intentions, see Cawkwell *CQ* (1976) 270–71, 275–77, who has him sail in late 391.

Ekdikos' passivity. The Rhodian democrats outnumbered him two to one in warships (16/8) and the 12 ships of Teleutias (rather than simply a more energetic leader) were needed to balance the odds.]

Thereafter, the Athenian *stratēgos*, Thrasyboulos of Steiria, arrived in Ionia (Xen. *HG* 4.8.25–30; DS 14.94.2–4, 99.4–5). Diodorus begins Thrasyboulos' activity in Attic Year (AY) 392/1, and relates his last actions and death in AY 390/89, ignoring the intervening year, AY 391/0.⁵¹ According to Xenophon, however, his arrival followed that of Teleutias at Rhodes, itself not earlier than 390 (*HG* 4.8.25). Yet, Thrasyboulos' strong fleet must have been long in preparation. Xenophon states that his despatch was in response to Spartan naval activism (4.8.25: οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι νομίσαντες τοὺς Λακεδαιμόνιους πάλιν δύναμιν κατασκευάζεσθαι ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ), but that could as easily have been news of the decision to send Ekdikos as of the later expedition of Teleutias. Thrasyboulos' plans clearly encompassed much more than Rhodes, which may have moved to the forefront of Athenian attention only with the arrival of Teleutias. Accordingly, he quickly shifted his attention to the Hellespont, reaching there through Ionia (*HG* 4.8.26; DS 14.94.2), when he recognized that the situation at Rhodes was stable. Thus, Diodorus may have misplaced the activities of Thrasyboulos in 392/1, which may be only the year of the authorization and preparation for his departure (i.e., the first mention of his expedition in Ephorus, Diodorus' source). Rather, his first activities may belong in late AY 391/0, the year about which Diodorus is silent, or even early in AY 390/89, as Xenophon suggests, and his death in 390/89. Here is the reason for the anxiety over Ekdikos' situation in spring or summer 390, and the decision to transfer ships from the west, apprehension about the impending appearance of Thrasyboulos.

Thrasyboulos died while collecting money at Aspendos for future campaigning, after wintering on Lesbos, probably in spring 389 (cf. Lys. 28.8 with 12, 17 for the exactions of his associate Ergokles at Halicarnassos). Possibly, the lull in Athenian activity thereafter freed the hands of Teleutias, so that he, in turn, could collect money in the Cyclades, his last endeavor before reaching Aigina. On Aigina Teleutias raised the Athenian siege, and then handed over his fleet to his successor Hierax, ostensibly in late summer 389 (Xen. *HG* 5.1.3). After the lifting of the siege, the Athenians were forced to rescue their hoplites in SY 389/8, who had been on the island over four months (Xen. *HG* 5.1.5).⁵² Since reckoning back four months from this rescue does not take us

51. Beloch (*Politik* 353–55; *GG*² 3.2.224–25, citing Arist. *Plutus* 549–50) puts the death of Thrasyboulos in 388. Against this view, see R. Seager, "Thrasybulus, Conon and Athenian Imperialism, 396–386 B.C.," *JHS* 87 (1967) 95–115, esp. n. 127, p. 109 and, in general, 109–13, which, however, makes too much of Thrasyboulos' failure to sail to Rhodes. Underhill (*JPh* [1894] 139–40), following Diodorus, keeps his death in spring 389, which conveniently maintains the chronological integrity of the order of events in Xenophon. See also S. Accame, *Ricerche intorno alla guerra corinzia* (Naples 1951) 131–47.

52. The Athenian commander, Pamphilos, was tried in winter 389/8, for he is mentioned in Arist. *Plutus* 174 of that winter: Beloch *Politik* 351; cf. *ΣPlutus* 174a–b (and *ΣJ.* Tzetzes); Plato

very far back into SY 390/89, and the siege had lasted for a time before ended by Teleutias, Teleutias did not reach Aigina until a month or a most two before the end of his term in summer 389.

In that summer of 389, Aiginetan raids had become serious enough that the Athenians could be said to be besieged by the Aiginetans (5.1.1–2). Therefore, Eteonikos' assumption of command precedes the Athenian expedition and summer 389 by some time. Unfortunately, Xenophon's remark that Eteonikos was again (πάλιν) on Aigina is not helpful, because there is no hint in the narrative that he had ever been there before (cf. *HG* 7.1.41). The ephors' proclamation had been made as soon as the Athenians joined the anti-Spartan coalition (395/4). Yet no notice had been taken of Aigina when Konon entered the Saronic Gulf, although a Spartan harmost had been on the island between the Peloponnesian and Corinthian Wars. The presence of a harmost seems incompatible both with Konon's disinterest in 393/2 and the continuation of pacific relations between the islanders and the Athenians. Thus, the Aiginetans signalled their unwillingness to become involved in the Corinthian War by requesting the withdrawal of the harmost, who, in the absence of a strong garrison, had no choice other than to acquiesce. In turn, the Aiginetans recalled the harmost when they decided to enter the war. Both harmosts may have been the same man, Eteonikos; hence, the "again" of Xenophon's text. Eteonikos was a third time sent to Aigina during a crisis later in this war, suggesting that he had a special rapport with the Aiginetans.

When Hierax succeeded to the navarchy in late summer 389, he replaced Eteonikos with his ἐπιστολεύς, Gorgopas (*HG* 5.1.5). Thus, Eteonikos ended his term with Teleutias, the navarch of the previous year. Would Eteonikos have been superseded if he had not served a term of, at least, a year? A year in any case appears a reasonable minimum duration for the raids before the Athenians could be said to be under siege. Hence, it is reasonable to look for a point in SY 391/0 at which Spartan resolution to fight at sea became credible to the Aiginetans. The best moment for this realization and the establishment of Eteonikos on Aigina will have been the dispatch of Ekdikos and his colleagues in spring or summer 390.⁵³ If the impending expedition of Thrasyboulos awakened the Spartans to a renewed threat at sea, it will not have been missed on Aigina. The preemptive advance of Ekdikos to Rhodes would have reassured the Aiginetans of the Spartan will to resist. Xenophon's missing allusion to Eteonikos should perhaps have been made in a description of a call by the Spartan squadron under Ekdikos at Aigina.

That the Athenians were forced to besiege the city of Aigina shows that the town was fortified (*HG* 5.1.2).⁵⁴ This precondition for conducting

Comicus, fr. 14 K. Pamphilos may be Pamphilos Keiriades (*PA* #11545: *Lys.* 15.5; *Dem.* 40.20, 22–23; cf. *Dem.* 39.2; Harpocration s.v. Κειριάδης). See Davies *APF* #9667, p. 365.

53. Note that when Teleutias took over Ekdikos' command, he sailed around the Peloponnesus directly to Samos (*HG* 4.8.23).

54. It is noteworthy that the rich Aiginetan metic Lampis, who embellished the city and emporion of Aigina, is not said to have contributed to the rebuilding of the city's walls. Lampis' bene-

ληστεία, in default in 431, was put in place before the Corinthian War. By their siege of Aigina, the Athenians showed their continued fidelity to Mediterranean fleet warfare; answer raids not with other raids, but with an amphibious expedition aimed at taking or closely blockading (from a nearby station) the enemy's base. Just as the Athenians had obliterated their Aiginetan eyesore by taking the city and levelling its harbor and fortifications in the 450s, refortification of Aigina elicited Periclean-style countermeasures. Xenophon calls their siege an *ἐπιτειχισμός*. In Thucydides, this term is used by Arkhidamos for the establishment of a fortified position in Attica, a role later fulfilled by the Spartan fort at Dekeleia.⁵⁵ One can think, however, of no clearer indication of the straitened resources of Athens in the early fourth century than the forces available for a decisive blow against Aigina: only 10 triremes. At the arrival of Teleutias' fleet, the Athenian ships were driven away. Athenian land forces attempted to retain their fortified position, although it was now the Athenians who were, so to speak, besieged. Even so, the Athenian determination is noteworthy, because a *ψήφισμα* was later necessary to remove the hoplites (*HG* 5.1.5). Therefore, it appears that the authority to withdraw the besiegers had been removed from the discretion of the *stratēgoi*. Athenian dissatisfaction was marked by the trial of the *stratēgos* commanding the hoplites, Pamphilos (see n. 52 above).

The choice of Aigina as the point at which Hierax succeeded Teleutias demonstrates again the island's other naval role as a fleet base. In contrast with the Spartan situation during the Peloponnesian War, Aigina served as a point of concentration for operations in the Aegean in 389, and especially among the Cyclades, where Teleutias had raised tribute before his arrival. To protect Aigina, Hierax left 12 ships, a token of the island's importance, since his entire fleet numbered only 37.⁵⁶ Gorgopas' detachment on Aigina was a covering force, meant to thwart a disruption of raiding like that caused by the Athenian siege. This force could be maintained out of *ληστεία*, which gave it the additional attraction of not being a drain on Spartan resources (see pp. 345–47 below). Its size was calculated to offset the flotilla of 10 ships which the Athenians had previously advanced in support of their *ἐπιτειχισμός*.

The 12 Spartan ships, however, do not appear to have been the only or even the main vessels with which raids were conducted against Attica, because the raids had taken place previously, independently of the presence of a squadron on the island. While attacks were made by the Spartan triremes, there may have been only a few other large ships involved, for example, a handful of Aiginetan triremes. We lose track, for instance, of four triremes captured by

factions appear to have been in the late 360s or the 350s. See Dem. 23.211 (from 352); cf. Plut. *Mor.* 234E–F, 787A; [Plut.] *Comm. in Hesiod* fr. 39; Cic. *TD* 5.14.40; Stob. *Flor.* 29.87.

55. Thuc. 1.122.1; cf. 5.17.2; 7.18.4, 28.3 (both Dekeleia); cf. also *ἐπιτείχισις*: 1.142.2; 6.91.7, 93.2; 8.95.6(?).

56. Teleutias had 27 ships when he captured 10 Athenian ships on his way to Rhodes (Xen. *HG* 4.8.24; cf. *DS* 14.97.4). Nikolokhos, deputing for Antalkidas in 388/7, had only 25 ships at Abydos, discounting the 12 on Aigina, to face 32 Athenian ships (*HG* 5.1.7).

Gorgopas (*HG* 5.1.9), which might have been assigned to raiders in the absence of additional Spartan crews to man them. Possibly, pentekonteres and triakonteres carried out much of the *ληστεία*. Xenophon's failure to discuss the conduct of these raids is to be attributed to his concentration on fleet operations, an emphasis which I have traced in Thucydides. The use of small ships might have further accentuated his disinterest.

As a covering force, Gorgopas' squadron was entirely successful. A large Athenian fleet was mobilized to rescue the isolated hoplites, but could do nothing more (*HG* 5.1.5). Subsequently, the Athenians began to be molested by the *λησταιί* and Gorgopas. The mere presence of the Athenians on the island had afforded Attica some protection from *ληστεία*, probably because the Aiginetans were compelled to keep men tied down manning defensive works, men who would otherwise have participated in raids. Also, without the *ἐπιχειρισμός*, Gorgopas may well have believed that a naval attack alone could not take the town of Aigina, so that Spartan warships could be more active in *ληστεία*.

As navarch for the year 388/7, Antalkidas again used Aigina as a fleet base. There he took over Gorgopas' squadron to escort him on his way to join the main Spartan fleet at Ephesos (*HG* 5.1.6). Yet, even though Athenian forces in the eastern Aegean would outnumber him (at least 32 to 25 ships: *HG* 5.1.7), Antalkidas sent Gorgopas back to Aigina. The good sense of his decision was amply borne out, for, near Aigina, Gorgopas met the Athenian general Eunomos. That he had been dispatched with 13 ships against Aigina in the absence of Gorgopas indicates the important defensive role of the squadron based on the island. Gorgopas fled this contact (near sunset) into the haven of Aigina, and Eunomos withdrew toward Attica. Eunomos may have hoped to surprise Aigina in an attack similar to that later tried by Khabrias (Polyaen. 3.11.12), but it is more likely that he merely intended to ravage the island in a fashion like that of the large Athenian raids on the Peloponnesus of the Peloponnesian War. Without a landing force, Eunomos could not take the city, and 13 ships had been shown to be too few to support a siege.

Gorgopas re-embarked his men and followed the unsuspecting Eunomos, who was surprised in the midst of his disembarkation at Cape Zoster (Xen. *HG* 5.1.8–9, for the whole episode). In a night engagement, Gorgopas captured 4 triremes, and the rest of the Athenians fled in disorder to the Peiraieus. Once again, the value of a secure base at Aigina had been demonstrated, inasmuch as Gorgopas was able to choose the time and place for engagement with the enemy, or even to refuse to fight at all. The support of the Aiginetans enabled the pilots of the Spartan ships (perhaps Aiginetans themselves) to become so acquainted with the Attic coast that Gorgopas could risk a night attack just offshore. A comparison with the Demainetos/Milon confrontation is appropriate: both suggest Peloponnesian proficiency in operating within Attic coastal waters. Nonetheless, the discomfiture of Eunomos elicited a greater and better organized effort by Athens against Aigina, a sign of the havoc wrought by the *λησταιί*.

Eunomos' defeat probably took place in late summer or fall 388. Thereafter, Khabrias was to be sent to help Euagoras in Cyprus. On his arrival in Athens with 800 peltasts and 10 triremes (Xen. *HG* 5.1.10–12), he picked up more ships and a hoplite force under the command of Demainetos, perhaps in fall 388 or at the latest in spring 387.⁵⁷ Landing on Aigina, Khabrias laid an ambush at night with his peltasts while disembarking his hoplite force at dawn as bait. Gorgopas and the Aiginetans seem to have been anticipating another effort at ἐπιτειχισμός because they marched out against the Athenian hoplites, who had advanced inland. Gorgopas may have felt unequal to withstanding a siege supported by so many men and ships, for he might not have known that Khabrias, commanded to Cyprus, could not persevere in an investment. As the sequel to the episode shows, the Spartans were dependent on ληστεία in order to subsidize their operations, so that a siege deprived their sailors of pay. Khabrias then cleverly exploited the threat of a siege to achieve a decrease in raiding activity, inasmuch as the Aiginetans and Gorgopas fell into his ambush, which was supported by the hoplites disembarked from the Athenian triremes. Gorgopas and his staff of Spartiates were killed, and their forces routed (cf. Dem. 20.76).

The description of this defeat elucidates the forces available on Aigina for military action. Aiginetans, marines from the Spartan triremes, and free sailors, variously armed, marched out. Out of this force, there fell 150 Aiginetans and 200 ξένοι, metics, and sailors. No casualties among the marines are noted. The vanguard (οἱ μὲν πρῶτοι) had been overrun, not the phalanx (οὐδενὸς ἀθρόου ὄντος: 5.1.12; cf. 4.1.19), so that the dead were not Aiginetan or Peloponnesian hoplites, but light-armed skirmishers. The Aiginetans were probably some of those previously engaged in raiding Attica. The ξένοι and metics are people of those statuses on the island of Aigina. These ξένοι and metics had been available for service on Aiginetan privateers, and, on this occasion, they were ready to fight in defense of the island.⁵⁸ They should be distinguished from the sailors from the Spartan squadron, who were later addressed as though Sparta was their homeland by Teleutias (Xen. *HG* 5.1.16; see pp. 323–24 above). These were probably enfranchised helots and Perioeci (cf. *HG* 7.1.12). The defeat of Gorgopas led to a near cessation of ληστεία against Attica (*HG* 5.1.13). Many Aiginetans, metics, and ξένοι had been killed, and it would have been difficult to replace them in the crews of privateers. The activity of the harmost at Dekeleia suggests that the harmost on Aigina may also have levied a percentage of the booty. Thus an ebbing of the raids undermined Spartan ability to support their ships. Hence, when the

57. Seager *JHS* (1967) n. 182, p. 113 observes that Eunomos was still in good odor when he was called as a witness in Lys. 19.23, cf. 19.19, 43, which Seager placed in early 388. Khabrias' expedition had occurred early enough for Demainetos to be at Abydos (*HG* 5.1.26) in the campaigning season of 387, when Antalkidas returned to the sea. See Beloch *Politik* 356.

58. Many of them will have been pro-Spartan oligarchs driven from the Cyclades by anti-Spartan forces, just like the Siphnians of Isoc. 19. See pp. 339–40 above.

Spartans ordered Eteonikos to Aigina to break the impasse caused by Khabrias' victory, he was stymied by a lack of money: the sailors refused to sail without wages (*HG* 5.1.13).

Teleutias was then sent to Aigina. Xenophon describes him as a navarch, although Antalkidas seems to have continued to command the Spartan fleet in the Hellespont. This conjunction suggested an inconsistency to Beloch. Xenophon's order of events is incorrect, and the operations of Teleutias belong to SY 387/6. In that year Teleutias was again navarch, according to Beloch for the third time.⁵⁹ There is, however, evidence to suggest that Beloch is mistaken. Lysias 22.8–9 describes the actions taken by the *σιτοφύλαξ* Anytos to hold down swiftly rising grain prices in the winter, 387–86, before the Peace of Antalkidas.^{59a} The speaker alludes to rumors maliciously spread at that time about the destruction of grain ships in the Pontus, their interception in the Hellespont, a closing of the Pontic markets, and a breaking of the *σπονδαί* (Lys. 22.14). No rumors were disseminated about Aiginetan attacks on grain ships bound for Attica, although, as shall be seen momentarily, Teleutias achieved striking success in this very activity. Consequently, while Spartan ships remained in the Hellespont, making the rumors credible, the squadron and harbor most seem to have withdrawn from Aigina, and the raids terminated. Furthermore, if there had been a navarch in SY 387/6, he would have been in the Hellespont and not on Aigina. <<As soon as a durable peace appeared likely, the Aiginetans ceased hostilities. Their willingness to indulge their hatred of the Athenians was predicated on a sufficient Spartan commitment to confront Athenian seapower. These observations suggest that Teleutias' activities belong to SY 388/7,>>⁶⁰ as the order of Xenophon's narrative indicates. Teleutias was not navarch,⁶¹ but he may have had special authority, the better to draw on his tremendous emotional ascendancy with the Spartan naval forces (cf. 5.1.3). Since the Spartans could not have anticipated that Teleutias would solve the Aiginetan impasse so decisively, without calling for reinforcements from the Hellespont, he might, in the absence of Antalkidas, have been authorized to give instructions to Nikolokhos, Antalkidas' *ἐπιστολεύς* and deputy. |

Taking advantage of the enthusiasm created by his arrival, Teleutias decided that only a bold stroke would set matters right. He chose to attack the Peiraeus itself in a daybreak assault which achieved total surprise (5.1.18–23). The Athenians had assumed that the victory of Khabrias had neutralized

59. *Politik* 352. See also Pareti *Studi minori* 2.101–2. [On the effects of Teleutias' activities, cf. now E.M. Burke, "Athens after the Peloponnesian War: Restoration Efforts and the Role of Maritime Commerce," *CA* 9 (1990) 1–13, esp. 7–8.]

59a. T.J. Figueira, "Sitopolai and Sitophylakes in Lysias' 'Against the Graindealers': Governmental Intervention in the Athenian Economy," *Phoenix* 40 (1986) 149–71, esp. 149–50, 161–65.

60. Underhill *JPh* (1894) 141–42, who thus removes the third navarchy of Teleutias. A first navarchy in 392/1 in the Corinthian Gulf is also questionable: Pareti *Studi minori* 2.98–100; also E. Auccello, "Ricerche sulla cronologia della guerra corinzia," *Helikon* 4 (1964) 29–45, esp. 42–44; cf. Cawkwell *CQ* (1976) 272.

61. Breitenbach *Hellenika*² 3.7–8.

any danger from Aigina (Xen. *HG* 5.1.20). The Spartan ships were ordered to ram Athenian triremes, but to seize merchant ships and the merchants and ship captains themselves. The captured ships were then convoyed to Aigina, while Teleutias swept the Attic coast down to Sounion, where he captured more merchant ships, some laden with grain (*HG* 5.1.23). Selling his booty, Teleutias gave a month's pay to his men (5.1.24), and was thereafter able to act with impunity against the Attic coast, subsidized by *ληστεία*.

Traditions on the life of Plato preserve valuable information on Aiginetan *ληστεία*, and specifically on 388/7, the final year of the raiding. Plato, on his return from Sicily, was sold as a slave on Aigina.⁶² Unfortunately, the accounts of his return are filled with commonplaces and moralizing appropriate to a philosopher's life. A bewildering array of variants exists, among which one can only pick out certain common elements and themes as the basis of a historical discussion.⁶³ There seems to be, however, fourth-century evidence for the historicity of the sale of Plato as a slave on Aigina, some of which may come from Aiginetan traditions.⁶⁴ |

The main tradition takes as its framework an embassy of the Spartan Pollis to Syracuse (Plut. *Dion* 5.5–6; DL 3.19; Ael. Arist. 46, 2.232–34 [Dindorf]; Olympiodorus, *In Gorg.* 41.8; cf. DS 15.7.1). In 393/2, Pollis had been the *ἐπιστολεύς* to the navarch Podanemos, when Podanemos was killed and Pollis wounded in fighting in the Corinthian Gulf (Xen. *HG* 4.8.11). Pollis is not mentioned again in Xenophon's narrative on the Corinthian War. There

62. It is inappropriate to enter here on a complete analysis of the complex of testimonia on Plato's trips to Sicily, including the authenticity of Platonic letters. See, most recently, A.S. Riginos, *Platonica: The Anecdotes concerning the Life and Writings of Plato* (Leiden 1976) 70–85. Despite the cautionary remarks of G. Boas, "Fact and Legend in the Biography of Plato," *PR* 57 (1948) 439–57, esp. 444–48, 452–55, I consider the historicity of a trip to the court of Dionysios I beyond question.

63. In general, see W.H. Porter, "The Sequel to Plato's First Visit to Sicily," *Hermathena* 61 (1943) 46–55; Riginos *Platonica* 86–92; K. Gaiser, "Der Ruhm des Annikeris," in P. Händel & W. Meid (eds.), *Festschrift für Robert Muth* (Innsbruck 1983) 111–28, especially on the account of the *Academicorum Philosophorum Index Herculanensis*, a fragmentary history of the Academy, probably by Philodemos (ed. S. Mekler [Berlin 1902]).

64. Philoponus (*CAG* 16.324.15–23) connects a passage on chance in Aris. *Phys.* 199b20–22 with the sale of Plato on Aigina. See H. Diels, "Zur Textgeschichte der Aristotelischen Physik," *APAW* (1882) 1–42, esp. 23–24; Porter *Hermathena* (1943) 51–52. Gaiser, *Festschrift Muth* 111, compares Aris. *Metaph.* 1025a25–30, which mentions as a happenstance a diversion to Aigina either by storm or by capture. Cf., however, Simplicius on the same passage (*CAG* 9.384.12–17), who alludes to Menander. Gaiser, *Festschrift Muth* 123–24, also adduces a restoration of col. II, 36–42 (p. 21) of the *Index Herculanensis* on the naming of Plato. For his evidence, the author of the treatise cites Neanthes of Kyzikos, probably the elder Neanthes, c. 300 (*FGH* 84 F 21b; T 2 for a date). See R. Laqueur, "Neanthes," *RE* 16.2 cols. 2108–10; cf. Jacoby *FGH* 2, 144–45. Neanthes claimed to have heard the story from the Aiginetan Cynic philosopher Philiskos (DL 6.75–76, 80), who tutored young Alexander (*Suda s.v. Φιλίσκος, Αἰγινήτης*, φ 359 Adler; Ael. *VH* 14.11). See pp. 364–65 below. Thus, there is a good chance that the story of Plato's sale as a slave (col. III.1–4, p. 12; col. X.17–24, pp. 8–9) was also derived by the author's treatise from Philiskos through the mediation of Neanthes.

is no reason to question an embassy to Syracuse in order to acquire for Sparta naval reinforcements like those sent during the Ionian War.⁶⁵ Such help arrived later in the form of 20 ships from Syracuse and Italy, commanded by Polyxenos, who joined Antalkidas in spring 387 in time for the final campaign of the war (*HG* 5.1.26).⁶⁶ Plato was returning to Athens supposedly unaware of the fate awaiting him (cf. *Dion* 5.6; *In Gorg.* 41.8). Since Aigina is hardly a way-station for a return to Sparta, Plato must have known that Pollis had a reason for passing near Attica, or he would never have taken ship with him (cf. Olympiodorus, *In Alcib.* 2.121–26, for Pollis as an Aiginetan merchant!). If Pollis was accompanying with his own ship the 20 ships of Polyxenos on their way to the Hellespont, his presence in the vicinity of Attica is no problem. Because the whole force stopped at Aigina in a fashion similar to that of other squadrons bound from the Peloponnesus to the eastern Aegean, Plato ended up on Aigina. The evidence from the career of Plato accommodates a date of 388/7 for Plato's sale on Aigina.⁶⁷ Plato was born in 429/8 (Neanthes *FGH* 84 F 20; cf. *DL* 3.2–3, 40) or 428/7 (Apollodorus *FGH* 244 F 37; Hippolytos *Philosoph.* 1.8.13 [Diels]; cf. Philochorus *FGH* 328 F 223). He departed for Syracuse at c. 40 years of age (Plato *Ep.* 324A6–7).

It is not necessary for us to balance the degree of Dionysios' guilt or of Pollis' complicity in a plot,⁶⁸ because the rest of the story turns on the existence of laws on Aigina which provided for legal action if an Athenian disembarked on the island. In other words, regardless of the involvement of Dionysios and Pollis, Plato as an Athenian would have been vulnerable.⁶⁹ In one tradition, Athenians could be executed when they landed on Aigina by virtue of a law of Kharmandros (*DL* 3.19 = Favorinus fr. 4, *FHG* 3.581; Ael. Arist. 46, 2.233 [Dindorf]). Alternatively, Plato was to be sold in the slave market according to Aiginetan law (Plut. *Dion* 5.7; *Index Herculanensis* col. III, 1–4 [p. 12, Mekler]; cf. Olympiodorus, *In Gorg.* 41.8). The two traditions are sometimes

65. Sparta also sought reciprocation for help brought to Dionysios by Pharakidas = Pharax (*HG* 3.2.12, 14; *DS* 14.79.4; *Hell. Oxy.* VII[II].1) in 396 (*DS* 14.63.4; cf. 14.79.4; Polyæn. 2.11; Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 192). Pollis may have countered an Athenian embassy, promoted by Konon (Lys. 19.19); see Seager *JHS* (1967) 103.

66. See P. Meloni, "Il contributo di Dionisio I alle operazioni di Antalcida del 387 av. CR.," *RAL* 4 (1949) 190–203.

67. Further confirmation could be found in the report that Annikeris, Plato's ransom, was on his way to Olympia, presumably for the games of 388, when diverted to Aigina (Philoponus *CAG* 16.324.17–23; Olympiodorus *In Alcib.* 2.121–26; *In Gorg.* 41.8), but there are reasons for doubting this detail, chiefly the relative geographical positions of Kyrene, Olympia, and Aigina. See Gaiser *Festschrift Muth* 115.

68. Cf. Porter *Hermathena* (1943) 52–54.

69. Plut. *Dion* 5.5–6 has Pollis help Dion save Plato from the anger of Dionysios by getting him away, only to be thwarted by Dionysios' intervention with the Spartan (Olympiodorus *In Gorg.* 41.8 has each stage of this story represented by a separate variant). In Ael. Arist. 46, 2.231–33 [Dindorf], Pollis does Dionysios, who wanted Plato sold, one better by going to Aigina, where he could be killed. See also *DL* 3.20–21, citing Favorinus (fr. 6, *FHG* 3.578), on the divine retribution which befell Pollis.

harmonized by asserting that Plato escaped the death penalty only to be sold, in most stories to a Libyan Annikeris, who freed him (DL 3.19–20; cf. Ael. Arist. 46, 2.234).

The existence of a special law prescribing the death penalty for any Athenian landing on Aigina is not difficult to believe. Athenian laws mandating mutilation of the hands for Aiginetans taken prisoner provide a parallel and perhaps precedent (Cic. *Off.* 3.11.46; Ael. *VH* 2.9; Val. Max. 9.2.ext.8). These provisions represent a sequel to the decision made by the Athenians shortly before Aigospotamoi to mutilate the hands of captured sailors, which, at the time, was considered an outrage against usual military customs (Xen. *HG* 2.1.31–32; Plut. *Lys.* 9.7).

[Both punishments are in one version each curiously explained as attempts to exclude a later wielding of spears by the captives, while permitting the later usage of the oar (Plut. *Lys.*, Ael. *VH*). This conjunction reinforces the conclusion that the two actions had the same general chronological context. Moreover, I believe that this suggestion is meant to indicate that the prisoners were going to be enlisted as rowers, which is a highly unlikely prospect for Aiginetan sailors.]

Before their restoration to their homeland, individual Aiginetan sailors, serving in Spartan ships, could not have been identifiable as such. So laws specifying Aiginetans did not make sense until the fourth century, when an Aiginetan navy (of sorts) existed once again. Concomitantly, the Aiginetan law probably envisaged the death penalty for Athenian soldiers taken prisoner in the course of military action on Aigina, and so may have been of only dubious relevance to the case of Plato. More applicable was the provision for his sale as a slave which treats the philosopher like any other prisoner who had been taken by the Spartans or their Aiginetan allies (e.g., like those seized in the Peiraeus in Teleutias' attack or Nikostratos in [Dem.] 53.6: pp. 352–53 below).⁷⁰ To insure that their captors did not appropriate their entire ransom, all hostile nationals had to be sold in the slave-market, where the share accruing to the state could be exacted.

In summation, one need not accept the factuality of every detail in these traditions in order to recognize that their context is eloquent about Aiginetan *ληστεία* against Athens. The taking of booty appears to have been both profitable and well supervised, and persons, ransomed or sold, may have constituted much of the booty. The story takes for granted that any Athenian maneuvered into Aiginetan hands was at great risk to his life, a testimony to the continuing bitter hatred between the two cities.

Xenophon's account of the end of the Corinthian War gives the motivations for the Athenian decision to make peace in 387 as follows. The Athenians feared a second Aigospotamoi with the King aiding the Spartans (*HG* 5.1.29),

70. This consideration seems implicit in the main tradition, but is made explicit in late antique versions of the story where Plato is captured by pirates (e.g., Hier. *Ep.* 53.1; see Riginos *Platonica* 91).

and they were besieged by *λησται* from Aigina, with the same term used, *πολιορκούμενοι*, as in 5.1.2.^{70a} On the consideration of the former, it is easy to see how Antalkidas through military operations and diplomacy had maneuvered the Athenians into a situation of local, tactical disadvantage, while he threatened their access to Pontic grain.⁷¹ For the latter, however, Xenophon's narrative fails to provide enough to gauge directly the impact of the Aiginetan raids. An affirmation can be reached indirectly by noticing the intensification and acceleration of hostilities in the last year of the fighting with the defeat of Eunomos by Gorgopas, the defeat of Gorgopas by Khabrias, and the raid by Teleutias on the Peiraeus. Given his final conclusion on the role of Aiginetan raids in the Corinthian War, Xenophon's emphasis on flotilla operations is far less justifiable than that of Thucydides, who would never have attributed (even partially) the Athenian defeat in the Peloponnesian War to *ληστεία*. The military resources of Athens had diminished so radically that grand naval warfare had lost significance relative to raiding. Xenophon, insufficiently appreciative of this change, only partially helps us understand how and why the activities of the *λησται* from Aigina harmed Athens so greatly.

LATER FOURTH-CENTURY OPERATIONS

The policy of sapping Athenian strength through raids from Aigina, deployed to such effect in the Corinthian War, was successfully revived in later military operations. The growing sketchiness of Xenophon's account, especially on naval warfare (he misses, after all, the foundation of the Second Confederacy), impedes a full reconstruction, so that only a few, albeit suggestive, episodes can be introduced. After the decision of the Athenians to help Thebes in 378/7, and the foundation of the Second Confederacy late in the same year, the Spartans, after some initial hesitation, decided to contest Athenian sea-power (Xen. *HG* 5.4.61). Eventually, Pollis was chosen navarch for 377/6 with 60 warships. According to Xenophon, Pollis interdicted the route for the grain ships, which were thereby held up at Cape Geraistos, the southern promontory of Euboea, while he operated from stations at Aigina, Keos, and Andros (*HG* 5.4.61). The latter two places had fallen under Spartan influence after the Peace of Antalkidas, when there had been a revival of pro-Spartan factionalists (cf. *DS* 15.28.2–3 for a movement of many insular states, probably neutral earlier, toward Athens). Diodorus, describing the same strategy, awards less success to Pollis: his ships attempted, with mixed success in the

70a. A gloss of Stephanus Byzantius on the *Μεθουριάδες*, a group of islands near Aigina, is based on a reference to them in book 5 of Androtion (*FGH* 324 F 21), which covered the early fourth century. Naval warfare could have been the Athidographer's reason for introducing the Methouriades.

71. R.K. Sinclair's view ("The King's Peace and the Employment of Military and Naval Forces 387–78," *Chiron* 8 [1978] 29–54) that the effect of the Aiginetan raids has been exaggerated by Xenophon out of admiration for Teleutias mistakes the nature of *ληστεία* in Attic waters. On Antalkidas, see F. Graefe, "Die Operationen des Antialkidas im Hellespont," *Klio* 28 (1935) 262–70.

face of Athenian escorts, to intercept the grain ships, much as Teleutias had done after his victory at the Peiraeus (DS 15.34.3). But Teleutias had disabled the Athenian squadron in the Peiraeus before sweeping down the coast. While Pollis' targets were economic assets of the Athenians and the Peloponnesian fleet was being used (in a sense) like a fleet of *λησται*, he was using Aigina as a fleet base in a mixed strategy that hoped to establish quickly a blockade, an aggravated form of the *πολιορκία* gradually created by raiders from Aigina in the Corinthian War.

Such a strategy was vulnerable to a diversion, which Khabrias provided in the form of an attack on Naxos. Pollis was tempted into coming to the defense of the pro-Spartan government of the island, whereupon he was decisively defeated on 16 Boedromion AY 376/5 (DS 15.34.4–35.2; Xen. *HG* 5.4.61; cf. Polyæn. 3.11.2; Plut. *Phoc.* 6.5–7; *Cam.* 19.6). Pollis had diverged from the conservative strategy of previous Spartan navarchs, with calamitous results. Rather than forcing the Athenians to dislodge him from his island bases, he not only chose to attack a superior force (83 Athenian triremes to his own 65), but also seems to have stripped Aigina of covering ships. Possibly, the Second Athenian Confederacy threatened all too credibly to Pollis a reconstitution of the fifth-century thalassocracy, to the extent that even rash actions became attractive, but his confounding of the two genres of maritime warfare suggests otherwise. The initiative for a more active prosecution of the naval war came from Sparta's allies (disenchanted with a war of attrition), who envisaged a single, decisive defeat of Athens, leading to a siege of that city (Xen. *HG* 5.4.60). So the Spartans discarded their mixed strategy of necessarily slow-acting *ληστεία* and a defensive stance for their fleet (like Teleutias at Rhodes or Antalkidas in the Hellespont) in favor of first an infeasible blockade and then of provoking a climactic battle. Not for the first time, their allies had caused them to diverge from the caution so deeply engrained in their character, with a disastrous outcome.

Enemy naval activity against Attica continued in its second mode, privateering. In Xenophon's list of the Athenian motivations for sending a peace embassy to Sparta in 375/4, damage from *λησται* operating out of Aigina is again cited (along with anxiety over Thebes, serving in garrison duty, and the burden of the *εἰσφοραί*: *HG* 6.2.1). *Ληστεία* is less prominent in this set of motives, and there is no suggestion that its effects approximated a siege, as previously. At Naxos, Khabrias had taken 49 triremes (DS 15.35.2: 24 destroyed; 8 captured; cf. Aesch. 3.222), and he returned to Athens with 3000 prisoners, 110 T in booty, and another 20 captured ships (Dem. 20.77, 80). He brought over most of the islands (capturing 17 cities) that had been in Spartan hands. That the Aiginetan raiders continued even after Naxos and that Aigina stood aloof from the Second Confederacy, indicates that the Aiginetans were confident, apparently with reason, in their ability to resist Athenian subjection. At the same time, the seemingly diminished role of *ληστεία* from Aigina also implies that the lack of Spartan naval support was significant. No participation by Spartan ships detracted from the intensity of the

raids, and the absence of Spartan forces may have forced the Aiginetans into a more defensive posture. It is tempting to carry this line of thought a little further by noting the absence of *ληστεία* from Xenophon's account of the factors leading to Athenian adherence to the Common Peace of 371. Does that represent a next stage in the diminution of the effectiveness of *ληστεία*? The hurriedness, however, of Xenophon's narrative makes for a reluctance to press this argument.

Nevertheless, Aiginetan *ληστεία* during the 370s was serious enough for the Athenians to make at least one more attempt to seize the island. |Khabrias, probably in the afterglow of Naxos, was again in command, as reported in a stratagem in Polyaeus (3.11.12). In combination, the presence of Khabrias and the absence of a harmost or Spartan squadron seems to exclude the Corinthian War as a context. Khabrias again tried to capture the town of Aigina without committing his forces to a siege, for which the Athenians presumably even now lacked the resources. He sailed to Aigina at night and landed a force of 300 men. The Aiginetans marched out against them. They may have feared a ravaging of the countryside, but would also have been on the look-out for another ambush, like the one sprung on them by the same general during SY 388/7. This time, the Aiginetans fared much better, killing many in the landing force. Khabrias, however, having diverted the main strength of the Aiginetans, made an attempt by sea on the city of Aigina itself. As it turned out, he was unsuccessful, but the Aiginetans were forced into retreat to cover the town.

<<Although Sparta was at peace with Athens from 371 and had undertaken such acquiescent steps as withdrawal of any remaining harmosts (Xen. *HG* 6.3.18, 4.1), the Aiginetans continued their pattern of hostility toward the Athenians during the 360s. Even though further Aiginetan victimization of Athenians is attested only by scattered data, there is enough to show the familiar model of *ληστεία*. When Aristotle compiled the *Metaphysics*, a typical vicissitude was still the accident of being diverted to Aigina either by a storm or through capture by *λησται* (1025a25–27). In a speech preserved in the Demosthenic corpus, which was written for Apollodoros, the abduction of one of his neighbors, Nikostratos, is described ([Dem.] 53.6). Nikostratos was pursuing runaway slaves when he was captured by a trireme, brought to Aigina, and sold as a slave. His ransom was 26 mn. (53.7). The misfortune befalling Nikostratos occurred during a trierarchy of Apollodoros in which he conveyed ambassadors to Syracuse. It is to be dated to 366 or 365.>>⁷²

In Aristotle's treatment of those attempting to overturn established regimes (or establish tyrannies) because they squandered their own estates, he mentions an Aiginetan (whom he does not name) who had been involved in some activity (*τὴν πρῶξιν τὴν πρὸς Χάρητα*), either conspiratorial or military (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 18.2), in juxtaposition with the Athenian general Khares (*Pol.* 1306a4–6). It is uncertain whether Khares conspired with this prominent

72. F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*² (Leipzig 1887–1893) 3.1.519; see also E. Ziebarth, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Seeraubs und Seehandels im alten Griechenland* (Hamburg 1929) 15.

Aiginetan to overthrow the island's anti-Athenian oligarchs—making him a latter-day Nikodromos—or was thwarted in an attack on Aigina by Aristotle's Aiginetan, who exploited his own success for an attempt at tyranny. Whatever the background to the incident, Aiginetan *ληστεία* seems to have been provoking these Athenian countermoves. Khares' long career was begun, to the best of our knowledge, with the *stratēgia* in 367/6 (Xen. *HG* 7.2.18–23; DS 15.75.3). Khares' intervention on Aigina has been dated to 366, when the general brought a force to Kenkhreai in order to stage a coup against the Corinthian government (Xen. *HG* 7.4.4).⁷³ Continuing *ληστεία*, demonstrated by the Nikostratos incident, and the presence of Khares in the Saronic Gulf makes this an attractive conjunction. It also helps explain why Pelopidas' terms of peace in 367 including demobilization of the Athenian fleet were unacceptable (Xen. *HG* 7.1.35–38). In making a decision on behalf of this date, the absence of another occasion when Khares operated in the Saronic Gulf might be weighed against the probability that two similar coups against Corinth and Aigina, albeit unsuccessful, were mounted in such close succession. Khares remained active as a commander until 324 (Plut. *Mor.* 848E), so that there are several other contexts in which hostility between Athens and Aigina could have motivated his intervention on Aigina.

The whole period saw much activity by *λησται* (e.g., Isoc. 4.115; Dem. 7.14–15; [Dem.] 52.5). The Aiginetans could have preyed on the Athenians during the period (366–64) when Epaminondas threatened Athenian maritime interests.⁷⁴ Another possible juncture is the raiding campaign of Alexander of Pherai in 362–61 against the Cyclades (DS 15.95.1–3; Dem. 51.8; [Dem.] 50.4–5; cf. Xen. *HG* 6.4.35; Polyae. 6.2.1), especially when his duplication of Teleutias' attack on the Peiraieus is remembered (Polyae. 6.2.2). There is, however, no indication, beyond the bare parallel with Teleutias, that Alexander had Aiginetan support for his raid. During the fighting against Alexander, Khares replaced Leosthenes (defeated at Peparethos), but, to believe Diodorus, he immediately sailed to Corcyra (15.95.3; cf. Aen. *Tact.* 11.13–15). Also, raids in cooperation with the rebels during the Social War of the early 350s—again Khares was active—would not be an impossible context for continuing Aiginetan *ληστεία* (DS 16.7.3–4, 21–22.2) and Khares' involvement.⁷⁵ During the 360s and even into the 350s, the Athenians were beset with so many difficulties in achieving tranquillity of the sea, let alone thalassocracy, that the Aiginetans could persist in their stance of aggression toward Attic commerce, even when the Spartans were no longer available as senior military partners. The Aiginetans were never, of course, pro-Spartan as much as unrelievedly anti-Athenian in this period. Yet, the only internal evidence

73. W.L. Newman, *The Politics of Aristotle* (Oxford 1887–1902) 4.356; Welter *Aigina*² 76–77; M. Amit, *Great and Small Poleis* (Brussels 1973) 157–58.

74. DS 15.78.4–79.2; Plut. *Philop.* 14.2–3; Isoc. 5.53; cf. Just. 6.9.1–5. See J. Buckler, *The Theban Hegemony: 371–362 BC* (Cambridge, MA 1980) 160–75.

75. See, most recently, S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford 1982) 200–18.

bearing on the Aiginetan situation during the 350s is that the fortune of the Aiginetan metic Lampis might have risen so dramatically, only because of a lull in the hostilities between the Aiginetans and Athenians.

<<On the balance, the context of the mid-360s is the most reasonable hypothesis for Khares' intervention on Aigina. Thus it is probable, but by no means certain, that the Aiginetan activities to which he was reacting should be distinguished from another period of confrontation to which a saying of Demades appears to give witness. Demades called for action against Aigina, the λήμη 'eyesore' of the Peiraeus in a deliberate adoption of the anti-Aiginetan rhetoric of Perikles (fr. 3 Sauppe = fr. 67 De Falco = Athen. 3.99D, see also Plut. *Dem.* 1.2; cf. pp. 212, 326 above). How do we know that the figure of Demades has not simply attracted a free-floating *sententia* in a manner like that that posited by Treves?⁷⁶ When the same rhetorical turn is attributed to both Demades and Perikles, it is not an issue of a misattribution, but rather of the later statesman striking a consciously Periclean stance in foreign policy (for other echoes of Perikles: fr. 3 Sauppe = fr. 28, 68 De Falco).>>

[The same train of argument might be extended to a further hypothesis. A fragment of Lycurgus from a speech hostile to Demades (c. 334) refers to the Periclean subjugation of Samos, Aigina, and Euboia (Κατὰ Κηφισοδότου ὑπὲρ τῶν Δημάδου τιμῶν: Lyc. fr. 9.2 Conomis). And it is not impossible that Lycurgus was contrasting the fruitlessness of Demades' imperialist period with the great accomplishments of Perikles.

An anonymous commentary on the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle provides an important clue in corroboration. Aristotle's remark that Perikles had called Aigina the "eyesore of the Peiraeus" is glossed as follows: ἡ Αἶγινα πλησίον ἦν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, καὶ εἴ τι ἤκουσεν, ὅτι βουλευόνται οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ τοῦ Φιλίππου, ἐμήνυε τοῦτο πρὸς τὸν Φίλιππον· λέγει οὖν ὁ Περικλῆς δεῖν ἀφανίσαι τὴν Αἶγινα ὡς λήμην τοῦ Πειραιέως ἥτοι τοῦ στόλου.^{76a} However willing one may be to convict the commentator of a *non sequitur*, his reference to Philip does suggest that the expression "eyesore of the Peiraeus" did appear somewhere in connection with Macedonia. It is thus possible that a lexicographer dependent on a Hellenistic commentator drew upon an *Atthis* or a lost oration (one of Demades, for instance). It contained the charge that the Aiginetans were observing Athenian naval preparations in the Peiraeus and reporting them to Philip.]

<<Demades, who was born around 390–80, achieved political prominence not earlier than the late 340s (name restored in *IG* II² 1623.188–89; cf. Plut. *Phoc.* 1.1). The earliest phase of Demades' public activity may have included a period of encouragement of Athenian military activism and anti-

76. See P. Treves, "Dèmade," *Athenaeum* 11 (1933) 105–21, esp. 108–13, who holds that Demades attracted γνῶμαι from other orators (cf. G. De Sanctis, rev. De Falco¹ in *RFIC* 61 [1933] 123–24). In answer, see V. De Falco, *Demade Oratore: Testimonianze e frammenti*² (Naples 1954) 97–99. [See also *Colonization* n. 60, p. 30; 242.]

76a. H. Rabe, *Anonymi et Stephani in artem rhetoricam commentaria*, *CAG* 21.2 (Berlin 1896) 205.19–23.

Macedonian feeling, as Schaefer suggested, citing Plutarch (*Dem.* 8.7; 13.3).⁷⁷ Through his father Demades inherited associations with the segment of the Athenian population involved in commerce and the sea (*Suda s.v.* Δημάδης, δ 415 [Adler; *Sext. Emp. Adv. Math.* 2.16; *Quintil. Inst.* 2.17.12; *Polyeuktos* fr. 1 Sauppe). He might well have been sympathetic to claims of theirs that their interests had been damaged by Aiginetan ληστεία. This "imperialistic" period may very well have been past before Demades could have been thought of as an intermediary in peace-making after Khaironeia (*Dem.* 18.285; *Suda s.v.* Δημάδης; cf. *Nepos Phoc.* 2.2) or as a suitable ambassador to placate Alexander (who was demanding the surrender of the leaders of the anti-Macedonian faction) after the capture of Thebes in 335 ([Demades] ὑπὲρ δωδεκ. 14; *DS* 17.15.3–5; *Plut. Dem.* 23.6). Khaironeia thus becomes our lower limit for Demades' advocacy of acts against Aigina. Therefore, the probable path for the political development of Demades, the likely moment for his entry in political life, and finally the absence of references to Aigina in Demosthenes seems to militate against putting Aiginetan ληστεία (and perhaps even surveillance) against Attica in aid of Philip before the Peace of Philokrates in 346/5, even though the operations of λησταί serving Philip are attested (*Aesch.* 2.12). In the period leading up to the Peace of Philokrates the maritime situation (according to Demosthenes) lay heavily in favor of Athens: in contrast to Macedonia, Attica was experiencing no significant harassment from the sea (*Dem.* 19.218; Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 166).

It is more likely then that the Aiginetans were active against the Athenians (and denounced by Demades) in the build-up of tensions leading to the outbreak of further hostilities with Philip and to the Khaironeia campaign.>> [It is during this very same period that I argue that Diogenes the Cynic was abducted by pirates in the neighborhood of Aigina (see pp. 366–68 below). One doubts that the Aiginetans would have felt themselves strong enough to provoke Athens without a greater power, a possible ally, clearly on the horizon. So activities hostile to Athens during this period were feasible only because of the estrangement between Philip and the Athenians. We are dependent on Demosthenic speeches for most of our direct evidence on the lead-up to war between Athens and Philip: *On the Embassy* (19) of summer (or later) 343, *On the Chersonese* (8), *Third Philippic* (9), the questionable *Fourth Philippic* (10), all of late spring to summer 341, to which may be added the *On Halonessus* from spring 342 ([Dem.] 7) of Hegesippos.⁷⁸ There are no

77. A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*² (Berlin 1885–1887) 3.22–23. In general, see Davies *APF* #3272, pp. 99–102. E. Badian notes the probable (albeit distant) kinship between Demades and Demosthenes and absence of direct attacks on each other by these two statesmen ("Harpalus," *JHS* 81 [1961] 16–43, esp. n. 134, p. 34). The aggressive Demades, who has been posited for the 340s, would have stood much closer in policy to Demosthenes.

78. [The retrospective section of *On the Crown* (19.60–101) adds some detail on the same period. On the assumption that they drew on authentic fourth-century material, we might also note [Dem.] 12, purportedly a letter of Philip to the Athenians, and [Dem.] 11 which presents itself as a Demosthenic answer to that letter.]

references to developments on Aigina or on the Aiginetan attitude toward Athens in these speeches. It is clear therefore that the development of a pro-Macedonian orientation at Aigina was not the result of the sort of overt intervention which can be corroborated for Megara (19.87, 204, 294–95, 326, 334; cf. 8.18, 9.18, 10.9; Plut. *Phoc.* 15.1–2). Moreover, in the campaigning season of 341, Demosthenes was speaking about merely the prospects of a Macedonian attack on Attica and on the Peiraeus in particular (8.7; 9.10). It can be assumed that he would have mentioned any aggressive acts by or suspicions of Aigina in such a context.

Yet, one can just envisage the maneuvering on both sides which was aimed at taking up positions for hostilities at sea in the waters around Attica and its approaches. Philip had proposed collaboration with the Athenians against *λησται* which, if the Athenians had accepted, would have provided a cover for a Macedonian naval build-up as well as giving Macedonian warships a pretext for operating in the Cyclades ([Dem.] 7.14–16). If there is any truth to Demosthenes' charges that Philip was plotting to gain control over Cape Geraios (19.326; cf. 4.34), both Philip's initiative and Demosthenes' anxiety over it (whether or not it is well grounded) bespeak a similar anticipation regarding the shape of coming hostilities. Counter-moves on behalf of Athens can perhaps be glimpsed in the recovery of Halonnesos by the Peparethians and the raids of Kallias of Chalcis in the Gulf of Pagasai ([Dem.] 12.5, 12–15).]

<<Philip was in any case soon to provide an appropriate cover for Aiginetan raiding. He attacked Perinthos in summer 340 (DS 16.74.2–76.5) and then moved against its supporter Byzantion toward autumn (DS 16.77.2–3; Didymus *In Demosth.* col. 10.39–45; cf. [Dem.] 12.2, 16 and compare for both attacks Dem. 18.87–94; Philochorus *FGH* 328 F 54–55).⁷⁹ At the same time, Philip himself was active at sea against the Athenians by his interception of the grain fleet in the Hellespont (Dem. 18.72, 87, cf. 241; Philochorus *FGH* 328 F 162; Theopompus *FGH* 115 F 295; cf. Dem. 4.34).>>⁸⁰ [Just as the Aiginetans had waited until it was obvious that Sparta would contest Athenian naval hegemony in the Aegean during the Corinthian War before starting a campaign of *ληστεία* against Attica (Xen. *HG* 5.1.1), the Macedonian seizure of the grain freighters, a token of inevitable war, may have activated their aggression in 340. That this interpretation is the correct one may also be indicated by the apparent absence of the Aiginetans from the Greek coalition at Khaironeia. Despite the success of the Athenians in getting support from most of the

79. [In general, see N.G.L. Hammond & G.T. Griffith, *A History of Macedonia* 2 (Oxford 1979) 566–81.]

80. [Philip may also have seized an Athenian covering force of triremes during a siege of Selymbria between the attack on Perinthos and the capture of the main grain fleet. Dem. 18.73 mentions the capture of the grain ships, but note the purported *psēphismata* and supposed letter of Philip in Dem. 18.73–78 with the scholia (140 Dilts) and Σ[Dem.] 11.1 (Dilts) which recount the interception of triremes under command of Leodamas. See Hammond & Griffith *Macedonia* 2.574 and n. 2 (§2). Cf. F.R. Wüst, *Philipp II von Makedonien und Griechenland in den Jahre 346 bis 338* (Munich 1938) 136–40.]

neighbors of the Aiginetans in the Saronic Gulf (Dem. 18.237: Corinthians, Megarians; Ael. *VH* 6.1: cities of the Akte), the Aiginetans did not fight with the Greek forces at Khaironeia.

There are Aiginetan *naopoioi* attested at Delphi from 346 when Philip became dominant there through his humbling of the Phokians. An Aiginetan named Pytheas is attested as a *naopoios* in 346/5, in 344/3 when he was an *ἐπιμηνιεύων* (the resident *naopoios*, on call, so to speak) for part of the year, and in 341/0 when he served as one of the *ἀργυρολογέοντες* (collectors of revenues).⁸¹ Pytheas bears a name well attested in the Aiginetan elite and was probably an aristocrat, who, from his attested service at the sanctuary, was a prominent man at Delphi.⁸² His countryman Nikeratos seems to have succeeded him as the single Aiginetan among the *naopoioi*, as he is attested on records at Delphi in 339/8, 336/5, 334/3, 327/6, and 326/5. His name is a likely restoration for 324/3.⁸³ Caution is demanded in drawing conclusions about political history from the appearance and number of *naopoioi* from various cities at Delphi.⁸⁴ Aside from clearcut examples like the disappearance of the Phokians after 346, changes in influence at Delphi may be a matter of changes in the proportion of representation (note the relatively high number of Argives attested after 346). There were also probably practical reasons associated with management of the project that affected the presence or number of *naopoioi*. For instance, the new temple's first architect was the Corinthian, Spintharos (Paus. 10.5.13), and Peloponnesians form the largest component of the board of *naopoioi*.

The pattern of Aiginetan representation on the board, however, is suggestive of political affinities. No Aiginetan is attested as a *naopoios* before Philip's termination of the Third Sacred War. Although our attestations of names of *naopoioi* is clearly lacunose, there is substantial evidence for three sessions. The absence of any Aiginetan prevails for a meeting held in 357

81. [Pytheas in 346/5 (archon, Damoxenos): *FdD* 3.5 19.78 (= *SIG*³ 241B); 344/3 (Kleon): 19.93 (= 241B); 341/0 (Peithagoras): J. Bousquet, "Delphes. Comptes du quatrième siècle," *BCH* 66–67 (1942–1943) 84–123, esp. #6.15, pp. 101–5. For a recent reconstruction, see G. Roux, *L'amphictyonie, Delphes et le temple d'Apollon au IV^e siècle* (Lyon 1979) 95–120. My chronology follows G. Daux, *Chronologie Delphique* (Paris 1943). Cf. undated *FdD* 3.5 67.8–9 which recorded Aiginetan arrears.]

82. [See p. 40, n. 15; pp. 321–22 above.]

83. [Nikeratos in 339/8 (archon, Palaaios): *FdD* 3.5 47.1.77–78 (= *SIG*³ 249B); 336/5 (Dion): 49.II.51 (= 251H); 334/3 (Damokhares): 48.I.15–16 (= 250D); 327/6 (Kaphis): 58.32 (= 252N); 326/5 (Kharixenos): 20.36 (= 241C), 60A.3–4, restored; 324/3 (Theon): 61.IIB.36–37, restored (253S).]

84. [For the *naopoioi* as reflective of wider political events, see P. Cloché, "Les naopes de Delphes et la politique hellénique de 356 à 327 avant J.-C.," *BCH* 40 (1916) 78–142; M. Sordi, "La fondation du collège des naopes et le renouveau de l'amphictyonie au IV^e siècle," *BCH* 81 (1957) 38–75. See also J. R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London 1976) 130–35. Cf. J. Pouilloux, "La reconstruction du temple au IV^e siècle et les institutions Delphiques," *REA* 64 (1962) 300–13, esp. n. 2, p. 309; P. de la Coste-Messelière, "Les naopes à Delphes au IV^e siècle," in *Mélanges Helléniques offerts à Georges Daux* (Paris 1974) 199–211, esp. 199–203; Wüst *Philipp II* 81–85; Roux *L'amphictyonie* 109–10.]

(under the archon Herakleios with 8 *naopoioi* known), before the Phokians had seized the sanctuary and in the sessions convened in 353 (under Nikon, with 9 known), when the Phokians were in control.⁸⁵ Pytheas duly appears in the first session after the war of autumn 346. An Aiginetan, Nikeratos again, is present during the autumn meeting of 339 (archon, Palaaios), when the absence of Theban and Athenian *naopoioi* can be explained by their war with Philip.⁸⁶ There is room to restore the name of Nikeratos for the spring meeting of 323, after which our documentation breaks down. Throughout this period, the Aiginetans appear to have had good relations with Philip, the master of Delphi, a result congruent with the conclusions reached from a consideration of Demades' initial hostility to the Aiginetans. Nor were these *naopoioi* the only prominent Aiginetans who were Macedonian partisans. We should add the Aiginetan aristocratic family which produced Philiskos, Alexander's early tutor (*Suda s.v.* Φιλίσκος, φ 359 Adler; Ael. *VH* 14.11; DL 6.73, 80) and the Alexander historian Onesikritos (*FGH* 134 T4–6; see pp. 364–65, 369–70 below). It is unknown then whether the board of the *naopoioi* during the late 320s or early 310s still contained an Aiginetan. Was the Aiginetan cooling toward Macedonia, which shall be hypothesized below, reflected in the absence of an Aiginetan *naopoios*?

Aiginetan attitudes seem to have changed during Alexander's lifetime, a contention which is supported by the flight of anti-Macedonians there in 324 and 322. Demosthenes fled to Aigina after his conviction for receiving monies from Harpalos (Plut. *Dem.* 26.5, 27.6; Zosimus *Vit. Dem.* 109–13, p. 301 Westermann).⁸⁷ The appearance of such a notorious anti-Macedonian represents an extraordinary contrast with the previous Aiginetan sympathy for Philip and activism on his behalf. After the death of Alexander, it was presumably from Aigina that Demosthenes intervened in the Peloponnese in support of Athenian embassies which were seeking allies against the Macedonians (Plut. *Dem.* 27.3–6; Just. 13.5.9–11; cf. Phylarchus *FGH* 81 F 75). These services helped earn him his restoration. After the defeat of the Greeks at the Battle of Krannon in 322 during the ensuing Lamian War, Antipater demanded the surrender of the anti-Macedonian leaders throughout the cities of the collapsed Hellenic League (Polyb. 9.29.2–4; Arr. *Diod.* fr. 23 = *Suda s.v.* Ἀντίπατρος, α 2703 Adler; Plut. *Phoc.* 26.1–2, 27.5).⁸⁸ Once again, Demosthenes fled to the Aiakeion on Aigina before deciding that the sanctuary of Poseidon at Kalaureia offered a better haven, only to be hunted down by Arkhias,

85. [Cf. Sordi *BCH* (1957) 54–57, but she is not to be followed in holding any of these lists as a complete list of all *naopoioi*. See de la Coste-Messelière *Mélanges Daux* 199–203, 209.]

86. [Cf. Cloché *BCH* (1916) 116–28; see also de la Coste-Messelière *Mélanges Daux* 207.]

87. [See Schaefer *Demosthenes* 3.351–71 for this period. It provides the dramatic context for the letters of Demosthenes, on which see J.A. Goldstein, *The Letters of Demosthenes* (New York 1968) esp. 37–63. Demosthenes moved around while in exile: a stay at Troizen (and perhaps Kalaureia) is well attested (Plut. *Dem.* 26.5; Paus. 1.8.2–3; [Dem.] *Epis.* 2.19–20). For full references, see Goldstein *Letters* 68–69, n. 33.]

88. [See Schaefer *Demosthenes* 3.385–94.]

an agent of Antipater (Plut. *Mor.* 846E; cf. Plut. *Dem.* 29.1–7; Phot. *Biblio.* 265.494b; Zos. *Dem.* 131–41, 301–2 W; *Suda s.v.* Δημοσθένης, δ 454 Adler). A group of fugitives including Hypereides, however, stayed at the Aiakeion where they were captured by Arkhias and then executed (Plut. *Dem.* 28.4; *Mor.* 849A–B; Arr. *Diod.* fr. 1.13–14).

Presumably both the Aiakeion and the sanctuary of Poseidon at Kalau-reia were chosen for their reputation as *asyla* and for their location out of the way of the Macedonian advance. It is possible that Aigina may also have been attractive as a city sympathetic to the Greek cause, but which may not have directly participated in combat against the Macedonians.⁸⁹ Troizen, which controlled Kalaureia, did belong to the anti-Macedonian League (Paus. 1.25.4; cf. DS 18.11.2: οἱ τὴν Ἀκτὴν κατοικοῦντες). The absence of mention of the Aiginetans in the accounts of the hostilities is not really probative in so poorly attested a struggle.⁹⁰ Just like the Athenians, who had condemned the anti-Macedonian leaders to death *in absentia*, the Aiginetans bowed to the superior strength of Macedonia (Arkhias' small force of Thracians acted as a guard against *private* resistance).

On these two occasions Athenian fugitives sought refuge on Aigina. Their decision is most unexpected in light of the record of hostility of the islanders toward the Athenians at other times during the fourth century unless one assumes that there had been some intervening convergence of attitudes between Aiginetans and Athenians (which may also be reflected in the confusion over the civic affiliation of Onesikritos, the officer of Alexander). While Philip may have seemed an attractive patron to the Aiginetans in their rivalry with Athens, time may have brought a truer appreciation of the pervasiveness and solidity of Macedonian hegemony over Greece. Similarly, the Aiginetans had once before on the eve of Marathon tendered tokens of submission to Dareios of Persia in order to gain the advantage over an Athens threatened with Persian attack (Hdt. 6.49.1). The greater threat of Xerxes' invasion, however, had motivated them to reconcile themselves with their enemies and join the Hellenic League in order to maintain their independence (Hdt. 7.145.1, cf. 144.1–2). One direct token of the readjustment might be the efforts of Eurylokhos of the Aiginetan colony Kydonia, who ransomed Athenian prisoners apparently during the Lamian War and was honored by the *dēmos* in c. 320/19 (*IG* II² 399; see p. 313 with n. 57 above).⁹¹

89. [While DS 18.10.5 is warrant for widespread Greek participation in the alliance, Aigina is not mentioned in the lists appearing in DS 18.11.1–2 and Paus. 1.25.4.]

90. [Especially in the treatments of the fighting at sea: DS 18.15.8–9 (general); Plut. *Demetr.* 11.4, *Mor.* 338A; *Marmor Parium* FGH 239 B9 (Amorgos); Strabo 10.1.6 C446; Plut. *Phoc.* 25.1–4 (Rhamnous). See also *IG* II² 493, 505. See T. Walek, "Les opérations navales pendant la guerre Lamiaque," *RPh* 48 (1924) 23–30.]

91. [See Ziebarth *Beiträge* 18, 104 (#48); L. Moretti, *Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche* 1 (Florence 1967) #2, pp. 2–4. The restoration ἐκ τῶν ἀθηναίων is to be preferred in ll. 18–19. For a date during the operations of Agis III against the Macedonians in 331, see D. Potter, "*IG* II² 399;

CONCLUSION

Aigina was an excellent base for military operations of two types. As a fleet base, it could be used both for launching raids around the Peloponnesus and for a staging point in operations in the Aegean. The Spartans appreciated this fact when they called for Aiginetan autonomy before and during the Archidamian War. In their turn, the Athenians took precautions for their exclusive use of the island by expelling the inhabitants. The record of Spartan operations from Aigina indicates that the island was more valuable to Sparta. After Leotykidas in 479, certain users of the island as a fleet base are Teleutias in SY 390/89, Hierax in 389/8, Antalkidas in 388/7, and Pollis in 376/5, while possible cases are Ekdikos in 391/0 and Pollis with the west Greek reinforcements in 388/7. A special case is the surveillance exercised over Attica in the period between the Peloponnesian and Corinthian Wars by the Spartan harmost on Aigina (and possibly later by the Aiginetans themselves on behalf of Philip). Spartan squadrons on Aigina under Gorgopas and Teleutias (388–87) fought several conventional engagements to protect Aigina from Athenian aggression, provoked by *ληστέια*.|

The second employment of the island was as a base for *λησται*. As raiders of the Athenians, fourth-century Aiginetans were reviving a mode of activity used against Athens by their late sixth- and early fifth-century forebears. These raids were most damaging during the Corinthian War, when they were supervised by Spartan harmosts and seconded by a Spartan covering squadron. So long as the Spartans themselves were ready to commit resources to a war at sea, Aiginetan hatred of the Athenians made them ready (and with their tradition of seafaring, valuable) tools of Spartan policy. Aigina stood as a permanent maritime *Dekeleia* poised off the Attic coast, the length of which made a defense of specific points ineffective. Stationing guard ships up and down the coast would have been expensive, even if such ships could have avoided being picked off by Spartan triremes. As merchant vessels reached Sounion, there was still a considerable voyage ahead, during which they could be taken by Aiginetan privateers. The Athenians had two techniques with which to counter. They could raid Aigina in force, as Eunomos tried, and as Khabrias pretended to try. But this would hardly offset their losses. Alternatively, they could subjugate Aigina by a land and sea attack. In the early fourth century, Athens lacked the military strength to accomplish this Periclean goal while sustaining operations against Sparta elsewhere. Furthermore, the mere existence of even a few Spartan ships on Aigina necessitated that ships be held in reserve in the Peiraieus (perhaps as many as 20: *HG* 5.1.20). That reservation withheld men and ships from other designs. The presence of Spartan covering ships raised the level of Athenian forces needed for engagement on Aigina to a still higher level. It is not coincidental that the Athenians repeatedly ravaged Lakonia during the Peloponnesian War, when Aigina lay in their

Evidence for Athenian Involvement in the War of Agis III," *BSA* 79 (1984) 229–35; cf. E. Badian, "History from 'Square Brackets'," *ZPE* 79 (1989) 59–70, esp. 59–64.

hands, and, during the Corinthian War, they raided Lakonia only at a time before the entry of the Aiginetans into the conflict.

One is left then with a new appreciation of the importance for Athenian power of the subjection and disarming of Aigina in the 450s. Concomitantly, the restoration of an independent Aigina raised the cost of Athenian expansionism, since any attempt to recreate the fifth-century ἀρχή would be accompanied by higher prices for imported goods (especially grain) and by harsher conditions for the commercial sector of the Athenian economy. These new costs of imperialism provided an impetus for peace in 387 and 374. The success of privateering sponsored by Sparta supported a defensive stance by the main Spartan squadron in the Aegean, which sought to impede Athenian operations and succor pro-Spartans rather than to provoke a decisive encounter. Spartan forces operating from Aigina shared in the profits of the raids, which could be substantial as so well illustrated by Teleutias' attack on the Peiraieus. Profits from ληστεία cross-subsidized the Spartan force on the island. Even Antalkidas, with a force distinctly superior to his Athenian opponents, was content to intercept grain ships and to hold himself ready to counter an Athenian attack. Autarkic Sparta needed only to deny the passage of the seas (both around Attica and in the Straits) to Athens; it need not have ensured safe passage for itself. Eventually, the ineptitude of the navarch Pollis and the impatience of Sparta's allies dissipated this advantage, ending Sparta's career as an Aegean naval power.

Nonetheless, the λησταί from Aigina continued to take their toll on Attica. The Aiginetans, unlike other Spartan allies, did not become reconciled to the Athenians after the rapprochement between Athens and Sparta in 370. It was the activity of Sparta or any other strong power like Macedonia as a counterpoise to Athens that commanded Aiginetan allegiance rather than some more fundamental congruence of attitudes.

The major historians of the long series of conflicts between Sparta and Athens, Thucydides and Xenophon, appreciated the roles of Aigina with different degrees of acuity. Thucydides' emphasis on large-scale amphibious naval warfare fit the political and military situation of the Peloponnesian War, especially before the defeat of the Sicilian Expedition. Xenophon continues this same focus, but far less justifiably, because the record of military activity in the early fourth century indicates the increased importance of ληστεία and with it privateering.*

* The author would like to thank the staffs of the Center for Hellenic Studies, Washington, D.C., and of the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, N.J., where he conducted the research for this article during 1982/1983 and 1984/1985. Thanks are also owed to Professor John Walsh, who read the article in draft and offered many helpful suggestions and criticisms.

An Aiginetan Elite Family of the Fourth Century B.C.*

STUDENTS OF Aiginetan social history are particularly fortunate in their possession of several bodies of documentation concerning the values and political principles of the island's ruling aristocracy. In the years between 490 B.C. and the mid-440s, Pindar composed eleven extant *epinicia* in honor of victorious Aiginetan athletes. His relationship with the island's elite was so close that the poems provide invaluable testimony on the attitudes current in that class.¹ For an overlapping period, we also have the evidence of Herodotus, who was deeply interested in the long feud between the Aiginetans and their Athenian neighbors.² Accordingly, his *Histories* reflect an interrogation of members of the island's oligarchy whom Herodotus used as informants on the previous history of what he called the *ἐχθρὴ παλαιή* 'ancient hatred' between these two peoples (Hdt. 5.81.2). For the Hellenistic period, the antiquarian and patriotic preoccupations of the two known Aiginetan local historians, Pythainetos (FGH 299) and Theogenes (FGH 300) are illustrated not only by their attested fragments, but also, and more significantly, by the material on Aiginetan antiquities preserved anonymously among the scholia to Pindar.³ It is indeed the fourth century, the period after the restoration of the Aiginetans to their homeland by the Spartan admiral Lysander (Xen. *HG* 2.2.9; Plut. *Lys.* 14.4), in which data about the *Weltanschauung* of the Aiginetan aristocracy are most scanty. Therefore, the political and intellectual activities of one family, that of Onesikritos, are especially noteworthy.⁴

THE FAMILY OF ONESIKRITOS AND DIOGENES THE CYNIC

The family of Onesikritos is known chiefly through the tutelage of its members as Cynics under Diogenes of Sinope, as noted in a tradition preserved

*In sadness, this contribution is dedicated to the memory of Professor Fordyce Mitchel, whom the author remembers for his many kindnesses.

1. See Figueira *Aegina* 321–31.

2. See pp. 35–57 and 276–78 above.

3. See now *Colonization* 87, esp. n. 21.

4. The following works are particularly useful: E. Badian, "Nearchus the Cretan," *YCIS* 24 (1975) 147–70; T.S. Brown, *Onesikritos: A Study in Hellenistic Historiography*, University of California Publications in History 39 (Berkeley & Los Angeles 1949); D.R. Dudley, *A History of Cynicism: From Diogenes to the 6th Century A.D.* (London 1937); G.D. Giglioni, "Una leggenda sulle origini dell'ellenismo: Alessandro e i cinici," in B. Virgilio (ed.), *Studi Ellenistici* 1 (Pisa 1984) 51–73; R. Höistad, *Cynic Hero and Cynic King* (Lund 1948); P. Pédech, *Historiens: compagnons d'Alexandre* (Paris 1984). Note also Figueira *Aegina* 347–48, which brief account this article supplements and corrects.

most prominently in the life of Diogenes by Diogenes Laertius (6.75–76; cf. *Suda* s.v. Φιλίσκος, Ἀιγινήτης, φ 359 Adler). An Aiginetan, Onesikritos by name, sent his younger son Androstenes to Athens on his behalf. Enchanted with the teaching of Diogenes, Androstenes did not return to Aigina, whereupon the elder son, Philiskos, was sent after him. He, too, experienced the same fate. Consequently, Onesikritos came to Athens himself, only to be similarly taken with the example of Diogenes. Hence, all three adult men of the family became Cynic philosophers.

The literal factuality of this story ought not to trouble us: it is a dramatization of the Cynic withdrawal from society. Several motifs in this story, however, deserve emphasis. These Aiginetans were wealthy men, who had business to be conducted in Attica, and the leisure to neglect it once they turned their attention to philosophy. Their identification as Aiginetans is an essential feature of the story. Surely, the failure of the sons to return from nearby Attica is intended as an unexpected result, much as our cliché has the wayward husband disappearing on his way to buy milk. Their trips to Athens were normally mundane occurrences, not chances fraught with unusual dangers and in this case with the risk of philosophical seduction. The very idea of leaving Aigina may not have been without a philosophical resonance.⁵

Thereafter, we hear nothing more of Androstenes, and I would argue that the Onesikritos of this story is to be differentiated from the follower and historian of Alexander ("a certain Onesikritos": Ὀνησίκριτον τινα). For one thing, the latter was still active at the court of Lysimakhos near the end of the fourth century (see pp. 372–73 below), which makes him an improbable contemporary of Diogenes. I shall distinguish them as Onesikritos I and Onesikritos II. Philiskos, however, was a major figure among the first generation of the Cynics. Diogenes cites Satyros, who identified Philiskos as an Aiginetan, describing him as a *gnōrimos* 'familiar friend' of Diogenes (DL 6.73 = fr. 19 Wehrli). The *Suda* notes him as a disciple of Diogenes, along with offering the interesting alternative that he was a pupil of Stilpo, the Megarian philosopher

5. Aigina had earlier in its history enjoyed a great reputation for wealth, and, as a port town, a greater range of opportunities for self-gratification may have existed there than elsewhere. Hence, it is possible that a departure from Aigina could, even divorced from the suggestive context here, symbolize an abnegation of pleasure, and concomitantly, a journey to Aigina stand for a surrender to pleasure. The companion of Socrates, Aristippos of Kyrene, is reported by Phaedo in the Platonic dialogue named after him to have been absent from the deathbed of Socrates, perhaps because of a visit by himself and by Cleombrotos to Aigina (*Phaedo* 59C; cf. [Socrates] *Epis.* 14.9, 16.1 Hercher). This seemingly innocent comment was later interpreted to connote a slander against Aristippos (DL 3.36, cf. 2.66; Demetr. *De eloc.* 287–88 Radermacher). Aristippos was the founder (whether in reality or through the attribution back to him of the views of his homonymous grandson) of the hedonistic Cyrenaic philosophical school, for which see W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* 3 (Cambridge 1969) 490–99. Augustine implies that Aristippos and the Cynic Antisthenes stood as polar opposites among the followers of Socrates (*Civ. Dei* 18.41). Accordingly, it is not surprising that a tradition existed that Aristippos spent the majority of his time on Aigina for the purposes of gratification, including the company of the famous *hetaira* Laïs (Athen. 12.544D, cf. Xen. *Mem.* 2.1; Athen. 13.588C, cf. 595A). See G. Giannantoni, *I cirenaici* (Florence 1958) 28–29, with complete citations on 198–201, 251, 359.

sometimes connected with the Cynics (citing Hermippos fr. 37 Wehrli). Sotion attributed to Diogenes a dialogue entitled *Philiskos* (DL 6.80 = fr. 17, *FHG* 3.164).⁶ On his own account, he was credited with dialogues, including one named after the early Attic king Kodros (*Suda s.v.* Φιλίσκος). The tragedies which some authorities assigned to Diogenes himself were held by Satyros to have been, in fact, the work of Philiskos (6.80 = Satyros fr. 17 W; cf. Julian 7.211D–212A, who also questions attribution to Diogenes). We know also of the collaboration of Philiskos with that major disciple and successor of Diogenes, Crates, who, in an anecdote told by Teles, speaks of writing him a *Protrepticus* (Teles IVB, p. 46.6–14 Hense *apud* Stob. *Flor.* 95.21). Philiskos the Aiginetan is also cited in the *Academicorum Philosophorum Index Herculanensis*, a history of the Academy probably written by Philodemos, fragments of which are contained on a papyrus from Herculaneum (#1021).⁷ Neanthes of Kyzikos is identified as an intermediary for information from Philiskos about the naming of Plato (col. II.36–40). Philiskos served as one of the early tutors of Alexander the Great, perhaps before the arrival of Aristotle in 342 (*Suda s.v.* Φιλίσκος: διδάξας γράμματα). Aelian tells a story of Philiskos giving Alexander advice on the nature of just rule (Ael. *VH* 14.11). Thus, in the figure of Philiskos we have a significant participant in the early consolidation of Cynicism as well as an important link between Aigina and the court of Philip.

In the first half of the fourth century, opportunities for peaceful intercourse between Aiginetans and residents in Attica (like Diogenes) were relatively limited. The Aiginetans had repeatedly raided Attica, and intercepted ships bound for Athens, most notably from 391 to 387 and again after 379, on both occasions in support of the Spartans.⁸ But the Aiginetans seem to have continued to harry the Athenians even after the rapprochement between Athens and Sparta in 370. Other passages in the *Index Herculanensis* deal with Plato's trip to the court of Dionysios I of Syracuse (col X.5–17, pp. 7–8 Mekler) and its sequel, the sale of the philosopher as a slave on Aigina (col. X.17–24, pp. 8–9; cf. col. III.1–7, p. 12 for another account of the sale). It has been suggested quite sensibly that, since Philiskos is used as a source on Plato elsewhere in the treatise, he was also utilized about a story involving the philosopher and the Aiginetans.⁹ Perhaps Onesikritos (and his sons?) was still on Aigina during 388/7, when Plato was captured and so had first hand knowledge of the incident.

Thereafter there would have been several periods during which the family of Onesikritos could have had regular dealings in Attica, the sort that provided a context for their involvement with Diogenes. An earlier context will

6. Thus it is likely that Philiskos appeared among the Cynics in the successions of philosophers compiled in Hellenistic Alexandria. Cf. Dudley *Cynicism* 18–19.

7. S. Mekler (Berlin 1902).

8. For Aiginetan hostilities against the Athenians, see pp. 338–55 above.

9. K. Gaiser, "Der Ruhm des Annikeris," in P. Händel & W. Meid (eds.), *Festschrift für Robert Muth* (Innsbruck 1983) 111–28, esp. 117–20.

have been during the years of peace after the Peace of Antalkidas, and a later one during a lull in fighting during the late 360s and the 350s (see pp. 354–56 above). The former can almost certainly be ruled out as too early for the arrival of Diogenes at Athens from Sinope, his mother city. The *terminus post quem* for Diogenes' flight from Sinope ought to be 370, because one could connect his exile with a hypothetical seizure of that city by Datames, the satrap of Cappadocia, one which followed on the attested, unsuccessful siege by the same man in 370.¹⁰ If one believes that Diogenes truly had personal contact with Antisthenes (Plut. *Mor.* 632E; cf. DL 6.21, with 6.9, 10), then it is likely that he reached Athens during the 360s, for Antisthenes was probably an old man in 366, at which time he is last attested (DS 15.76.4). Another view argues for a later *terminus post quem* and puts Diogenes' banishment after 362, connecting the tradition of a mishandling of the Sinopean mint (*παπαχάριξαντος*: DL 6.20–21; cf. DL 6.1; *Suda s.v.* Διογένης, δ 1143) by Diogenes and his father Hikesias with coins bearing the legend ΙΚΕΣΙΟ which may be dated after 362 (the date of the death of Datames), but just when afterward is uncertain.¹¹ Yet, care must be observed, inasmuch as the supposed Diogenian program of modification of Sinopean coinage may be taken to parallel the Cynic program of social transformation.¹² It may well be that there was at work in elaborating the biographical tradition on Diogenes an overly literal interpretation of Diogenes' own remarks which played on a transformation of *nomisma* = *nomoi* against the background of his familial connection with banking and minting.¹³ In that case, there is no reason to identify the Sinopean minting official Hikesias with the father of Diogenes: he can become a relative who resumed the family's involvement with the mint.

Furthermore, establishing a lower limit for Diogenes' stay in Attica is helpful, not only for working out the history of the family of Onesikritos, but also for its utility in supporting the historicity of a period of Aiginetan

10. Note Aen. Tact. 40.4–5; Polyæn. 7.21.2, 5; cf. Nepos *Dat.* 5.6. For the traces of Datames on Sinopean coinage, see D.M. Robinson, "Ancient Sinope: Second Part," *AJP* 27 (1906) 245–79, esp. 246–47; E.S.G. Robinson, "A Find of Coins of Sinope," *NC* 20 (1920) 1–16. For this date for Diogenes' arrival in Athens, see Höistad *Cynic Hero* 19; cf. P. von der Mühl, "Interpretationen biographischen Überlieferung," *MH* 23 (1966) 234–39, esp. 236–39, who rejects as fictional the whole tradition that Diogenes or his father were exiled for tampering with the currency of Sinope. Confusing the issue of satrapal control of Sinope is the fact that Sinopean-style coins with Aramaic legends need not have been minted at Sinope itself.

11. On chronology, note C.T. Seltman, "Diogenes of Sinope, Son of the Banker Hikesias," in J. Allan, H. Mattingly, & E.S.G. Robinson, *Transactions of the International Numismatics Congress* (London 1938) 121, who doubts the historicity of actual forgery. Cf. I. Bywater & J.G. Milne, "ΠΑΠΑΧΑΡΙΞΙΣ," *CR* 54 (1940) 10–13. This line of analysis is sometimes extended to hold that Diogenes cannot have reached Attica before 340 (for which see Dudley *Cynicism* 2–3, 21–22), but gives a difficult interpretation for the term *παπαχάρις*. See Höistad *Cynic Hero* 12–13.

12. Giglioni *Studi Ellenistici* 54–61.

13. Note H. Bannert, "Numismatisches zu Biographie und Lehre des Hundes Diogenes," in *Litterae Numismaticae Vindobonenses: Roberto Goebel Dedicatae* (Vienna 1979) 49–63.

provocation of the Athenians which prompted Periclean rhetoric from Demades (see pp. 354–58 above). The majority of the anecdotes concerning Diogenes have an Athenian setting. His best known pupils (or better, disciples or emulators), Hegesias, Crates, Philiskos, and his son Onesikritos will have associated with him in Athens (DL 6.48, 75–76, 84, 85). Thus, Diogenes lived long in Attica. Yet, his meeting with Alexander is supposed to have taken place at Corinth in the winter of 336–35 (DL 6.38, 60); Diogenes died at Corinth in 324–21 (DL 6.79; cf. *Suda* s.v. Διογένης). The late 340s is a reasonable chronological setting for the movement of Diogenes to Corinth.

Biographical tradition brought Diogenes from Athens to Corinth through capture in the waters near Aigina and sale as a slave rather like Plato and Nikostratos of [Dem.] 53.6 (DL 6.74; cf. 6.29, 30–32, 36). One reaction has been to doubt the factuality of such an abduction. Admittedly, the tradition of the sale of Diogenes has undoubtedly undergone elaboration at the hands of later authors: Menippos of Gadara, first half of the third century, and Euboulos of Alexandria, second century, wrote works entitled “Sale of Diogenes” (DL 6.29, 30–31).¹⁴ Typical of later elaboration is the development of Diogenes’ occupation or vocation as ἀνδρῶν ἄρχειν (DL 6.29):¹⁵ paradoxically Diogenes was being sold to a master whose master he would become by virtue of his superior *aretē*. Before rejecting the story entirely, it is worth remembering that in its absence there is no explanation at all in the biographical tradition for the movement of Diogenes from Athens to Corinth. It would be bold indeed to hypothesize that there was no historical datum at all on which such elaborations depended. We have already observed that Philiskos, the Aiginetan follower of Diogenes, may have been interested in the sale of Plato on Aigina. Philiskos, who had good access to information on Plato’s vicissitudes on Aigina, may have contrasted the deportment of his master with that of Plato under similar circumstances (cf. Sen. *EM* 47.12; Ael. *VH* 14.33; Lact. *Inst.* 3.25).

In the story of the capture and sale of Diogenes as it is told by Diogenes Laertius, he was carried off from the neighborhood of Aigina to Crete and sold to the Corinthian Xenias, to whose sons he served as tutor (DL 6.74; cf.

14. K. von Fritz, *Quellen-Untersuchungen zu Leben und Philosophie des Diogenes von Sinope* (*Philologus* Supplbd. 18.2, Leipzig 1926) 22–27. On the crucial role of Menippos in the development of traditions on Diogenes, see G. Donzelli, “Una versione Menippea della ΑΙΣΩΠΙΟΥ ΠΙΡΑΞΙΣ?,” *RFIC* 38 (1960) 225–76, where a considerable list of attestations is contained in n. 1, p. 248. Donzelli also discusses the effects on each other of the biographical traditions on the “sales” of Aesop and Diogenes. See also Höistad *Cynic Hero* 118–24, who notes that some confirmation lies in the telling of the story of Diogenes’ enslavement by Cleomenes, the student of Metrocles, who will have been active c. 300 (DL 6.75; cf. 6.95). The interaction of Diogenes and the family of Xenias became the basis for a Cynic mode of pedagogics, which was elaborated, starting from Cleomenes through Menippos and Euboulos. A higher level of scepticism, however, is appropriate toward material illustrating Diogenes’ behavior as a slave, since Diogenes might well have merely accompanied Xenias to Corinth after having been ransomed by the Corinthian.

15. See also Philo, *Quod omnis probus liber sit* 18.121–22; Gell. *NA* 2.18; Muson. *apud* Stob. *Flor.* 40.9; Stob. *Flor.* 3.63. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 466E; Clem. Alex. *Paed.* 3.3.16. There is also some play on the reassuring idea that the free man can never truly be enslaved: Epict. *Diss.* 4.1.114–17.

6.29, 30–32, 36).¹⁶ That pirates would have carried him so far from his point of capture for a sale to an individual whose city was very close to that point of capture only to have him returned in the end to the same vicinity renders an implausible sequence. Given the notoriety achieved by Cretan pirates subsequently, it is worth considering whether the story of Diogenes' sale as a slave has not suffered modernization from the standpoint of a later date. At a date in the third quarter of the fourth century (as this incident must be), an abduction by Cretan pirates in the Saronic Gulf would be the earliest such action of theirs by a considerable margin.¹⁷ Either of the later Cynics, Menippos or Euboulos, might have introduced Crete (a *lectio facilior* for their period) into the story in the sort of elaboration common in the anecdotes about Diogenes.¹⁸ Therefore, I suggest that the original story had Diogenes sold on Aigina to Xenias from nearby Corinth. Even if, however, one rejects this hypothesis, it is still likely that *λησται* (of any derivation whatsoever) were operating in the vicinity of Aigina with the acquiescence if not the active complicity of the Aiginetans. It is even possible that the role of the Cretans is historical but in a way other than that customary for a Hellenistic audience: raiders from the Aiginetan colony and refuge at Kydonia in Crete might have been using Aigina as a base against Attica (pp. 310–15 above).

This reconstruction of the sequence of events surrounding the capture and sale of Diogenes suggests that Onesikritos I and his sons either no longer had connections with Aigina or were not still in the company of Cynic circles at Athens: they could no longer bring help to their teacher.¹⁹ Onesikritos and Androsthenes may have already been dead, while Philiskos may have moved on to the court of Philip, beyond the range of intervention in the Saronic Gulf. In the *Index Herculanensis*, Neanthes, who had his *floruit* c. 300, is presented as having obtained information on Plato directly from Philiskos, which suggests that the latter lived into the last quarter of the century.²⁰

ONESIKRITOS AND ALEXANDER

The next attested member of this family is my Onesikritos II. Onesikritos II served as the helmsman of Alexander's ship during his voyage down the Indus River (Arr. *Ind.* 18.9 = Onesikritos *FGH* 134 T 4 = Nearchus *FGH*

16. For other accounts of Diogenes' capture, see Cic. *ND* 3.34.83; Jul. *Or.* 6.201B; *Suda s.v.* Διογένης; Epict. *Diss.* 4.1.115; Plut. *Mor.* 499B; [Crates] *Ep.* 34, pp. 215–16 Hercher.

17. For citations of the evidence, see H.A. Ormerod, *Piracy in the Ancient World* (Liverpool 1924) 127–50; P. Brulé, *La piraterie crétoise Hellénistique* (Paris 1978) 2–12. Strabo has three phases of piracy in the eastern Mediterranean: the Tyrrhenian, the Cretan, and the Cilician (10.4.9 C477). The heyday of Cretan piracy belongs well into the third century (cf., e.g., *IC* 1.8.6; *SIG*³ 535; *IC* 3.3.3A = *SVA* 3.551; *SVA* 3.552; also Polyb. 6.46; 13.4.1–2, 5.1).

18. Note the possible Cretan pirates of *IG* II² 1225, with their attack on Salamis, for which see Brulé *Piraterie* 3–6.

19. This common sense reconstruction is not entirely preferable to the ancient tradition, going back to Cleomenes, that Diogenes would not allow his friends to ransom him (DL 6.75).

20. For the relationship of Philiskos and Neanthes, see R. Laqueur, "Neanthes," *RE* 16.2, cols. 2108–10; cf. Jacoby *FGH* 2, 144–45.

133 F 1; Arr. *Anab.* 7.5.6 = *FGH* 134 T 6). More in doubt is whether Onesikritos was given general authority over the seamanship of the fleet during the expedition from the Indus to the Persian Gulf, as some authorities maintain. He would have been the ἀρχικυβερνήτης of the fleet (T 5b–c), and Plutarch describes him as the ἄρχων of the helmsmen (*Mor.* 331E = T 5a).²¹ Onesikritos II is described either as derived from Aigina, presumably the majority opinion: οἱ μὲν, or, according to Demetrios of Magnesia, from Astypalaia, which one supposes to be the island of that name or possibly the older main settlement on Kos (Strabo 14.2.19 C657).²² Yet the appearance of the name as that of the father of Philiskos, who is independently connected with Alexander and universally considered an Aiginetan, suggests that Onesikritos II belonged to the same family. He was probably a son of Philiskos, who owed his entrance into the intimate circle of Alexander's court to his father's prior relationship with the Macedonian royal family. Moreover, Plutarch (*Mor.* 331E = T 5a) and Diogenes Laertius (6.84 = T 1) portray Onesikritos as a disciple of Diogenes the Cynic. In his own interview with the Indian sages, Onesikritos describes himself as a pupil of Diogenes (Strabo 15.1.65 C716 = *FGH* 134 T 2; F 17a–b). The reflections of Cynic political ideas in the surviving fragments of Onesikritos put this contention beyond doubt.

These associations alone might be taken to suggest that the tradition of Onesikritos as an Aiginetan ought to be preferred to Demetrios' opinion that he came from Astypalaia.²³ The minority view of Demetrios reaches us through Arrian (*Ind.* 18.9 = *FGH* 133 F 1) which might suggest that Nearchus, scarcely an unprejudiced witness, may be the ultimate source. There is a good chance that a man identified as an Aiginetan would have a better presumptive claim to expertise in seafaring than one described as an Astypalaian, and Nearchus seems to have been concerned with impugning his rival's abilities consistently. It is even possible that we need not bring the two traditions on his nationality into a stark opposition. Onesikritos could have been of Aiginetan derivation, with some later association with Astypalaia. The Aiginetans grew less enchanted with the Macedonians during Alexander's lifetime so that Onesikritos may have received an estate and citizenship on Astypalaia or on Kos under Macedonian patronage (see pp. 358–59 above).

21. Cf. Jacoby *FGH* 2, 469–70; Pédech *Historiens* 73–75.

22. Onesikritos from Astypalaia: DL 6.84 = T 1; Arr. *Ind.* 18.9 = *FGH* 134 T 4 = Nearchus *FGH* 133 F 1.

23. Cf. H. Strasburger, "Onesikritos," *RE* 18.1, cols. 460–67, esp. 460–61, whose objections regarding chronology are answered by the hypothesis of two Onesikritoi; also Jacoby *FGH* 2, 469. See also Pédech *Historiens* 71–72. L. Pearson, *The Last Histories of Alexander the Great* (*APA Monographs* 20, Philadelphia 1960) 106 suggests a derivation of Strabo 15.1.33 C701 on the kingdom of the Indian Sopeithes with its 5000 cities the size of Meropid Kos from Onesikritos, more comfortably an observation by a Koan Astypalaian, writing his history in retirement. Strabo cites Onesikritos just below (F 24, 26). Cf. p. 84 n. 7, where a change in affiliation is posited. Yet, observe that Onesikritos was at the court of Lysimakhos at some point after 305 (T 8 = Plut. *Alex.* 46.4).

It is also possible that this Astypalaia is not the rather obscure island or the old settlement on Kos of that name, but the district called Astypalaia within the town of Aigina itself.²⁴ Its existence is attested from the narrative of Herodotus on an early fifth-century uprising by the Aiginetan *dāmos* led by a disgruntled aristocrat called Nikodromos (6.89). Moreover, Hellenistic/Roman Aiginetan inscriptions mention the existence of a pentapolis on the island, which could have included Astypalaia.²⁵ Possibly, this was merely a cult association, but it cannot be ruled out that some sort of dissociation of the island's polity took place in the Hellenistic period. Therein, the name Astypalaia might have been given to the town of Aigina, in order to distinguish it from the homonymous island. There is no reason, in any case, to sever Onesikritos II from Aigina for the sake of a minority ancient tradition.

Onesikritos wrote a work on Alexander entitled (or beginning with the words) Πῶς Ἀλέξανδρος ἤχθη *'How Alexander was Reared'* which Diogenes Laertius described as parallel to the *Cyropaedia* of Xenophon (DL 6.84 = T 1). This is unsurprising, inasmuch as the *Cyropaedia* seems to have influenced both Antisthenes and other later figures who are more properly termed Cynics.²⁶ The education of Kyros provided a model for explaining the development of a charismatic monarch. An interweaving of philosophical elaborations on Alexander and Kyros may have been featured in Onesikritos, who treated the Persian royal tombs (F 34–35). Onesikritos also gives Kyros a death characteristic of a sage, one at an advanced age, and by suicide in protest against the executions ordered by his son Kambyzes (F 36). One should note the congruence with Cynic praise for appropriate suicide (e.g., for Herakles or for Diogenes), which Onesikritos noted among the Indian sages.²⁷

Onesikritos may have been interested in and have become knowledgeable about the education, strictly speaking, of Alexander from his father Philiskos. Fragment 38 (= Plut. *Alex.* 8.2) on Aristotle's preparation of a copy of the *Iliad* for Alexander's reading is probably expressive of such material.²⁸ Our very knowledge of the instruction of Alexander by Philiskos may, in fact, be owed to his son Onesikritos. Yet, his work on Alexander (like the *Cyropaedia*) treated the moral and intellectual development, broadly construed, of Alexander with events such as the king's meeting with Diogenes the Cynic and his

24. F. Lillie, *De Onesicrito Scriptore Alexandri Magni* (Bonn 1864) 5–7.

25. See W. Wurster & F. Felten, *Die spät-römische Akropolismauer: Alt Ägina* 1.2, ed. H. Walter (Mainz 1975) 51 with Figueira *Aegina* 318–19.

26. Höistad *Cynic Hero* 77–94.

27. Höistad *Cynic Hero* 88–90 adduces the use of the *Cyropaedia* by Dio Chrysostom in *Or.* 2 (esp. 2.77) as possibly based on Onesikritos (cf. F 36).

28. Brown *Onesicritus* 20 observes that the story of the death of Boukephalos was recounted by Onesikritos (F 20 = Plut. *Alex.* 61.1), which may suggest that the story of Alexander's taming of the horse was part of Onesikritos' account of his *paideia*. J.R. Hamilton, *Plutarch: Alexander: A Commentary* (Oxford 1969) lii–liii, followed by Pédech *Historiens* 77, lists other passages from Plutarch's life (on Alexander's education and the king as "philosopher in action") which may be owed to Onesikritos: 5.7–8; 22.7–10; 25.6–8; 59.1–5; 60.12–16; 62, where the passages on Androkottos (= Chandra Gupta) may argue for a late date for Onesikritos' final publication.

conversations with the Indian sages (Brahmins, later called Gymnosophists by the Greeks). The work may even have portrayed Alexander's Heraklid ancestry with the Cynic treatment of Herakles as a paragon in the background.²⁹ There is no reason to distinguish this work from the *sungraphē* on Alexander by Onesikritos (*FGH* 134 T 9), unless that is considered a preliminary version of the longer work. The character of Onesikritos' work is obscured by the interests of those who cite him, for they frequently used his digressive material on the geographical singularities of the East.³⁰

A common scholarly judgment on Onesikritos, exemplified by the treatment of Jacoby, has been to denigrate his work on Alexander as untrustworthy, when compared with the supposedly factual historical writing of Nearchus.³¹ Badian rightly criticizes this line of interpretation, and has shown that the account of Nearchus was not unaffected by a self-interested tendentiousness.³² The critical treatment of Onesikritos can even be extended to doubt traditions on his standing within the military establishment of Alexander—Nearchus questioned a description of Onesikritos as *ναύαρχος* (Arr. *Anab.* 6.2.3 = *FGH* 134 F 27; cf. Nearchus *FGH* 133 T 1). Yet Badian observes that Nearchus had gotten the fleet into difficulties at the confluence of the Hydaspes and Akesines (Arr. *Anab.* 6.4.4–5.4), and that Alexander had taken pains that he himself (and perhaps Onesikritos) would be present at the next danger point, the conjunction of the Akesines and the Hydraortes (*Anab.* 6.5.7, 13.1, 14.4).³³ Badian also points out that the title of *ἀρχικυβερνήτης* probably correctly denominated the officer, in this case Onesikritos, in charge of the navigation of the whole fleet (cf. *DS* 20.50.4).³⁴ To denominate such a person as a *navarch*, a term in general usage for a commander at sea, was not a significant distortion. As Badian notes, Pliny made much use of Onesikritos and described him as *dux* (2.75.185 = F 10) and *praefectus classis* (6.24.81 = F 13). Various other passages hint at such wider authority for Onesikritos. Q. Curtius Rufus 9.10.3 and 10.1.10 show Nearchus and Onesikritos on a level of equality.

29. Cf. Høistad *Cynic Hero* 22–28.

30. Where they can be compared, Nearchus seems to give a fuller historical narrative, suggesting the emphasis within Onesikritos was on the archetypal figure of Alexander.

31. Jacoby *FGH* 2, 468–69; cf. H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich: Die prosopographische Grundlage* (Munich 1926) #583, pp. 2.288–90, for a more judicious summary of earlier scholarship, which is more balanced on the question of Onesikritos versus Nearchus as a source.

32. See his thorough dissection of the self-serving elements of the account by Nearchus of his appointment to command the expedition sailing from the Indus (Arr. *Ind.* 20.1–8: Badian *YCIS* (1975) 153–56), and his account of his reception by Alexander after the return of the expedition (*Ind.* 42.5–9: pp. 166–67). See also Brown *Onesikritos* 10–11, 105–24, esp. on the return voyage from the Indus to the Persian Gulf. Finally, note the self-serving and exaggerated portrait by Nearchus of his disagreement with Onesikritos—the narrative inadvertently retains untoward traces of Onesikritos' authority—over the latter's suggestion to cross over to the Arabian shore of the Persian Gulf (Arr. *Anab.* 7.20.9–10; *Ind.* 32.9–13). Cf. Badian 159–60.

33. Badian *YCIS* (1975) 152–53.

34. Badian *YCIS* (1975) 157–59.

The general approach of Jacoby subjects the work of Onesikritos to unfair standards, just as if one would criticize the *Cyropaedia* by juxtaposing parts of the account of Kyros the Great in Herodotus. Onesikritos was clearly dramatizing vignettes from the life of Alexander in order to create an exemplary portrait of him as a philosophical king. Diogenes Laertius, after all, describes the work of Onesikritos as an *enkômion* (DL 6.84). Accordingly, Onesikritos reports Alexander's own wish to return after his death in order to learn people's true reaction to his life as represented by the reports of his friends (T 7). In this spirit, a reading can be given to the anecdote in which Onesikritos narrated Alexander's encounter with an Amazon for Lysimakhos, who smiled and asked Onesikritos where he (Lysimakhos) had been at that time (Plut. *Alex.* 46.4 = *FGH* 134 T 8; cf. F 1). In this vignette, approaches toward Alexander on two levels of reality were clashing. Hence, the irony of the anecdote. Tendentiousness, albeit impalatable to our historical tastes, is not mendacity. Onesikritos was engaged in a form of literary mythologizing for the purpose of an exposition of politico-philosophical positions. Here Alexander's union with the Amazon may symbolize his Heraclid destiny as a unifier of Europe and Asia.³⁵

It should also be noted that later scholarly criticism leveled at Onesikritos (*FGH* 134 T 10 = Strabo 15.1.28 C698, cf. F 16) was also leveled (in some cases, quite erroneously) at other Greek historians of the East and, in particular, of India (note *FGH* 134 T 11-13 for the appearance of Onesikritos with other authorities). Therefore, it is unreasonable (as has already been indicated) to doubt the tradition concerning the standing of Onesikritos in Alexander's entourage. He received the award of a gold crown in the distinguished company of Nearchus, Leonnatos, Hephaisteion, and other, unnamed *σωματοφύλακες* (*FGH* 134 T 6 = Arr. *Anab.* 7.5.6; cf. Arr. *Ind.* 42.8-9, probably based on Nearchus, e.g., *FGH* 134 T 9a). Need this notice really be questioned under the unlikely idea of Jacoby that it derives from Onesikritos himself?³⁶

As already noted, Lucian reports an anecdote, probably based on Onesikritos himself, in which Alexander expresses a desire to return to life in order to learn about the reception of *ταῦτα*, which are presumably accounts of him such as that of Onesikritos (*Quom. Hist. Conscr.* 40 = T 7). The anecdote suggests that Onesikritos may have previewed his treatment of Alexander's *paideia* in the company of the king. Yet, Onesikritos published his fourth book on Alexander, the one in which the anecdote about the Amazon appeared, after 305, because Lysimakhos is addressed as "king" in the episode (*FGH* 134 T 8 = Plut. *Alex.* 46.4). Jacoby, however, noted that Nearchus had attempted to correct Onesikritos,³⁷ and that Cleitarchus used both of their works c. 310

35. Cf. Pédech *Historiens* 89.

36. Jacoby *FGH* 2, 447, 469-70. Cf. Badian *YCIS* (1975) 166-67, who notes that the narrative on the rewarding of these officers is probably derived from Ptolemy.

37. See Jacoby *FGH* 2, 447, 469. A use of Onesikritos by Nearchus might be interpreted to contradict the supposition of a piecemeal publication of Onesikritos' work on Alexander. Yet, it is

(cf., e.g., *FGH* 134 F 3, F 4 with *FGH* 137 F 14), so that Onesikritos ought to have published a part of his work c. 320.³⁸ While this may be true for the first part of the work, the later date implied by the reading in the presence of Lysimakhos ought not to be doubted. Brown suggests an appearance in installments.³⁹ Nearchus answered Onesikritos and Cleitarchus used him on India and the voyage home from the Indus so that it is possible that a geographical and ethnographic discussion of Onesikritos' experiences appeared early, that is, in the heat of his rivalry with Nearchus. It preceded and was later encapsulated within the work which later authorities compared to the *Cyropaedia*.

If the fourth book reported the appearance of the Amazon, while Alexander was in northern Iran, and the notice of this occurrence appears about midway through the *Anabasis* of Arrian (4.15.4) and a little less than two thirds through the life by Plutarch (*Alex.* 46.4), then Onesikritos had a considerable distance to go before finishing his work, especially if the interaction between Alexander and the Indian sages occupies the place of significance suggested by the surviving references. Therefore, he may well have lived into the early third century. Onesikritos comes to our attention only in 326, and it is a reasonable assumption that he had newly joined Alexander's expedition as a young man around that time. This conclusion is endorsed by the activity of his father as Alexander's teacher. That eventuality would explain well the rivalry with Nearchus, who, as a boyhood friend of Alexander, might naturally have resented the appearance on the scene of a younger rival. The earliest notice on Alexander's *anabasis* which might suggest autopsy involves Hyrkania in 329 (F 3, 4), but the majority of the fragments touch on India (F 6–26), or on later stages of the expedition (F 27–33). If this supposition is correct, Onesikritos stands in an interesting position, since he had served under Alexander, and began creating his work in the king's lifetime, but lived long enough to participate in the later ideological and philosophical elaboration of Alexander's life.

THE FAMILY OF ONESIKRITOS IN POLITICS AND PHILOSOPHY

One dimension of the careers of the family of Onesikritos can be dealt with briefly, although it provides a significant insight. They were connected with seafaring, as might be deduced from their conducting of business in Attica, which was probably mercantile in nature. Onesikritos II serves with Alexander as a specialist in sailing. If I am correct that he was a young man at that time, it is possible that inherited connections may well have prepared him for this role. So he stood in that great tradition of archaic and classical Aiginetan seafaring, of which he is one of the last prominent representatives. The maritime skills of

equally likely that Nearchus tried to "correct" views promulgated orally by Onesikritos in opposition to himself in the court circles of Alexander during the king's lifetime.

38. See, e.g., J.R. Hamilton, "Cleitarchus and Aristobulus," *Historia* 10 (1961) 448–58, esp. 457–58; cf. W.W. Tarn, *Alexander the Great* 2 (Cambridge 1948) 16–43.

39. Brown *Onesikritos* 7; cf. Pédech *Historiens* 76.

Onesikritos might have become known to the Macedonians through their military cooperation with the Aiginetans, since there are indications that the Aiginetans may have been actively raiding Attica in support of Philip.⁴⁰ Conversely, these upper-class Aiginetans might have been attracted to the Macedonian cause because of Philip's confrontation with the Athenians during the 350s and 340s.

On the political philosophy of the family, one is heavily dependent on the writings of Onesikritos II. Some of the tragedies of Diogenes with mythological subjects may have concerned kingship. As we have seen, they were attributed to Philiskos. The dialogue *Kodros* might have dealt with political questions. Onesikritos II appears to have used the subject of the rearing and maturation of Alexander as a framework for promulgating Cynic political ideas. For one thing, he has been thought to have been the original source for that famous encounter between Diogenes the Cynic and Alexander the Great, in which Alexander states that he would be Diogenes, were he not Alexander.⁴¹ If so, Onesikritos II gave a unique and highly significant twist to the incident. The dominant Cynic tradition on the Hellenistic kings is hostile, and the summonses of Diogenes specifically by Philip and the Diadochi are usually given a hostile slant.⁴² It is even possible to speak of an Alexander/Diogenes antithesis.⁴³ In the specifically Onesicritean tradition, however, although Diogenes dismisses Alexander by asking him to remove himself from his light, he wins the king's admiration: if Alexander could not be Alexander, he would be (or should like to be) Diogenes.

The abstemious and ascetic lifestyle of Hindu wise men was treated by Onesikritos in terms exactly parallel to the conventional treatment of the Cynic sage. A clear example is F 17a (= Strabo 15.1.63–65 C714–16), which relates Onesikritos' audience with the Gymnosophists Kalanos and Mandanis.⁴⁴ These Brahmins practice an ascetic lifestyle based on the avoidance of pleasure and pain, a reaction against *truphē*, and a distinction between *lupē*

40. See pp. 355–57 and 366–68 above.

41. Cf. Plut. *Mor.* 331F, 605E; [Diogenes] *Ep.* 33.4, p. 248 Hercher. See S.L. Radt, "Zu Plutarchs *VITA ALEXANDRI*," *Mnemosyne* 20 (1967) 120–26, esp. 120–22; Pédech *Historiens* 94–99.

42. In Diogenes Laertius, Diogenes mocks Philip by calling himself a spy of the king's greed (DL 6.43). Incidents involving Alexander and his court are often negative (6.45, 60?, 63, 68). Others treated with scant respect are Perdikkas (6.44), the "satraps?" (6.46), and Krateros (6.57). The apocryphal epistles of Diogenes are filled with similar material: for Alexander, see *Ep.* 24 (p. 241 Hercher), 33 (247–48), 40 (254–56); for Antipater, see 4 (236), 14 (239), 15 (239); for Perdikkas, see 45 (256). For complete citations, see F. Sayre, *The Greek Cynics* (Baltimore 1948) 73, and for analysis, see H. Niehues-Pröbsting, *Der Kynismus des Diogenes und der Begriff des Zynismus* (Munich 1979) 87–109. See also Dio Chrys. *Or.* 4 for an elaboration of Cynic anti-Alexander polemics in a reworking of a meeting between Alexander and Diogenes (cf. Höistad *Cynic Hero* 205–10).

43. Giglioni *Studi Ellenistici* 54–57.

44. In general, see Brown *Onesicritus* 38–46; Sayre *Cynics* 42–49; Höistad *Cynic Hero* 135–38; Pédech *Historiens* 104–14.

and *ponos* (Strabo 15.1.64 C715; cf. DL 6.71 on Cynic *ponos*, with 6.2).⁴⁵ Mandanis views the king as a seeker of enlightenment (cf. ἐν ὅπλοις φιλοσοφοῦντα) and sees his political role as the practice, encouragement, and even the imposition of *sōphrosunē*.⁴⁶ Hence, native rulers ought to submit to Alexander, who is their better. Mandanis also approves of Pythagoras, Sokrates, and Diogenes from Onesikritos' report of them, but criticizes their failure to prioritize φύσις over νόμος (outdoing Diogenes in his ἀναίδεια, one might notice). This interpretation of Indian religion is hardly surprising: Onesikritos reduced an exotic behavior pattern into the nearest familiar analogue, Cynic self-mortification and withdrawal from society.

There may have been even more in Onesikritos' narrative along the same lines, in the form of retelling other meetings between Alexander and the sages, as is shown by lengthier treatments of such meetings between Alexander and his representatives and the Indian sophists in Pseudo-Kallisthenes (III.5–6), and the Cynic diatribes which are known from a papyrus from Geneva (*PGen.* #271).⁴⁷

Such accounts have only a tenuous grounding in Indian cultural realities with the subject providing almost an open field for ideologizing. Accordingly, it is not surprising to learn that the Cynic tradition hostile to Alexander is also represented in the reworking of material on the Indian sages.⁴⁸

Similar Cynic parainetic features are seen in Onesikritos F 24 (= Strabo 15.1.34 C701–702) on the Indian kingdom of Mousikanos, which was remarkable for the austerity of its people. Among the utopian features that make their appearance are the inhabitants' long life, the non-existence of courts, and the cooperation between the generations, wherein youths serve their elders, and so take the place of slaves.⁴⁹

Let us conclude by hypothesizing about the attractions of Cynicism for the family of Onesikritos. The surviving fragments of Onesikritos II provide some confidence that the general pattern outlined below may be correct. The adversarial attitude of the Cynics toward the institutions of the *polis* may well

45. See Pédech *Historiens* 108–10.

46. Note the occasions on which Alexander emended the customs of a non-Greek people: *FGH* 134 F 5, with Jacoby *FGH* 2, 471–72. In a parallel fashion, Plutarch has Alexander observe during his meeting with Diogenes that δι' ἔργων ἐφιλοσόφουν (*Mor.* 331F).

47. See V. Martin, "Un recueil de diatribes cyniques, Pap. Genev. inv. 271," *MH* 16 (1959) 77–115. Cf. P. Photiadès, "Les diatribes du papyrus de Genève 271, leur traductions et élaborations successives," *MH* 16 (1959) 116–39, who suggests thorough utilization of Onesikritos in the other accounts of Greek interaction with the "sophists" during Alexander's expedition.

48. Compare a papyrus account of Alexander's interaction with the Indians (*PBerl.* #13044 = *FGH* 153 F 9), presenting them as philosophers confronted by an arbitrary ruler, for which see U. Wilcken, "Alexander der Grosse und die indischen Gymnosophisten," *SPAW* (1923) 150–83. See, in general, G.C. Hansen, "Alexander und die Brahmanen," *Klio* 43–45 (1965) 351–80.

49. Brown *Onesikritos* 57–62; Pédech *Historiens* 114–17. A very different reality, one of resistance to the Macedonians, is passed over (Arr. *Anab.* 6.15.5–17.2; cf. DS 17.102.5–7; Q. Curtius 9.8.8–14. Plut. *Alex.* 64 ends his abbreviated account of the revolt with a rather more sinister dialogue with the brahmanic rebels.

have been the key factor. For all the disasters suffered by the Athenian state, for instance, fourth-century Athenian and Athenocentric intellectuals, for the most part, remained faithful adherents to the idea of the *polis*. Plato and his successor, Aristotle, set out to design emended versions of a *polis*-polity. While such an exercise may appear to have been worthwhile to those thinkers immersed in the history of the leading cities, to an Aiginetan, the political order of the *polis* may have appeared rather less viable. It mattered, in the end, very little what the constitution of the Aiginetans had been during the Pentekontaeteia. Contemporary Aiginetans seem to have considered it an embodiment of *eunomia*. In any case, the overwhelming military power of the leading states was the operative factor in the later misfortunes of Aigina, which can only have been a disillusioning experience to members of the political and economic leading groups. And misfortune in foreign affairs undoubtedly led to internal strife (see pp. 352–54 above).

It may not be too bold, then, to find in the Cynic rejection of the *polis*-lifestyle a particularly attractive stance for elite Aiginetans like the family of Onesikritos. One Cynic answer to the political impasse facing the ordinary *polis* was to reject upper-class Greek mores of the fourth century in favor of self-abnegation and withdrawal. So Crates sang the praises of the utopian city *Pērē* 'Leather Pouch' (an actualization of the Cynic lifestyle itself), which was a place free from self-indulgent behavior.⁵⁰ The story of the philosophical "seduction" of the worldly Onesikritos (I) and his sons is another dramatization of the same rejection. If the *polis* was no longer viable, lowered expectations created the possibility for autarchy/autarky.⁵¹ Diogenes had described his civic status as *κοσμοπολίτης* 'citizen of the world' (DL 6.63), and this was perhaps an attractive alternative to continued fidelity to the *ethos* of the traditional *polis*.⁵²

Even more attractive may have been the idea of the charismatic king, as Onesikritos II presented Alexander. In society, his leadership was balanced by the authority of the Cynic recusant, who instructed the ruler rather more by example than by precept. So the absolute exercise of semidivine royal power, which could coerce changes in the human condition, might be delimited by the sages' near absolute rejection of all political activities. These polarities could then become a rehearsal for the ideologies of the Hellenistic period.

50. See the fragments collected by Diels in *PPF* 10 B 2, fr. 4–9, esp. fr. 4 = DL 6.85; fr. 6 = Plut. *Mor.* 125F, where *truphē* leads to *stasis*.

51. Cf. A.N.M. Rich, "The Cynic Conception of ΑΥΤΑΡΚΕΙΑ," *Mnemosyne* 9 (1936) 23–29.

52. Giglioli *Studi Ellenistici* 60–68; note p. 61 for "il cosmopolitismo cinico sia la faccia complementare dell'individualismo . . . il cinismo sia un sintomo di dissoluzione e di disaffezione per la Polis, annuncio dell'avvento della civiltà 'ellenistica'."

Notes on Hellenistic Aigina

WITH THE SHIFT in military strength and economic power away from individual city-states of homeland Greece during the Hellenistic period, a corresponding shift takes place in the historical documentation.¹ Once, during the archaic and classical periods, the Aiginetans had been not only a major force in the constellation of military powers in central Greece, but also one of the leading maritime states in all Greece. Aigina's long confrontation with the Athenians, at first as an individual *polis* (so well attested, for example, in Herodotus), had eventually made of the city an obvious (and often eager) recruit for the groupings of states brought together by the Spartans against Athens. With the waning into insignificance on the stage of international politics of the animosities of the *poleis* of central Greece, Aigina can be expected to make only fitful impressions on the surviving historical record. Our dossier on Hellenistic Aigina, however, can be augmented when epigraphical material is brought under consideration. The extant data can illuminate some major historical phenomena during the Hellenistic period in their connection to the cities of homeland Greece, for even isolated notices lie open to interpretation because of their meaningfulness in the context of the previous history of the island. It is not only for their impact on Hellenistic international relations that the evidence on Aigina after Alexander's death is important. By investigating Hellenistic Aigina, we can shed light on the earlier history of the island by enlarging the body of comparative evidence.

THE ANTIGONID STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF GREECE

I have suggested above that the Aiginetans had a change in heart toward the Macedonians during Alexander's lifetime (pp. 358–59). That change is evidenced by the use of the island as a refuge by anti-Macedonians like Demosthenes and Hypereides. Nonetheless, Aigina may have also stood aloof from the Hellenic League which fought Antipater for Greek freedom in the Lamian War. For the remainder of Antipater's life, Aigina remained under the leadership of pro-Macedonians. There is no reason to think that it was worthwhile for the Macedonian regent to garrison the island, which was not of military significance at this time. However, with the death of Antipater and the confrontation between Polyperkhon, his chosen successor, and his son Cassander, Aigina once more took on strategical importance. In 319, Cassander

1. The following works will be cited by author's name: B. Niese, *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten* (Gotha 1893–1903); W.S. Ferguson, *Hellenistic Athens* (London 1911); E. Will, *Histoire politique du monde hellénistique (323–30 av. J.-C.)*² (Nancy 1979–1982). L. Moretti, *Iscrizioni storiche ellenistiche* (Florence 1967–1975) = ISE.

attacked Attica with a naval force provided him by Antigonos Monophthalmos (DS 18.68.1). He was admitted to Mounikhia by Nikanor, the commander of Antipater's garrison there, who had for some time been one of his sympathizers (DS 18.64–65). When Cassander was confronted by the superior forces of Polyperkhon, he brought Aigina over (*προσηγάγετο*) before mounting an unsuccessful assault on Salamis (DS 18.69.1–2). The term *προσηγάγετο* implies that Cassander induced the Aiginetans to join his following rather than forced them militarily (note Kassandros of Aigina, active c. 186). Whether they thought it politic to become followers of the man leading the dominant naval force in the region or saw some advantage in siding with Cassander (such as an opportunity to damage the Athenians) cannot be reconstructed. Nevertheless, Aigina was probably Cassander's base when he operated against the Athenians (cf. Paus. 1.15.1), whom he defeated in a battle at sea (Polyaen. 4.11.1).²

In this sequence of events Aigina can be seen to acquire once again a familiar role in naval warfare. The island was most opportunely situated for use by a power whose naval forces controlled the Saronic Gulf and wished to operate against the mainland. That had presumably been why the Aiginetan submission to Dareios in 491 had been so threatening to the Athenians that they encouraged an intervention by the Spartan king Kleomenes in order to curtail its impact (pp. 113–14 above). Similarly, a Spartan harmost had mounted watch on Attica from Aigina in the period after the Peloponnesian War (pp. 335–38). Once again in 377–76, the Spartan navarch Pollis had attempted to blockade Attica from an arc of bases which included Aigina (pp. 350–51).

As has been noted, the fleet with which Cassander had taken Aigina and threatened Salamis had been provided to him by Antigonos. Any determination of the status of Aigina in the years after 318 turns on a reconstruction of the history of Antigonid seapower in the Aegean. Unfortunately, Aigina is not again mentioned in our sources for some time after its adhesion to Cassander: Aigina was occupied by Demetrios Poliorcetes in 296–94 during his campaign directed at punishing the Athenians for their rebellion against him. His interdiction of Attica, underlined by the brutal execution of a merchant and helmsman of a grain freighter, had driven the Athenians to the brink of starvation, at which time a Ptolemaic fleet appeared in the waters *περὶ Αἴγινα* 'around Aigina' (Plut. *Demetr.* 33.7). One assumes that this phraseology is used because the Ptolemaic squadron did not actually have access to Aigina itself, which lay in Antigonid hands. Demetrios was trying to mount a blockade of Attica similar to that essayed by the Spartan admiral Pollis in 377–76. Like his Spartan forerunner Demetrios probably utilized Aigina as a base.

If we ask whether Demetrios' occupation of the island at this time was a recapture or its first seizure by the Antigonids, the likelihood is that Aigina

2. See Niese 1.244 with n. 4. Salamis eventually fell during the next autumn to Cassander's admiral, Nikanor, on his return from the Hellespont (Paus. 1.25.6, 35.2; DS 18.72.3–9; Polyaen. 4.6.8).

was easily retaken, because it had recently been an Antigonid dependency.³ In that case, the issue becomes in what context was the island likely to have fallen under Antigonid influence. The two most probable junctures (in the present state of the evidence) are the time of the foundation of the League of the Islanders in 315/4 and when Demetrios liberated Athens in 307. In the absence of direct testimony, the geographical setting of the island is an ambiguous indicator. Aigina was an essential outwork for any power seeking security in its possession of Attica. Hence Perikles rejected Spartan calls for Aiginetan autonomy before the Peloponnesian War (see pp. 266–71 above). Yet, at the same time, it was the last insular stepping stone for a military presence which intended to utilize its hegemony over the Cyclades to extend influence into mainland Greece, as the Persians had anticipated doing in 491.

Nonetheless, let us take up the latter of the two contexts first, since it is, to my mind, the less probable alternative. Plutarch's account of the liberation of Athens does not mention Aigina (*Demetr.* 8.3–9.4). The capture of Megara is, however, recounted (*Demetr.* 9.5–8) and diplomatic efforts to pry Sikyon and Corinth out of Ptolemaic hands are also treated (*Demetr.* 15.1–4). It had been in the previous year (308) that Ptolemy had overrun Andros before sailing toward the Isthmus, whereupon he had taken Sikyon and Corinth (DS 20.37.1–2; *Suda s.v.* Δημήτριος, δ 431 Adler). At that time he was initially acting against Cassander in an early effort to build up his own power base in Greece, but chose to end his expedition in an agreement with Cassander.⁴ When he had taken Megara, Ptolemy had attempted to woo the philosopher Stilpo into following him to Egypt (DL 2.115). That Stilpo avoided his attentions by going to Aigina until Ptolemy left Megara is another indication that the island was not in Ptolemaic hands. Aigina is also passed over in the treatment by Diodorus of Demetrios' later successes, which included a later "liberation" of Corinth and Sikyon (20.102.1–103.3).⁵ That both Ptolemy and in the next year Demetrios seem to have bypassed Aigina argues that the island already lay in Antigonid hands.

Thus we are pointed away from the activities of Demetrios and Ptolemy in 308–7 toward our other alternative, to which several positive arguments may be added. Aigina fell into Antigonid hands in the period around the establishment of the League of the Islanders and after the breach between Antigonos and Cassander (cf. DS 19.61.1–62.2).⁶ An unattested transfer of Aigina into Antigonid hands at this time finds its place among a series of events of a similar

3. C. Wehrli, *Antigone et Demetrios* (Geneva 1969) 163, assumes a recapture at this time, basing himself on Polyæn. 4.7.5 (to be discussed below). See also Niese 1.359–63; J.G. Droysen, *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (Gotha 1877–1878) 2.2.250.

4. Will 1.68–69; see also F. Durrbach, "ANTIFONEIA—DHMHTREIA," *BCH* 31 (1907) 208–27, esp. 220–22.

5. See also *ISE* #7.1–5, 1.12–15; Philochorus *FGH* 328 F 66.

6. For the date of the League, see Durrbach *BCH* (1907) 208–27, analysing *IG* XI.4 1036; cf. Plut. *Demetr.* 25.7; Phylarchus *FGH* 81 F 31. See also I.L. Merker, "The Ptolemaic Officials and the League of the Islanders," *Historia* 19 (1970) 141–60, esp. 141–43 and n. 2 on chronology. For hostilities in this period, see Ferguson 49–53.

political and military complexion. Contemporaneously, Dioskourides, the nephew of Antigonos, was operating in the Aegean, bringing over islands, and another admiral Telesphoros moved against the Peloponnesus (DS 19.62.9).⁷ Dioskourides was also charged with succoring unspecified others who had already accepted the suzerainty of Antigonos. When we recognize that Athens under Demetrios of Phaleron was a naval surrogate for Cassander's Macedonia, some more details from the same situation can be isolated. Delos was lost to Athens around this same time.⁸ Lemnos too appears to have been lost by Athens, then recovered by the Athenian general Aristoteles, and lost once more to Dioskourides and Antigonid control.⁹ Finally, in the same year, the Athenians had to intervene against a brigand chief named Glauketas, who employed Kythnos as his base (*IG* II² 682.10–13).¹⁰ Thus the naval balance in the Aegean had turned during 315–14 heavily against Cassander and Athens.

After a lull during which Cassander and Antigonos failed to find a *modus vivendi* (DS 19.75.6), fighting at sea resumed in the waters of central Greece during 313. Cassander countered by attempting to recover Oreos in Euboea with a fleet, which was in turn attacked by two forces of Antigonos which converged on it from the Peloponnesus and Asia (DS 19.75.7–8). Amid some manoeuvring by Cassander which involved Athenian forces under Thymokhares (*IG* II² 682.13–18), Antigonid forces received further augmentation with the arrival of Ptolemaios (as supreme commander) with another fleet (DS 19.77.2). Thereupon Ptolemaios was himself active at Oropos and in the waters adjoining Attica (DS 19.78.3–5)¹¹ between two sets of operations in Euboea, during which he dislodged Cassander from Oreos by threatening Chalcis (DS 19.77.4–7, 78.2–3).¹² He then operated successfully against Cassander's interests in Boiotia and Phokis (DS 19.78.5). Thereupon the naval

7. For the operations of the Antigonid admirals, see H. Hauben, *Het Vlootbevelhebberschap in de Vroege Diadochentijd* (Brussels 1975) 27–30, cf. 93–98.

8. W.A. Laidlaw, *A History of Delos* (Oxford 1933) 97–101; Ferguson 49–51. See J. Tréheux, "Les dernières années de Délos sous le protectorat des Amphictions," in *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire offerts à Charles Picard* (Paris 1949 = *RA* 31–32) 2.1008–32, esp. 1029–30 and Wehrli *Antigone* 114 n. 65 for arguments from Tréheux' unpublished thesis dating the loss to 314. Note its oral defense as reported by N. Duval in *RH* 224 (1960) 241–45 and the remarks of P. Mazon, "Rapport sur les travaux d'École Française d'Athènes en 1947," *CRAI* (1948) 283–301, esp. 289–90. Cf. *IG* XI.2 138.

9. Operations of Dioskourides and Themison (another officer of Antigonos) in the northern Aegean are implied by the later movement of ships under their command from the Hellespont to Tyre (DS 19.62.7). For the intervention at Lemnos of Aristoteles and the counteraction of Dioskourides: DS 19.68.3–4. The change is reflected in the archon dates of Lemnian decrees (*IG* XII.8 18, 19; *IG* XII Suppl., p. 147), for which see Wehrli *Antigone* 113, 115–116; Merker *Historia* (1970) 141–42 with n. 2. For parallel changes in the status of Imbros, see Ferguson 50, n. 4, citing *IG* XII.8 47–48. See Durrbach *BCH* (1907) 214–16 with n. 1; Hauben *Het Vlootbevelhebberschap* 18–19. For the restoration of the islands by Antigonos to Athens in 307, note DS 20.46.4.

10. See Hauben *Het Vlootbevelhebberschap* 36–40.

11. See R.H. Simpson, "Ptolemaeus' Invasion of Attica in 313 B.C.," *Mnemosyne* 8 (1955) 34–37.

12. See S.C. Bakhuizen, *Salganeus and the Fortifications on its Mountains* (Groningen 1970) 105–30.

war between Cassander and Antigonos seems to have run down as the Antigoniid squadrons withdrew to Asia Minor.

The loss of Aigina to the Antigoniid camp (if it truly occurred at this juncture) would be another item in the same series of setbacks. In 313, the Antigoniid forces must have had bases of operation adjoining the contested waters of the Euripos and the Saronic Gulf, which may have included Aigina. But alignment in the Antigoniid camp does not imply occupation by a garrison, since the purported purpose of the Antigoniid intervention was Greek autonomy (DS 19.78.2 on the contemporary display made of autonomous Chalcis; cf. DS 19.61.3).

The same situation has every probability of having continued down to the end of the century. The shift of Athens into the hands of Demetrios in 307 meant that Attica (Plut. *Demetr.* 8.1–9.4, 10.1–2; DS 20.45.2–46.3; Marmor Parium *FGH* 239 B 20–21; *ISE* #7, 1.12–15), a target of priority for recovery by Cassander, lay between Aigina and Macedonian military activity. Cassander's attack on Attica was made by land in 306 (Paus. 1.26.3; *IG* II² 467; cf. *IG* II² 463, 1487; *SIG*³ #328, 346). Although he again used an approach by land in 304 (taking Phyle and Panakton: Plut. *Demetr.* 23.3), Cassander struck at Attica by sea at the same time. His concern for getting the use of Salamis in order to operate against Attica indicates that Aigina was not available for his use (Polyaen. 4.11.1; Paus. 1.35.2).¹³ A similar conclusion is indicated by Demetrios' actions in 304–1: he operated successfully in central Greece and in the Peloponnesus, taking Sikyon and Corinth (Plut. *Demetr.* 23.1–3; DS 20.102–103; Polyaen. 4.7.3).¹⁴ Later Demetrios gained the adhesion of the cities of the Argolic Akte (Plut. *Demetr.* 25.1). Once again there is no reference to Aigina; possibly it already served as a base for Antigoniid naval forces.

A confirming witness to the situation of an Aigina under Antigoniid influence is provided by an inscription (cf. *IG* VII 2419) which contains a list of states and dynasts contributing to the reconstruction of Thebes.¹⁵ The Aiginetans appear as contributors (ll. 25–26) just before Philokles, son of Apollodoros (ll. 27–29), and Demetrios Poliorcetes, who contributed out of the spoils of his Rhodian campaign of 305–4 (ll. 30–34). Demetrios brought Boiotia into the Antigoniid camp in 304/3 (Plut. *Demetr.* 23.3), and his presence in central Greece probably provided the occasion for his gift. As Sidon, the mother city of Philokles (he was later its king) lay in Antigoniid hands at this time, Philokles' appearance on the inscription is owed to an early stage of Antigoniid service for this distinguished admiral, at a time before he entered the following of Ptolemy.¹⁶ The Aiginetans had had a long history of friendship with Thebes: they

13. See Ferguson 114–18; M. Fortina, *Cassandro, re di Macedonia* (Novara 1965) 97–102; N.G.L. Hammond & F.W. Walbank, *A History of Macedonia* 3 (Oxford 1988) 175–78.

14. Note *ISE* #5, 1.8–10.

15. My discussion follows the epigraphical treatment of M. Holleaux, "Sur une inscription de Thèbes," *Études d'épigraphie et d'histoire grecques* (Paris 1938) 1.1–40 (= *REG* 8 [1895] 7–48).

16. Less credible is Holleaux' contention (*Études* 26–32, 34–35) that Aigina was subjected to Ptolemy after the defection of Ptolemaios, admiral of Antigonos (DS 20.19.2, 28.3), and after his

considered the nymphs Thebe and Aigina to be sisters, and had helped Thebes against Athens in the late sixth century (see pp. 91–93, 208–9 above). Joining with Demetrios in subsidizing the Thebans might not then have been a task that was unattractive to them. It may also be assumed that the Aiginetans participated in Demetrios' revival of the League of Corinth in 302 (Plut. *Demetr.* 25.4; DS 20.102.1, cf. 107.1; *IG* IV.1² 68).¹⁷

The steep decline in Antigonid power and prestige after Ipsos will of course have affected the situation of the Aiginetans. Athens might have been given some breathing room by Demetrios, who withdrew his garrison from the city (*IG* II² 774 = *ISE* #23?).¹⁸ In any event, after Ipsos Athens distanced itself from Demetrios (Plut. *Demetr.* 30.4–31.2; *IG* II² 641 = *SIG*³ #362). Hence the report of Polyaeus of Demetrios' capture of Salamis and Aigina indicates a successful attempt by the king to recoup an eroding position (4.7.5: Δημήτριος Αἴγινα καὶ Σαλαμῖνα λαβῶν).¹⁹ After taking Salamis and Aigina, Demetrios seems to have continued to attack Attica, then entered the Peloponnesus to attack Messene, and finally returned to seize Rhamnous and Eleusis (Plut. *Demetr.* 33.1–8). It was at this point in 294 that a Ptolemaic force had operated from the environs of Aigina before its dislodging by Demetrios' fleet (*Demetr.* 33.7–8). Demetrios thereupon forced the Athenians, recently beset with secessions and the usurpation of Lakhares (Paus. 1.25.7; Polyaeus 4.7.5; Phlegon? *FGH* 257a F 2–4), to seek terms in 294 (Plut. *Demetr.* 33–35; *IG* II² 646).²⁰

Nonetheless, it is unlikely that Aigina remained as an Antigonid possession for much longer. In 287, Demetrios was removed from his control of Macedonia itself (by Pyrrhos and Lysimakhos: Plut. *Demetr.* 44.2–9; *Pyrrh.* 10.6–11.14). Athens revolted from Antigonid control.²¹ At that time, the Athenian

sweep through the Cyclades of 309/8 (in Holleaux' opinion, a campaign undertaken to the disadvantage of the Antigonids, not with their cooperation). The gift was then made at a time when Philokles was already a Ptolemaic agent, not a servant of Antigonos as Beloch *GG*² 4.2.327–28 had argued. Cf. also Wehrli *Antigone* 117 with n. 88; Merker *Historia* (1970) 143–46; H. Hauben, "Philokles, King of the Sidonians and General of the Ptolemies," in E. Lipinski (ed.), *Studia Phoenicia* (Leuven 1987) 413–27, esp. n. 18, pp. 416–17.

17. See *SVA* #446, 3.63–80; also W.W. Tarn, "The Constitutive Act of Demetrios' League of 303," *JHS* 42 (1922) 198–206; W.S. Ferguson, "Demetrios Poliorcetes and the Hellenic League," *Hesperia* 17 (1948) 112–36, esp. 120–23; L. Robert, "Adeimantos et la ligue de Corinthe," *Hel-lenica* 2 (Paris 1946) 15–33. Note also *ISE* #9, 1.17–21.

18. Hammond *Macedonia* n. 4, 3.201.

19. Demetrios was sensibly recovering a base which had only recently been in his possession and not (with an imprudent diversion of resources) seizing a position which had been under Ptolemaic control for over a decade; see n. 3 above.

20. C. Habicht, *Untersuchungen zur politischen Geschichte Athens im 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* (Munich 1979) 16–21.

21. Plut. *Demetr.* 46.2–4, *Pyrrh.* 12.6–8; Paus. 1.26.1–3, 29.13; [Plut.] *Mor.* 851E; cf. *SEG* 28.60; *IG* II² 650, 657.33–38, 666–67, 682.30–40; *ISE* #13, 1.26–27. See Ferguson 136–65; A.R. Deprado, "La liberazione di Athene nel 286 A.C.," *RFIC* 31 (1953) 27–42; T.L. Shear, *Kallias of Sphettos and the Revolt of Athens in 286 B.C.*, *Hesperia* Suppl. 17 (Princeton 1978) esp. 14–25, 61–73; Habicht *Untersuchungen* 45–62.

Kallias of Sphettos, who commanded the Ptolemaic garrison on Andros, conveyed a force of mercenaries to aid in the defence against the Antigonid garrisons in Attica (*SEG* 28.60.18–27). Ptolemy had brought a strong fleet to the Aegean and many cities went over to him (Plut. *Demetr.* 44.3; cf. *Pyrrh.* 11.2). The League of Islanders probably came under Ptolemaic hegemony.²² The League's membership included Amorgos, Andros, Delos (?), Keos, Ios, Kythnos, Mykonos, Naxos, and Paros (?), so that it is not *prima facie* impossible that Aigina also participated. Demetrios attempted to redeem the situation by besieging Athens, which was assisted by Pyrrhos (Plut. *Demetr.* 46.2–3; *Pyrrh.* 12.6–8). Demetrios was then dissuaded by an embassy headed by the philosopher Crates and left for Asia (Plut. *Demetr.* 46.3–4). Athens accepted a peace that left the *asty* girdled by Macedonian-held fortifications (*SEG* 28.60.32–40; *IG* II² 682.36–40).²³ The Athenian attempts to liberate these positions will, however, have had the effect of sheltering Aigina (Polyaen. 5.17.1; Paus. 1.29.10; [Plut.] *Mor.* 851F; *IG* II² 657.34–36; cf. *ISE* #13, 1.26–27).²⁴

Aigina is not mentioned among the handful of other strongpoints that remained under the control of Antigonos Gonatas after the capture of his father by Seleukos.²⁵ It was also quite likely that Macedonian counteractions attempting to exert control once again over Attica had the effect of allowing Aigina to avoid any direct pressure from Antigonos Gonatas.²⁶ Aiginetan freedom from Antigonid direct control is also suggested by the pattern of fighting in the Chremonidean War (265–61?). A solid network of Ptolemaic bases appears to have been put in place when the Ptolemaic admiral Patroklos intervened on behalf of the Athenians, who were contesting Macedonian hegemony.²⁷ The existence within Attica itself of forward bases for Ptolemaic forces is the most striking manifestation of Ptolemaic domination of the Aegean.²⁸ Those positions on the Attic coast would not have been tenable had Antigonos Gonatas possessed bases on the nearby islands like Keos or Aigina from which to take in the rear the advanced Ptolemaic squadrons.²⁹

22. On the rationale behind Ptolemaic policy, see Will 1.161–67. The extensive epigraphical evidence of the League is discussed at length by Merker *Historia* (1970) 158–59; R.S. Bagnall, *The Administration of the Ptolemaic Possessions Outside Egypt* (Leiden 1976) 136–58.

23. Habicht *Untersuchungen* 62–67.

24. Cf. Habicht *Untersuchungen* 78–79, 95–112.

25. See Hammond *Macedonia* 3.269–75.

26. Cf. Moretti who interprets *ISE* #14, 1.28–31 to indicate Macedonian control of the *asty* itself in 281.

27. *SVA* #476, 3.129–33; Paus. 1.1.1, 7.3; 3.6.4–6; *SEG* 24.154; cf. Trogus *Prolog.* 26; Just. 26.2.6–8; Phylarchus *FGH* 81 F 1; Athen. 8.334A; Plut. *Agis* 3.7; Polyaen. 4.6.20. Note also *IG* II² 665–67 = *SIG*³ #385–87. See Ferguson 178–87; W.W. Tarn, *Antigonos Gonatas* (Oxford 1913) 294–306; Habicht *Untersuchungen* 108–12; Hammond *Macedonia* 3.276–89.

28. J.R. McCredie, *Fortified Military Camps in Attica*, *Hesperia* Suppl. 11 (Princeton 1966) esp. 107–14. H. Heinen, *Untersuchungen zur hellenistischen Geschichte des 3. Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Wiesbaden 1972) 142–52, 159–67.

29. In fact, it was Patroklos who operated from Keos (*IG* XII.5 1061).

AIGINA AMID KINGDOMS AND LEAGUES

I prefer to see Aigina in the period after its liberation from Antigonid influence preserving an autonomy (however precarious) rather than being envisaged as falling under Ptolemaic influence through the Nesiotic League. While Egypt was the dominant maritime power, the example of Tenos shows how an island city might maintain its autonomy (at least for a time).³⁰ So the strategic argument against Antigonid control does not conversely imply Ptolemaic domination, as there is no mention of Ptolemaic activity out of Aigina during the 260s. Instead, the Ptolemaic admiral Patroklos used as bases the island that later bore his name and a group of coastal positions in Attica itself. Would he not have operated (perhaps with greater impetus against the Peiraeus) from Aigina, if it had been under Ptolemaic control? A similar point, one of more general application, can be made about the Ptolemaic naval base at Methana (Arsinoe), which had a long history as an important Egyptian military asset in the region of the Saronic Gulf. It was certainly less strategically placed than Aigina.³¹ It seems unlikely that the Ptolemaic administration would have preferred Methana to Aigina if it had had that choice. The analogy provided by Spartan military activity during the late fifth and early fourth centuries underscores both points. The Spartans were rather ineffectual operating out of Kenkhreai and Epidauros (compare the Egyptians at Methana) while the Athenians held Aigina (see pp. 327–28 above). Yet they used Aigina to great effect against the Attic coast during the Corinthian War (pp. 342–47).

If Aigina did not fall into the hands of the Ptolemies or come under their influence through the League of the Islanders by the time of the Chremonidean War, it is unlikely that the island would have done so afterward. The Ptolemaic naval power demonstrated during the war represents a high water mark. The defeat of the Greek clients of Ptolemy in itself may have been disruptive to the islands under Ptolemy's control. Next the poorly attested Second Syrian War (c. 260–53) may have served to undermine Ptolemaic influence in the islands. Though Egypt continued to possess valuable holdings in the Aegean, the hegemony expressed through the League of the Islanders appears to have ended during the late 260s on the basis of the epigraphical record.³² The poorly attested and hard-to-date battles at Kos (261 or 253?) and Andros (245?; with an Antigonos, probably Gonatas, as adversary) are very probably implicated in this decline.³³

30. The island lay outside the League, on the basis of its diplomacy with Athens (*IG* II² 660, cf. 2378).

31. On Arsinoe-Methana, see F. Hiller (von Gaertringen), “Ἐπιγραφαὶ ἐκ τοῦ ἱεροῦ τῆς Ἐπιδαύρου,” *AE* (1925–1926) 67–86, esp. 69–76; Bagnall *Possessions* 135–36. Note the head of Ptolemy VI, probably from Methana (incidentally found underwater off Aigina's harbor): J. Six, “Ein Porträt des Ptolemaios VI Philometor,” *AM* 12 (1887) 212–22.

32. Merker, *Historia* (1970) 159–60 with n. 99, p. 160, finds an epigraphic *terminus ante quem* for the League in a statue base at Delos for Agathostratos, the Rhodian admiral who defeated Ptolemaic forces at Ephesos (*IG* XI.4 1128; cf. Polyæn. 5.18).

33. Trogus *Prolog.* 27; Plut. *Pelop.* 2.4; *Mor.* 183C, 545B; *DL* 4.39; *Phaun.* #6.1.6–13; Pylarchus *FGH* 81 F 1; cf. Front. *Strat.* 3.9.10. See A. Momigliano, “A New Date for the Battle of

One characteristic of this unsettled period was an apparent friendship of the Aiginetans with the Aitolians (which could be considered a token of the absence of Macedonian control over the island). A series of proxeny decrees for Aiginetans from Aitolian-dominated Delphi (from 301–298) span these years.³⁴ A decree of 269/8 or 268/7 grants the list of privileges standard in this period to two brothers Lyandros and Onymakles, the sons of Anaxilas.³⁵ Lyandros is attested from another contemporary inscription in which a board of *hieromnāmones* was honored with the rights of *proxenoi*, while he was representing the Dorians from the Peloponnesus (*SIG*³ #482 = *FdD* 3.4 415). At very nearly the same time a grant was made to Kharikles, son of Laophon (*FdD* 3.4 149, dated by its editors to c. 270/69). A psephism of c. 265–60 in honor of the *hieromnāmōn* Timorakhos, son of Eusthenes, offers another list of similar privileges (*SIG*³ #440 = *FdD* 3.1 195.4–9). The period spanned by these decrees is controversial, with Flacelière suggesting both earlier and later dates.³⁶

One is tempted to interpret any Aiginetan effort to further their amity toward Aitolia as an example of the projection of Aitolian naval power over Aegean waters as much as by the more obvious fact that any Aitolian advances to the east and northeast in central Greece had the effect of sheltering Aigina from Macedonian pressure (a similar phenomenon seeming to exist for Attica). Yet, our best evidence for the diplomatic effects of Aitolian piracy comes from the period after mid-century.³⁷ Direct evidence for Aitolian actions around Attica is also later, in support of Aratos and the Achaeans (cf. *IG* II² 834, 844, cf. 746, 791; *SEG* 22.128).³⁸ It could be that the Aiginetans had an

Andros," *CQ* 44 (1950) 107–16; E. Bikermann, "Sur les batailles de Cos et d'Andros," *REA* 40 (1938) 369–83; W. Peremans, "La date de bataille navale de Cos," *AC* 8 (1939) 401–8; E. Manni, "Note di Cronologia Ellenistica: VI Due battaglie navali di Andros?," *Athenaeum* 30 (1952) 182–89; J. Seibert, "Die Schlacht bei Ephesos," *Historia* 25 (1976) 45–61. In general, note Heinen *Untersuchungen* 189–97; Hammond *Macedonia* 3.587–600.

34. See R. Flacelière, *Les Aitoliens à Delphes* (Paris 1932) esp. 80–91. Note the compensating gesture of Demetrios Poliorcetes in holding his own Pythia at Athens in 290 (Plut. *Demetr.* 40.7–8; Duris *FGH* 76 F 13).

35. *FdD* 3.3 200.1–6: Δελφοὶ ἔδωκαν Λυάνδρῳ, Ὀνυμακλεῖ Ἀναξίλῃ|Αἰγινάταις αὐτοῖς καὶ ἐγγόνους προξενίαν, προ|μαντείαν, προεδρίαν, προδικίαν, ἀσυλίαν, ἀτέλει|αν πάντων καὶ τᾶλλα ὅσα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις προξέ|νοισι καὶ εὐεργέταις. If its suggested date is correct (end of the fourth century), an earlier decree honoring Herakle[. . .], son of Aristas, betrays a prior stage of Aiginetan involvement at Delphi, perhaps when the island was under Antigonid hegemony (*FdD* 3.4 398). Similarly, a later phase of interaction is witnessed by *FdD* 3.3 420, along with a decree of the Aitolians in honor of Eumenes II (dated to 183/2). Among a group of three *theōroi* 'sacred ambassadors' sent out by the Aitolians is Theolytos, the son of Ariston, from Aigina. They are honored with the status of *euergētai* and *proxenoi* of the Aitolians.

36. *FdD* 3.1 195: 275/4 (*Aitoliens* App. II, 23b); 3.4 149: 270/69 (App. II, 28b); 3.4 415: 268 (App. I, 11); 3.3 200: 249/8 (App. II, 49b).

37. H. Benecke, *Die Seepolitik der Aitoler* (Hamburg 1934) esp. 11–17; E. Ziebarth, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des Seeraubs und Seehandels im alten Griechenland* (Hamburg 1929) 24–26. Note the Aitolian influence at Tenos, Delos, and Keos, for which see Flacelière *Aitoliens* 202–25, 228–33.

38. Hammond *Macedonia* 3.328 with n. 2. See also Flacelière *Aitoliens* 250.

alliance with the Aitolians or had been granted *isopoliteia* (and *asylia*) which had a basis in insuring protection from piratical depredations.³⁹

The Aiginetans lived in the midst of great turmoil in the Saronic Gulf by the late 250s. There is uncertainty, however, whether the instability in the area made Aigina a borderland which, although beset with dangers, maintained some degree of autonomy or whether it became an appanage of Macedonia, Macedonian Corinth, or even Athens. The Macedonian governor of Corinth, Alexandros, son of Krateros, revolted (c. 253/2) and declared himself king.⁴⁰ Alexandros not only attempted to hold his own against Antigonos Gonatas, but also operated against the Greek cities in the vicinity, hoping to expand his hegemony. He was successful in Euboia, using the key position of Chalcis as a stronghold. He made war on the Athenians and on the Macedonians based in Attica.⁴¹ Aigina may have moved closer politically to Athens during this period. The will of Lykon, head of the Peripatetic school, which is dated to 228–25 (DL 5.68), leaves property on Aigina to his heir Lykon (DL 5.69–70 = fr. 15 Wehrli). Yet, this ability for an Athenian or an Athenian metic to hold property on Aigina may also indicate that the property of Lykon was held through the good offices of representatives of the Macedonian king. Beloch grouped Aigina among the *τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ταπτομένων μετὰ τοῦ Πειραιέως* which are attested in *IG II*² 1225.8–9 (cf. 834).⁴² Aigina, however, is not mentioned among the locations surrendered by Diogenes, the Macedonian commander in Attica in 228 (Plut. *Aratus* 34.6; Paus. 2.8.6). The island may have varied in its degree of subservience to Macedonia in these years. As long as the Macedonians controlled the Peiraeus and other *points d'appui* in Attic territory, total independence of policy for Aigina may not have been feasible. The Aiginetan goal may have been to insure the absence of a governor and garrison.

The next stage in the history of Hellenistic Aigina is shaped by the advance of the Achaean League under Aratos to the east. After the fall of Corinth, Troizen and Epidauros on the Akte, and Megara on the Isthmus went over to the Achaeans, giving the League for the first time a significant position along the shores of the Saronic Gulf.⁴³ The Achaeans were seeking to redress the

39. On the model of the Chian treaty of c. 247/6: *ISE* #78, 2.19–24.

40. Note Trogus *Prolog.* 26; *Suda* s.v. *Εὐφωρίων*, ε 3801 Adler; *IG XII.9* 212. See P. Treves, *Euforione e la storia ellenistica* (Milan 1955) 84–111; W.H. Porter, *Plutarch's Life of Aratus* (Cork 1937) xxxvi–xli; Will 1.316–21; Hammond *Macedonia* 3.296–303. For Alexandros and the powers of the Macedonian “viceroy” at Corinth, see H. Bengtson, *Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit* (Munich 1937–1952) 2.348–53.

41. *SEG* 3.98 = *ISE* #23, 1.47–50 for cooperation between Argos and Athens. *IG II*² 1225 = *SIG*³ #454 is a decree of the Salaminians (c. 252) on behalf of Herakleitos, Macedonian *stratēgos* of the Peiraeus, who had protected the Salaminians against pirates in the service of Alexandros.

42. *GG*² 4.1.640; see also Porter *Aratus* 71; F.W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius* (Oxford 1957–1979) 1.239. J.J. Gabbert, *The Greek Hegemony of Antigonos II Gonatas (c. 283–239 B.C.)* (Diss., Univ. of Cincinnati 1982) esp. 122–39, 272, does not identify Aigina as an Antigoniid garrison.

43. Paus. 2.8.5; cf. Polyb. 2.44.3–6; *IG IV*¹ 70 = *SEG* 11.40; see *SVA* #489, 3.160–61. See F.W. Walbank, *Aratos of Sicyon* (Cambridge 1933) 57–69, for the military situation in the 230s.

Macedonian advances in Boiotia and the Megarid of Demetrios II after 237/6 (cf. Polyb. 20.5.3). The status of Aigina was (not unexpectedly) bound up in the designs of Aratos on Athens. Aratos pursued a policy of harassment of Attica and its Macedonian garrisons (including at least one full-fledged attempt on Athens) through much of the reign of Demetrios II (Plut. *Aratus* 24.3–4, 33.5–6; *SIG*³ #485; *ISE* #25, 1.51–56). At the death of Demetrios II in 229, a better opportunity arose of which Aratos availed himself (*Aratus* 34.1–4). While he was not in a position to bring Athens into the Achaean League, being out of office that year, he still brokered the Athenian purchase of their freedom from Diogenes, the commander of the Macedonian garrison troops. Diogenes surrendered the Peiraeus, Mounikhia, Salamis, and Sounion to the Athenians for a payment of 150T (*Aratus* 34.5–6; Paus. 2.8.6).⁴⁴ Thereupon the Phliasians, the Hermioneans—tyrants abdicating in each city—and the Aiginetans (cf. Polyb. 2.45.6) joined the Achaean League (*Aratus* 34.7).⁴⁵ With the removal of the Macedonian bases from which action could be taken against them, these communities of the Saronic Gulf which had been so vulnerable to seaborne assault could act with greater impunity and break away definitively from the Macedonian sphere of influence.

ATTALID AIGINA

The Aiginetan participation in the Achaean League was punctuated violently. In 210, during the First Macedonian War, a Roman fleet under a proconsul, P. Sulpicius Galba, was operating in the Saronic Gulf against the Achaean allies of Philip V. We know from Livy of attacks on the territory of Corinth and Sikyon launched from Naupaktos (27.31.1). Thereafter Galba presumably shifted his activities to the Saronic Gulf for he also captured Aigina with the aid of the Aitolians (Polyb. 9.42.5–8; cf. 22.8.9–12).⁴⁶ At first Galba intended to sell the Aiginetans into slavery although they entreated him to grant an opportunity to arrange ransoms. His reasons for refusal of this plea are noteworthy: the Aiginetans had not admitted his envoys previously, when he had sought to win them over without a resort to force. Undoubtedly, his intention then had been to use the island as a base for further operations in the Saronic Gulf, a role in which it will be seen very shortly.⁴⁷ On the next day, however, Galba did allow them to send envoys to see if they could procure ransoms.⁴⁸ He described this concession as *φιλόανθρωπον*, albeit undeserved,

44. Ferguson 237–44; C. Habicht, *Studien zur Geschichte Athens im hellenistischen Zeit* (Göttingen 1982) 79–92.

45. Walbank *Aratos* 71, 189–90.

46. Note F.W. Walbank, *Philip V* (Cambridge 1940) 307.

47. That this conclusion is correct is also indicated by the later juxtaposition of Aigina and Oreos in northern Euboea, the target of a similar seizure in 207 (this time with Attalos present), as noted in a speech to the Aitolians on behalf of peace with Philip V by the ambassador of an unknown Greek state (possibly Thrasykrates of Rhodes: Polyb. 11.5.8). Oreos was well situated for naval operations in the Malian Gulf. See Livy 28.5.18–6.8, also 28.7.4, 8.13.

48. Walbank, *Polybius* 2.186, interprets *πρὸς τὰς συγγενεῖς πόλεις* and *πρὸς τοὺς συγγενεῖς*

an act done for the sake of the rest of the Greeks. Their efforts, however, do not appear to have been all that successful, as demonstrated by the (Rhodian?) speech before the Aitolians with its stress on Aiginetan suffering (*τῶν θαλασσιπύρων Αἰγινητῶν*) and by the speech before the Achaeans in 186 of the Aiginetan Kassandros (whose name hints at earlier alignments). He refers to the fall of his home island as an *andrapodismos* (Polyb. 22.8.9).⁴⁹

Aigina became Aitolian property in accordance with the earlier Roman treaty with Aitolia (Polyb. 22.8.10). To the best of our knowledge, however, Aigina lay outside the limits of the original clause of cession.⁵⁰ Yet, previous connections between the Aitolians and Aiginetans (which we are unable to specify) may have improved their claim to the island. Their willingness to stand by while their friends of a generation or two before were enslaved does argue for the existence of some grievance, one based on an estrangement. Thereupon the Aitolians declined to occupy the island themselves. They had no particular use for a naval base and (one assumes) such an incorporation might well have been made in the face of a population bitter over its treatment at the hands of Aitolia's Roman allies. As it was, the Aitolians are severely blamed by the aforementioned (Rhodian?) ambassador for their allowing a brutalization of fellow Greeks by Roman barbarians. Rather the Aitolians (presumably in accordance with Roman wishes) viewed Aigina as an inducement for drawing Attalos I into greater exertions on behalf of the anti-Macedonian coalition by providing him with a military base in homeland Greece.⁵¹ Accordingly, they sold Aigina to Attalos for 30T (Polyb. 22.8.11). Even if this was a "knock-down" price to encourage the sale, this figure, which happens to coincide with the annual tribute once paid by the Aiginetans to the Athenians, points up that Hellenistic Aigina was merely a shadow of its archaic and classical predecessor.

Before considering the military advantage in controlling Aigina, which was to become manifest over the next few years, the island's worth in peacetime may be noted. Aigina was an excellent vantage point for monitoring affairs in the *poleis* of the homeland and a good place from which to exert influence through embassies and benefactions, as Attalos I did in the case of Athens.⁵² Attalos' military motivations were the same as those of naval powers going back to Dareios I of Persia, who had been anxious to draw Aigina into their orbit. Attalos planned to use Aigina as a forward base for operations in the Saronic Gulf and central Greece.⁵³ In the course of his operations against

as meaning that they resorted to the surrounding Dorian communities of the Gulf, but an appeal to the Achaeans makes more sense. Political affiliation creates of itself an affinity and kinship.

49. See M. Holleaux, *Rome, la Grèce, et les monarchies hellénistiques au III^e siècle avant J.-C.* (273–205) (Paris 1921) 37, 231–36.

50. Walbank *Polybius* 2.179–80.

51. Flacelière *Aitoliens* n. 2, p. 300; R.B. McShane, *The Foreign Policy of the Attalids of Pergamum* (Urbana 1964) 107; Will 2.90, 92. See also Niese 2.484–85. On Roman attitudes, see also Holleaux *Rome* 218–19. For the suggestion that Attalos participated in the capture, see just below.

52. Will 2.92.

53. See E.V. Hansen, *The Attalids of Pergamon* (Ithaca 1947) 46–47; McShane *Foreign Policy*

the Achaeans in 209/8, Attalos, who had been chosen as *stratēgos* of the Aitolian League, operated from Aigina (Livy 27.30.10).⁵⁴ The Roman fleet continued to use Naupaktos as its base so that a tactical situation similar that prevailing during the Archidamian War was created. Then the Athenians acted from both Naupaktos and Aigina against their enemies in the Peloponnesus and central Greece.

This utilization of Aigina to the northeast of the Peloponnesus to balance Naupaktos in the Corinthian Gulf is clearly demonstrated by our next attestation about the island. In late 209, Galba moved his fleet to Aigina in order to link up with Attalos and his ships. Both proconsul and king eventually wintered with their forces on the island (Livy 27.33.4–5). In spring 208, Sulpicius and Attalos set out for Lemnos. From Lemnos, they returned to the vicinity of Thermopylai via Peparethos (Livy 28.5.1–19). Sulpicius operated in Euboeia, taking Oreos and failing at Chalcis (28.6.1–12; cf. Polyb. 10.42.1–4; Dio Cass. fr. 57.57–58 for all these operations). Attalos took Opous in Lokris before being recalled to Asia by the news that Prusias of Bithynia had invaded his territory (28.7.4–10). Galba then withdrew to Aigina (28.7.11). Unfortunately, our sources fail us at this point. Yet, Galba was not succeeded by P. Sempronius Tuditanus until 205, when the Aitolians had already made peace with Philip (Livy 29.12.1–2). Sempronius in turn presided over the signing of the Peace of Phoinike with Philip (29.12.8–16). It is likely that hostilities of an indecisive nature continued to occur with Aigina as a base for Roman warships during these years.

The first phase of the involvement of Attalos I with the Aiginetans is also attested by non-literary sources. An inscription found at Pergamon reports a dedication (now lost) of Attalos I: βασιλεὺς Ἀτταλος τῶν ἐξ Αἰγίνης ἀπαρχὴν Ἀθηνᾶι (*IPerg.* #47 = *OGIS* #281). It has been argued that this inscription implies a participation of Attalos in the capture itself of the island, a conclusion that seems to fly in face of the narrative of Polybius.⁵⁵ It has been suggested alternatively, however, that this *aparkhē* refers to the first-fruits of tribute drawn from Aigina.⁵⁶ With the Attalids drawing on the resources of so many cities, is it likely that such a singling out of Aigina should have taken place? Rather the τῶν ἐξ Αἰγίνης can as well have been spoils taken by Attalid forces operating from Aigina, such as those of the captured town of Lokrian Opous against which Attalos had sailed from Aigina. Aigina was used as a place for the collection and, presumably, the sale of plunder (much as early fourth-century Aigina had profited from the sale of booty taken by the Peloponnesians from the Athenians and their allies). The disparate operations

110. Cf. R.E. Allen, *The Attalid Kingdom* (Oxford 1983) 69, 74–75, however, for sensible cautions on the question of a deliberate policy of expansion westward.

54. See Walbank *Philip* 92–93, 98; Hansen *Attalids* 47–48.

55. Niese n. 5, 2.484; Hansen *Attalids* 46 with n. 94; cf. McShane *Foreign Policy* n. 50, p. 107; Will 2.92.

56. G. Cardinali, *Il regno di Pergamo* (Rome 1906) 178.

undertaken by Attalid forces were subsumed under a heading provided by the name of their base.

The Attalids did remove or acquire for export major works of art for dedication at Pergamon, as two statue bases show; one indicates a work by the Aiginetan master Onatas (*IPerg.* #48), which appears to have been a colossal bronze statue of Apollo (Paus. 8.42.7; *AP* 9.238). Another attests to a work of the Boiotian Theron (*IPerg.* #49a) which bears on the side of the base the phrase ἐξ Αἰγίνης (#49b); it was perhaps a representation of an Aiginetan Olympic victor (cf. Paus. 6.14.11). Compare *IPerg.* #50b with its ἐξ Ὀρεοῦ. These monuments were incorporated into a rebuilding of the important sanctuary of Athena Nikephoros undertaken by Eumenes II.⁵⁷

Another inscription found on Aigina records a dedication made to Zeus and Athena on behalf of King Attalos I (identifiable through the lack of patronymic), which was made by Saturinos and Kallimakhos, the Attalid officers under them (*hēgemones*), and the soldiers stationed there.⁵⁸ Unsurprisingly, there was a regular garrison based on an island as open to maritime attack as was Aigina (cf. Livy 31.25.1).⁵⁹ This mercenary force may well have been partially staffed from Hellenized Thracians, Mysians, and Bithynians, who (with their descendants?) can be identified from their funerary monuments found on the island (*IG* IV 98b, 112, 154; *SEG* 11.11–12).⁶⁰

In 200, during the Second Macedonian War, Aigina once again proved its worth to Attalos.⁶¹ After the Pergamene and Rhodian fleets had demonstrated to Philip V that he lacked the naval assets to contest control of the Aegean, the allied fleets came back to the island (Livy 31.14.11).⁶² From Aigina, Attalos crossed over to Attica, where he and his envoys were enthusiastically received, with the result that Athens declared war on Philip (Polyb. 16.25–26; Livy 31.14.11–15.6). Returning to Aigina, Attalos remained inactive militarily, but conducted diplomacy aimed at drawing the Aitolians into the war (Livy 31.15.9; cf. Polyb. 16.26.10).⁶³ The Rhodian fleet meanwhile sailed to Keos and then through the Cyclades, and separated all but the garrisoned islands from the Macedonian cause (31.15.8). The advance of the allies to Aigina

57. See Allen *Kingdom* 123–27, citing H. Kähler, *Der grosse Fries von Pergamon* (Berlin 1948) 135–36.

58. K. Kourouniotis, “Αἰγίνης μυνσεῖον,” *AE* (1913) 86–98, esp. 90–92; also *ISE* #36, 1.84–85 (cf. *SEG* 25.320): Διὶ καὶ Ἀθηνᾷ ὑπὲρ βασιλέως Ἀττάλου Σατυρίνου Καλλίμαχος καὶ οἱ ὑπ’ αὐτοὺς ἡγεμόνες καὶ στρατιῶται. See also Hansen *Attalids* 213.

59. R.E. Allen, “Attalos I and Aigina,” *BSA* 66 (1971) 1–12, esp. 4–6, adduces other inscriptions to prove that this must be a Pergamene garrison and not merely detachments from the Attalid fleet (*IPerg.* #13 = *OGIS* #266; *FdD* 3.4 132–35; *IPerg.* #29 = *OGIS* #280).

60. An alternative explanation sees the Thracians as persons dislocated by military activity of Attalus II in Thrace (e.g. *OGIS* #330). See Hansen *Attalids* 132. For the graves, see G. Karo, *AA* (1931) cols. 274–77, 279–82; H. Payne in *JHS* 51 (1931) 200.

61. Cf. Polyæn. 4.18.2. See Walbank *Philip* 130; Will 2.130–31.

62. Cf. Niese 2.591; Hansen *Attalids* n. 126, p. 56.

63. I follow J. Briscoe, *A Commentary on Livy: Books XXXI–XXXIII* (Oxford 1973) 99 in believing the Attalid fleet to have been at Aigina, while the Rhodian fleet operated in the islands.

helped to deny central Greece and the central Aegean to Philip. Philip, however, was content to carry through with his original intention to absorb those Ptolemaic possessions in the northern Aegean which had fallen to him in his agreement with the Seleucid Antiochos III (Livy 31.16.1–17.11; cf. Polyb. 16.29–34 [siege of Abydos]). Polybius, echoed by Livy, castigates Attalos and the Rhodians for failing to impede Philip in these designs (16.28.1–9; Livy 31.15.11). But their disinterest in the north is to some extent excusable: after all, they lacked convenient bases there from which to harass the Macedonians.

The Attalid fleet continued to operate from Aigina in 200–199, even when the Roman fleet arrived under C. Claudius Centho acting as a legate of the consul of 200, P. Sulpicius Galba (Livy 31.22.5), and based itself in the Peiraieus. Perhaps two fleets could not be supported on Aigina—we do not know their size—or the Romans may have wanted to make a show of their support for the Athenians. Once the direct threat of attack on Athens was beaten back, some Roman ships were ordered to concentrate on Aigina during the next winter (cf. Livy 31.28.3), but, for the remainder of the war, there were never two fleets based on Aigina. For the moment, when Philip ravaged Attica up to the walls of the city (in retaliation for the Roman sack of Chalcis), the troops of Attalos on Aigina as well as the Romans from the Peiraieus came to the aid of the Athenians (31.25.1; cf. Zon. 9.15). Later the same year, Philip made further attempts to gain ground against the Athenians by trying to storm first Eleusis and then the Peiraieus (Livy 31.26.1–8). The Roman forces in the Peiraieus checked him and there is a good chance that Attalid forces based on Aigina pitched in yet again.

When P. Sulpicius Galba arrived to operate on the western frontier of Macedonia, he was met by Pergamene envoys. He directed them to instruct their master to remain on Aigina where he was wintering and to await the Roman fleet. With the Roman warships, he was to continue to conduct the naval war against Philip (Livy 31.28.3: *classem Romanam . . . qua adiuncta bello maritimo, sicut ante, Philippum urget*). Philip prepared to counteract these preparations first by destroying Skiathos and Peparethos in order to deny them to the enemy (31.28.6). Next he assembled his fleet at Demetrias so as to forestall a move in the spring from Aigina by the combined Roman and Attalid fleets (31.33.1–2).

At the start of the next campaigning season (199), Attalos and his fleet left Aigina to rendezvous with the Romans sailing from Corcyra under the legate, L. Apustius (Livy 31.44.1; cf. Zon. 9.15). One supposes that the Roman ships which had previously been based at the Peiraieus had already joined Attalos at Aigina. The two fleets met at Cape Skyllaion on the northern coast of the Argolic Akte. Then they sailed to the Peiraieus and from there to the Cyclades with Andros as their first target (31.45.1–8; cf. 33.31.3). After operations near Euboea, the Chalcidice, and the Malian Gulf, the allies, who had been joined by the Rhodians, returned to the Peiraieus before disbanding (31.47.2–3). Attalos returned to Asia inasmuch as his kingdom was under

pressure from Antiochos (32.8.9–16). Thus ended for the moment the role of Aigina as an Attalid base in the Second Macedonian War.

With the Roman advance under T. Quinctius Flamininus into Macedonia itself, Philip was incapable of countering by military action in central Greece, let alone in the *poleis* bordering the Saronic Gulf. In the naval campaign of 198, L. Quinctius Flamininus came out to take command of the Roman ships in the Peiraeus (Livy 32.16.2–5), but Attalos and the Rhodians traveled from the eastern Aegean via Andros (now in Attalid hands) against Euboia, being met there by the Roman fleet (Livy 32.16.5–17.3). Thereafter, the allies repaired to Kenkhreai in order to prepare an action against Corinth (32.19.3; cf. Paus. 7.8.1; Zon. 9.16). After the Romano-Pergamene siege of Corinth had miscarried (Livy 32.23.3–12), Attalos withdrew to the Peiraeus and then once more wintered on Aigina during the winter of 198–97 (Livy 32.23.13, 39.2–3). It was from Aigina in 197 that Attalos traveled to join Titus and Lucius Flamininus at Sikyon in order to meet with Nabis of Sparta, who had seized Argos (Livy 32.39.5–10).

Aigina was not liberated by the Romans in 196, despite the Isthmian declaration, but remained in the hands of Attalos: *adicit Antias Valerius Attalo absenti Aeginam insulam elephantos dono datos*.⁶⁴ The naming of Attalos as the recipient could be an error, for Eumenes had succeeded to the throne. Yet, the reference to the elephants may belong to a reconfirmation in 188 after the First Syrian War. Two Roman confirmations of Attalid ownership of the island may have been conflated. The cliché of falling into a “memory-hole” is in this case quite apposite, as it was held to be prudent to leave the fate of the island in the background. The Achaeans acquiesced in Attalid control over Aigina, although the speech of Kassandros and its reception advise us that there was residual bitterness among them over the abandonment of the island.⁶⁵ Indeed, the League even allowed itself to be courted by Attalos.⁶⁶ The Romans not only reaffirmed Pergamene domination of Aigina, but their commissioners were willing to give Eumenes Oreos and Eretria (Polyb. 18.47.10).⁶⁷ The mutterings were at this time confined to the Aitolians (Livy 33.31.1–2).

Aigina plays its now familiar role in Attalid naval operations during the First Syrian War. It is probable that Eumenes II had brought a small fleet and troops to Aigina in order to assist the Romans against the Aitolians and Antiochos, even though Livy has missed out telling us of the king's arrival in Greece.⁶⁸ He notes his presence first in 192 when Eumenes met Flamininus in

64. Livy 33.30.10–11. See Hansen *Attalids* 68 with n. 7; cf. Niese n. 2, 2.648–49.

65. A. Aymard, *Les assemblées de la confédération Achaïenne* (Paris 1938) n. 2, p. 109; *id.*, *Les premiers rapports de Rome et de la confédération Achaïenne* (Paris 1938) n. 41, pp. 143–44, n. 49, pp. 146–47, 184, 192–93, 351. See also Will 2.167, 232.

66. See Aymard *Rapports* 143–44 with n. 41; McShane *Foreign Policy* 116 and n. 81.

67. E. Badian, *Foreign Clientelae* (Oxford 1958) 81; also n. 3, p. 71.

68. Hansen *Attalids* 74–75; R.M. Errington, *Philopoemen* (Oxford 1969) n. 2, p. 104. Dedications of spoils to Athena Nikephoros give some useful information. One group mentions booty taken from Nabis (*IPerg.* #60–63), for which fighting in 195 would be a natural context (even though Attalid participation is not directly attested). But another inscription combines spoils from

the Euripos (35.39.1). There it was decided that 500 Pergamene troops would be sent to Chalcis to reinforce the city against the Aitolians (cf. 35.50.6, 8; 51.7). Under attack by Antiochos' lieutenant, Menippos, they withdrew under truce (51.8). In 191, however, we are told that Eumenes came from Aigina with three ships in order to confer with C. Livius Salinator, who was coming from Italy with a large fleet in order to take over the naval war against the Seleucids (Livy 36.42.6). Eumenes had been in doubt whether to remain with the main Roman force or to return to defend Pergamon from Antiochos, which explains the commitment of such modest forces to Europe. The main Pergamene naval force was brought to rendezvous with Livius at Phokaia (36.43.12) in time for the climactic defeat of the Seleucid fleet at Kissos (36.44–45.5). The Attalid fleet returned to its bases in Asia until the next phase of the naval war with Antiochos III, which was fought in Ionia, Lycia, and the Hellespont.

During the remainder of the reign of Eumenes II, Aigina continued to play a role in peacetime similar to its earlier employment in war. Instead of serving as a base for the Attalid fleet, it served as a waystation and residence for the Attalids when they chose to intervene in Greek affairs. It has been suggested that Eumenes wintered on Aigina in 189–88 after his journey to Rome.⁶⁹ On his journey back to Asia from his visit to Rome in 172, made to denounce Perseus of Macedonia, an assassination attempt was made on Eumenes by Macedonian agents while he visited Delphi. The gravely injured king was then brought to Aigina by way of Corinth and the Isthmus (Livy 42.16.7).⁷⁰ Eumenes stayed on Aigina while receiving a course of medical treatment (Livy 42.18.4). Then he used Aigina as a convenient site from which to orchestrate the campaign of accusations against Perseus, many of which had originated in the cities of homeland Greece (cf. Livy 41.22.5–6). Later in the same year he entertained on Aigina envoys of Antiochos IV and Ptolemy VI, who recounted their masters' resistance to overtures from the Macedonian king (42.26.7).

That the control of Aigina by Pergamon continued to be something of an unspoken embarrassment among the Achaeans is revealed by an episode in 186. A fragment of Polybius records a speech made by the Aiginetan Kassandros before the synod of the Achaean League (22.8.9–12). The context for his remarks was an offer of Eumenes II to the Achaeans of the amount of 120T from which the income was to be used to pay members of the *boulē* during its sessions. Kassandros suggested that a more appropriate gesture would be for the king to surrender Aigina to the League. He adverted to the *aklēria* 'dispossession' that the Aiginetans had suffered through their earlier adhesion to the

Nabis with those from Antiochos by the soldiers who "sailed a second time to Europe with Eumenes" (*JPerg.* #62a.1–2, cf. #63.5). That looks like participation in an expedition against Sparta of early 192, not 195. See Niese 2.706.

69. Niese 2.757 with n. 2; Hansen *Attalids* 90.

70. Hansen *Attalids* 104–5; P. Meloni, *Perseo* (Rome 1953) 162–76.

League after their capture by the Romans and sale by the Aitolians to Attalos I. Accepting the offer of Eumenes would constitute an abandonment of the Aiginetans, presumably because subsidizing the council would grant the king a degree of ascendancy over its decisions and would constitute a definitive relegation of the island: (the Achaeans) *τὰς εἰς τὸ μέλλον ἐλπίδας ἀφαιρούμενοι τῆς Αἰγινήτων σωτηρίας* (22.8.12). It may also be that measures prejudicial to Attalid interests had been enacted when Aigina was lost, the renunciation of which Eumenes sought to achieve by this gift. These and other objections prevailed—the treatment of Aigina being a good issue for those urging a cooler stance toward Rome (e.g., Polyb. 24.13; Livy 39.37.9–15). Kassandros was probably an Aiginetan exile who exercised Achaean citizenship by virtue of the earlier *sumpoliteia* of Aigina with the other cities of the League.⁷¹ Members of the elite of Achaean Aigina may have been ransomed after the Roman capture and then withdrawn to the Peloponnesus.

Pergamene control of Aigina spared the island much of the turmoil of the second century, in particular the Fourth Macedonian/Achaean War. The island was only transferred to the jurisdiction of the province of Achaea by M'. Aquillius and the ten senatorial commissioners who organized the province of Asia.⁷²

The nature of the Pergamene control of Aigina can be seen from the epigraphical documents associated with the *epistatēs*, the senior Pergamene official on the island (*IG* IV 1.35 = *OGIS* #329; *n.b.* the term is a common one for governing officials in the subject cities of Hellenistic kingdoms). One Attalid governor of Aigina in the reign of Eumenes II was the Ephesian Hikesios, son of Metrodoros (*ὁ κατασταθεὶς ἐπ' Αἰγίνας ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως Εὐμένεος*), who is honored in a Megarian inscription of uncertain date (*IG* VII 15 = *SIG*³ #642). Hikesios clearly exerted considerable authority in central Greece, because we also possess a copy of an Athenian decree that grants him citizenship (*IG* II² 922).

Even more informative is an inscription of c. 159–44 honoring the Pergamene Kleon, son of Stratagos, who had been an Attalid governor of the island for 16 years and had held the rank of *sōmatophulax* 'bodyguard' of the king (*IG* IV 1). Thus his service had begun under Eumenes II and continued under Attalos II. The inscription reveals the political structure of the island: *stratēgoi*,

71. Aymard, *Assemblées* 103–20, offers a complete discussion, establishing that Kassandros, not holding civic office, was speaking as a private citizen (in exile) at the federal synod. See also Walbank *Polybius* 3.189–90, who cites the refugees from Delos as a parallel (cf. Polyb. 32.7.3).

72. Note *IG* IV 14, a dedicatory inscription in honor of the *patronus* of the Aiginetans, C. Norbanus Flaccus (cos. 38). An inscription in Doric, *IG* IV 2 (cf. *SEG* 11.25), honoring the *agoranomos* Diodoros, son of Herakleidas, from 69 (or 65: ll. 4–5) informs us about Roman Aigina with its references to a war with pirate attacks (9–11), and to a festival called the Rhomaia in honor of deified Rome (32–33). See S. Accame, *Il dominio romano in Grecia dalla guerra acaica ad Augusto* (Rome 1946) 238–39; Hansen *Attalids* 148–49. Antonius awarded Aigina to Athens in 41 (App. *BC* 5.1.7). Augustus punished the Athenians in 22 by removing both Aigina and Eretria from Athens' control (Dio Cass. 54.7.2; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 207E).

boulē, and *dēmos*. The elective or appointed character of the office of *stratēgos* is unclear, complicated by the use of the same term to denote a regional governor elsewhere in the kingdom. The Aiginetan governing board may well have been renamed at the Attalid take-over to conform to the nomenclature of the kingdom, but no evidence precludes their being chosen by the Aiginetans under traditional (oligarchic) rules.⁷³

Allen has remarked on the broad authority of Kleon. Yet, one must be cautious in extrapolating from Aigina to other Attalid holdings, inasmuch as the island was so isolated a possession. Aigina was useful to the Attalids as a base and that may also have affected the discretion granted to its commanding officer. Kleon would most often have had to act on his own, although Attalos and Eumenes seem to have used Aigina as a stopping point in transit to mainland Greece. Therefore the presence of the king may have intermittently complicated the jurisdiction of the governor. The inscription mentions three categories of legal enactments with which Kleon had acted in accordance: *nenomothetēmēna* of the kings, *prostagmata*, and *nomoi*. The king possessed the sole right of legislation: the honors for Kleon must be sent to him for approval (ll. 51–54).⁷⁴ This may be an outgrowth of the king's possession of the island as personal property.⁷⁵

Much of the first part of the inscription is devoted to an encomium of Kleon's administration of justice (9–22). First a practical observation is in order. Adjudication in a city such as Aigina would have been particularly difficult, because of the long judicial history of the island, one complicated by the sophistication of a legal code that had evolved to support an unusual intensity of commercial activity. Kleon's caution in such a situation may be shown in efforts to settle suits through "reconciliation" (*συλλύειν, συλλυομένους* [12]; *σύλλυσιν* [18–19]).⁷⁶ Such a practice served to elicit from litigants settlements which were consonant with local legal tradition. Justice in court played a central role in Aiginetan self-appreciation. Herodotus' Aiginetan informants had implied that the struggle for independence of the Aiginetans from Epidauros could be traced to the fact that Epidaurian magistrates judged lawsuits involving Aiginetans. A favorite theme of Pindar's *epinicia* honoring Aiginetan victors was the devotion of the Aiginetans to justice, especially in the dealings with *xenoi* (whom we may equate with their trading partners). The mythological paradigm for this fair dealing was Aiakos himself, who was enshrined in Greek myth as one of the judges of men in Hades.

73. Cf. Bengtson *Strategie* 2.240–51; Allen *Kingdom* 106–8.

74. Cf. A. Heuss, *Stadt und Herrscher des Hellenismus* (Leipzig 1937) 131–32. For *prostagmata*, see Allen *Kingdom* 104 and compare *IPerg* #248 = *OGIS* #331.

75. Cardinali *Pergamo* 236; Hansen *Attalids* 154 with n. 8; Allen *BSA* (1971) 2; *id.* *Kingdom* 42–43, 74–75, 106, who emphasizes the initial singularity of the status of Aigina and its possible role as a paradigm for later acquisitions (e.g. after the Peace of Apamea in 188). Cf. Heuss *Stadt* 35–36 with n. 1; 76–77.

76. Cf. McShane *Foreign Policy* n. 76, pp. 171–72.

Kleon is described as being especially accessible to Aiginetans on public business, officials sent from the court, and *xenoi* in residence (ll. 26–28): προαιρέσει εὐαπάντ[ητο]ς γινόμενος τοῖς τε κατὰ τῆ[ν πό]λιν καὶ τοῖς παραγινόμενοις παρὰ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ τῶ[ν ξ]ένων τοῖς παρεπιδημοῦσι. . . . If these *xenoi* are not mercenaries, they will be those coming to Aigina for business purposes rather like the *xenoi* whose good treatment was so much a commonplace in Aiginetan self-laudation. It is because of his commitment to justice, which the decree extols, that the Aiginetans had often requested Eumenes and Attalos to grant that Kleon remain on Aigina. The last part of the decree briefly reintroduces Kleon's faithful discharge of the king's business (31–32: διὰ τε δὴ ταῦτα καὶ διὰ τὸ εἰς τὰ τοῦ βασι|λέως πράγματα [καλῶς] καὶ δικαίως ἀνεστράφθαι . . . ; cf. 7–8: ἀποδε[ίξι]ν πεποιημένου τ[ῆς] π[ραγ]|μα-τικῆς). It then describes various honors accorded to Kleon, including citizenship. It is known that the Aiginetans had been jealous of their citizenship as late as the fourth century so that the grant of citizenship could perhaps have been relatively unusual (cf. Dem. 23.211). They did wait, in any case, sixteen years before granting it. When they did so, their decree was careful to connect Kleon with *dikaio sunē* (cf. 33–34), a virtue with particularly strong resonances in Aiginetan self-representations.

The announcement of the honors given Kleon was to be made at a number of religious festivals. Apparently, Aigina had a Dionysia in this period at which tragedies were performed (l. 41). The festival of the Nikephoria on Aigina (the tutelary deity of which was Athena Nikephoros) was taken over from Pergamon as it seems to have been at other sites within the kingdom (41).⁷⁷ Attaleia and Eumeneia were also celebrated in honor of two previous kings of the dynasty (40–41). An Attaleion existed as the locus for the cult of Attalos I (l. 46). Welter has identified the site for this building on the Aiginetan acropolis.⁷⁸ The Attalids had put in place the standard mechanism for the legitimization of political power through religion, namely the ruler-cult. But that is not to say that Attalos I was not genuinely esteemed by the Aiginetans. The presence of his household and his fleet on the island for considerable periods of time is likely to have been a source of considerable additional income to the Aiginetans, although they may well have suffered some inconvenience from having to quarter his military personnel.

Allen argues that the cult of Attalos had its prestige augmented by the treatment of the Pergamene king as a *sunnaos theos* of the primary Aiginetan hero, Aiakos. He bases this conclusion on *IG II² 885* (last years of the third century) which he would derive from Aigina and connect with Attalos I.⁷⁹ As citations cannot give the full impression of this badly damaged stone, reproduction

77. Hansen *Attalids* 407.

78. G. Welter, "Aeginetika XXV–XXXVI," *AA* (1954) cols. 29–48, esp. 45–46. See also Hansen *Attalids* 419.

79. *BSA* (1971) 6–7.

in full is advisable.⁸⁰ Allen finds a reference to the acquisition of the island by Attalos in ll. 16–17 with its invocation of the affinity of Herakles to Aiakos.⁸¹ He also restores the crucial lines for the relationship of the cults of Aiakos and Attalos (ll. 11–13) as follows:⁸² ποιήσουσιν δὲ καὶ σύνναον καὶ [σύμβωμον τῷ Αἰακῷ] | διὰ τὰς γεγενημένας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πράξεις πρὸς τὴν σωτηρίαν? | τῶν Ἑλλήνων. The formula restored in l. 11 is well attested (cf., e.g., Plut. *Mor.* 708C; *IDelos* #2128 [= *SIG*³ #1126], 2387). Parallels may be offered by the cult role for Attalos I at Sikyon (Polyb. 18.16.1–2), and by the status of Attalos III as *sunnaos* with Asklepios at Elaia (*IPerg.* #246). This juxtaposition of an Attalid and a local deity may then have been a particular feature of Pergamene royal cults (as Allen argues). The *temenē* in l. 8 may provide evidence for similar cult sites elsewhere. As Allen notes, Attalos was treated as a new founder of Aigina, worthy to be linked with its heroic founder Aiakos. The island would have received an image of the king, who would also have received honors at the Aiakeia (cf. *ΣPin. Ol.* 7.156b, 13.155; *Nem.* 5.78c).⁸³

Aigina achieved a degree of prosperity under the Attalids. One estimate of the annual tribute of the island is 8–12T.⁸⁴ Rostovtzeff notes the Aiginetan economic revival and approves the suggestion that much ordinary Athenian

80. -----δ Βα[σιλεῶς-----
 -----πρὸς του-----
 -----ν μὲν παρὰ |-----
 -----ν τὰς ἐπεΣΑΝΔ-----
 5 ----οὐδὲν] ὑποστειλαμεν-----
 ----τῶν Ἑλλήνων κα-----
 ----κατὰ τὰ ἔθνη τιμω|-----
 ----μενη ἀνείθη ἀπετ-----
 ----βασι|λέως Ἀττάλου ἐν αἷς οἱ κατ-----
 10 ----ον καὶ τοῖς κατέχοντας θεο[ύς-----
 ----ποιήσουσιν δὲ καὶ σύνναον καὶ-----
 ----τὰς γεγενημένας ὑπ' αὐτοῦ πράξεις-----
 ----Ἑλλήνων βουλόμενος δὲ καὶ εἰς-----
 ----σ|αφεστέρον τὴν τε εὐσέβειαν καὶ|-----
 15 ----πατ|ρίου αὐτῷ ὑπάρχοντος τὸ τιμᾶν-----
 ----ον ὑπάρχοντα καὶ νῦν δὲ παραλα[βῶν-----διὰ τὴν Ἡρακ]
 λέους πρὸς Αἰακὸν συγγένειαν|-----
 ----οἱς ἐξεφθαρμένων τῶν τὴν ἀρχήν|-----
 ----πρότερον τιθέμενος τῆς π-----
 20 ----ε]ὐνοίας ἡβουλήθη συ-----
 ----ἀνθρώπων ἀπεστ[αλ-----
 ----πα|ραγε[νόμενος-----

81. *BSA* (1971) 8, citing the relevant *comparanda*. Cf. L. Robert *BE* (1973) #172, pp. 356–57, who questions Allen's interpretation of ποιήσουσιν (l. 11) and the restored διὰ (l. 13).

82. Allen *BSA* (1971) 9–12.

83. Another prominent figure of Pergamene Aigina was ... Iesippos, son of Apelles, who was praised, crowned, and granted citizenship in an Attic inscription of the mid-second century (*IG* II² 981).

84. Cardinali *Pergamo* 176–78 (the argument is quite weak); see also McShane *Foreign Policy* 169.

Hellenistic plain ware was produced on Aigina.⁸⁵ The island also seems to have been the site of a mint, perhaps producing Aiginetan silver coinage and also Pergamene bronze coinage.⁸⁶ If Jacoby is correct in his date of the Aiginetan local historian, Pythainetos, his activity may also suggest a recovery in the island's fortunes.⁸⁷

CONCLUSION

If any common thread in Aiginetan foreign policy has emerged from this discussion of the Hellenistic period, it is that the Aiginetans focused their energies on staying out of the grasp of the incumbent ruler of Macedonia, moving away from Cassander into the Antigonid camp; then possibly moving toward the orbit of Egypt; and finally aligning themselves with the Greek leagues when suitable opportunities offered themselves. The island as an economic, political, and military entity was relatively insignificant. Its inhabitants had to accommodate themselves to the major military powers. The openings toward the Aitolians, Athenians, and Achaeans show the Aiginetan inclination toward finding Greek friends with whom to work for a collective security arrangement for the Saronic Gulf and central Greece. The Achaean affiliation, albeit congenial institutionally and ideologically, turned out to be a trap, as the Achaean League had no naval establishment and the alliance with Aigina does not appear to have turned their thoughts to the sea.⁸⁸ There was no Achaean garrison on the island when the Romans attacked, suggesting that Aigina had been left as a chance victim, a target of opportunity. It was the location of Aigina that made it significant for the balance of power in the late third and early second centuries and not (it seems) by virtue of any physical or human maritime assets. The Attalids seem to have brought their ships, sailors, and troops to Aigina. Nonetheless, the island remained superbly situated both for operations in mainland Greece and for mounting expeditions in the Aegean.

85. *The Social and Economic History of the Hellenistic World* (Oxford 1941) 3.1507–8 (n. 22); on pottery, 2.1206, 3.1621; see H.A. Thompson, "Two Centuries of Hellenistic Pottery," *Hesperia* 3 (1934) 310–480, esp. 465.

86. A series is attested with the name of Aigina on the reverse in place of the customary reference to Philetairos. F. Imhoof-Blumer, "Die Münzen der Dynastie von Pergamon," *APAW* (1884) 38–39; H. von Fritze, "Die Münzen von Pergamon," *APAW* (1910) 24; S.R. Milbank, *The Coinage of Aegina* (New York 1924) 47–55; H. Thiersch, "Äginetische Studien I," *NGG* (1928) 135–66, esp. 142–44; see also Hansen *Attalids* 203–4.

87. *FGH* 3b, 1.4.

88. Aymard *Rapports* n. 2, p. 349.

Conclusion

WHEN THE GENERAL characteristics of Aiginetan political history are assessed, it is important to emphasize at the outset that the geographical setting of the island did indeed create a set of constraints shaping the lines along which its political evolution could travel. In contrast, there were naturally corresponding opportunities which the Aiginetans could exploit to their advantage. Nonetheless, both sets of factors (not, of course, truly discrete) did not determine how Aiginetan history unfolded so much as they acted to channel it. Other insular states reacted to similar challenges and opportunities differently and, from the standpoint of their vitality as actors in economic and political history, for the most part less successfully. Even when the opposition of Sparta and Thebes to the status of Athens as a superpower among the *poleis* is given its full weight, we must conclude that no other adversary of the Athenians affected the political *development* of Athens to the same degree as the Aiginetans.

The insular setting of the Aiginetan *polis* was a significant factor, as the island was juxtaposed to both Attica and the northeast Peloponnesus, being drawn into interaction with both regions but at some remove of time and place. That detachment was initially advantageous to the Aiginetans for their social development. Geography prompted an involvement in seafaring and the general penetration of maritime preoccupations into institutions and patterns of behavior is a salient characteristic of Aiginetan history as well as an unusual phenomenon among archaic *poleis*.¹ Moreover, there was a specific valence to this early turning toward the sea which was of particular significance for international affairs. Aigina was admirably placed for interacting (peacefully or hostilely) with those traveling from Kenkhreai, Nisaia, Phaleron, the Peiraeus, and the ports of the Argolic Akte. In addition, the island became a place to which those seeking goods resorted, not because it stood at a natural crossroads like Corinth or the Euboian cities, Chalcis and Eretria, which were more passive entrepôts, but by virtue of the maritime interests (and later commercial knowledge) of its inhabitants, which made of the island a location for seeking products and information (be it commercial or political).

The initial social dispositions of the Aiginetans with reference to piracy, slave trading, and low scale itinerant peddling (or retailing) were adaptations to this geographical reality. In our view, the membership in the Kalaurian Amphictyony and the penetration of Arkadia through Elis show some of the wider links that could be forged by such activity even at this preliminary stage. The later hostility, however, of the Athenian and Corinthian governments

1. In general, see *Aegina* 166–214 with notes.

toward the Aiginetans bespeaks a legacy of victimization of their citizens from these same pursuits. Since early exchanges of goods probably took place along a seamless continuum of violence and coerciveness, anger at conscious exploitation was probably inextricably mixed both with dissatisfaction over commercial dependency and with envy over an enrichment hard to explain in terms of traditional aristocratic values.²

The impulse of Peloponnesian powers such as Argos and Epidaurus toward a domination of Aigina is expressive of the intention to control, utilize, and extract the profits from the maritime pursuits of a "perioecic" community. A community oriented toward sailing was marginal within those widely prevailing political orders in which an aristocratic ethos (focusing on the *oikos*) gradually yielded and intermeshed with an agrarian/hoplite consciousness. Yet, we can just glimpse symbiotic aspects in the sheltering of eighth- and seventh-century Aigina within the spheres of influence of its mainland *hēgemones*. While most other populations specializing in seafaring in homeland Greece were inhibited from accentuating their unique adaptations by their continued existence within states that were more agricultural, more traditional, and less homogeneous, Aigina differed in that it broke completely from its symbionts, acquiring the freedom from constraint to develop along its own lines.

It was perhaps the experience of balancing interaction with many overseas connections, along with the absence of borders with neighbors on land, that prompted the Aiginetan aloofness from political entanglements after the breaking of the Epidaurian hegemony. The necessity for the Thebans to pitch their appeal for Aiginetan aid in c. 506 in mythological terms indicates that there was no preceding alliance with Boiotia. And there is even less evidence for other alliances with nearby central Greek and Cycladic cities than even that short-lived collaboration with the Boiotians. The lateness of the association with Sparta and its Peloponnesian allies seems a token of the same general pattern (although the specific hostility of Corinth probably played an immediate contributory role).

The exception in the archaic period was the friendship with Argos, but even this was curiously one-sided. The Argives claimed hegemony over Aigina by virtue of its belonging to the Temenid inheritance and possibly its participation in the cult league of Apollo Pythiaeus in the days of Pheidon. While there may have been acts of ritual deference (about which we can only speculate), practical Aiginetan services to Argos are hard to document. The Aiginetans are entirely missing from the record of Argive struggles against the Spartans—appearing only at Sepeia as freelancers (and then on the Spartan side), and they refuse to compensate Argos for the damage of that participation. It is the Argives who aid the Aiginetans, both in the early war with Athens, if we believe the stories told Herodotus by his Argive and Aiginetan informants, and in the fighting right after Marathon. Doubtless the Argive decision to reject overtures to join the struggle against Xerxes (and the "crypto-Medism" of that

2. *Aegina* 333–43.

city's foreign policy after Sepeia) may well have weighed heavily on Aiginetan minds. Aigina, however, did not reciprocate Argive support in the early 480s by standing apart from the Hellenic League (thus prompting that Argive fine?). The earlier Aiginetan willingness to Medize in 491 was characteristically predicated on an opportunity against Athens (which Argive attitudes on Persia at the most only helped to rationalize). We are free to hypothesize that the Aiginetans had provided naval auxiliaries to the Argives on occasions unknown to us, ones where their own risk was minimized. Yet, it is also appropriate to note the Argives may have been compensated by the Aiginetans for their political friendship by economic and commercial reciprocities more than by their military aid. Rather than standing as an example of Aigina's sole military alliance, the willingness of the Argive aristocracy (*n.b.*) to help the Aiginetans in combat may stand instead as an outgrowth of an (albeit particularly intense) interdependency mediated through the practices of *xenia*.

The development of more far-ranging commercial and maritime interests does not seem to have widened the circle of Aigina's allies. The record of archaic conflict with Samos bespeaks the frictions and rivalries which emerged from competition in long-distance commerce. It is noteworthy that the Aiginetan subjugation at the hands of Athens is never a subject of regret in any statement attributed to other Athenian allies/subjects. Allied forces collaborated in the fighting against Aigina and nothing indicates that they did so reluctantly (cf. Thuc. 1.105.2).

Just as the insular locale of Aigina motivated its inhabitants to orient themselves toward the sea, it also imposed on the community a limitation in size and thereby in political influence. That parameter was not so prominent in the archaic period. Archaic Greece was typified by the relative independence and cultural autonomy of its many small and moderately-sized *poleis*. As speciation takes place in zoological terms by the isolation of small populations which then develop new physical and behavioral qualities in unique settings, the division of archaic Greece into many separate polities had the effect of turning its civilization into a laboratory for social adaptation. Especially among marginal groups like the Aiginetans, significant opportunities existed for institutional innovation and differentiation of lifestyles (the first stages of which I have just noted). New principles and patterns of organization were potentially available for secondary dissemination, inasmuch as Greek culture remained a unity through the centripetal influence of panhellenism (e.g., regional and panhellenic cults, overlapping mythology, and transecting audiences for poetical performances).

The Aiginetans assimilated (it seems) from the Ionians the procedures of long-distance, non-intermediated trade which included as its customers and suppliers Greeks and non-Greeks alike. Grain, slaves, precious metals, exotic items, and many of the goods which established aristocratic social status played a part in their cargoes. The priority and magnitude of Aiginetan silver coinage signifies the strength of this commerce as well as suggesting that a facility in operating in terms of money was still another special aspect of the

skills deployed in Aiginetan trade. Industries sprang into being to supplement the stock of goods in trade of which the bronzeworking craft is the best attested example.³ The *dikē* 'justice' and *xenia* 'guest-friendliness' or 'inter-group propriety' which were promoted by the Aiginetan elite as its particular qualities provided the social framework sustaining commerce. Through seafaring Aigina had access to considerable numbers of slaves which could be incorporated into the community. Under a constitution which, for want of a more exact denomination, we must call oligarchic, the Aiginetans had achieved a stable polity. The ability of Aigina to defend itself so effectively against Athens in the early fifth century demonstrates a capacity to mobilize the whole community against a foreign enemy that is emblematic of the strength of Aiginetan political integration.

The results of this progression have been much in evidence above. By the late sixth century Aigina harbored a larger population than could be supported by primary economic activity like agriculture.⁴ Hence the Aiginetans could man a large war fleet. That skill in naval warfare is evinced at an early stage by the raiding associated with the emergence of a fully independent Aiginetan *polis*. As late as the early 480s, the Aiginetans still possessed a fleet numerically equivalent to those of their potential adversaries and in particular a match for the Athenian fleet. Their *aristeia* at Salamis bears witness to the quality of their equipment and personnel. None of that picture ought to be surprising: until the island fell to Athens, the Aiginetans appear to have possessed greater economic and fiscal sophistication, and to have been the wealthier community in terms of *per capita* output, when compared to their Athenian adversaries. Are we surprised then that the Athenians, who wasted the sterling opportunity offered them by Nikodromos and his faction through incompetent preparation, could not master an Aigina where some individuals had the organizational skills suggested by the business dealings (e.g. in Etruria) of a Sostratos, to Herodotus the wealthiest of all the Greeks?⁵

Nevertheless, the Aiginetans could not transcend the restrictions imposed by their origins as a small island community. Throughout their history, they lacked the numbers in themselves to man their fleet, to defend their fortifications, and to exert military power in their own *khōra* at the same time. The conclusion that even two of these missions strained their military capacity gains corroboration from fighting as disparate as that in the early 480s and during the Corinthian War. Hence even when Aigina and Athens were peers in naval strength during the *polemos akēruktos*, Aigina never constituted a genuine risk to the integrity of the Athenian state. They could throw their power into the fray with the Thebans c. 506 in the hope of demoralizing the Athenians, but it would have to have been Boiotian or better still Spartan hoplites who would break up the Cleisthenic regime. In sum, the Aiginetans

3. *Aegina* 235–36.

4. *Aegina* 22–52.

5. *Aegina* 241–48, 265–66.

could depress the Attic economy, divert precious Athenian resources, and inhibit Athenian expansionism, but they could not credibly invade Attica. In contrast, it is not too much of an exaggeration to say that the Aiginetans were always within one defeat of massive Athenian disruption of their social order.

Their Athenian adversaries had the advantage then of inhabiting a larger, more populous territory. Attica supported a seafaring population to provide the nucleus of a fleet, craft industries to underwrite naval expansion, a large farming population offering good raw material for a hoplite phalanx, a sizeable thetic component of the population who were deployable for service as rowers, and, in a final piece of misfortune for the Aiginetans, mines which when properly exploited created the resources to sustain an "arms race" against Aigina during the 480s and the Pentekontaeteia. It may well have taken the statesmanship of a Themistokles and a Perikles to educe these potentialities, but it must be recognized that such chances were available to the Athenians and not to the Aiginetans. The institutional and economic successes of Aigina could just not offset so much disparity in size, numbers, and resources.

The experience of the Aiginetans can be taken to exemplify the plight of the many smaller and middling city-states which achieved their unique socio-political integration in the period 550–480 but lacked the military strength to maintain their detachment from the struggles for hegemony of the classical period. Unlike the Megarians, who seem to have internalized the ideological confrontation between the Spartans and the Athenians with catastrophic results for the autonomy of their cultural and political traditions,⁶ the Aiginetans were for the most part beaten by the Athenians through brute force—able to man their ships in that last climactic engagement. If one must go down in defeat, there are many worse ways to play out the hand than to the accompaniment of choruses instructed by Pindar, that is, to an affirmation of one's *dikē*, *xenia*, and *eunomia*.

In the case of Aigina, this predicament is accentuated by the proximity of the island to Attica. For the Aiginetans, there was the added complication that the boundary between the Dorian linguistic and cultural sphere of the Peloponnesus and the Ionian cultural domain of Attica, Euboia, and the Aegean left their island as a forward Dorian salient. Otherness or apartness may have lain in the background of the critical (and eventually fatal) decision to raid Attica in c. 506. They owed no debts to the other enemies of the Athenians; one doubts whether at so early a stage of democratization they already envisaged the Cleisthenic constitutional order as representing a threat to Aiginetan *eunomia* and *homonoia*. Kleisthenes would not have appeared so differently to them from any of the other popular anti-aristocratic usurpers and pretenders to tyranny that had emerged from time to time in many of the Saronic Gulf cities. Is there not then here a testimony to the deepseatedness of the Aiginetan proclivity toward the taking of booty from Attica? Was it not for them, in other words, an act of a propriety and naturalism by now almost instinctive?

6. *Theognis* 155–58.

Wealthy, self-confident, Dorian Aigina did lie, however, so near Attica, and there were such complicated interrelationships between Aiginetans and Athenians, that the fact that Athens aspired to draw the island under its own hegemony will surprise no one. The inclusive mentality of the archaic Attic state developed through the incorporation of Eleusis, Salamis, and finally the borderlands facing Boiotia, but that repertoire of religious, mythological, and socio-normative gestures was counter-productive for the Aiginetans.⁷ The Athenians signalled the opening of their campaign toward absorption with the foundation of the Aiakeion. To be sure, this device signified an attempt to appropriate the major cultic and mythological figure in the Aiginetan system of self-representation. Whether the early fifth-century Athenians would have been prepared to settle for something short of a thorough assimilation of Aigina is unknown. Given their slim prospects for immediate, decisive victory, would the Athenians not have been open to an Aiginetan attempt at finding a *modus vivendi*? Though useful in stimulating speculation, the point is in a sense moot, given the vehemence of Aiginetan resistance. Any such rapprochement was stillborn in the midst of the uncompromising hostility of the *polemos akēruktos*.

The protraction of the confrontation between Athens and Aigina in fact provoked two momentous changes in Greek foreign affairs. The earlier of the two was the Athenian collaboration with Nikodromos in his attempt to overthrow the Aiginetan government. The initiative does have its roots in earlier Athenian expansionism. In 506, after the defeat of Chalcis, the aristocrats of that city had been expelled and Athenian colonists were sent to settle the site, apparently with members of the Chalcidian *dēmos* who continued as inhabitants. The Athenians were resettling Chalcis as an extension of their own state (one guesses), much as they had re-incorporated Salamis after episodes of Megarian occupation. This refounding exploited the alienation of the Chalcidian *dēmos* from the aristocracy.⁸

The cooperation with Nikodromos, while moving forward in the same progression of policy, crosses an important threshold. For the first time, the Athenians were attempting to expand their state on the basis of the superiority of their political system over that of their enemy. Implicit in Nikodromos' uprising was the possibility that non-Athenians should opt to replicate the Cleisthenic constitution in their own *polis* in preference to indigenous political traditions. And it is significant that this assimilation would take place not through an act of *nomothesia* but through a *coup de main* supported by the armed force of the Athenian state. That intervention assumed that the *dāmos* was the sovereign entity within Aiginetan society (possessing the same status as the Athenian *dēmos* within Attica), whose preferences conferred political legitimacy. Nikodromos, although an alienated member of the elite, possessed true authority to act with the Athenians by virtue of his representation of the will of the *dāmos*. The culmination of these claims was the creation of a new,

7. *Colonization* 130–60.

8. *Colonization* 256–60.

legitimate Attic Aigina after the expulsion of the Aiginetans in 431. Yet, that consummation was costly in terms of hardened Peloponnesian hostility against the Athenians, because it necessitated the dissolution of a Dorian *polis* which had distinguished itself in combat against the Persians.⁹

Thus, we see in this incident the first internalization of an interstate military struggle, making of it a conflict between social classes within the polity of one of the combatants. Here in its inception is the ideologization of international competition, in which cities not only contend with military techniques for victory over their enemies but strive to win "the hearts and minds" of (a part) of their opposition by holding out to them an avowedly superior way of life. Present in the incident is one great rationale for Athenian hegemony over their *arkhē*: Attic primacy is the guarantor of a wide participation in political rights and processes, for it can best suppress oligarchic or tyrannical exclusionism. Since the Attic vision of the Aiginetan elite painted them as a hybriatic, self-aggrandizing ascendancy of wealth, the Athenian upholding of the prerogatives of the *dēmos* was not only estimable in itself, but essential (in their minds) for the protection from economic exploitation of non-aristocrats.

In the great liberal tradition of historiography on ancient Greece, we are inclined to view with satisfaction the expansion of popular government at Athenian instigation. In balance, it is then important to note the existential dread which might be inspired in those facing adversaries who went beyond merely inflicting military defeat on their opponents to an effort to replace their enemies' social identity with their own. In the proud boast of the Thucydidean Perikles, Athens had become the *paideusis* of Greece (2.41.1),¹⁰ inasmuch as the daily enactment of Athenian political principles could replace the paradigms formerly provided by archaic, aristocratic *paideia* (cf. Perikles again in Thuc. 1.37.1). Yet this new acculturation entailed an infantilization of the rest of the Greeks, for who but children are suitable for receiving such tutelage. The progress of ideologization had as its necessary companion the delegitimization of other constitutional orders, a process intrinsic to the elevation of *dēmokratēia*. The end point of the trajectory of ideologization which began in the *asty-palaia* on Aigina in 489 or 488 was the total war of the end of the century.

Aiginetan naval strength stood as a powerful impediment to the expansion of Athenian influence in central Greece, as well as to any prospects for projecting military power further into the Aegean. There was first of all the need to balance the Aiginetan fleet in the ships kept at home: note the feeble contribution to the Ionian rebels or the inadequate window of opportunity to act on Paros under Miltiades. The Aiginetan fleet could operate with such ease against Phaleron and the Peiraeus that its mere existence added a complicating factor to the calculations of any Athenian military venture.

9. Cf. *Colonization* esp. 126–28.

10. It is significant that this comment immediately follows his defence of Athenian activism or interventionism (2.40.5): καὶ μόνοι οὐ τοῦ ξυμφέροντος μᾶλλον λογισμῷ ἢ τῆς ἐλευθερίας τῷ πιστῷ ἀδεῶς τινὰ ὠφελοῦμεν.

Athenian thalassocracy emerged only with the subjugation of Aigina and, after its liberation by Sparta, Attica paid the costs of any attempt at revival of the fifth-century *arkhē*. The great “democratizing” statesmen, Themistokles, Xanthippos, and Perikles understood this reality. One force driving democratization was need to mobilize the entire community for resistance to Persia and for the confrontation with the Aiginetans, the two dominant, synergistic threats of the early fifth century.

The other great impact of the hostility between the Aiginetans and Athenians was the passage of the Themistoclean naval law. The Athenians forewent the individual subsidies, previously distributed from mining revenue, to support an expansion of their fleet. As these were the ships that repelled Xerxes, the hatred between Athens and Aigina had enormous consequences for world history. The naval bill also encouraged Athenian politicization, since it probably generalized the responsibility of upper-class individuals for commanding a trireme. Naval command was no longer a function of previous acquaintance with seafaring (as it had been under the naukraric system), but merely another modality of the political existence of those possessing estates of a certain census rating. One ought not to make the mistake of overlooking that the fleet’s supervision and command placed a huge burden in time, in psychic energy, and in additional financial outlays on the Athenian elite, even when the revenues from the mines and later tribute subsidized the cost of the ships and their manning.

Not only was the proximity of Aigina to Attica important for promoting Aigina as a target for Athenian expansion, but the history of the island gives ample witness to the pervasiveness of the interactions between Athenians and Aiginetans. A list of the known journeys between Aigina and Attica—only those with a wider importance for political history have been discussed above—could be extended almost at will. There is also evidence suggesting that Aiginetan merchants and their Athenian suppliers continued somehow to keep their cooperation active even during the period of the *polemos akēruktos*, when the atmosphere between the two peoples was so inflamed.¹¹

Furthermore, the Aiginetans had their friends among Attic political leaders like Aristides, Melesias, and the latter’s son, Thukydides. In addition, a statesman like Kimon (and possibly Kleisthenes) was at the very least not an enemy of the Aiginetans. There were doubtless seventh- and sixth-century representatives of the same tendency: their names are unknown to us, but the orientation of leading men in the two communities was mythologized into the figure of Draco as lawgiver of Aigina, and, to some extent, may also have been represented in Solon as differentiator of Attica from Aigina. In an archaic mode of mediation, the Athenian friends of Aigina seem to have sought to mitigate the intercommunal frictions. After 480, the role of the friends of Aigina first as dissuaders of revanchism toward the islanders and

11. *Aegina* 244–46.

then as minimizers of the scale of Athenian intervention and intrusion becomes central to the Aiginetan effort to retain as much of their political and social heritage as possible. Yet, they had to work against a strong current of hatred which had been nourished by what were perceived as Aiginetan acts of exploitation of the Athenians. Overall, the familiarity bred from personal collaboration (whether between members of the elite or between partners in commerce) does not appear to have achieved a common ground of shared values, and possibly served mainly to exacerbate animosities.

The Aiginetans, however, were only a potential threat after 480, since they followed an unprovocative tack toward Athens. To acquiesce in the existence of that uncontrolled variable, to set this curb on the exercise of Athenian power, was something which conservative Athenian statesmen were prepared to accept. They could work in a context where the Hellenic League was still valid, with both its guarantee of Aiginetan autonomy and a role for Spartan leadership. Toleration of Aiginetan autonomy was the price to be paid for halting the emergence of the imperial *dēmos*. Living with the foreign enemy was perhaps not so difficult, when his existence served to hold in check a daunting domestic adversary like Perikles. Unfortunately, the Spartans and Corinthians were not equally solicitous of the standing of the Athenian opposition, to whom they gave gratuitous injuries like the dismissal at Ithome, aggression against Megara, and the invasion of Attica in 446, challenges that abetted the rise to preeminence of the democratizers like Ephialtes and Perikles.

The final turning point of Aiginetan classical history was the extraordinary decision to agitate at Sparta in 432–31. The outbreak of the Peloponnesian War and the invasion of Attica led unsurprisingly to the Athenian expulsion of the Aiginetans, an action which was not immoderate in its context. Thereafter Aiginetans could retain their communal identity only by their participation in anti-Athenian operations—hatred of Athens becoming the glue that united them. The Aiginetans who fought the Athenians were made to suffer for their enmity, and the restored *polis* was a far lesser community than its pre-expulsion predecessor. Insofar as commerce revived on the island, it lay largely in the hands of a metic class (although the metics may have been partially of Aiginetan ancestry or of earlier association with the island). Our testimonia suggest that the political tradition most in evidence on fourth-century Aigina was hatred of the Athenians. That hostility provided the leitmotif for Aiginetan foreign affairs until the supremacy of the Macedonians cast that ancient hatred at last into the shadows.

Ex Asia rediens cum ab Aegina Megaram versus navigarem, coepi regiones circumcirca prospicere. Post me erat Aegina, ante Megara, dextra Piraeus, sinistra Corinthus; quae oppida quodam tempore florentissima fuerunt, nunc prostrata et diruta ante oculos iacent.

(Ser. Sulpicius to Cicero: *Epis. ad fam.* 4.5.4)

Chronological Table

DATES	EVENTS	MAIN TEXT REFERENCES
c. 700	Kalaurian Amphictyony founded with Aiginetan participation	33, 89; <i>Aegina</i> 185-88, 219-20
700-640	Argive (Pheidonian) hegemony over Aigina	10-12, 15-17, 28-29, 88-89; <i>Aegina</i> 65-80, 150-51, 175-80
700-650?	Aiginetan trading with Arkadia	18-19, 90; <i>Aegina</i> 204-5
635-13	Epidaurian (Proklean) hegemony over Aigina	17-23
618-13	Samians under Amphikrates attack Aigina Aiginetan break with Epidauros; realignment with Argos	23-28; <i>Aegina</i> 207-8 27-33
c.610-594	Naukratis founded in Egypt	10-11; <i>Aegina</i> 253-64, 292-94
595-90?	Significant estrangement with Athenians	41, 51, 56, 78, 85-86
580-50	Aiginetan coinage begins ¹	9-10, 63-65; <i>Aegina</i> 88-97, 155-57
570-50	Amasis reorganizes Naukratis (Aiginetan sanctuary built)	cf. 82-86; <i>Aegina</i> 254-57
544	Praxidamas, Aiginetan victor at Olympia	211; cf. <i>Aegina</i> 300
535-15	Sostratos, Aiginetan merchant active	39; <i>Aegina</i> 241-48, 290
519	Aiginetans drive the Samians from Kydonia and found colony ²	90-91, 311; <i>Aegina</i> 267-68
c. 510	Demokedes, state physician on Aig. ³	<i>Aegina</i> 280-81

508-7	Aiginetans send Aiakidai to aid Thebes ⁴	
506	Aiginetans raid coastal Attica; beginning of Heraldless War Aiakeion founded by Athenians	92-93, 133-36, 138-39, 209 93, 179-80; <i>Colonization</i> 104
500	Aig. colony in Umbria at Adria ⁵	<i>Aegina</i> 268-70
500-485	Ath./Aig. adopt trireme warship	123; <i>Aegina</i> 30-31, 57
494	Aig. ferry Spartans before Sepeia	94-95, 140
491 (sp./sum.)	Aiginetan submission to Persia Kleomenes fails to extract Aiginetan hostages	94-96, 147-48
491-90 (fall/ winter)	Demaratos deposed Kleomenes succeeds in taking Aiginetan hostages	123-24 96-98
490-80	Aiginetan thalassocracy	48-49
490-89 (win./sp.)	Aig. accuse Leotykidas at Sparta	98-101
489-88	Aiginetans seize Athenian <i>theōris</i>	101-2, 120-21, 126, 141-42
488	Athenian plot with Nikodromos Nikodromos' uprising is crushed ⁶ Athenians buy ships from Corinth ⁷ Nikodromos & followers in Attica Athenians defeat Argives on Aigina	100-1, 143-46, 168; <i>Colonization</i> 104-5 120-21, 141, 168, 252; <i>Colonization</i> 105 100-1, 131-32, 140, 142, 168, 278 131, 193, 277-78; <i>Colonization</i> 83-84, 105 133

488	defeat of Athenian expedition public burial of Athenian freedmen	131-32, 140, 141-46, 168 146-47
483/2	Naval Bill passed against Aigina ⁸	121-22, 138-39, 141-42, 148-49, 168
480s	Fortification/military harbor ⁹	146, 148; <i>Aegina</i> 189-91
482-80	Aristeides Lysimakhou on Aigina	182-86, 190-96
481	Aiginetan & Athenian reconciliation; Aigina joins Hellenic League	103-4, 147-48, 191-92
480 (sp.)	Xerxes encounters Aiginetan grain ships in Hellespont	148; <i>Aegina</i> 273-74
480 (sum.)	Aiginetans at Artemision; loss of Aiginetan guard ship ¹⁰	
480 (sum.)	Aigina as haven for Athenian evacuees ¹¹	
480 (sum.)	Aiginetans at Salamis ¹² Aiakidai summoned to Salamis ¹³ Aiginetans fight at Salamis ¹⁴ Polykritos confronts Themistokles Aigina wins <i>aristeia</i> ; Polykritos, a personal <i>aristeia</i> ¹⁵	Cf. <i>Aegina</i> 32-33 143-46 40, 55, 286, 329
479	Greek fleet concentrates at Aigina for Mykale campaign ¹⁶ Aiginetans serve at Plataia ¹⁷ Lampon urges mutilation of the corpse of Mardonios ¹⁸ Aiginetans buy booty from Plataia ¹⁹	328 212 141

478	Polyarkhos intervenes over Athenian refortification	106-7, 284
469	Aiginetans erect <i>polyandria</i> at Plataia	141, 212
465	Aig. aids Sparta against Helot rebels	107, 284
late 460s	revival of Athenian pressure on Aig.	<i>Colonization</i> 106-10
459-58	Battle of Kekryphaleia ²⁰ outbreak of Athenian/Aiginetan war ²¹ battle at Aigina ²²	104, 107-8, 169; <i>Colonization</i> 112-13 107-9, 169, 278, 303-4, 326, 330-31; <i>Colonization</i> 84, 106-13 109
459/8-56	siege of Aigina ²³	<i>Colonization</i> n.9, pp.107-8
457-56	subjection of Aigina ²⁴	110, 270-71; <i>Colonization</i> 84-88, 113-14
456-31	Atticizing cults on Aigina	278, 297; <i>Colonization</i> 115-20
450-46	security measures taken regarding Aigina	216, 272; <i>Colonization</i> 120-26
446/5	Thirty Year Peace; Aigina remains Athenian subject	109-10, 215-16, 275-76
430s	usury of Thoukydides Melesiou on Aigina	187, 197-200, 221-23, 228-29, 253, 275; <i>Colonization</i> 85, 92, 114-15 with n.28
432-31	Aig. agitation agt. Athens at Sparta ²⁵	110, 221-23, 255
431	Spartan ultimatum demanding Aiginetan autonomy ²⁶ expulsion of Aiginetans ²⁷	110-11, 253, 266-71, 329-30 197-200, 222-23, 252, 325-30; <i>Colonization</i> 105-6

431	establishment of Ath. colony ²⁸ many Aiginetans settle in Thyreatis ²⁹	279, 297; <i>Colonization</i> 7-20, 24-28, 30-39, 53-59, 64-66, 79-103 294-99
429-28/7	Plato born on Aigina ³⁰	348; <i>Colonization</i> 57-59
430-26	demands for Aiginetan restoration & autonomy	221, 228, 259-60, 329-30; <i>Colonization</i> 82-84, 90-93
427	Aiginetans contribute to campaign of Alkidas	308-10
424	Athenian attack on Thyreatis ³¹	299-307
418	Aiginetan colonists at Mantinea ³²	<i>Colonization</i> 8-13
415	Syracusan expedition begins with race to Aigina ³³	326
413	Aiginetan colonists at Syracuse ³⁴	<i>Colonization</i> 8-13
413-5	5% tax collected; treason of <i>eikostologos</i> Thorykion ³⁵	285; <i>Colonization</i> 93-99
411	Aiginetan colonists intervene for Four Hundred ³⁶ Spartan warships raid Aigina ³⁷	<i>Colonization</i> 13-14; n.43, p.99 327
c. 410	Rhodians choose Aiginetan <i>proxenos</i> at Naukratis	316-24
405	attack on Aigina by Lysander (?) ³⁸	327
405-4	restoration of Aigina ³⁹	323-24, 333-35
404-395	Sp. harmost stationed on Aigina ⁴⁰	335-38
395-91	Aigina haven for Laconizers ⁴¹	339-40
391-87	Aiginetans raid Attica ⁴²	338-44

390-89	abortive Athenian siege of Aigina ⁴³	340-44
389	Teleutias breaks siege; Gorgopas as harmost ⁴⁴	341-42 343-45
388	Aiginetan squadron to Asia ⁴⁵ squadron returns to defeat Athenians at Cape Zoster ⁴⁶ victory of Khabrias on Aigina ⁴⁷ Teleutias attacks Peiraieus ⁴⁸	344 344-45 324, 345 324, 346-47
387/6	Plato sold on Aigina ⁴⁹	347-48
386	Aiginetan ληστεία motivating Peace of Antalkidas ⁵⁰	349-50
378	Aiginetan attacks on Attica resume ⁵¹	350-51
376	Pollis uses Aigina as base against Attica ⁵²	350-51
371	Aiginetan raids continue ⁵³	351-52
370s	Khabrias attacks Aigina ⁵⁴	352
366?	Khares assaults Aigina ⁵⁵	352-53
358	Aiginetan pirates active ⁵⁶	349
350s	public benefactions of the metic Lampis ⁵⁷	342-43, 354
late 350s	Onesikritos & Philiskos travel from Aigina to Attica ⁵⁸	364-65
early 340s	Aiginetan complicity with Philip II; Demades calls for action agt. Aig. ⁵⁹ Diogenes captured near Aigina ⁶⁰	354-58 355, 366-68

330-26	Aigina among states supplied with grain by Cyrene. ⁶¹	
324	Demosthenes in exile on Aigina ⁶²	358
322	Flight of anti-Macedonian leaders to Aigina ⁶³	358-59
319	Aiginetans defect to Cassander ⁶⁴	377-78
315/4-296	Aiginetans in Antigonid camp	378-82
296-94	Demetrios recovers Aigina ⁶⁵	382-83
270-49?	Delphians honor Aiginetans (Aitolian friendship)	385-86
229	Aigina joins Achaean League ⁶⁶	386-87
210	P. Sulpicius Galba captures Aigina; Aitolians sell Aigina to Attalos I ⁶⁷	387-88
209-8	Attalos operates from Aigina	388-90
200-197	Aigina is Attalid base in Second Macedonian War	390-92
196	Aig. confirmed as Attalid possession	392
192-91	Aigina is Attalid base in First Syrian War	392-93
189-88	Eumenes II winters on Aigina	393
186	Kassandros speaks on behalf of Aigina before Achaean synod	393-94
172	Eumenes II recuperates on Aigina	393
during 192-59	Hikesios Metrodourou from Ephesos, governor of Aig. under Eumenes II	394
during 159-44	Aigina honors Kleon, governor of island	394-97
129	Rome attaches Aigina to Achaia	394

FOOTNOTES

(*N.B.*, these notes contain material useful for *supplementing* the citation of the testimonia which are provided in the pages of the text(s) which are indexed.)

¹ See Ephorus *FGH* 70 F 176, cf. 115: *apud* Strabo 8.6.16 C376; Aris. fr. 481 Rose; Orion *Etym. s.v.* ὀβολός, p. 118.19 Sturz; *Etym. Mag. s.v.* ὀβελίσκος, p. 613.13; Poll. 9.83; Eustath. *Il.* 1.444.9-10.

² Hdt. 3.59.1-3; cf. Plato *Laws* 707E-708A; Strabo 8.6.16 C376.

³ Hdt. 3.131.1-2; *Suda s.v.* Δημοκίδης, δ 442 Adler.

⁴ Hdt. 3.80-81.1.

⁵ Strabo 8.6.16 C376.

⁶ Hdt. 6.88-91, for the whole Nikodromos episode.

⁷ Cf. Liban. *Decl.* 25.2.31.

⁸ Hdt. 7.144.1-2, 145.1; cf. Plut. *Them.* 4.1-3; Ael. Aristid. 46.187.26-28.

⁹ Paus. 2.29.10-11.

¹⁰ Hdt. 7.179-81; 7.203.1; 8.1.2.

¹¹ Hdt. 8.41.1.

¹² Hdt. 8.46.1-2; cf. Hdt. 8.60α, γ, 74.2, 79.1, 81; Paus. 2.29.5; cf. SEG 22.274 = Meiggs-Lewis 23.

¹³ Hdt. 8.64.2, 83.2, 84.2; Plut. *Them.* 15.2; Syrianus *Comm. Peri ideōn* 76; Philostr. *Her.* 1.743.

¹⁴ Hdt. 8.83-86, 90.2, 91, 92.1; DS 11.18.2; Strabo 8.6.16 C375; 9.1.9 C394. Philostratos refers to an image employed by the sophist Niketas in his "Xerxes" where the island of Aigina was fastened to the king's ship (VS 1.513). Lyc. *Leoc.* 70 makes the unparalleled charge that the Aiginetans intended to flee from Salamis with Adeimantos the Corinthian and his forces. Not only does Herodotus not mention this accusation in his discussion of Adeimantos' supposed reluctance to fight and treachery (8.5.1; cf. 59, 61.1, 79.4, 94.1), but he notes the intervention of the Aiginetans in favor of a stand at Salamis (8.74.2, cf. 8.60α, γ). Any other policy would have rendered Aigina vulnerable to attack and occupation. The charge may have received currency in fourth-century Athenian oratory and historiography.

¹⁵ Confrontation with Themistokles: Hdt. 8.92.2. *Aristeia*: Hdt. 8.93.1, 122 ([Plut.] *Mor.* 871C-D); DS 11.27.2; Plut. *Them.* 17.1; cf. Strabo 9.1.9 C394.

¹⁶ Hdt. 8.131.2, 132.1-2; cf. 9.76.3; DS 11.34.2.

¹⁷ Hdt. 9.28.6, 31.4; their tomb: 9.85.3, cf. [Plut.] *Mor.* 873A; their cheating of the Helots over booty: Hdt. 9.80.3; cf. Paus. 5.23.2-3.

¹⁸ Hdt. 9.78-79; cf. Paus. 3.4.10.

¹⁹ Hdt. 9.80.3.

²⁰ Steph. Byz. *s.v.* Κεκρυφάλεια (*Et.* 372) reports an Athenian victory at Kekryphaleia which Muller *AL* 177 regards as a proof of an Aiginetan presence at the battle. Herodian (*Pros. Cath.* 3.1.278.32-34) also reports an Athenian victory over the Aiginetans. Inasmuch as Kekryphaleia is an islet near Aigina, it is likely that the two naval battles of Kekryphaleia and Aigina may have occurred in nearly the same waters, a fact that encouraged their conflation.

²¹ Thuc. 1.105.2; DS 11.70.2, 78.3; And. 3.6; Lyc. fr. 9.2. Lycurgus assigned the capture of Aigina to Perikles (fr. 9.2). I should assign to the decision to attack Aigina at this time Perikles' remark on removing the eyesore of the Peiraeus: Aris. *Rhet.* 1411a15-16, cf. *Anon.* in Aris. *Rhet.* CAG 21.2.205.19-23; Plut. *Per.* 8.7, *Dem.* 1.2, *Mor.* 186C, 803A; cf. Athen. 3.99D.

²² *IG* I² 929.3 = Meiggs-Lewis 33; Lys. 2.48; Thuc. 1.105.2; DS 11.70.2, 78.4; Ael. Aristid. 13.155.8 (Phot. *Bibl.* 246.404a29-30); cf. Ael. Aristid. 13.154.10-14.

²³ Lys. 2.49-50; Thuc. 1.105.2-4; DS 11.70.3, 78.4; Ael. Aristid. 13.155.17-24 (Phot. *Bibl.* 246.404a39-b6); 29.371.33-372.2.

²⁴ Thuc. 1.108.4; DS 11.78.4; cf. Himer. *Decl.* 6.328-29. Aig. paid 30T in tribute right after surrender as attested in *IG* I² 259.A.VI.18, 454/3; 260.A.IV.17, 453/2; 261.A.V.5, 452/

1; 263.A.IV.39, 450/49 (name restored; partial payment); 267.C.IV.17, 445/4 (amount res.); 269.C.V.35, 443/2 (amt. res.); 270.C.V.37, 442/1; 271.D.II.99, 441/0; 272.D.II.101, 440/39 (name, amt. res.). The only payment which is attested from the 430s is either 15T or 9T: IG I³ 279.C.I.88, 433/2.

²⁵ Thuc. 1.67.2; DS 12.44.2; Plut. *Per.* 29.5.

²⁶ Thuc. 1.139.1, 140.3; Aesch. 2.173; Ael. Aristid. 32.402.11-12, 406.10-11; 34.428.32, 429.3, 27-28; cf. Thuc. 3.64.3; Aris. *Rhet.* 1396a18-20; Hermogenes *De Inventionibus* 4.13.50-52; Sopater *Diairesis* 8.190.24-26.

²⁷ Hdt. 6.91.1; Thuc. 2.27.1; DS 12.44.2; Paus. 2.29.5; Plut. *Per.* 34.2; cf. DH Thuc. 15; Ael. Aristid. 32.404.16-17.

²⁸ Thuc. 2.27.1; DS 12.44.2; Plut. *Per.* 34.2; Strabo 8.6.16 C375; cf. And. 1.65; Dinarchus fr. 4a-b Conomis; Steph. Byz. s.v. Αἰγιναιτρεῖς (*Et.* #42); Aristophanes and Aigina: Arist. *Ach.* 652-58 with scholia; Theogenes *FGH* 300 F 2; *Vita Aristophanis*: Kassel-Austin, *PCG* 3.2, #1.21-23 = Koster XXVIII.22-25; cf. Telecleides fr. 43 K. Olympiod. *In Gorg.* 50.14 explains Plato *Gorg.* 527A1, ἀλλὰ ἐλθὼν παρὰ τὸν δικαστὴν, τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης υἱόν by observing that Socrates' interlocutor Kallikles was from Aigina: τὸν τῆς Αἰγίνης υἱόν: προσέθηκεν τὴν Αἰγιναν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ὁ Καλλικλῆς ἀπὸ Αἰγίνης ἦν. Plato's surface reference is obviously to Aiaikos, the Aiginetan hero, serving as judge in the underworld. I should not rate very high the possibility that on a second level, Plato's comment had relevance because Kallikles (like the philosopher himself) had some relationship with the Athenian colony on Aigina. While lauding the Megarians, Liban. *Decl.* 16.63 mentions that they were cut off from the sea by the Aiginetans in what is supposed to be a late fifth-century context (ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἂν ὤπ' Αἰγινητῶν ἐκ θαλάττης εἴργετο). He may have garbled the historical blockade by the Athenians of the Peloponnesian War. If the name Αἰγινητῶν, however, is correctly transmitted, this interdiction would have to be imagined either as an operation of the Athenian colonists on Aigina against Megara or harassment by Aiginetan raiders during the fourth century.

²⁹ Thuc. 2.27.2, 4.56.2; DS 12.44.3; Paus. 2.29.5, 38.5-6.

³⁰ DL 3.3 (= Favorinus fr. 23; *FHG* 3.580-81); cf. Anon. *Proleg.* 2.8-10 Westerink; Anon. *Vita Platonis* p. 390.63-65 Westermann; Suda s.v. Πλάτων, π 1707 Adler.

³¹ Thuc. 4.56.2-57.4; cf. DH Thuc. 14; Aris. *Rhet.* 1396a18-20, also Anon. in Aris. *Rhet.* CAG 21.2.131.31-32; DS 12.65.9; Plut. *Nic.* 6.7 (cf. *Comp. Nic. et Crassi* 4.3); cf. Xen. *HG* 2.2.3.

³² Thuc. 5.74.3.

³³ Thuc. 6.32.2; cf. Ael. Aristid. 29.371.16-17, 391.5.

³⁴ Thuc. 7.57.2.

³⁵ Arist. *Ranae* 362-64, 380-82 with scholia.

³⁶ Thuc. 8.69.3.

³⁷ Thuc. 8.92.3.

³⁸ Plut. *Lys.* 9.2; cf. DS 13.104.7-8.

³⁹ Xen. *HG* 2.2.9; Plut. *Lys.* 14.3; Paus. 2.29.5; Strabo 8.6.16 C376.

⁴⁰ *Hell. Oxy.* VI.3, VIII.1; Dem. 18.96 (cf. Hermogenes *De Inventionibus* 4.1.14-21).

⁴¹ Isoc. *Asgineticus* (19).

⁴² Xen. *HG* 5.1.1; cf. Cic. *Off.* 3.46-47; Val. Max. 9.2(ext.).8.

⁴³ Xen. *HG* 5.1.2.

⁴⁴ Xen. *HG* 5.1.5.

⁴⁵ Xen. *HG* 5.1.6.

⁴⁶ Xen. *HG* 5.1.7-9.

⁴⁷ Xen. *HG* 5.1.10-13; Dem. 20.76; cf. [Aristid.] 1.3.2.3.32 (Spengel).

⁴⁸ Xen. *HG* 5.1.13-24.

⁴⁹ Plut. *Dion* 5.5-7; DL 3.19 (= Favorinus fr. 4, *FHG* 3.581); Plut. *Mor.* 471E; Ael. Aristid. 46.233.25-26; Philopon. *In Phys.* CAG 16.324.21-22; Olympiod. *In Alcib.* 2.121-27, *In Gorg.* 41.8. Reference to Plato's sale in Aris. *Phys.* 199b20-22 (cf. *Metaph.* 1025a25-30), note Philopon. *In Phys.* CAG 16.324.15-23. See also Alex. Aphrod. *In Metaph.* CAG 1.438.14-24; Asclepius *In Metaph.* CAG 6.2.357.22-31.

⁵⁰ Xen. *HG* 5.1.29.

- ⁵¹ Xen. *HG* 5.4.61.
- ⁵² Xen. *HG* 5.4.61.
- ⁵³ Xen. *HG* 6.2.1.
- ⁵⁴ Polyæn. 3.11.12.
- ⁵⁵ Aris. *Pol.* 1306a4-5.
- ⁵⁶ [Dem.] 53.6.
- ⁵⁷ Dem. 23.211; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 234E; [Plut.] *Comm. in Hesiod.* fr. 39; Cic. *TD* 5.14.40; Stob. *Flor.* 29.87; Themist. *Or.* 23.297d.
- ⁵⁸ DL 6.75-76; cf. DL 6.73 (Favorinus fr. 35, *FHG* 3.582-83), 80, 84.
- ⁵⁹ Athen. 3.99D; Anon. in Aris. *Rhet.* CAG 21.2.205.19-23.
- ⁶⁰ DL 6.74.
- ⁶¹ Tod, *GHI* #196.46, 50; 2.273-76.
- ⁶² Plut. *Dem.* 26.5, 27.7.
- ⁶³ Arr. *Diad.* fr. 1.13-14 (Phot. *Bibl.* 92.69b.34-40); Plut. *Dem.* 28.4; [Plut.] *Mor.* 849B; see also Phot. *Bibl.* 265.494b13-28, 266.496a22-29; [Plut.] *Mor.* 846E.
- ⁶⁴ DS 18.69.1.
- ⁶⁵ Polyæn. 4.7.5; Plut. *Demetr.* 33.7; cf. DL 2.115.
- ⁶⁶ Plut. *Ara.* 34.7.
- ⁶⁷ Polyb. 9.42.5-8; cf. 11.5.8; Polyb. 22.8.9-12.

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About the Author

THOMAS J. FIGUEIRA was born on Broadway in Manhattan in 1948 and educated in the public schools of New York City and Poughkeepsie, New York. He received his B.A. in Liberal Arts from Bensalem College of Fordham University in 1966 and his Ph.D. in Ancient History from the University of Pennsylvania in 1977. He is Professor of Classics and of Ancient History at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey (New Brunswick), where he teaches courses in ancient history, Greek, Latin, and classical civilization. He makes his home with his wife, Sarah George, and three children in Lawrenceville, New Jersey. He has published books and articles on a wide range of subjects in Greek social, economic, and political history and on classical historiography.