



The Chronology of the Conflict between Athens and Aegina in Herodotus Bk. 6

Author(s): Thomas J. Figueira

Source: *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica*, 1988, New Series, Vol. 28, No. 1 (1988), pp. 49-89

Published by: Fabrizio Serra Editore

Stable URL: <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20546937>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at <https://about.jstor.org/terms>



JSTOR

Fabrizio Serra Editore is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Quaderni Urbinati di Cultura Classica*

The Chronology of the Conflict between Athens and Aegina in Herodotus Bk. 6

Thomas J. Figueira

1. Introduction

As the ancient historian diverges from well-attested Athenian history, chronology becomes a preoccupation. Slight adjustments in dating disproportionately affect our insight into events, documented by few data. The chronology of the confrontation between Athens and Aegina in 491 is typical of such problems. Herodotus describes the episode in 6, 49-94. Time references during the preceding account of the Ionian Revolt give 491, the year before Marathon, for Darius' demand for submission, the affair's cause. From chapter 94, describing events directly leading to Marathon, the reader concludes that the whole episode precedes the battle. Generally, both historians and commentators on Herodotus have asserted that he was mistaken ¹. This suggests that the question for close analysis is when the pre-Marathon series of events is to end, and where the post-Marathon series to begin. Recent scholarship provides a sharp contrast to this anticipation. This work has taken two opposing lines of approach. N.G.L. Hammond (amplified by L.H. Jeffery) argues that the pre-Marathon chronology is defensible. The other view holds that Herodotus has incorrectly united into a single narrative details which belong to different stages of the Athenian/Aeginetan struggle (Andrewes, Podlecki) ².

¹ See the works cited in L.H. Jeffery, 'The Campaign between Athens and Aegina in the Year before Salamis (Hdt. VI, 87-93)', *Am. Journ. Philol.* 83, 1962, pp. 44-54, esp. 44. n. 1, and in T.J. Figueira, *Aegina and Athens in the Archaic and Classical Periods — a Socio-Political Investigation*, Diss. Univ. Pennsylvania 1977, pp. 396-397 n. 14.

² A. Andrewes, 'Athens and Aegina, 510-480 B. C.', *Ann. Brit. School at Athens* 37,

Clearly, however, the ingenuity of these scholars is not wasted. To attribute to Herodotus even the simplest error assigns him a gross error indeed, that of losing sight of an event central to his narrative, Marathon. Thus, there is an understandable tendency to redeem a valuable source from error by making the mistake our own (a failure to credit the text's correct chronology), or by showing the text's confusion to be complex, with origins in methods of research or of composition. This study is offered to demonstrate that a pre-Marathon date is untenable. Cleomenes' death probably, and the fighting between Athens and Aegina almost certainly, were after Marathon. A table has been composed for the reader's convenience in referring to the events under discussion.

2. *The Strict Chronology*

The obvious reading, or strict chronology, as we shall name it henceforth, would put chapters 49-94 entirely before Marathon. It has been argued by Hammond, whose outline is reproduced in the Table³. Though much of our discussion is directed at Hammond's scheme, it has, nevertheless, a general validity, inasmuch as any strict chronology must follow along lines similar to Hammond's suggestions.

A. Some Cautionary Thoughts

The strict chronology raises the question whether Herodotus can have had such precise information, a nearly week by week record of events in 491/490. The difficulties in correlating events between any two calendars suggests that such information may not have been retrievable after even one generation. For instance, there is no certainty that the Spartan and Athenian calendars were in their correct absolute relationship either to each other or to natural phenomena. Ad hoc adjustments reconciling calendars with seasonal phenomena were made irregularly,

1936-37, pp.1-7; N.G.L. Hammond, 'Studies in Greek Chronology of the Sixth and Fifth Centuries B.C.', *Historia* 4, 1955, pp. 371-411, esp. 'V. The War between Athens and Aegina c. 505-481', pp. 406-411; Jeffery, *art. cit.*; A.J. Podlecki, 'Athens and Aegina', *Historia* 25, 1976, pp. 396-413. Note also G. De Sanctis, 'Gli ostaggi egineti in Atene e la guerra fra Atene ed Egina', *Riv. filol. class.* 8, 1930, pp. 292-299, who dates the hostilities after Marathon, but would dissociate them from Aeginetan submission to Persia, which he believes apocryphal.

³ Hammond, *art. cit.* pp. 410-411.

and at magistratal discretion ⁴. Thus, political considerations, as well as sheer inattention, operated, as seen in manipulation of the month Karneios, and its festival, the Karneia ⁵. It is a short step from exploitation of such religious prohibitions internationally to their factional use to promote or hinder a line of policy. ⁶ Motivation for calendaric tampering here might be expected in the confrontation between Spartan factions: those Spartans like Cleomenes, eager to resist Persia, and those like Demaratus, who resisted Cleomenes about Aegina and later fled to the Persians. Thus, it would be no negligible achievement for Herodotus to create a weekly chronology, juxtaposing data about contemporaneous events from several cities. Yet, such data were translated into his narrative disappointingly, with so few explicit pointers to the passage of time. To reconstruct such a timetable is to forget that calendars were open to manipulation and imply unjustified unanimity among the parties to the episode about the hostages.

⁴ In their reason for not moving to aid Athens at Marathon, the Spartans take for granted that their calendar is not synchronized with the moon (Hdt. 6, 106, 3-107, 1); see W.K. Pritchett, 'Julian Dates and Greek Calendars', *Class. Philol.* 42, 1947, pp. 235-243, esp. 238-240, who notes discrepancies between the few attested Athenian dates and other calendars. On extreme calendaric confusion: Aristoph. *Nubes* 615-616 (Athens); Hesych. s. v. ἐν Κέῳ τις ἡμέρα (Keos) (see G. Grote, *A History of Greece* V, London 1888, p. 466). Systematic efforts to correct calendars in the 5th century (esp. before 432) are unattested. See A.E. Samuel, *Greek and Roman Chronology*, Munich 1972, pp. 52-55; B. van der Waerden, 'Greek Astronomical Calendars and their Relation to the Athenian Civil Calendar', *Journ. Hell. Stud.* 80, 1960, pp. 168-180, esp. 177-179. Thucydides' dates in 423 and 421 (Thuc. 4, 118, 12; 119, 1; 5, 19, 1) suggest that the Spartan and Athenian calendars were being intercalated differently (Samuel, *op. cit.* p. 93). See also A.W. Gomme-A. Andrewes-K.J. Dover, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* (HCT), Oxford 1954-81, III pp. 713-715.

⁵ Argos manipulated the Karneia in 419 (Thuc. 5, 54, 3) and during the Corinthian War (Xen. *Hell.* 4, 7, 2; 5, 1, 29). See HCT 4, 75. Spartan tampering with the *Gymnopaidiai*: Thuc. 5, 82, 3.

⁶ W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, Berkeley 1971-74, I p. 119, notes that Herodotus' statement (Hdt. 6, 106, 3-107, 1) that the Spartans did not wish to break their *nomos*, implies the possibility of not observing it. This opens the way to factional manipulation. At Marathon, specifically, the moon, awaited by the Spartans, need not have been that of the Karneia (Pritchett, *op. cit.* I pp. 116-126), nor should it be doubted that the battle occurred on 6 Boedromion (E. Badian-J. Buckler, 'The Wrong Salamis?', *Rh. Mus.* 118, 1975, pp. 226-239). Cf. W.W. How-J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, Oxford 1912, II pp. 101-102; D. Hereward, 'The Flight of Damaratos', *Rh. Mus.* 101, 1958, pp. 238-249, esp. 241-244.

Hammond's use of the Attic calendar as a temporal framework is questionable ⁷. Herodotus, in his narrative of the 490's and 480's, used a format based on campaigning seasons ⁸. It lent itself to military activity, and compensated for a lack of absolute chronological data. Periods of quiescence between campaigns were more easily retained in the memory of informants, and the historian could often group a single campaign's events on internal grounds. The adoption of the Attic calendar could only inject a note of parochialism, more fitting to a local historian, and opposed to the pan-hellenic dimensions of Herodotus' work. For him, the value of the Attic calendar would have been as a time-scheme already correlated with historical events. This it was not before the publication of Hellanicus. For the reader, it would have value only if it were explicit, which it is not. Thucydides sides with Herodotus in this matter ⁹. If Hammond's outline is converted to a seasonal calendar, some time in late spring or early summer 491 thereby lies open for the early events of the incident. Yet this does not relieve the pace of events, as, according to Hammond, Demaratus was deposed as early as late August 491, if he stood for election by the end of the month. The seasonal calendar, however, precludes that March to July 490 be employed in the strict chronology.

To Hammond, Herodotus was aware of conditions of contemporary travel and diplomacy. The situation in 491 required immediate action. Distances were short; diplomatic and judicial proceedings in these small cities were simple ¹⁰. Yet, in a parallel case, Cleomenes' attempt to insure a cooperative government at Athens took place over five archon years ¹¹. The issue is not a simple interchange, however important; it is rather a series of discrete interactions: Athens' appeal to

⁷ Hammond, *art. cit.* pp. 381-385, 410-411.

⁸ That contemporary with the spring, Mardonius went to sea (6, 43, 1) is a clear indication (cf. 7, 20, 1; 7, 37, 1; 8, 113, 1). See H. Strasburger, 'Herodots Zeitrechnung', *Historia* 5, 1956, pp. 129-161, esp. 135 n. 3, 151-154; M.E. White, 'Herodotus' Starting-Point', *Phoenix* 23, 1969, pp. 39-48, esp. 43.

⁹ Thucydides, with typical technical awareness, defended his seasonal organization with a polemic directed against local history (5, 20, 2-3), and may have recognized Herodotus' use of a seasonal calendar to treat the Persian invasion, the section of the latter's work most parallel to the Peloponnesian War.

¹⁰ Hammond, *art. cit.* pp. 410-411.

¹¹ Hdt. 5, 63-94, 1. One difference, however, is that Cleomenes' moves involving Athens entailed preparations for expeditionary forces.

Sparta, Cleomenes' trip to Aegina, the Spartan embassy to Delphi, Cleomenes' second journey to Aegina, his negotiations in Thessaly and Arcadia, Sparta's embassy recalling Cleomenes, the Aeginetan embassy accusing Leotychidas, his embassy to Athens, Athens' negotiations with Nicodromus, her purchase of ships from Corinth, and Aegina's request to Argos. An enumeration impresses us with the possible complexity of each stage. These diplomatic and judicial proceedings, inseparable since diplomacy initiates legalities, had a simplicity in a sense other than intended by Hammond. Without standing foreign services, diplomacy waited either on the assembly of an oligarchy's leading politicians or on a meeting of the demos. Such occasions were doubtless vulnerable to obstruction where unanimity was lacking, as it must have been on almost every occasion involved here.

Also, it was not advantageous to all parties to expedite this diplomacy. Initially, Cleomenes was indeed anxious to scotch Aeginetan cooperation with Persia. Demaratus' conduct and Cleomenes' inability to bring him to heel (however momentary) show that the Spartans did not unanimously share Cleomenes' anxieties. If the Persians arrived with Aegina still recalcitrant, Sparta was helpless to offset directly this increase in Persian strength. Thus, it was advantageous to Spartans seeking rapprochement with Persia to delay the extraction of the hostages, because anti-Persians at Sparta may have had greater difficulty in urging a now unpromising policy line, when Aeginetan Medism dimmed Athenian hopes of repelling the Persians. At other junctures, Demaratus and Leotychidas, the former threatened with deposition, the latter with *atimia*, may have suspected that a judgment against them was in the offing¹². Thus, they ought to have tried to postpone condemnation as long as possible. The notion that the Spartans had every reason to hurry such business has its foundation in a view that sees an unreal, unitary Sparta, instead of the reality of Spartans with disparate attitudes.

The Athenians were in a hurry to get the hostages, the Aeginetans to get them back. Aeginetan leaders hoped that Cleomenes would be stymied by Demaratus. Should he get Spartan permission to use force, a last resort, they would have time to change their policy. The Aeginetans were motivated to draw out negotiations until it would be too late for

¹² On the legal moves against Demaratus and Leotychidas: T.J. Figueira, 'Aeginetan Membership in the Peloponnesian League', *Class. Philol.* 76, 1981, pp. 1-24, esp. 8-14.

Cleomenes to act. Later, when the Athenians had the hostages, they had reason to prolong the protection which the hostages afforded them. They echo the original Aeginetan refusal to give hostages by saying that they would not return to one king what two had entrusted to them. The desperate Aeginetan counter-measure suggests this was no mere delay; rather, an outright refusal, if the Athenians meant they would return the hostages only to Cleomenes, who was dead or at least incapacitated. The Spartans may not have played their final trump, the embassy of Leoty-chidas, prematurely, before lower-level Spartan or Aeginetan appeals were over. Nor would the Athenians have made a provocative refusal until Spartan resolve had been tested. Aegina countered by kidnapping an Athenian theoris, a desperate act risking the hostages' lives, not to have been undertaken lightly. That there were other diplomatic initiatives is possible, because Herodotus gives little sign of completeness here.

Undoubtedly, at some points, the participants believed speed was essential: the Athenian purchase of Corinthian ships, which, as it turned out, caused them to be late; the Aeginetan dispatch of envoys to Sparta after Cleomenes' death; or the Aeginetan appeal to Argos. But these were balanced by times when a wait-and-see approach was fitting ¹³.

B. Internal Chronological Evidence

1) *The Later Career of Demaratus*

Hammond draws our attention to several facets of the incident to create synchronisms compatible with the strict chronology. Demaratus entered office in late August/September 491 (when the ephors began their term), so as to preside at the Gymnopaidiai of mid-summer 490 ¹⁴.

¹³ The term *autika* indicates that events fell in close succession (6, 73, 1: Cleomenes' second trip to Aegina after Demaratus' removal; 6, 75, 1: the onset of Cleomenes' madness after his return to Sparta). In Hammond's outline, Herodotus could equally have appended *autika* to any phase of the incident, so rapid was the succession of events. Yet, Hammond (*art. cit.* pp. 410-411) allows mid-September to the end of October for the hostages' extraction and deposit in Athens (6, 73, 1). As this is not accelerated in terms of his outline, *autika* has little force, an interpretative lapse inherent in the strict chronology.

¹⁴ Hammond, *art. cit.* pp. 410-411. On the ephors' term: Thuc. 5, 36, 1; see G. Busolt-H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde*, Munich 1926, II pp. 686-687. Navarchs, at least during the Ionian War, served with the ephors, but perhaps earlier only for the duration of assigned operations. Cf. J. Beloch, *Griechische Geschichte*, Strassburg 1914-

This is possible, but must be accepted cautiously, as we possess little information about other officials' terms at Sparta. In conservative Sparta, the terms of religious officials may not have been made to coincide with the civil year. Moreover, an election not long before the beginning of the official year would then be assumed, although this is perhaps no problem in Sparta. Her "childish" elections may have almost immediately preceded duties¹⁵. Yet, though it is conceded that Demaratus was popular (witness the lengths that Cleomenes was forced to go to discredit him), it is astounding that a man recently stigmatized by a Delphic pronouncement could have been elected to religious office so soon afterward¹⁶.

An examination of the implications of Herodotus' account of the encounter of Demaratus with Leotychidas demonstrates that it cannot be placed after Cleomenes' death. If Demaratus was still in Sparta after Cleomenes' downfall, why did he not seek justice by demanding the restoration of his kingship, at least for his posterity, if religious sanction forbade this for himself? For Herodotus, the machinations of Cleomenes were known before his death. After Cleomenes' death, Leotychidas was very soon condemned, and almost haled off by the Aeginetans. Leotychidas' condemnation for violent acts against Aegina vindicated Demaratus' policy on this issue. Vilification from someone in this situation would be exceedingly bold, and not likely to have so shamed Demaratus that he abandoned his duties. Demaratus' anxious questioning of his mother on his parentage is senseless unless the implicit dramatic date for this conversation was before Cleomenes' duplicity was uncovered. Demaratus cloaked his flight with a story of a trip to Delphi, which

27, II/2 pp. 269-283; Busolt-Swoboda, *op. cit.* II pp. 715-716 (for the earlier work); R. Sealey, 'Die spartanische Nauarchie', *Klio* 58, 1976, pp. 335-358.

¹⁵ Arist. *Pol.* 2, 1265b, 1270b. The new board of ephors was elected in 421 after the Peace of Nicias (Thuc. 5, 17, 1-20, 1) and the Spartan-Athenian alliance (5, 22, 3-23), and is to be connected with the period of suspicion at Sparta (5, 35, 2) "in the summer".

¹⁶ Demaratus scarcely conducted the festival as ephor. Leotychidas' contempt for him makes best sense if he held some less prestigious office (see How and Wells, *op. cit.* II p. 90). How and Wells' suggestion that he was one of the *bideoi*, gymnastic supervisors (Busolt-Swoboda, *op. cit.* II pp. 735-736), though possible, is only a guess. The whole Spartan official establishment can be assumed to have been in attendance. If the encounter is dated to 490, one is tempted to see Demaratus in an office with a term not coinciding with the official year, or in an office limited to duties at the Gymnopaediai. See Hereward, *art. cit.* p. 241.

should have been to obtain a reversal of the pronouncement against him. His flight to Persian territory shows that a favorable response could not be anticipated. Thus, Cleomenes was not yet discredited for his moves against Demaratus, and his Delphic accomplices had not yet been exposed¹⁷. Demaratus incurred accusations of Medism before the discovery of Cleomenes' acts could swing public sentiment at Sparta in his favor. Even if Herodotus was wrong in saying that Cleomenes' misdeeds concerning Demaratus became known before his death, the fighting between Athens and Aegina must follow the incident at the Gymnopaïdai, since the fighting follows Leotychidas' condemnation, inconceivable before the incident at the Gymnopaïdai¹⁸. If this incident can be no earlier than mid-summer 490, as Hammond grants, the hostilities were after Marathon, as time must still be left for the discrediting and death of Cleomenes, and the trial of Leotychidas.

2) *The Penteteric Theoris*

The penteteric theoris, ambushed by the Aeginetans, has been connected with a boat race, attested by Lysias at Sounion, and thought to be in honor of Poseidon on the strength of that god's association with the site¹⁹. Hammond opines that the festival took place in Poseideon, corresponding to December. Not all festivals of Poseidon took place in this month. It is possible that chthonic aspects of the god were primary in cult activity during Poseideon. The boat race points to the maritime attributes of the god. It would be odd in December, when sailing was feared, and would be more appropriate early in the sailing season to propitiate the god²⁰.

The conjunction of the boat race and the theoris cannot accommodate a date in 491. The speaker of Lysias 21, who boasts of his victory

¹⁷ Demaratus' flight: Hdt. 6, 70, 1; the incrimination of Cleomenes: 6, 66, 2-3. See Hereward, *art. cit.* p. 247 and n. 34.

¹⁸ See below, 2 B 5.

¹⁹ Hammond, *art. cit.* p. 411; Andrewes, *art. cit.* p. 6. The penteteric theoris: Hdt. 6, 87; boat race at Sounion: Lys. 21, 5. See L. Deubner, *Attische Feste*, Hildesheim 1966, p. 215. On the chthonic aspects of Poseidon in Poseideon, *IG II² 1367*, lines 16-18; Deubner, *op. cit.* p. 214; F. Sokolowski, *Lois sacrées des cités grecques*, Paris 1969, #52, p. 103.

²⁰ On the season of the year: H.W. Parke, *Festivals of the Athenians*, London 1977, pp. 97-98.

in the race, achieved his majority in 411/410 (Lys. 21,1). Presumably, one could not be victorious in a warship race until the age for holding the trierarchy. The speaker lists his liturgies through 403/402, so that 402/401 is the date of the speech ²¹. He mentions seven years as trierarch, 411/410-405/404, the year of Aegospotami, from which his ship was one of the few to escape (Lys. 21,2; 21,9, 11). A penteteric festival in 491/490 would repeat in 411/410, 407/406, and 403/402. The verbs of the speaker's list are aorists (21,1-4), with appended imperfects, and are dated by archons. The perfect (21,5) for the victory in the race breaks the pattern. Another perfect then describes unspecified services at festivals totalling 30 mn. The speaker would have been greatly tempted to attach the victory to the list by an aorist, had it taken place in 403/402. The liturgies were presumably unavoidable duties. The race and religious functions listed with it were voluntary. Perhaps the services at festivals were too insignificant to list or date separately, but the race's circumstances may have been such as to have been instantly recalled by the audience.

411/410 can ruled out. The speaker undertook the choregia for tragedy at the city Dionysia (for 30 mn.), and a liturgy of 2000 dr. at the Thargelia (21,1). He would have to be thought of as spending 15 mn. on the race, perhaps in the same spring (if the race was held then) as the Dionysia and Thargelia. Also, 411/410 was an inauspicious year in the main for boat races. Since winter 413/412, Sounion had been fortified to protect the grain ships. The 400 came to power in June, 411. In late summer, a Spartan squadron sailed to Euboea. An Athenian force following it was decisively defeated at Eretria, and the island was lost, save for Oreus. In Boedromion (August/September), the 400 were deposed. In fall 411, a critical struggle ensued in the Hellespont, where Mindarus had moved in September. At Cynossema, the Athenians achieved a victory. A further engagement at Abydos, also to Athens' advantage, ended the season's fighting. While the Spartan ships remained in the Euripos, it was highly improbable that a boat race could be held at Sounion. These ships, recalled by Mindarus after Cynossema, were still in the Euripos at the Battle of Abydos (near the end of the season). They had left by the time Theramenes, with a flotilla raised in Athens, operated there early the next year. Yet, every ship was critical at this time, a situa-

²¹ Lys. 21, 1-4. For a date: F. Blass, *Die attische Beredsamkeit*, Leipzig 1887-93, I p. 499.

tion only relieved when Mindarus' fleet was annihilated at Cyzicus. There is a slight possibility for a boat race between Cyzicus and the end of the year, but only if the earliest possible date for Cyzicus, March, 410 is taken ²². The speaker was a trierarch this year, but most Athenian ships were in the Hellespont.

407/406 can also be excluded. The speaker's list of liturgies is interrupted after the Lesser Panathenaia of Hecatombaion 409/408. We do not know how long he remained in Athens. The latest date for his departure was when Alcibiades left Athens, since Alcibiades chose his ship as his flagship (21,6). The speaker mentions his return in 405/404, after Aegospotami, when he provided gowns at the Promethea (21,3). The dating of Alcibiades' activities during 410-406 is controversial. At the earliest, Alcibiades returned home in Thargelion 408, staying long enough to celebrate the Mysteries in Boedromion, fall 408. In this chronology, Alcibiades and our speaker were not in Athens in 407/406. In the lower chronology, Alcibiades' return took place in 407, so that the speaker would have been in Athens for the first three months of the Attic year ²³. Nevertheless, this does not give a possible date in 407/406 for the race. Even the tightest chronology in 491/490 cannot accommodate a race before Boedromion. Hammond puts the race in Poseideon, three months later.

The last possibility is 403/402. It is barely possible that the speaker won his race after the Thirty fell in September. A race during the troubled ascendancy of the tyrants is improbable. Nonetheless, a boat race is so redolent of naval hegemony, as witnessed by the departure of the Syracusan expedition (Thuc. 6, 32, 2), that it scarcely fits the restored democracy's cautious policy toward Sparta²⁴. The speaker

²² General chronology: W.S. Ferguson, *Cambridge Anc. Hist.* V pp. 336-343; fortification of Sounion: Thuc. 8, 4; Euboean campaign: Thuc. 8, 95; Mindarus' move to the Hellespont, Cynossema: Thuc. 8, 99-106; Diod. 13, 39, 1-40, 6; Spartan ships summoned from the Euripos: Thuc. 8, 107, 2; Diod. 13, 41, 1-3; engagement at Abydos: Xen. *Hell.* 1, 1, 2-7; Diod. 13, 45-46; second battle in the Euripos between Thymochares and Agesandridas: Xen. *Hell.* 1, 1, 1; Theramenes in the Euripos: Diod. 13, 47, 3-6; Cyzicus campaign: Xen. *Hell.* 1, 1, 12-26; Diod. 13, 49, 2-51, 8. The earliest date for Cyzicus is late March (L. Breitenbach, *Xenophons Hellenika*, Berlin 1884², I pp. 80-81), but May/June 410 is to be preferred (Beloch, *op. cit.* II/2 pp. 241, 245, 392).

²³ The lower chronology: Beloch, *op. cit.* II/2 pp. 245-254; Ferguson, *Cambridge Anc. Hist.* V pp. 483-485. The higher chronology: G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, Gotha 1885, III/2 p. 1529 n. 1. Alcibiades' return: Plut. *Alc.* 32-34.

²⁴ Athenian submissiveness toward Sparta: M. Cary, *Cambridge Anc. Hist.* VI pp. 34-35. Boat races (?): Plato Comicus, fr. 183 Kock (*apud* Plut. *Them.* 32).

testifies to the state's lack of funds (21, 13). For a race in 403/402, the speaker must be supposed a trierarch of one of the twelve warships legally possessed by Athens in terms of the peace treaty (Xen. *Hell.* 2, 2, 20).

On the other hand, an ambush after Marathon in 489, for example, makes 410/409 a possible date for the speaker to win the race. He was at the Panathenaia in Hecatombaion, and the Dionysia in Elaphebolion. After Cyzicus, in spring or early summer 410, the balance of naval power had swung back to Athens. Thereafter, the restrictions on the democracy under the 5000 were erased. The diobelia was instituted, and work on the Erechtheum went ahead. The Athenians were sufficiently confident to rebuff Spartan peace offers. Here the boat race would reaffirm ideologically the naval hegemony upheld at Cyzicus. The race, perhaps otherwise suspended, was performed sumptuously, if the 15 mn. outlay of the speaker was characteristic. This would have been comparable to Alcibiades' self-assured escort by land of the Sacred Procession to Eleusis. We cannot be sure that the race was not held at a seemingly difficult time. Yet, our evidence points to a post-Marathon date rather than one before ²⁵.

3) *Sophanes and Miltiades*

In support of Hammond, L.H. Jeffery has introduced a notice in Plutarch's *Cimon* where Miltiades, seeking a crown from the Assembly for the victory at Marathon, is opposed by Sophanes of Deceleia ²⁶. Sophanes said that Miltiades should make this request when he had defeated the enemy single-handedly, a reference to his own killing of the Argive commander Eurybates on Aegina. If a date of late 490 or of spr-

²⁵ 489/488 is an alternative for the ambush, and gives a date of 409/408 for the victory of Lys. 21, 488 allows 408/407 for a victory. A date in 408 for Alcibiades' return will not accommodate this date, unless the race can have occurred before Alcibiades' departure in the fall. There is a possibility, not to be pressed, that the speaker's list of choregiai broke off in Hecatombaion 409/408 because he left Athens shortly thereafter. This speaks on behalf of 410/9 for the victory, and 490/489 for the ambush of the theoris.

²⁶ Jeffery, *art. cit.* p. 54; Plut. *Cimon* 8, 1-2. The manuscripts have Sochares, a mistake repeated in *Mor.* 873D, where Sochares and Deipnistos win the *aristeia* at Plataea, instead of Sophanes and Arimnestos (cf. *Hdt.* 9, 64, 2, 73, 1, 74, 1). Plutarch knew of Sophanes' *aristeia* (*Arist. and Cat. Comp.*). That Miltiades' interlocutor was an unknown Sochares (the anecdote making equally good sense) cannot be ruled out. But the repetition of the mistake where the original must have read Sophanes makes this unlikely.

ing 489 is granted for the Paros expedition (the beginning of Miltiades' downfall), Sophanes' victory was before Marathon. Jeffery suggests Ion of Chios (less likely) or Stesimbrotus as Plutarch's source²⁷. Ion's *Hypomnemata* were probably not his source. The incident is too early to be based on autopsy. Ion would have had to have learned of it from Cimon, as he learned of Cimon's exploits at Sestos. The disparaging tone toward Miltiades is hardly Cimon's, nor is it Ion's, generous in his admiration of Cimon. Ion was offering a portrait of his relations with leading Athenians that put his Atticism in a favorable light. There was no material for extolling the service of Athens to the Greek world here²⁸.

Stesimbrotus (used elsewhere in the *Cimon*), derogatory toward Athenian statesmen, is a better conjecture. In this case, the notice no longer supports the strict chronology. Stesimbrotus believed that Themistocles was opposed by Miltiades during debate over his naval bill in the reign of Darius. Therefore, he cannot have placed the Paros expedition, closely followed by Miltiades' death, as early as spring 489. We may reject Stesimbrotus on Miltiades' career or follow him in that Miltiades lived longer into the 480's. In either case, the scene between Sophanes and Miltiades is of no use to us²⁹.

²⁷ Paros expedition: Hdt. 6, 132-136; Nepos, *Milt.* 7; Ephorus, *F. Gr. Hist.* 70 F 63 (Steph. Byz. s. v. 'Paros'; cf. Zenob. *Prov.* 2, 21; Diog. 2, 35, 7); *Schol.* Ael. Arist. (Dindorf) 3, 531-532, 572, 677-678, 691. See K. Kinzl, 'Miltiades' Parosexpedition in der Geschichtsschreibung', *Hermes* 104, 1976, pp. 280-304. The expedition is usually dated on the strength of Hdt. 6, 132, 1: μετὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν Μαραθῶνι τρώμα γενόμενον... and of Ephorus, *F. Gr. Hist.* 70 F 63, which seems to assume that the Persians could be in the vicinity of Paros. Autumn 490 is a common date (e. g., J.A.R. Munro, *Cambridge Anc. Hist.* IV p. 253). Beloch (*op. cit.* II/2 p. 57) prefers to date it to spring 489, so as not to attribute foolhardiness to the Athenians. In this case, Herodotus' terminology would be interpreted as merely transitional, not demanding immediate succession.

²⁸ Ion on Cimon: *F. Gr. Hist.* 392 F 12-14. See F. Jacoby, 'Some Remarks on Ion of Chios', *Class. Quart.* 41, 1947, pp. 1-17.

²⁹ Plutarch's use of Stesimbrotus: *Them.* 2, 3 (*F. Gr. Hist.* 107 F 1), 4, 4 (F 2), 24, 5-6 (F 3); *Cimon* 4, 5-6 (F 4), 14, 5 (F 5), 16, 1 (F 6), 16, 3 (F 7); *Per.* 8, 9 (F 9), 13, 16 (F 10b), 26, 1 (F 8), 36, 1 (F 11). Miltiades' opposition to Themistocles: F 2. Plutarch on Stesimbrotus' hostility to Athenian statesmen: F 3, 4, 5. Disparagement couched in terms of their family life: F 6, 10, 11. See F. Jacoby, *F. Gr. Hist.* 2 B *Komm.* 343-344 (cf. F. Schachermeyr, *Stesimbrotus und seine Schrift über die Staatsmänner, Sitzungsber. Akad. Wissen. Wien, Phil.-Hist. Kl.* 1965, esp. pp. 19-23). E.S. Gruen, 'Stesimbrotus on Miltiades and Themistocles', *Calif. Stud. Class. Ant.* 3, 1970, pp. 91-98, sees the juxtaposition of Miltiades and Themistocles' naval bill as a mistake of Plutarch, not Stesimbrotus. Plu-

4) *The Athenian Fleet c. 490*

Andrewes, who holds that a part of the fighting of our incident belongs before Marathon, compares the 70 ships used by Athens against Aegina with Miltiades' 70 ships at Paros³⁰. For him, if we date the Nicodromus coup after Marathon and Paros, Athens had lost 20 ships in two years, and needed to buy 20 from Corinth. With a pre-Marathon date, the fleet reached 70 after the purchase, and maintained it at Paros, a preferable alternative. This point of his is only telling if one insists that the Paros campaign must closely succeed Marathon, before any fighting with the Aeginetans could occur. Nonetheless, that both fleets consisted of 70 may be coincidental. The 70 ships used against Aegina cannot simply be 50 ships from the naucraries plus 20 from Corinth, even if we believe that the naucratic system improbably permanently locked Athens into a fleet of 50 regardless of contingencies. The Athenians had recourse to Corinth on discovering insufficient "battleworthy" vessels. The paper strength of the Athenian fleet, as well as the number of hulls in Athens' possession, must have been greater than 50. Otherwise, the tardiness of an effort to get more ships is inexplicable. The Athenian and Aeginetan navies were changing over in their standard warship type from penteconter to trireme (Thuc. 1, 14, 3). The process of decommissioning penteconters and replacing them with triremes may obscure increases or declines in ship numbers. The seven ships captured at Marathon ought to figure in the totals of fleets after Marathon (Hdt. 6, 115, 1). In the second of the naval battles at Aegina, the Aeginetans captured four Athenian ships (Hdt. 6, 93). There may have been losses, unknown to us, in the first battle (Hdt. 6, 92, 1). It is unlikely that Athenian losses and gains in the fighting balanced each other, allowing us to

tarch confused Stesimbrotus' correct data on a debate over military policy in the 490's with the Herodotean tradition on the naval bill (cf. Schachermeyr, *op. cit.* pp. 13-16). To the alternatives that Stesimbrotus was wrong, or his evidence on the 490's was misdated, a third can be added. If hostilities between Athens and Aegina are post-Marathon, the Themistoclean reaction to their disappointing results may have been to agitate for more ships. It is unlikely that Stesimbrotus described a debate before 490 so like the one on the naval bill as to mislead Plutarch. A confrontation between the two statesmen in the early 480's permits the preservation of cooperation between the two down to Marathon, which, while undocumented, has been an attractive hypothesis: e. g., H.T. Wade-Gery, 'Themistokles' Archonship', in *Essays in Greek History*, Oxford 1958, pp. 171-179.

³⁰ Andrewes, *art. cit.* p. 5; Miltiades' fleet at Paros: Hdt. 6, 132.

equate the fleets at Paros and at Aegina. Athens could confidently man 70 ships for any one expedition at this time. Despite the loss of ships wrecked or decommissioned, fleet size tended to creep back to that number until the naval bill. The fleets at Aegina and Paros, although of the same size, need not have been the same ships.

5) *The Deposition of Demaratus*

The deposition of Leonidas II may shed some light on the removal of Demaratus from the kingship. In Plutarch, we learn that the ephors observed the heavens every eight years for a sign regarding the kings³¹. On the appearance of a negative sign, a judicial proceeding ensued, attributing responsibility to one of the kings, who was deposed pending an appeal to Delphi or Olympia. The observation of the heavens was to evaluate the kings' mediation of relations between gods and men. The time of the year for the observation is subject to speculation, but a strong possibility is the beginning of the ephors' year in office, in early fall³². The speed of the deposition procedure depended on the proximity of Cleomenes' move against Demaratus to the official time of observation. Hammond's time scheme allows only two to four weeks for Demaratus' deposition. Thus, it depends on a narrow coincidence between the date of Cleomenes' decision to move against Demaratus and the date it was legally possible to do so. Moreover, in Herodotus, there may be a hint that detailed proceedings have been abbreviated; "at last (*telos*), since these things were at issue, the Spartans sent to Delphi" (Hdt. 6, 66, 1). That Herodotus has summarized here tallies with our impression of Spartan conservatism, i. e., the deposition of a king could not be a simple

³¹ Plut. *Agis* 11. For the deposition procedure: H.W. Parke, 'The Deposing of Spartan Kings', *Class. Quart.* 39, 1945, pp. 106-112, who sees Phylarchus as Plutarch's possible source. To him, the appearance of Olympia and Delphi as authoritative oracles attests to the procedure's antiquity. If it was used against Demaratus, Herodotus must be imagined to be abbreviating its stages.

³² M. Cary, *A History of the Greek World from 323-146 B. C.*, London 1965, p. 154, has winter 243 or spring 242 for the deposition of Leonidas II, both consonant with Spartan year 491/490 for Demaratus' removal on an eight-year cycle. Beloch, *op. cit.* IV/2 p. 162, puts the deposition in autumn 242, in the next Spartan year, and irreconcilable with 491/490. Hereward, *art. cit.* pp. 239-240, suggests 244/243 for Leonidas II's deposition, which gives Spartan year 492/491 for Demaratus' deposition. 492/491 is compatible with the strict chronology, if Demaratus was deposed at the very end of the Spartan year.

procedure. Note their hesitation in punishing Pausanias (Thuc. 1, 128, 3-134, 1), or their willingness to take back Cleomenes (Hdt. 6, 74-75, 1). The last stage of deposition was, in Demaratus' case, a consultation of Delphi. This raises problems because the Pythia originally prophesied yearly, and it is uncertain at which date monthly sessions became the rule³³. With annual sessions in February/March, the strict chronology is impossible, since many events in the incident must follow Demaratus' deposition. In the case of monthly consultations, a lack of coincidence would entail several weeks' delay, a serious distortion in Hammond's chronology. 491 appears to be a year in the observation cycle, when we reckon back from a probable date for Leonidas II's deposition. It is possible, then, that Cleomenes initiated measures against Demaratus at the beginning of the Spartan year, in fall 491.

C. Historical Enigmas Caused by the Strict Chronology

1) *Actions during the Marathon Campaign*

Doubtless, Cleomenes desired to support Athens firmly by extracting hostages from Aegina. His freeing Athens from the fear of Aeginetan aid to Persia is analogous to his preemptive strike against Argos at Sepeia, which freed Sparta's hands to face the anticipated Persian arrival (Hdt. 6, 76-82). A faction existed around Demaratus that sought a less provocative policy toward Persia. Yet, there is no evidence for a dramatic volte-face in Spartan foreign policy. If the Spartans had truly slain Darius' envoys, they had embarked on a deliberate collision course with Persia (Hdt. 7, 133, 1). The eventual arrival of Spartan reinforcements in Attica demonstrates that views prevailing in Sparta held that Athens should still be supported. Demaratus' actions after deposition are comprehensible only if Sparta was still anxious over Persia and Medism. On departure, Demaratus deceived the Spartans about his destination.

³³ On Delphic procedure: H.W. Parke, *The Delphic Oracle*, Oxford 1956, I pp. 17-45; yearly consultation: Kallisthenes, *F. Gr. Hist.* 124 F 49 (= Plut. *Mor.* 292E-F). They were held in the Delphic month of Bysios, approximately February/March. Monthly consultations: Plut. *Mor.* 398A. H.W. Parke, 'The Days for Consulting the Delphic Oracle', *Class. Quart.* 37, 1943, 19-22, believes monthly consultation to have begun surely by 480, guessing that the change was made during the First Sacred War. R. Flacelière, *Ét. archéol. gr.* 2, 1938, p. 106, cited by Parke, believes that monthly sessions began in the 4th century.

When his deceit was discovered, he was pursued (Hdt. 6, 70, 1-2). If the Spartans wavered in their determination to act forcefully against Persia, it was in the summer of 490, under the impact of Cleomenes' activities in Arcadia. In summer 490, this vacillation, which must be momentary, is too late to be accommodated to the strict chronology. (See the Table).

Another problem is the willingness of a Spartan court to condemn Leotychidas before Marathon. The Spartans appear thoughtless of the disruption in their leadership which this act would cause. Is it not more likely that, with the recession of the Persian threat after Marathon, the balance of Spartan feeling turned against Cleomenes' high-handed tactics, and found its butt in his protégé Leotychidas? The Spartans could indulge their honor with minimal political consequences by a move against Leotychidas, since his services as a commander were, for the moment, dispensable. In the strict chronology, the Spartans must be supposed to have deposed Demaratus, lost Cleomenes, and envisaged exiling Leotychidas in rapid succession.

By condemning Leotychidas, Sparta reversed a policy concerning the hostages, formerly thought essential for freeing Athenian hands. Yet, there is no hint in Herodotus of this aspect of the decision. Leotychidas' diplomacy at Athens gives a very different indication. There he preached about the tragic results of the bad faith of Glaucus of Sparta. The story has point because Glaucus refused to return goods entrusted to him, much as the Athenians kept the hostages when the reason for Sparta's entrusting them had passed ³⁴. Before Marathon, this is pointless. Sparta was acting in bad faith for reversing policy over the hostages. In answer, the Athenians do not protest that, on the hostages' return, Aegina would no longer be deterred from aid to Persia. Nor are they anxious over non-compliance with Sparta. It is as if Spartan aid against Persia were not contingent on Athenian cooperation in this issue. The Athenians can resort to a quibble (i. e., that what was entrusted to them by both kings should not be returned to one) only with their victory at Marathon recently past. Their defiance reflects their new-found confidence after a victory achieved without Spartan aid.

³⁴ Hdt. 6, 85, 3-87. See H.W. Stubbs, 'The Speech of Leotychidas in Herodotus VI. 86', *Proceed. Class. Ass.* 56, 1959, pp. 27-28. If the speech's homiletic character, and the absence of detail relevant to the diplomatic context, suggests a free composition, analysis indicates that Herodotus' dramatic date for it (at least in this passage) was after Marathon.

Aeginetan behavior toward Athens is also incomprehensible in a pre-Marathon setting. By the capture of the theoris, Athens' advantage in holding Aeginetan hostages was offset. Both sides undertook hostilities, presumably without the fear of summary execution of each other's prisoners. It is odd that the Athenians would initiate such hostilities rather than an exchange of prisoners with Datis' arrival near. These inconclusive hostilities of considerable scale are put by Hammond in winter 491/490, itself an anomalous turn of affairs. Both sides mobilized their navies in other than the sailing season. This was not commented on by Herodotus.

Also, there is no impression made by the fighting on the Marathon campaign or its history. Apparently, the inconclusive fighting had no effect on Athens' ability to defeat the Persians. No subsequent Athenian panegyric literature mentions the difficulties of the warfare with Aegina to extol Athens' victory, thereby greater. On the Aeginetan side, their determination or fighting power was scarcely curtailed by these encounters. However, they do not offer their island as a Persian base, an obvious step. That Datis believed that he retained a force capable of subduing Athens is shown by his sailing into the Saronic Gulf after Marathon. Because he could not bring the Athenians to battle on his own terms before winter, he was stymied. Had Datis a base capable of supporting him on Aegina, he might well have remained, hoping for the aid of treachery or waiting for reinforcements to permit an offensive in the spring. Without such a base, he could only withdraw his fleet to Asia. One may object that this is to attribute to Datis firmer resolve than he possessed, and that no evidence tells of a request for an Aeginetan base. Nonetheless, it is noteworthy that the Aeginetans did not carry on a campaign of raids, a measure that they had used in support of Thebes in c. 506 (Hdt. 5, 81, 3; 89, 1-2). Rather, the retention of the hostages compelled the Aeginetans to remain inactive. The grave actions and counteractions concerning the hostages were predicated on the belief that Aeginetan Medism marked a significant change in the power balance. In the strict chronology, this belief becomes nonsensical, as events indicate that the Medism was in the end of no moment. There is no suggestion in Herodotus why such a reversal of expectations should have occurred.

2) *Cleomenes' Absence from Sparta*

The last period of Cleomenes' life took shape from his intervention on Aegina. With his plot against Demaratus suspected, Cleomenes with-

drew to Thessaly, and then to Arcadia. Hammond allots two weeks for his total absence from Sparta, little more than the time necessary for a round trip, if that. Cleomenes' actions are meaningless in this context. Thessaly is a strange choice for a mere refuge from Sparta. Arcadia would have been far enough for that ³⁵. Rather, only Thessaly and Thebes possessed substantial cavalry establishments in mainland Greece. At some point, Darius' provision for horse-transport for Datis' fleet would have become known in Greece. Hating Athens, Thebes would offer no help. The Spartans had already faced one Thessalian force, supporting Hippas, who would be returning with the Persians. However, if the Aleuads had already begun their Medism, their Thessalian opponents might have been receptive to Spartan overtures ³⁶. Cleomenes is not known to have accomplished anything in Thessaly, though he could have changed the balance between pro- and anti-Persians in a situation about which we know nothing. His motivation for going was perhaps soon forgotten. Later, when Cleomenes was viewed with hostility at Sparta, Spartan suspicions about the king became the journey's cause. If information about provision of horse-transport came quickly to Greece, almost any date from spring 491 would be possible for the Thessalian trip. If, however, the Spartans learned of the transports only on the fleet's assembly in Cilicia, the trip to Thessaly would follow April 490 ³⁷.

Returning from Thessaly, Cleomenes, fearful of the Spartans, conspired with the Arcadians. This is a premature and disproportionate

³⁵ Exiled Spartan kings in Arcadia: Hdt. 6, 72, 2; Thuc. 5, 16, 3; Xen. *Hell.* 3, 5, 25. Possibly, Cleomenes' trip is a mirage, and the Arcadian town of Sellasia is to be read (D. Hereward, 'Herodotus VI. 74', *Class. Rev.* n. s. 1, 1951, p. 146).

³⁶ Thessalians aiding Hippas: Hdt. 5, 63, 3-64. Medism of the Aleuads: Hdt. 7, 6, 130, 3; 9, 1, 1, 58, 1; Paus. 3, 7, 9-10. H.D. Westlake, 'The Medism of Thessaly', *Journ. Hell. Stud.* 56, 1936, pp. 12-24, dates Aleuad Medism as early as 492, when Larissa began coining on the Persian standard. Cf. C.M. Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*, Berkeley 1976, p. 115, who dates this coinage to the late 6th century. Therefore, the policy of the Aleuads was known to Cleomenes in 491. The Scopads or the Echetratids (if a separate family) would have been naturally disposed to a Spartan request. During Xerxes' expedition, the Thessalian opponents of the Aleuads had the upper hand momentarily, and called in a Greek expeditionary force (e.g., Hdt. 7, 172, 232). See N. Robertson, 'The Thessalian Expedition of 480 B. C.', *Journ. Hell. Stud.* 96, 1976, pp. 100-120, esp. 108.

³⁷ Beloch, *op. cit.* II/2 pp. 55-56.

reaction to the mere possibility of subsequent prosecution. Measures calculated to topple the Peloponnesian hegemony of Sparta are incongruous in one who had raised her influence to previously unreach heights. After his pains to extract the hostages, so allowing Athens to face Persia, must Cleomenes then be assumed to have ruined this same prospect by threatening Spartan ability to help Athens, with the spectre of an Arcadian defection?

At this time, Arcadia began to issue federal coinage³⁸. This was a backward region, where small, loosely affiliated political units, i. e., groups of villages, still existed. Important centers, like Tegea and Mantinea, beneficiaries of regional consolidation, had not yet absorbed them. Unification was suspended by the relative inter-state balance, but perhaps more significantly by the intervention of Sparta, to whom the predominance of sub-political units was advantageous. She was on hand for appeals from Tegea or Mantinea, if the other was moving toward cantonal hegemony³⁹. With Arcadia restive, this traditional policy may have seemed unsustainable⁴⁰. Cleomenes had the Arcadian leaders swear their holiest oath to follow his lead. This group commitment ought to be juxtaposed with the appearance of federal coinage. Cleomenes may have hoped to achieve Arcadian acquiescence in Sparta's leadership of the Peloponnesus by conceding an opportunity for regional unity under a closer, perhaps more personal, subordination to the Spartan king. In effect, he was attempting to alter the "constitution" of the Peloponnesian League concerning the kings' executive power⁴¹. This policy, with

³⁸ See W.P. Wallace, 'Kleomenes, Marathon, the Helots, and Arkadia', *Journ. Hell. Stud.* 74, 1954, pp. 32-35, who rightly insists that the Arcadian League was a real political entity. Kraay, *op. cit.* p. 97, argues for a looser connection between Cleomenes' Arcadian stay, and the beginnings of League coinage, dated by him to 470-465.

³⁹ Spartan intervention in Arcadia: at Tegea and Dipsa: Hdt. 9, 35, 1-2; Paus. 3, 11, 7, 8, 8, 6; Isoc. 6, 99; Diod. 11, 65, 4; during the Peloponnesian War (422): Thuc. 4, 134; 5, 29, 1, 64-74; in the Corinthian War: Xen. *Hell.* 5, 2, 2-7; after Leuctra: Xen. *Hell.* 6, 5, 4, 10 (371); Xen. *Hell.* 7, 5, 1-2 (362).

⁴⁰ See A. Andrewes, 'Sparta and Arcadia in the Early Fifth Century', *Phoenix* 6, 1952, pp. 1-5. On Spartan acquiescence in the League's existence: Wallace, *art. cit.* p. 34.

⁴¹ Hdt. 6, 74, 1. Compare the 5th-century Spartan treaty with the Erxadieis, an Aetolian sub-group, restored by Peek as:

...ἡεπο-
[μ]ένος ἡοπυι κα Λα [κεδαιμόνι]
[ο]ι ἡαγίονται καὶ κα[τὰ γαν]
[κ]αι καθαλαθαν

its potential for change in Spartan internal politics, not the threat of an Arcadian uprising led by Cleomenes, provoked Spartan fears.

Plato attests a Helot revolt at the time of Marathon. Some have suggested that Cleomenes stirred up problems with the Helots and with the Arcadians⁴². This, however, may be reasoning *post hoc propter hoc*, unduly crediting Herodotus' appraisal of Cleomenes' predicament. Sparta decisively defeated Argos during the 540's. It must have become obvious by the mid-490's that the Argives would soon try matters again, especially if a 50-year truce had been made in the 540's. Arcadia had been the field over which Argive and Spartan ambitions had previously played. Argos was an obvious ally (as were, and had been, the Arcadians) of the Messenians, who could only prosper from Spartan absorption elsewhere⁴³. Cleomenes' victory at Sepeia forestalled this development, and obscured it from modern scholars. Yet Sparta could little afford to fight against Arcadians and Helots on the eve of the Persian arrival. It cannot be ruled out that Cleomenes was partially successful in Arcadia. The Arcadians remained quiescent until the Battle of Tegea (468?), and the Helot troubles were weathered without great difficulty. From this analysis, two points deserve mention. If the Arcadian situation was critical, a few weeks is very little time for Cleomenes' reaction. Secondly, if the situation was intensified by Datis' imminent arrival, then the Arcadian trip should precede Marathon, but ought not precede it by a great span of time.

D. External Data

A passage in Justin has the Sicilian Greeks sending to Leonidas, described as the "brother of the king", for help against Carthage. Gelon, speaking to the envoys of the Hellenic League, seems to suggest a date

(W. Peek, 'Ein neuer spartanischer Staatsvertrag', *Abhandl. sächsischen Akad. Wissen. zu Leipzig*, Phil.-Hist. Kl. 65, 3, 1974, pp. 3-15.

⁴² Plato, *Leg.* 3, 692d, 698e. Wallace, *art. cit.* 32-33, connects a Spartan dedication at Olympia (IG V 1 1562) with this revolt (cf. L.H. Jeffery, 'Comments on Some Archaic Greek Inscriptions', *Journ. Hell. Stud.* 69, 1949, pp. 25-38, esp. 26-30), and with the flight of Messenians to Anaxilaos of Rhegium (Paus. 4, 23, 6). See also G. Dickens, 'The Growth of Spartan Policy', *Journ. Hell. Stud.* 32, 1912, pp. 1-42, esp. 31-32.

⁴³ On the Argives and the Messenians: Paus. 4, 15, 7; Apollodorus, *F. Gr. Hist.* 244 F 334 (= Strabo 8, C 362).

for this war early in his reign at Gela ⁴⁴. Justin's description makes sense on the assumption that Leonidas had responsibility for foreign affairs by virtue of his relationship to his brother Cleomenes. If Leonidas was *de facto* or *de iure* regent for Cleomenes during his incapacitation, that period is unlikely to have been but a few weeks, and it cannot have preceded summer 490. Gelon came to power in late summer or fall 491 at the earliest. Leaving some time for his consolidation of power, a likely date for the appeal to Leonidas is in the earliest 480's. Thus, the weight of opinion points to a post-Marathon date for the appeal, and so also for Cleomenes' death. Moreover, Cleomenes' absence in Arcadia, the earliest point at which Leonidas can have served in his place, should not be long before Marathon. Justin's source may be Timaeus. If Pompeius Trogus and Justin transmitted him correctly, this would be weighty evidence, since the exact status of Leonidas at the time of the appeal is typical of the precision that the fastidious Tauromenian strove after ⁴⁵.

Cornelius Nepos, in his *Themistocles*, informs us that a war with Corcyra was Themistocles' first service to Athens (2, 1-4). As strategos (praetor), Themistocles introduced his naval bill, and won victory in the war. Thereupon, he swept the seas clear of pirates. In fact, Themistocles

⁴⁴ Justin 19, 1, 9: ad Leonidam fratrem regis Spartanorum. An emendation often made is: Dorieium Leonidae fratrem... (F. Ruehl, 'Die Textesquellen des Iustinus', *Jahrb. f. Class. Philol.* Suppl. 6, 1872, p. 157). This would be an error of Justin's, not a corruption of the text (O. Seel, *M. Iuniani Iustini: Epitoma Historiarum Philippicarum*, Stuttgart 1972, p. 165). T.J. Dunbabin, *The Western Greeks*, Oxford 1948, pp. 411-412, takes issue with the emendation, which connects the request with Dorieus' expedition, about whom the description, brother of the king, is very odd, since Leonidas would not yet be king for some time, when Dorieus left. Dunbabin connects the notice with Gelon's war to avenge Dorieus (*op. cit.* pp. 411-412; cf. Hdt. 7, 158, 1-2) during his reign at Gela, and suggests that an appeal to Leonidas was natural, with Cleomenes involved in political intrigue. The war is the fighting mentioned in Justin 4, 2, 6. See also A.S. Graf von Stauffenberg, 'Dorieus', *Historia* 9, 1960, pp. 181-215, esp. 191-192.

⁴⁵ 491/490: Dunbabin (*op. cit.* p. 410), who puts the appeal in 489; R. van Compernelle, *Étude de chronologie et historiographie sicilotes*, Brussels 1959, pp. 262-264, 293-296 (cf. Paus. 6, 9, 4); autumn 490: A. Schenk von Stauffenberg, *Trinakria*, Vienna 1963, p. 176; at the latest in 488: G. Vallet, *Rhégion et Zancle*, Paris 1958, pp. 346-354. Timaeus as Justin's source in Bk. 19 is probable, as he lies behind the narrative on Carthaginian history. See A. Enmann, *Untersuchungen über die Quellen des Pompeius Trogus für die griechische und sicilische Geschichte*, Dorpat 1880, pp. 149-154. On Agathocles (Bks. 22-23): J. Beloch, 'Zur Geschichte Siciliens von Pyrrhischen bis zum Ersten Punischen Kriege', *Hermes* 28, 1893, pp. 481-488. Justin's source was not Ephorus: contrast 19, 1, 10-13 with Ephorus, *F. Gr. Hist.* 70 F 186.

advocated the naval bill against Aegina. He had arbitrated a dispute between Corinth and Corcyra, and earned the gratitude of the Corcyraeans (Plut. *Them.* 24) ⁴⁶. Nepos confused the arbitration with a war. His mistake was perhaps fostered by recollections of Corinthian charges of Corcyraean piracy in Thucydides (Thuc. 1, 37, 3-5), and by the mention of the naval bill in the same book. But something in his source may have encouraged his mistake. This may have been the prominent portrayal of the Aeginetans as pirates. Moreover, Nepos confused the intention of the bill with an apocryphal result, a victory over Aegina. His source probably recorded military activity between Athens and Aegina with Themistocles as strategos, but correctly associated it with Themistocles' urging of development of the navy. Conceivably, the account of the ambush of the theoris was used as corroboration for an emphasis on Aeginetan piracy. Nothing in Nepos' biography is from Themistocles' career, or supposed career, before Marathon: no archonship, no beginning of the fortifications, and no strategia at Marathon. Nepos' source put Themistocles' rise to prominence no earlier than Marathon, as did Herodotus ⁴⁷. Thus, for this source, the hostilities after the ambush of the theoris have an upper limit in that battle. Ephorus, known to have been interested in Aeginetan seapower, was used by Nepos in his 5th-century lives, and may well have been his source here ⁴⁸.

3. *The Emended Chronologies*

A refutation of the chronologies that displace a part of the events described by Herodotus partly runs over the same ground as our discus-

⁴⁶ K. Nipperdey, *Cornelius Nepos*, ed. K. Witte, Berlin 1913¹¹, pp. 44-45, points out that Thucydides' remark about the early naval battle between Corinth and Corcyra (1, 13, 3-4) may also have lingered in Nepos' memory to mislead him.

⁴⁷ Cf. D.H. 6, 34; Thuc. 1, 93, 3. See D.M. Lewis, 'Themistocles' Archonship', *Historia* 22, 1973, pp. 757-758. Cf Hdt. 7, 143, 1: ἀνὴρ ἐς πρῶτους νεωστὶ παριών. A similarity may be noted between Nepos 2, 1: *non solum praesenti bello, sed etiam reliquo tempore ferociorem reddidit civitatem*; Justin 2, 12, 12: *namque Athenienses post pugnam Marathoniam praemonente Themistocle, victoriam illam de Persis non finem, sed causam maioris belli fore, CC naves fabricaverunt*; Plut. *Them.* 3: οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλοι πέρας ὄντο τοῦ πολέμου τὴν ἐν Μαραθῶνι τῶν βαρβάρων ἦτταν εἶναι, Θεμιστοκλῆς δ' ἀρχὴν μειζόνων ἀγώνων, ἐφ' οὗς ἑαυτὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ὅλης Ἑλλάδος ἤλειφε καὶ τὴν πόλιν ἥσκει πόρρωθεν ἤδη προσδοκῶν τὸ μέλλον. See M. Mohr, *Die Quellen des plutarchischen und nepotischen "Themistokles"*, Berlin 1879, p. 17.

⁴⁸ See Mohr, *op. cit.* p. 17 and n. 1, who suggests that the three passages cited in n.

sion of the strict chronology. Specific arguments can also be introduced to supplement our treatment of the historical enigmas. In Andrewes' chronology, the Nicodromus coup, and the Argive expedition, were in 493. The ambush of the theoris and resultant hostilities were in 487⁴⁹. Herodotus confused the two confrontations. He gave himself a *terminus post quem* of 491, the date for Aeginetan submission, and a *terminus ante quem* in Marathon, since he or his source knew that some detail (e. g., the Nicodromus coup) was before Marathon.

Andrewes makes several points in support. A discrepancy exists between Herodotus and Thucydides 1, 42, where the Corinthian speaker declares that an Athenian *epikratisis* resulted from Corinth's sale of ships. Herodotus ends with Athens defeated at sea, no *epikratisis*. Moreover, the behavior of the Argive volunteers seems adventurous in 487, but is comprehensible in 493, according to Andrewes. Another point, on the Athenian fleets at Aegina and Paros, has been discussed above, as it can support the strict chronology. The difficulties are in the Nicodromus episode. The fighting is poorly integrated in the text with what follows. If the Nicodromus story is shifted to 493, a bout of confused fighting is left that stimulated the naval bill.

Andrewes observes that the transition from 6, 92 (Athenians victorious on land) to 6, 93 (Athenians at sea) is jarring, but whether it is particularly so in an obviously hurried and abbreviated narrative is questionable. The narrative directly leading up to Marathon had been suspended for a long stretch of text. Herodotus may have been anxious to return to the main line of his history. Nor is the possibility of a lacuna to be ruled out⁵⁰. However, the sudden change from victory on land to defeat at sea need not necessarily trouble us. It may not be a displacement in time, but a sudden change in perspective. The nature of warfare between Athens and Aegina entailed sudden thrusts on land and sea, with equally sudden changes in fortune. This scenario may be offered. The Athenians, successful in the initial sea battle, landed an expeditionary force, which devastated the countryside. In time, it met the Argives

47 above are from Ephorus. On Nepos' use of Ephorus in the *Miltiades*: H.A. Macan, *A Commentary on Herodotus Books IV-VI*, London 1895, II pp. 206-211.

⁴⁹ Andrewes, *art. cit.* at n. 2, pp. 4-7.

⁵⁰ See Podlecki, *art. cit.* p. 400. His argument for the incompleteness of the text here is not compelling, namely the absence of an antithesis to τῆσι νηυσί. It would be more than speculation to attempt to fill any lacuna here.

in the field. Here there is no mention of the Aeginetans; the Argives opposed the Athenians alone. With their numbers strained by the task of manning a 70-ship fleet, the Aeginetans, specialists in naval warfare, concentrated on their navy. Although successful against the Argives, the Athenians could not seize the city, and had to withdraw upon the defeat of their fleet. Such a series of engagements ill fits the conventions of hoplite warfare. It challenged the skill of a narrator, perhaps insensitive to this sort of warfare, on a subject about which he was already impatient to conclude.

Concerning the *epikratesis*, to call this an abuse of language, as Andrewes does, misses the point of the speech's partisan character. To justify the Corinthian's phrase, all that was needed was that the Corinthians had aided Athens against an enemy later subjugated. There is no reason to suppose that Thucydides would specifically refer to obvious inaccuracies in this speech. Another of the services cited by the Corinthian, their dissuasion of the Peloponnesians bent on aiding the Samian rebels in 440, is also doubtful ⁵¹. No external evidence corroborates consideration of so infeasible an undertaking as timely help to Samos would have been. Even an abortive Peloponnesian commitment to war would scarcely escape Athenian notice. Yet, Athens does not react to it. It is not mentioned in Thucydides' *Pentecontaeteia*, where it should have been emphasized as a stage in growing Spartan fear of Athens. The attribution of inaccuracies to the Corinthian was a comment on the alleged ties of friendship between two states, obviously hostile, that had fought a generation before.

Concerning the Argives, it is hard to see a real difference between 493 and 487. The Argive counter-revolution occurred when the sons of the fallen at Sepeia were mature enough in numbers to recover control of the polity, around 470 ⁵². In 487, Andrewes tells us, the aristocrats should have been saving their strength in order to take power. But is looking forward from 493 to the late 470's, or from 487, so very different a thing? They could not foresee that their counter-revolution would be

⁵¹ A.E. Raubitschek, 'Corinth and Athens before the Peloponnesian War', in *Greece and the Eastern Mediterranean in Ancient History and Prehistory: Studies Presented to Fritz Schachermeyr*, Berlin 1977, pp. 266-269.

⁵² Hdt. 6, 83, 1-2. See W.G. Forrest, 'Themistokles and Argos', *Class. Quart.* n. s. 10, 1960, pp. 221-241, esp. 227-229.

successful far in the future. Yet, they could see an effort to aid Aegina, an old ally whose navy complemented their land forces, as a means to achieve their own political aspirations.

The refusal of official aid and the subsequent volunteer expedition may lie in Argos' delicate situation after Sepeia. Although the regime of former dependent classes had straitened resources, it was not reduced to a Spartan satellite. Advances were made to Persia, aloofness from the Spartan bloc in the Peloponnesus was maintained, and efforts were made to re-establish control over the Argolid, when conditions were propitious⁵³. Argos may have been willing to help Aegina, but fearful of Spartan retaliation on evidence of renewed vitality. The fiction of a volunteer force was concocted so that Argos could intervene without involving the city in risks vis-à-vis Sparta. 1000 volunteers from the aristocracy of any city, as Andrewes says these were, let alone from weak, post-Sepeia Argos, is hard to believe. Argive corps of 1000 picked troops are otherwise attested. Eurybates' volunteers may have had official encouragement⁵⁴.

For Andrewes, the background of the Nicodromus hostilities was a revival of Athenian confidence during Themistocles' archonship. The fighting led to Aegina's decision to Medize in 491. In itself, the coup was not so successful as to prompt this decision. Rather, Aeginetan Medism is more explainable in terms of the collapse of Argos, her traditionally.

A more extreme approach has been suggested by Podlecki.⁵⁵ To him, the fighting of 6, 87-94 occurred after Aegina aided Thebes in c. 506. He finds 6, 87, 1 incongruous because, in Herodotus, the Aeginetans never δίδουσι δίκας. Is not Herodotus, however, making this very point? The Aeginetans broke the normal pattern of injury-reparation by a second outrage. He meant that in c. 506, the Aeginetans got off scot-

⁵³ Continuity in early 5th century Argos' foreign policy — Argive Medism: Hdt. 7, 150, 1-2; 9, 12; the fine on Sicyon for helping Cleomenes: Hdt. 6, 92, 1-2; the grant of proxenia to Gnostas, a perioikos: *Suppl. Epigr. Gr.* XIII p. 239; the harboring of Themistocles: Thuc. 1, 135, 3. Forrest, *art. cit.* pp. 229-232, argues that the douloi were still in power when Argos attacked Mycenae (Diod. 11, 65, 3-5; Paus. 7, 25, 5-6; Strabo 8, C 377).

⁵⁴ R.A. Tomlinson, *Argos and the Argolid*, Ithaca 1972, pp. 100, 181. Cf. Thuc. 1, 107, 5; 5, 67, 2, 81, 1; Diod. 12, 75, 7.

⁵⁵ Podlecki, *art. cit.* pp. 398-403. On the central role of retribution in historical causation, cf. Mimmernus fr. 3 G.-P. with B. Gentili-G. Cerri, *Storia e biografia nel pensiero antico*, Roma-Bari 1983, p. 5.

free, a very different result from the hostilities of 6, 87-94, where, while not defeated, they suffered losses. The Aeginetans are not to be thought of as giving requital until 457. The verbal echoes between 5, 89, 1 and 6, 88 are not as striking as Podlecki views them. Presumably, Herodotus, adopting the Athenian perspective of his informants, uses the stock language of injured victims for justifying retaliation. This is not unreasonable. The retaliation of 5, 89, 1 answered an attack made after a long period of peace, without a previous alliance with Thebes. In 6, 88, Herodotus' language stems from his anti-Persian stand, because Aeginetan Medism necessitated the taking of hostages. The retention of them by the Athenians caused the ambush. Similar phrasing came from a similar evaluation of separate incidents; an evaluation also grounded in Athenian politics, where, in each case, popular outcry may have overcome politicians' counsels of restraint. The hostilities should not be moved before 500. The Argives refused official help to Aegina because of Aeginetan aid to Cleomenes in the Sepeia campaign. To precede hostilities before 500, Sepeia must be dated early in Cleomenes' reign. C. 494 is preferable to such a date. Another obstacle, admitted by Podlecki, concerns Sophanes, a participant in the fighting. It is unbelievable that Sophanes remained so vigorous in 479 as to win the *aristeia* at Plataea, or that, as an active officer in the 460's, he fell in Thrace. There is no reason to separate the Sophanes/Eurybates incident from the events resultant on the ambush.

4. *Herodotus and his Evidence*

Does placing some of these events after Marathon convict Herodotus of serious error, or can his narrative admit such a possibility? If Herodotus was mistaken, how can an error of this magnitude be explained when mid-5th-century veterans of Marathon survived to correct him? The second question tacitly adopts the view that the narrative is Athenian in perspective. The connection of the narrative to its context is through the relevance of Aegina's Medism to a description of the extension of Persian power down to Marathon. To be contrasted with the Athenian/Persian emphasis of the context is the narrative section's emphasis on Sparta, clear not only in long digressive or excursive passages (on the rights of Spartan kings, and on the careers of Cleomenes, Demaratus, and Leotychidas), but also because the Spartans are generally the initiators of the actions recounted. The Athenians and Aeginetans react to these initiatives until the outbreak of hostilities.

To Herodotus, Athens embroiled mainland Greece with Persia by aiding the Ionians, while Sparta did not. Datis' expedition resulted from Athenian participation in the revolt. This impression was reinforced by an accidental event: the Spartans arrived too late to fight at Marathon. A proper appreciation of Sparta's actions on the eve of Marathon entails a development of the Spartan theme in the background of the Persian invasion of Greece. Yet, only intermittent light is shed by Herodotus on Spartan foreign policy toward Persia. Pertinent data appear not in their correct chronological context, but in a form rather like a footnote, where relevance to another situation is foremost⁵⁶. Within the narrative on the hostages, Herodotus focused on internal politics at Sparta. The discrediting of two Spartan kings and another's death could not be ignored. Thus, we glimpse Spartan divisions over Persia. They are not in the foreground. The narrative's character presumably mirrors the sources, probably Spartans, until the account of the hostilities.

Much of the material which Herodotus presented on Cleomenes is included in the narrative about the hostages. The history of Aegina's three conflicts with Athens is treated in several locations in the text. Alternative patterns where the information on Cleomenes could have been presented chronologically, or where most of the evidence on Athens and Aegina could be contained in the narrative concerning the hostages, are conceivable. This reminds us that it is not transparent at what stage of composition Herodotus combined, separated, or juxtaposed large blocks of material. The final product remains, and, with it, the practical assumption that all the information from one set of informants on one topic must have been filed together initially (if only mentally). When a chronological problem concerns the transition from one relatively large block of text to another (e. g., the episode about the hostages [6, 49-94] to the Marathon campaign [6, 95-124] or the Spartan narrative within the episode on the hostages to the actual hostilities), it is difficult to believe that an audience's reaction to an oral presentation played any role.

The actual hostilities are appended to a largely Spartan narrative on the results of Cleomenes' intervention. No internal evidence suggests

⁵⁶ Macan, *op. cit.* II pp. 80-82. Contrast De Sanctis, *art. cit.* pp. 292-296, who reasons from a belief that the Athenian and Spartan execution of Darius' ambassadors (Hdt. 7, 133) are not historical to an unwarranted doubt of the historicity of the Persian demand for Aeginetan submission.

that Herodotus' Athenian or Aeginetan informants set the hostilities in their correct chronological relation to the Spartan context. Herodotus connects all three conflicts between Athens and Aegina. The early war is adduced to explain the Aeginetan decision to aid Thebes in c. 506, and in the description of the hostilities of 6, 92-93, Herodotus makes a back reference to the Aeginetan misdeeds of 506 (6, 87). Some details (Aeginetan piracy, Argive help to Aegina, the intervention of sacrilege) link the accounts. Herodotus does not give us a detailed political history of the hostilities, but highlights a single facet, the Nicodromus coup, with its aftermath, the Aeginetan sacrilege. This suggests that Herodotus' informants responded to his questioning with an eye toward the entire history of the Aegina/Athens struggle. His emphasis on the Nicodromus coup suggests that their interests lay in material useful for partisan purposes. The textual juxtaposition of the hostilities with Cleomenes' career or with Marathon was not in the foreground for Herodotus' sources, but was the result of a deliberate stylistic choice which was not grounded in historical analysis. A gulf stands between the hostilities and the preceding and following sections, regardless of chronology. Even on a pre-Marathon date, the hostilities have nothing to do with Marathon.

Herodotus did not ask a question of vital interest to us, whether Cleomenes was already dead when Marathon was fought, and, if not, what was he doing. A consideration of what material Herodotus may have had to work with on Cleomenes helps explain his silence. Sparta was not the relatively open society that was Periclean Athens. Herodotus was more dependent on leading Spartans, who were unlikely to have been completely candid about Cleomenes. To Herodotus, he was a violent and impious man. His actions are not understood against the background of a policy. Cleomenes, an activist king, turned rather opaque when seen from a perspective uninterested in foreign policy. Cleomenes' intervention on Aegina was irreconcilable with this negative appraisal. Yet, Herodotus makes little of this, stating somewhat baldly that Cleomenes was benefitting Greece. Concomitantly, the treatment of Demaratus is generous. He opposes Cleomenes on grounds of personal enmity, by 5th-century standards innocuous. Demaratus' Medism is not treated negatively, like that of Hippias, and is obscured by a portrayal of him as a mouthpiece of Hellenic ideals in the Persian camp, a dramatic foil to Xerxes, the oriental autocrat. Demaratus' treasonous flight is palliated by its close connection to Cleomenes' treacherous designs against him. The anecdotal material favorable to Demaratus transcends this epi-

sode, and points toward a source(s) close to Demaratus. The personality-centered interpretation of the feud between the two kings trivialized the incident involving the hostages.

Cleomenes' lurid end (parallel in Herodotus to the deaths of Cambyses and Miltiades) stems from Herodotus' reworking of Spartan views of him, already negative. His death was mysterious, as shown by the contemporary explanations of his madness. Since contemporary folk-science could not evaluate such a breakdown, whether somatic or psychosomatic, supernatural, along with mundane, explanations were produced. However, more than one modern scholar has seen a successful plot against the king in Herodotus' account ⁵⁷. If a group of Spartans was guilty of engineering Cleomenes' death, a conspiracy of silence would surely ensue. Besides guilt, there were other reasons for a lack of candor at Sparta. Cleomenes had tried to strengthen his position relative to other organs of government. By legislation that provided that only one king be on campaign, the other king's veto was removed (Hdt. 5, 75, 2). Receiving embassies, he conducted a foreign policy in a fashion that would undoubtedly have trespassed on the sphere of the ephors (e. g., Hdt. 5, 49-51; 6, 84, 3). Regarding the extraction of hostages, it is possible that Cleomenes was stretching the kings' discretionary powers to their limit ⁵⁸. His actions in Arcadia seem to show an attempt to alter the pattern of inter-relations with Spartan allies. Good reasons could be advanced for these changes, perhaps too good. Cleomenes' success may have been ominous to conservatives at Sparta. Much as Lysander's constitutional reforms were equated with treason, and were suppressed posthumously, a negative and superficial construction may well have been subsequently broadcast about Cleomenes' last activities ⁵⁹.

One place where material hostile to Cleomenes may have touched Herodotus' account is in the sequence: discovery of guilt in Demaratus' deposition — Cleomenes' withdrawal from Sparta — recall — madness and death. In order for anyone to believe that Cleomenes plotted against Sparta in Arcadia, a powerful motivation would need to be assigned to

⁵⁷ Beloch, *op. cit.* II/1 p. 36; Dickens, *art. cit.* p. 31; Munro, *Cambridge Anc. Hist.* IV pp. 261-262.

⁵⁸ See Figueira, *art. cit.* at n. 12, pp. 9-12.

⁵⁹ Lysander's proposed reform: Diod. 14, 13, 2-8; Plut. *Lys.* 24-26, *Mor.* 212C-D, 229F; Nepos, *Lys.* 3, 5; Arist. *Pol.* 5, 1301b 19-21. Cf. Strabo 8, C366 on Pausanias II's treatise. See C.D. Hamilton, *Sparta's Bitter Victories*, Ithaca 1979, pp. 89-95.

the king. Such a stimulus was available in the incrimination for bribery at Delphi. Its use by pro-Demaratus source(s) may have been posthumous retaliation for Cleomenes' treachery, even if, in fact, the bribery was discovered after the Arcadian trip. Herodotus also thought that Cleomenes' death followed his return by no great period. This impression may come from Spartan minimization, out of guilt or reticence, of his last actions. Nevertheless, a predicament may have lain here for Herodotus. At some stage of the composition of his work, he may well have pondered the absence of Cleomenes from his evidence about Marathon. An absence in Arcadia, or inactivity due to incapacitation, were both possible reasons. But the prevailing interpretation of Cleomenes' actions, an insurrection against Sparta, had nothing to do in Herodotus' mind with Marathon. Also, to Herodotus, the period of incapacitation was too short to explain anything. Reasoning seemed to point toward Cleomenes' death falling before Marathon.

Moreover, there is evidence that he did not commit himself wholeheartedly to that date. To him, Marathon took place because of Athenian participation in the Ionian Revolt. Emphasizing the forward thrust of events inherent in the Persian victory, Herodotus brought us straight ahead from the fall of Miletus. The sixth year of the Revolt, probably 494, saw the fall of Miletus. In the next year, the Persians mastered Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos (6, 31, 1). In the next spring, Mardonius campaigned in Thrace. Then, in the next year, Thasos was reduced to a Persian satellite. The Persian request for Aeginetan submission is attached to this by *μετὰ τοῦτο*. Our whole narrative concerning this episode follows with few chronological signposts. After Marathon, Herodotus denotes two events, Darius' order for horse transports, and the catastrophe at Mt. Athos, as being in the previous year (6, 95, 1-2). Yet, the latter, in his account, must be two years before, although the provision of the transports, associated with the demand for submission sent to Aegina, is properly described as in the previous year.

Herodotus was uncertain about spacing over time the Persian preparations before Marathon. In 6, 48, 2, between the dispatch of Persian heralds to Greece and the submission of the islanders, orders for triremes and horse transports are reported. After the treatment of the incident about the hostages, Herodotus resumes Persian preparations with Ἀθηναῖοισι μὲν δὴ πόλεμος συνήπτο πρὸς Αἰγινήτας, ὃ δὲ Πέρσης τὸ ἔωυτοῦ ἐποίεε, a statement purposefully vague that merely signals events leading directly to Marathon. 6, 48 and 6, 94 can be inter-

puted as marking off a rudimentary ring composition. The *μετὰ τοῦτο* of 6, 48, 1 is no true chronological signpost, but rather a loose connective. Nothing in 6, 94, 1 suggests that Persian preparation had advanced. There is no indication of time elapsed from the Persian perspective. Herodotus does not insist that 6, 48-94 was concluded before Marathon. The Athenian/Aeginetan confrontation belongs to a different chronological process from the events leading to Marathon. At 6, 94, two sections of the narrative abut on each other without truly chronological transition.

The foregoing analysis can be briefly contrasted with that of Jeffery. Her technical point, that the aorist participle *συστάς* (in the context of Themistocles' naval bill) cannot mean "continue" (as Hammond suggests), is correct, but this should not be pressed to compel that, when Herodotus wrote 7, 144, 2, he thought war had just broken out before 484-482, and that the hostilities of 6, 87 ff. were therefore unknown to him⁶⁰. We cannot be sure that Herodotus would not have described a war breaking out in 489/488 or a little later by such a participle in his treatment of 483/482. This is especially telling, if we remember that Herodotus views the naval bill as a newcomer's initiative which quickly met success. If Themistocles had urged for some time that revenues be employed to subsidize fleet building against Aegina, only achieving success in 483/482, in the favorable environment of the strike at Maroneia, then Herodotus' juxtaposition of the Aeginetan war and the agitation for the bill can be maintained without prejudice to the date. In other words, Herodotus was misinformed about Themistocles, and this led to vagueness in which setting hostilities with Aegina prompted the naval bill.

Conventions, both of language and of diplomacy, were attuned to hoplite warfare. Naval warfare between Athens and Aegina, often akin to piracy, poorly fit this model (*vid. akeruktos polemos*). Whether the struggle from 506 to 483/482 ought to be a single war or several was questionable. Judging from periods of quiescence or low-grade activity, one could make each flare-up the outbreak of war. Herodotus chose to remind us that the two states were at war in 483/482, but it seems incautious to seek here for a precise previous relationship between the two states.

⁶⁰ Jeffery, *art. cit.* at n. 1, pp. 46-47. Cf. Hammond, *art. cit.* p. 409.

For Jeffery, certain factors indicate a late inclusion of 6, 87, 1-94, 1. 1) The Argive fine of Aegina (6, 92, 1) is not mentioned in the treatment of Sepeia (6, 76). 2) Sophanes of Deceleia is mentioned with reference to the Peloponnesian War not only in this passage (6, 92, 3), but also in another (9, 75). 3) The Corinthian sale of ships and citation of the pertinent law may have become known to Herodotus when mentioned on the eve of the Peloponnesian War. 4) The fighting is compressed, with an abrupt end. 5) In 6, 87, 1, the Aeginetans' non-payment of the penalty for their deeds has no connection with Leotychidas' embassy preceding it, but introduces well the seizure of the theoris and events following. In the 440's Herodotus, with no further information, concluded Cleomenes' intervention with Leotychidas' embassy. Thus, to him, the war prompting the naval bill had just broken out. The expulsion of the Aeginetans in 431, traced to their earlier impiety, revealed new data. These were inserted in 6, 87-94, perhaps unsatisfactorily regarding conclusions and dating, but, except for a cross-reference to Sophanes in 9, 75, the remaining narrative was left unchanged.

This approach, concentrating on Herodotus' composition, merely lessens the incongruities of the strict chronology, but does not confront the historical implausibilities associated with it, nor refute indications arguing a post-Marathon date. Fundamental to Jeffery's views is a publication (or, rather, abandonment) of Herodotus' work not long after 431. The later Herodotus terminated his work, the more inexplicable the inadequate insertion of 6, 87-94 becomes. There is always the risk of confusing the few references to the Peloponnesian War with the supposition that little of the final draft was composed in the 420's. Herodotus' blindness to the War can equally have been deliberate; contributory to his pan-Hellenic emphasis. There is equally little about the "First Peloponnesian War", doubtless a dominating political event of his lifetime. Evidence points toward a publication date of 421 or later ⁶¹. If such dating is

⁶¹ The traditional date is 431-430, based on Hdt. 7, 137; 6, 91, 1. See F. Jacoby, *RE* Suppl. 2, s. v. 'Herodotus' cols. 232-233. A date no earlier than the 420's: 1) 6, 98, 2, the earthquake at Delos is after Artaxerxes' death, and probably after the Peace of Nicias; 2) 7, 235, 2-3, the mention of Cythera is made in light of its capture in 424; 3) 9, 73, 3, the immunity of Deceleia implies the end of the Archidamian War. A date after the Archidamian War is argued by C.W. Fornara, 'Evidence for the Date of Herodotus' Publication', *Journ. Hell. Stud.* 91, 1971, pp. 25-34, citing reminiscences of Herodotus in Aristoph. *Av.* 1124-1138, *Eur. El.* 1280-1283. J.A.S. Evans, 'Herodotus' Publication Date', *Athe-*

correct, Jeffery's hypothesis collapses. New information in 431 will not excuse the text's inadequacies, since sufficient time will have passed between its discovery and publication.

The hypothesis that recollection of earlier confrontations between Athens and Aegina was prompted by the expulsion of the Aeginetans in 431 will not bear examination. Herodotus appears to have visited Aegina (presumably before he travelled west). He collected the variant traditions on the beginnings of the feud between Athens and Aegina at this time. His occasional sympathy for Aegina shows the influence of Aeginetan or pro-Aeginetan informants, contacts made long before 431⁶². The three narratives on Aeginetan/Athenian hostility show similarities (as has been mentioned) that speak against a separate provenience for any of them⁶³. The scattered references to Aegina in the later books show that Herodotus did not lose interest in the island during his composition⁶⁴. Much of this data has a partisan character, but I doubt that anyone would care to call them late insertions, as though the last books of Herodotus were not late enough. The details considered by Jeffery to have been remembered in 431 are unlikely to have been forgotten. The lack of mention of Cleomenes' use of Aeginetan ships before

naeum n. s. 57, 1979, pp. 145-149, suggests a date as late as 424, but not much later (on the traditional view of Aristoph. *Ach.* 68-92 as a burlesque of Herodotus). Citing R. Latimore, 'The Composition of the Histories of Herodotus', *Class. Philol.* 53, 1958, pp. 9-21, Evans hypothesizes that the work appeared serially on papyrus rolls as he revised, as early as 425. Against Jeffery's hypothesis, 6, 98, 2 ought to have appeared in the late 420's. Linear revision, proceeding end to end, cannot accommodate Jeffery's view of spot revision on Aegina in Book 6 without alterations in later sections to accommodate the insertions. Piecemeal publication allows a two-way process, where Herodotus could make corrections, if only in later sections, and incorporate new information. This precludes tracing the inadequacies of the narrative on the hostages to new material in 431.

⁶² Herodotus' visit to Aegina: Jacoby, *RE cit.* cols. 268-269.

⁶³ On Herodotus' Aeginetan sources, most obvious in the early confrontation between Athens and Aegina (e. g., 5, 86, 1-4; 5, 87, 1): T.J. Figueira, 'Herodotus on the Early History of Aegina', *Am. Journ. Philol.* 105, 1984. On the similarities between the three Athens/Aegina conflicts: U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Aristoteles und Athen*, Berlin 1893, II pp. 280-287.

⁶⁴ Mention of the Aeginetans in the accounts of Salamis and Plataea was compulsory. More striking are the 5 unconnected notices, some passing, in the course of 10 chapters of Book 9: a cross-reference to the killing of Eurybates (9, 75); Pausanias sends a Coan lady to Aegina (9, 76); Lampon urges the outrage of the corpse of Mardonius (9, 78); the Aeginetans cheat Spartan Helots over Persian booty (9, 80); the Aeginetan monument at Plataea (9, 85).

Sepeia is not surprising. Herodotus did not feel bound to give a connected history of Sparta in this period. The Sepeia campaign itself is introduced only tangentially as one reason for Cleomenes' breakdown. Sophanes' exploit in killing Eurybates does not seem easily forgettable. His *aristeia* at Plataea, admittedly in the earliest account of the Battle, must have kept alive many of his accomplishments. The annihilation of the Argive volunteers was an unusual accomplishment in hoplite warfare, and thus intrinsically memorable. The Argive defeat is the counter-image of an Argive destruction of Athenian invaders on Aegina (save for one survivor) in the first war between Athens and Aegina (Hdt. 5, 87, 1-2). The two episodes should not be given proveniences independent in time.

The reprisals campaign had relevance for the rights and wrongs of the conflict between Athens and Aegina. The Aeginetan atrocity toward the suppliants was the cause for Herodotus of their eventual expulsion. Yet, such justifications did not become controversial only in 431. They were an issue during the Thirty Years Peace, as evinced by Pindar's support of the Aeginetan cause (e.g., Pind. *Pyth.* 8, esp. 98-100), and by the Spartan belief that capital could be made of Athenian treatment of Aegina by a demand for Aeginetan autonomy (Thuc. 1, 139, 1). There must have been justification for the harsh treatment dealt Aegina in the 450's, but we have little pertinent evidence. However, Herodotus' linking of the ambush of the theoris with earlier Aeginetan crimes, and the absence of any elaboration of the treachery of Nicodromus, together with the account of the sacrilege, was certainly justificatory of Athenian subjugation of Aegina, as well as expulsion of the inhabitants in 431. If Herodotus was adapting raw material in praise of Athens, the abrupt shift in scene is explicable, since Herodotus' Athenian informants gave no details to flesh out the Athenian defeat⁶⁵. Herodotus merely had the fact of the closing defeat at sea, which his Aeginetan informants would have supplied.

If the Corinthian speaker in Thucydides has been deliberately made to misrepresent Corinth's service to Athens, it follows that his audience, Athenians of 431, were thought by Thucydides to already have had the correct information about the incidents mentioned. The sale of ships to Athens ought to have been known to politically active

⁶⁵ Hdt. 6, 92, 3-93. See above pp. 75-77.

Athenians before the First Peloponnesian War, when the wisdom of confronting Corinth by aid to Megara should have been a matter for discussion. A final point deserves emphasis. The narrative on the hostages can never have ended with Leotychidas' embassy. The ambush of the theoris answers an obvious question; did the Aeginetans get their leaders back? The prominent Athenians captured not only freed Aeginetan hands against Athens, but also served as an exchange for the hostages. Mutual exchange of prisoners was widespread, but is seldom mentioned in our sources. That an exchange eventually took place may have been a rather more natural assumption to Herodotus' audience than it is to us, but it is the only one that allows for a satisfactory close to the episode ⁶⁶.

5. *Historical Considerations*

A hypothetical revised chronology has been provided in the Table, with references to the relevant sections above. Some accent should be placed on two events that provide brackets for Marathon: Cleomenes' activities in Arcadia belong before the Battle; the trial of Leotychidas and the ambush of the theoris belong after it. The chronological relationship of events after Marathon depends on the relationship of the hostilities with Aegina to the Paros expedition. The points cited by Andrewes and Jeffery are not strong enough evidence that the hostilities must precede Paros. However, the view that Athenian ability to go against Paros depended on the retention of the hostages to ensure Aeginetan quiescence has some attraction ⁶⁷. The sequence: Paros expedition — hostilities has been adopted by those who opted for a date of 487/486 for the oracle in Herodotus' account of the confrontation of 506, which they believe apocryphal ⁶⁸. The oracle mentions thirty years for the period of Athenian forbearance before the gods would grant the conquest of Aegina. The oracle has seemed post-eventum to many scholars, concocted during Athenian moves against Aegina in the 450's, and the thirty year period runs from 487/486 to 457/456, the Aeginetan capitulation.

⁶⁶ See P. Ducrey, *Le traitement des prisonniers de guerre dans la Grèce antique*, Paris 1968, pp. 266-270, for the 5th-century evidence. Aeginetan seizure of the theoris: De Sanctis, *art. cit.* p. 298.

⁶⁷ See De Sanctis, *art. cit.* p. 298; Beloch, *op. cit.* II/2 p. 57. See note 27 above.

⁶⁸ Wilamowitz, *op. cit.* II pp. 280-281; cf. Walker, *Cambridge Anc. Hist.* IV pp. 254-259, who would collapse the three wars into one conflict in 487.

lation to Athens. The grounds for this view are flimsy ⁶⁹. Without the oracle, the two possibilities for the ambush of the theoris appear to be spring 489 or 488 ⁷⁰. In the former case, the Paros expedition can only precede the Aeginetan hostilities if it was in autumn 490. In the case of 488, it is likely that the Paros expedition had already occurred. Both of these alternatives are included on the Table. I incline slightly toward 489 for the ambush, which would not give a great delay before Aeginetan steps to recover their leaders. Even this impression must be treated cautiously, as the duration of the proceedings against Leotychidas, or of the diplomacy to recover the hostages, is unknown.

Even in the early 480's, hostilities between Athens and Aegina should be put in the context of Themistoclean foreign policy. Incidental details point us in this direction. Polycritus, son of the Aeginetan leader Crius, played verbal one-upmanship on Themistocles at Salamis in asking him whether the Aeginetans were still Medizers. This suggests that Themistocles had something to do with this charge when it had been broadcast before, in 491 (Hdt. 8, 92, 2). Simonides, who put his poetical talents in the service of Themistocles and Athens on several occasions, seems to have ridiculed Crius, Polycritus' father, a leading Aeginetan held by the Athenians in 490 ⁷¹. The source behind Nepos' garbled account of Themistocles' early career seems to have associated him with a sequence of real fighting against Aegina. Moreover, although we have no direct evidence, Athens' handling of Nicodromus and his followers seems appropriate to Themistoclean policy. The attempt to foment an uprising of the demos on Aegina was a revolutionary turn in Athenian foreign policy. Here, inter-state warfare, for the first time, began to work on an ideological level, and to have in its background features of class-warfare. That this was in a sense a conscious effort to export the Athenian constitution may be judged from the subsequent incorporation of the fugitive Aeginetans into the Athenian body politic. An uprising on Aegina, timed to coincide with the descent of the Athenian fleet, was a stratagem with which the wily Themistocles would have found no fault ⁷². The strengthening of the fleet by purchase of ships

⁶⁹ Andrewes, *art. cit.* at n. 2, pp. 1-4.

⁷⁰ See Sections 2 B 1, 2 above.

⁷¹ Themistocles and Simonides: Plut. *Them.* 5, 6; Cic. *De fin.* 2, 32, 104; *Suda*, s. v. 'Simonides'. On Crius: fr. 507 (Page) (= Aristoph. *Nubes* 1355-1356, *Schol. ad loc.*).

⁷² Cf. Themistocles' plan to burn the allied fleet at Pagasae: Plut. *Them.* 20, 1.

from Corinth, and the subsequent use of the Aeginetan émigrés as privateers against their homeland, is consonant with Themistocles' policy of orienting Athens toward the sea.

Here is the place for a piece of evidence more important for the political situation than as a chronological signpost. Pausanias saw tombs, erected at state expense, of slaves, who had fallen at Aegina, buried next to citizens⁷³. Pausanias' expression, *πρὶν ἢ στρατεῦσαι τὸν Μῆδον*, will probably allow for pre- or post-Marathon dates. The burial is comparable to the gesture made after Marathon, where fallen slaves were accorded burial with the Plataeans. State burial for slaves suggests that these were not simply hoplites' attendants. Their presence is better explained when we recognize that Greek states only freed slaves for military service in times of extreme peril⁷⁴. The fighting on Aegina was not itself such a crisis, but slaves mobilized to meet the critical Persian danger may well have continued to serve afterwards against Aegina. Possibly, the inscription honoring the fallen ex-slaves was meant to testify to the concord between different social groups at Athens, providing a deliberate contrast to Aegina, where the depressed population, having risen, was so brutally suppressed.

Next we may briefly consider the effects of the hostilities on Athenian policies. Although Athens had not overthrown the Aeginetan government, or subdued the island, she still had reason for satisfaction. The defection of Nicodromus and his party was an increment to Athenian strength, and a corresponding diminution of Aegina's. The Athenian victory over the Argive volunteers marked a striking demonstration of the prowess of the Athenian hoplite. Nothing in the fighting, which the Athenians perhaps viewed as defensive, discredited a policy of confrontation with Aegina. However, the discovery that a portion of the fleet was not battleworthy must have quickly become a cause *célèbre*. It

⁷³ Paus. 1, 29, 7: *πρὶν ἢ στρατεῦσαι τὸν Μῆδον*. Thucydides' phrase (1, 41, 2), *ὑπὲρ τὰ Μηδικά*, used by the Corinthian for his city's service to Athens, is no true parallel, as it can only mean "before Xerxes' invasion" in the mouth of a Corinthian, who would scarcely adopt an Athenian perspective by taking Marathon into account.

⁷⁴ Pausanias (1, 32, 3) states that slaves first fought at the side of their masters at Marathon, suggesting a post-Marathon date for slaves' service against Aegina. On slaves' emergency service in war: Corcyra (Thuc. 1, 55, 1); Chios (8, 15, 2); Athens from Arginousae (Xen. *Hell.* 1, 6, 24; Aristoph. *Ranae* 33, 191, 693-694; IG II 1951²). See R.L. Sargent, 'The Use of Slaves by the Athenians in Warfare', *Class. Philol.* 22, 1927, pp. 201-212, 264-279.

is uncertain whether Themistocles' proposals to direct revenues to the development of the fleet, and to make changes in the naval establishment, though eventually associated, had a simultaneous birth. Nevertheless, the failure to bring support to Nicodromus can reasonably be seen as a cause of the decision to supersede the naucraric system, with its quasi-private ship procurement. If the association of Themistocles with fighting against Aegina in 489 or 488 be admitted, then it may be no mistake to see the eventual passage of the naval bill as a product of a reeducation campaign, rather than an adventitious initiative prompted by the happenstance of a state surplus. Let the reader judge how this would affect the credibility of Stesimbrotus on Miltiades' opposition to the naval bill.

A final conclusion touches on the conflict between Aristides and Themistocles. Aristides spent his ostracism on Aegina, where tradition had him the recipient of Persian overtures. Friendship with the Aeginetans surely stood as one of the motivations of Aristides' opposition to the naval bill, perhaps along with fears of a centralization of military functions, and an increase in liturgies. The opposition could have had its beginning in the period before the magnitude of the Laurium surplus became known, and so more understandable in its anxiety over the fiscal and social costs of armament. Raubitschek has called attention to the traditions on Aristides and Aegina⁷⁵. The Athenians feared that Aristides would Medize during Xerxes' invasion. Furthermore, an ostrakon accuses Aristides of an act of impiety toward a group of suppliants, identified by Raubitschek as fugitives from the Nicodromus coup. He further connected this act of impiety with a charge of judicial tyranny levelled against Aristides by Themistocles. While his second point is problematical, a post-Marathon date for the hostilities with Aegina renders Raubitschek's hypothesis more probable because of an increased proximity of Aristides' ostracism to the acceptance of the suppliants.

⁷⁵ Aristides' ostracism on Aegina: Dem. 26, 6; Aristodemos, *F. Gr. Hist.* 104 F 1; cf. Plut. *Aris.* 8, 1; *Them.* 11, 1; Hdt. 8, 79, 1; *Suda*, s. vv. 'Aristeides', 'dareikous'. A.E. Raubitschek, 'Das Datislied', in *Charites: Studien zur Altertumswissenschaft*, Bonn 1957, pp. 234-242. His emendation of the ostrakon (P 9948):

[Ἄριστειδες] / [ho Λυσίμ] ἄχο /
[hōs τὸ]ς ηἰκέτας / [ἀπέο]σεν.

Themistocles' charge of judicial tyranny: Plut. *Aris.* 7, 1. See Figueira, *op. cit.* at n. 1, pp. 299-305.

In the campaign against Aristides, Medism, impiety, and tyranny were served up in an improbable but highly effective mixture. He could be called a Medizer because he associated with the Aeginetans, who had Medized at a moment traumatic for the Athenians, because he had opposed ships being built against Aegina, which could also be used against Persia, and perhaps because he was connected with the Alcmaeonids, already discredited for Medism. If Aristides had spoken against the fugitive Aeginetans, he could be described as an enemy of suppliants, like his Aeginetan friends whose massacre of suppliant rebels became a theme for anti-Aeginetan propaganda. To be pro-Aeginetan provided a link, unfortunately for Aristides, between opposition to the naval bill in the late 480's and actual or imagined treason (at home and abroad) at the time of Marathon.

This is not an exhaustive treatment of the changes in our understanding of Athens in the 480's, stimulated by a date after Marathon for these hostilities. These tentative observations may be broached here with further discussion postponed.

Rutgers University

<i>Text Outline</i>	<i>Chronological Notes</i>	<i>Hammond</i>	<i>Revised Chronology</i>
6,4: Aegina submits to Persia; Athens appeals to Sparta	Ath. appeal to Sparta ἰθὺς	491: mid-July	After year's beginning: first week March (HCT 3, 698-703; 2 A)
6,50: On. Aeg., Cleomenes is rebuffed by Crius at urging of Demaratus	Dem.'s plot against Cleo.: τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον	end July	
6,51: Dem.'s hostility to Cleomenes			
6,52-60: Digression on Spartan kingship			
6,61: Returning from Aeg., Cleo. plots to depose Demaratus			Plot against Dem. after Spartan New Year (Sept. 491) 2 B 5
6,62-64: Digression Dem.'s birth		mid-August	
6,65: Leotychidas accuses Dem. of illegitimacy, at Cleo.'s urging		end August	Delphic Oracle against Dem.: Feb./March 490?; 2 B 5, esp. n. 33
6,66-67: Delphi influenced by Cleo. & decides against Dem.; he is deposed			(mid-summer 490: 2 B 1)
6,67-72: Later careers of Dem. & Leo.	Concluding note: ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ἐγένετο χρόνῳ ὕστερον (τότε δέ) After Dem.'s deposition, the kings go to Aeg.: αὐτίκα	(confrontation Dem. & Leo.: Gymno. 490) mid-Sept. 491	late winter 490?
6,73: Cleo. & Leo. take 10 Aeginetan hostages; deposit them in Athens	Cleo. withdraws: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα; goes to Arcadia: ἐντεῦθεν δέ	end Oct. 491	Thess.: early summer; Arcad.: summer 490 2 C 2
6,74: Cleo.'s plot against Dem. discovered; he goes to Thessaly, then plots with the Arcadians	Cleo. goes mad after return: αὐτίκα	mid-Nov. 491	fall/winter 490
6,75: Spartans fear Cleo.'s actions; recall him; his madness and death			
6,76-84: Reasons for Cleo.'s madness: impiety (Sepeia & aftermath); drunkenness			

6,85: Death of Cleo.; trial & condemnation of Leo.; Leo. to Athens on Aegina's behalf 6,86: Leo.'s embassy to Athens; Athenian refusal to hand back hostages 6,87: Aeg. capture of theoris to Sounion 6,88: Athens plots with Aeg. noble Nicodromus to overthrow Aeginetan government 6,89: Nic. takes Aeg. Old City; Ath. delays to buy 20 ships from Corinth 6,90: Nic. flees Aeg., later is given Sounion; harasses Aegina 6,91: Aeg. ruling class massacres rebels; is cursed 6,92: Athenians arrive, defeat Aeg. at sea; Aeg. appeal to Argos; 1000 vols. come to help; leader Eurybates killed by Ath. Sophanes 6,93: Aeg. finds Ath. ships in disarray; attack, capture 4 ships 6,94: Resumption of Marathon narrative	Aeg. appeal to Sparta τελευτήσαντος δὲ Κλεομένεος Aeg. plots against Ath.: ἀπαλάσσειτο (Leo.'s return to Sparta) ταῦτα μὲν δὴ ὕστερον ἐγένετο	end Nov. 491 mid-Dec. 491 mid-Dec. 491 Jan./Feb. 490 Jan./Feb. 490 Jan./Feb. 490 Ath. defeats Aeg.: Feb./March 490 Feb./March 490	wint. 490/489 or later; 2 D ambush of theoris: spring 489 or 488 2 B 2 Allow several months for the Ath. plot against Aeg. & the fighting on Aegina 2 B 3; 3; 5
--	--	--	---